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ATHENS 403: STATE OF THE ECONOMY AND THE TREASURY Before the end of the War, the Athenian state had five primary sources of revenue: 1. Rents on State Property 15% of revenues 2. Indirect Taxes & fines (taxes on transactions & services) 15% 3. Direct Taxes (e.g. metic tax) 5% (much more during emergencies) 4. Tribute 50% 5. Liturgies 15% The Athenian state had five areas of expenditures: 1. Military 2. Public Works 3. Pay for Jurors 4. Pay for other officials 5. Religious ceremonies 6. Support for orphans & invalids 7. Domestic policing 35% of expenditures 20% 12% 7% 10% 10% 6% At the height of the Empire, Athens’ total state revenues from all sources may have exceeded 6,000 talents per year.1 But in 403, Athens’ economy is in a state of significant turmoil. The War and its disastrous conclusion caused a severe economic depression in Athens, with the loss of foreign tribute, control of trade, and overseas possessions. The reign of the Thirty and the Phyle Campaign caused yet further disruptions of trade and agriculture. All told, guaranteed revenues for the state have been cut by nearly 98%, to just over 100 talents. Expenses associated with maintaining the Empire, in particular military expenditures, have also declined precipitously. But even so, many vital social services have been suspended, including pensions for disabled veterans and war orphans, as well as payment for most government offices. Thus, the situation in 403 is indeed dire. But there are signs that, at long last, matters are beginning to stabilize: trade is resuming and the harvest can be gathered without risk for the first time in almost a decade. At the start of the game Athens can anticipate a surplus of 30 talents. Details of governmental income and expenses can be found in ATHENS 403: STATE OF ATHENIAN FINANCES, below. A note about taxation: Athenians paid a wide range of (more and less onerous) taxes. But the kind of tax did matter. There was a strong preference for indirect taxation of transactions and services (licensing and usage fees, rents, import-export duties, etc.) over the direct taxation of people, their property, or income. Direct taxation was problematic in ancient Athens for both ideological and practical reasons. Because the tyrant Peisistratus had instituted a direct tax on wealth and property, such taxes were associated with tyrannical governance. Also, because direct taxes were applied to metics and slaves, they carried with them the suggestion that those who paid them were of inferior status, subjugated and marginalized. To this social stigma must be added the more mundane difficulties of attempting to account for wealth and income in an information poor society, and one in which a sizable percentage of economic activity was agricultural and destined for personal use, rather than sale and trade. As a result, direct taxation of citizens was usually restricted to times of crisis. Units of Athenian Currency: 1 talent = 60 mina = 6,000 drachma 1 drachma = 6 obols = the daily wage for a rower or skilled craftsmen 1 Strauss 1987, 50, 51, and 54. 1 ATHENS 403: STATE OF ATHENIAN FINANCES At the height of the Empire, Athens’ total state revenues from all sources (tribute, taxes, leases, liturgies, etc.) may have exceeded 6,000 talents per year.2 But in 403, Athens’ economy is in a state of turmoil. The War and its disastrous conclusion have caused a severe economic depression in Athens, compounded by the disruption of agricultural production, and the loss of foreign tribute, control of trade, and overseas possessions. The reign of the Thirty and the Phyle Campaign caused yet further disruptions. All told, guaranteed revenues for the state have been cut by nearly 98%, to just over 100 talents. Thus, the situation in 403 is indeed dire. But there are signs that, at long last, matters are beginning to stabilize. Trade is resuming and the harvest can be gathered without risk for the first time in almost a decade. Many details about Athenian finance are uncertain; but for the purposes of the game, it is safe to assume the following: CURRENT STATE INCOME = 100 TALENTS • Trade Tax: 36 talents/year [2% tax on 1800 talents of total shipping]. With trade beginning to rebound, this amount can be expected to grow 10%+/year for the next few years, more if pro-trade policies are enacted, and much, much more if the Empire can be reestablished: in 413 BCE over 30,000 talents of shipping moved through the Piraeus annually. Taxed at 5%, this produced between 1,200 and 1,500 talents of revenue per year! • Metic tax: 40 talents/year [22,500 metics each paying 12 drachmas/year].3 • Rents on State Property: 6 talents. • Liturgies: at least 97 regular liturgies paid by plousioi (‘the wealthy’) designated by Ekklesia to cover expenses of festivals, totaling no less than 18 talents. Liturgies are “funds donated by an individual to support some state activity, including equipping a trireme (trierarchy) and underwriting a group of plays or other performances at state festivals (choregia). Liturgies may once have been largely voluntary contributions and as such served as expressions of patriotism and personal goodwill toward the state” (Ober 1990). Over time, liturgies became mandatory for wealthy Athenians (and metics), and were almost certainly compulsory during times of hardship, as in the final years of the war. Suspended sources of revenue • Eisphora (emergency property tax): suspended. Because of the depredations of the War, the total value of assessed property liable to the eisphora is 3,000 talents; e.g. a 2% eisphora would raise 60 talents (3,000 * 2%). • Tribute and Rents from Subject Allies: none. • Mining revenues: negligible; if the mines are reopened, a standard 10% tax will produce 2 talents in first year, increasing by 70% per year up to 100 talents as more mines are reopened.4 Units of Athenian Currency: 1 talent = 60 mina = 6,000 drachma 1 drachma = 6 obols = the daily wage for a rower or skilled craftsmen 2 Strauss 1987, 50, 51, and 54. In practice, only male metics were liable to the 12 drachma tax; female metics without a working male in their household were liable to a 6 drachma tax. But the numbers of such women were likely low (maybe 5% of the total). 4 There is, unfortunately, scant evidence for how the mines were operated between the end of the War and 367/6 BCE, when Kallistratos seems to have (re-?) established a system of leases (Hopper 1961: 148). The State owned the ore beneath the ground, but leased the right to extract it to private contractors. It seems likely that there was a tax of 1/24 or 1/10 of revenues assessed on mining in addition to the small licensing fee charged to operators. 3 2 CURRENT EXPENDITURES = 70 TALENTS • Festivals: 18 talents, basic operation of existing festivals covered by existing liturgies. • Other Cult Expenses: 7½ talents for processions, sacrifices, banquets, races and allowances for religious officials. • 2 State Triremes: used for ceremonial and state business: 7½ talents [assuming that sailors are on emergency 1/2 pay = 2 obols/day; these triremes are required for religious and diplomatic service] • Full-time minor officials necessary for maintaining commerce and order (such as the Eleven (jailers), keepers of weights and measures, etc.): 7 talents [assuming officials are paid a reduced wage of 3 obols/day] • Basic defense and policing: 30 talents, consisting primarily of the Scythian Archers (the police, reduced to ½ force) and a skeleton force of guards, watchmen, etc. [600 Archers * 2 obols/day + 600 men * 3 obols/day] Suspended expenditures • Because of the recent chaos, payment for serving in the Haliaea, the Boule, and the Prytaneis, has been suspended, as have payments for magistracies (archons, strategoi, etc.). • Pensions for disabled veterans have also been suspended [1400 veterans * 2 obols/day = 28 talents] • Allowances for war orphans [2000 orphans * 2 obols/day = 40 talents] • Payments to the poor for attending public festivals and competitions (theorika) have also been suspended [2 obols *15 days/yr * 9000 thetes = 7½ talents] These figures omit a host of minor or unpredictable revenues (fines, fees, licenses, and other minor taxes, like those to operate a brothel or set up a stall in the Agora) and expenses (scribes, salaries for priests, basic maintenance of public shrine and buildings), but for our purposes, we will assume that these balance out.5 At the start of the game, therefore, Athens has a surplus of 30 talents. This may seem like a look of money, but on the scale of city finances, it can go quickly. Reduced wages make public officials disgruntled (and more susceptible to corruption). Many wounded soldiers expect that their pensions will be restored. Demobilized veterans have no support. Many citizens have been reduced to utter poverty by the War and its aftermath. The landless poor have grown dependent on the allowance for serving in government positions and are without any visible means of support. Large numbers of colonists have been forced to return to Athens and are landless, or dependent on family members who can ill afford the added expense. Landed taxpayers and metics have also suffered terribly in the War and its aftermath. Failure to satisfy any of these groups may lead to civil discord (or worse). Important note on financial planning: Athenians did not have a “budget” in the sense that a modern government will (or should) pass an annual and detailed projection of all anticipated revenues and expenditures into and out of a general treasury. Athenians did, however, attempt to gauge revenues and expenditures and attempted to strike a balance. The could (and often did) run small short term deficits. Students interested in raising additional revenues may consult Xenophon’s enigmatic work, the Poroi (‘Revenues’) [http://bit.ly/poroi]. Xenophon’s treatise was likely written after the Social War (357–355 BCE), and so not all of his suggestions are relevant to the situation in 403 BCE. Nevertheless he provides an example of an Athenian grappling with how to increase revenues for the state in the absence of a hegemonic empire. 5 The most common fine was 1,000 drachmas, but they could in fact be quite substantial. For example, Kleon may have been fined 5 talents. 3 SUMMARY OF SOME TYPICAL WAGES AND COSTS • 2 obols/day: subsistence wage, the bare minimum required to keep a citizen clothed, sheltered, and fed. Unskilled laborers earned this wage. • 2 obols/day: cost to rent and provide food and lodging for an unskilled slave. • 2 obol/day: allowance for disabled war veterans and for orphans of war dead (legitimate sons under 18). • 3 obols/day: the daily allowance given to citizens serving in the courts (dikastikon) and political assemblies (misthophoria). It was raised from 2 obols/day in 408 BCE. Currently suspended. • 3 obols/day: absolute minimum cost to educate one student/day; a single session with famous Sophists ran from several minas to upwards of a talent (!). • 3 obols/day: wage for a soldier on garrison duty. • 4 obols/day: average wage of an archer or hoplite soldier. • 5 obols/day: the daily allowance that citizens received for serving in the Boule of the 500. • 1 drachma/day: poverty line for a small family. Currently suspended. • 1 drachma/day: the average wage for a skilled worker (skilled workers make between 3 obols and 5 drachmas/day depending on the job). • 1 drachma to pay the stonecutters for engraving every 50 letters of every ratified law. • 3 drachmas/day: cost of a small diplomatic mission (assuming that the ambassador travels on one of the state triremes). Larger embassies might have a better chance of success. • 1 talents: the cost to build and outfit one trireme; also the cost to maintain one trireme and sailors on war footing for one month.6 • 1/4-1/2 talent: cost to stage a play. The expenditure was largely up to the discretion of the choregus, although an archon would ensure that the choragus fulfilled his duty to produce a splendid production worthy of the gods and Athens.7 • 0 talents: cost to enclose a small shrine.8 • 35 talents: cost to build a small temple, like the Temple of Athena Nike (although not nearly as refined). Note: a golden cult statue could easily cost more than 100 talents.9 • 469 talents: cost to build the Parthenon.10 • 850 talents: cost of the chryselephantine cult statue of Athena Parthenos in the Parthenon. • 8,000+ talents: cost of the entire Periclean building program in Athens, including the Acropolis temples, Middle Long Wall, the expansion of Piraeus, and the Odeum. • 10,000 or 40,000 man-days: the number of days worked by the members of the Ekklesia if they met once per month (as they did in the early years of the democracy—remember that the Athenian calendar had 10 months) or four times per month as they did in recent years. Example: if the misthophoria of 2 obols for attending a monthly meeting of the Ekklesia were reestablished, the expense would be: 10,000 men * 2 obols = 20,000 obols = a little more than ½ talent per meeting. • 18,250 man-days: the number of days worked by the Prytaneis, the executive council of the Boule that was on constant call in the Tholos in the Agora (in addition to their allowance for serving on the Boule, they received a food allowance of 1 obol/day). • 182,500 man-days: the number of days worked by the Boule of 500. • 100,000-400,000 man-days: number of days worked by the members of the Ekklesia in 1 year • 110,000 man-days: the minimum number of man-days needed to rebuild, in rudimentary fashion, the 16 stade (~ 2 mile) gap in the Long Walls. Workers would require a wage of at least 3 obols/day. Assuming another talent for supplies, rebuilding would cost 10 talents. • 1,200,000 man-days: the number of days worked by the 6000 members of the Haliaea in one year (assuming a traditional number of court days). 6 The actual cost for a trireme was slightly more than a trireme, as the figure of one talent referred only to the hull and not the rigging and other equipment. The exact expense of trireme, of course, varied with the cost of raw materials and could cost nearly two talents (Gabrielsen 1994, 141). 7 Pickard-Cambridge 1953, 88–89. 8 The land for small shrines was leased for a nominal amount to a tenant, who was then responsible for enclosing the area and maintaining the shrine (for example of a decree leasing and fencing a temenos, see Rhodes 1972, 97). 9 Zimmern 1931, 412. 10 Stanier 1953. 4 ATHENS 403: ECONOMIC STRATA AT THE END OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR When considering the economic status of Athenians in 403 BCE, it is useful to distinguish between two groups: 1. Thetes: the ~9,000 male Athenian citizens who are excused from all taxation and other financial contributions to the state; 2. The other ~9,000 male Athenian citizens who possess property (i.e. land) equivalent to at least 2,000 drachmas and are responsible for a variety of monetary and material contributions to the state. Within these two categories, it is possible to identify 6 economic strata in Athenian society the end of the Peloponnesian War.11 1. The “Liturgical Class” or Plousioi (‘Wealthy’): the 300 or so wealthiest Athenians, possessing property of more than 3 talents, who are able to afford liturgies, or public works. 2. The “Rentier/Leisure/Propertied Class”: the roughly 900 Athenians who have at least 500 drachmas of income and at least 1 talent of property. Although not wealthy enough to fund liturgies by themselves, they can join with other wealthy individuals to participate in joint liturgies, especially the cooperative outfitting of triremes (syntrierarchy). They were subjected to many of the same financial pressures as the plousioi. 3. The “Eisphora Payers” or Hippies (‘Cavalrymen’): the 1,800 Athenians who possess at least 300 drachmas income and 3,600 drachmas (or 4/10 of a talent) in property. They have sufficient capital to pay the direct tax known as the eisphora, which was levied in times of economic stress. 4. “Hoplites” or Zeugetai: 6,000 Athenians who have 150 drachmas of income and property valued at over 1,800 drachmas. 5. “Thetes”: the 9,000 Athenian citizens with property valued at less than 2,000 drachmas. They are judged incapable of purchasing a hoplite kit and are excluded from the eisphora. ~3,000 of these own some amount of land. 6. “Ptochoi”: the indeterminate number of thetes who are genuinely destitute and entirely dependent on charity and/or the state. Note that in Athens, as in the contemporary United States, political affiliations cut across class lines. Basic self-interest would lead many property owners to favor a more restricted government, while the landless would favor a more radical democracy. But some of the most passionate democrats, like Thrasybulus, were very wealthy. Small farmers in the Zeugetai were often among those the most supportive of limited government and a curtailing of welfare for the Thetes and Ptochoi. Athenian Tetradrachm; Source: Wikimedia 11 The exact relationship between these economic classes listed above the Solonic political classes (Pentakosiomedimnoi, Hippies, Zeugetai, Thetes) is debated; but for the purposes of the game they can be assumed to be the same. 5 ATHENS 403: DOWN ON THE FARM (WEALTH IN CONTEXT) As citizens of a large and populous country, one who are accustomed to rapid transportation and the globespanning reach of modern telecommunications, it is easy for us to lose sight of the small scale of many historical societies. Ancient Athens–although very large for a Greek city-state or polis–was comparatively tiny by the standards of modern states. All of Attica was barely 700 square miles, or less than a third the size of Delaware. And of this, only 18-20% of Attica was suitable for grain farming, with another 5-10% capable of olive and grape cultivation, and some smaller percentage for personal vegetable plots. It is important to keep this scale in mind as you consider the resources available to Athens and its citizens. The farmstead of an average Athenian was around 40-50 plethra or, in modern parlance, a mere 8-to-10 acres. To give you a better sense of scale, a football field pitch is approximately 1⅓ acres. Wealthy Athenians, perhaps 2,000 to 3,000 citizens, did have larger plots, but even here the sizes are surprisingly modest, and never seem to expand much beyond 100 acres or so. To put it in Source: source: http://en.wikipedia.org/ perspective, the largest single farm in Attica was likely less than half the size of a small college campus. We learn, for example, that the patrimonial estate of Alcibiades, an incredibly wealthy man by Athenian standards, was only 70 acres. Of course, wealthy families might own more than one farm, or have holdings in Athenian colonies (the latter is especially true during the time of the Empire). But in 403, almost all of those overseas holdings were lost. 6 ATHENS 403: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR In this survey of Athens in 403, we will look at the socio-economic situation of the city after the Peloponnesian War, focusing on the 1. loss of Empire, 2. economic cost in Attica, and 3. demographic changes. 1. The Loss of Empire The loss of their empire was the most significant change the confronted Athenians in 403 BCE. • The Empire was extremely profitable for the Athenians. In 431 BCE, tribute was over 600 talents; in 425: 1,500 talents; in 413: 900 talents.12 This revenue supported 6,000 jurors who received 3 obols per day for 150-200 days/year (75-100 drachmas/year); the salaries of thousands of other officials; as well as tens of thousands of sailors and hoplites who earned drachma or more per day when deployed. An additional 5,000-10,000 Athenians were kleruchs, who had received property around the Aegean in the land of the subject allies. We should not underestimate the value of these kleruchies, even for small-scale farmers. If a brother went to Amphipolis as a kleruch, the remaining family did not have to share their property, with the effect that all were better off. Many of the wealthier Athenians held extensive holdings and resource concessions in the colonies. Athenians did not need to pay taxes on grain imported through the Hellespont (the narrow passage between the Black Sea and the Aegean). With another power in control of the straight, the cost of grain would be expected to rise. • Under the Empire, all strategic goods, such as timber, wax, iron, flax, grain, were required to be shipped to or through Piraeus. Since the Athenians assessed a 2% duty on goods imported into Piraeus, the Athenians profited from the trade within their empire. in 413 BCE, total trade in the Empire was valued at 18,000 talents (108 million drachmas); of which 1/4 travelled through Piraeus (4,500 talents); from the trade that flowed into the Piraeus, Athens received tax revenue over 60 talents per year. in 402/1: trade at Piraeus totaled 1,800 talents, a reduction of 60% from the wartime high. With the loss of Empire, therefore, the Athenians lost nearly all of their overseas property–a deprivation that would have affected members of all economic classes, either directly through loss of property, or through the return of family members who held kleruchies. The Athenians also lost revenues from tribute and taxations in excess of 1,000 talents per year. Of course, Athens was also no longer burdened by the immense expense of maintaining a large fleet on war footing. Although revenues had declined precipitously, expenses had plummeted as well. Units of Athenian Currency: 1 talent = 60 mina = 6,000 drachma 1 drachma = 6 obols = the daily wage for a rower or skilled craftsmen 12 Strauss 1987, 50–51. For 431 BCE: Thuc. I. 99. 3 & II. 13. 6-7; for 425: Meiggs 1972, 343. 7 2. The Economic Cost of the War in Attica Near the start of the Peloponnesian War in 428 BCE, Athenians were able to raise 200 talents from the eisphora, a 2% tax on metics and citizens in the three wealthiest economic classes. Thetes were exempt from the eisphora. This implies that wealthy Athens had property (timema) worth between 10,000 and 12,000 talents. Based on data from the 4th century, it seems probable that the total value of property in Attica in 403 was less than 5,000 talents, indicating a loss of at least 50% and perhaps more during the war.13 The losses sustained by Ischomachus, the subject of Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, are indicative of the hardships endured by many of the wealthy: the value of his property fell from 70 to 20 talents during the war, a decline of more than 70%. But 20 talents is still represents a sizable estate. For those who possessed less than a talent of capital, however, their financial and property losses could have easily dropped their families into the thetic class. Agriculture: despite the raids from the Spartan garrison at Decelea, olive production likely experienced only a small decline during the War. Animal husbandry, however, would have suffered significantly and taken longer to return to peacetime levels. Of immediate concern, the 8 months of civil war in 403 likely caused noticeable disruptions in agricultural production. We should assume that by 403, Athens was importing more of its basic foodstuffs than at any point in memory. Slaves: Part of the economic loss resulted from the more than 20,000 slaves who escaped their Athenian masters to the Spartan garrison at Decelea (most from the mines in Laureion). At a value of 150-200 drachmas per slave, the flight of slaves represented a loss of more than 500 talents, before one reckons the lost economic output if the slaves were not replaced.14 Commerce: the loss of preferential trading rights within the empire certainly damaged Athenian commercial concerns, as did the collapse of silver mining. The necessity of importing so many basic foodstuffs, however, likely mitigated the short-term damage to the import-export business. Certain businesses, such as fishing, could immediately return to full production, although the sale of luxury foods and goods suffered because of the general decline of demand. Light Industry: these small-scale factories, which averaged 20-30 people (none were larger than 120) crafted pots, knives, lamps, clothing, leather goods, weapons, ships, jewelry, etc. In times of great uncertainty, the purchase of these goods would have been greatly curtailed.15 Light industry suffered less than mining and farming during the War; but escaping slaves and the general decline of resources from 413-403 led to lowered domestic demand. The provisioning of military materiel was, of course, the exception to this rule until the end of hostilities. Mining: after the investment of the Spartan garrison at Decelea, silver mining in Laurion was dramatically reduced. The extent of the economic loss is unknown, but was certainly substantial. 13 Strauss 1987, 54. Lauffer 1957, 63–65. 15 Strauss 1987, 46. 14 8 3. Demographic Change The war altered the composition of the demos. The losses, however, were borne disproportionately by the different classes of society during the different phases of the war. During the Archidamian War (431-421), the majority of the military causalities were suffered by hoplites; in the war’s second phase, the IonianDeclean War (416-404), the loses by the thetes, who manned the vital triremes, continued to mount at an alarming pace until the war ended. As a result of the escalating thetic casualties, the demos was more or less evenly divided between thetes and the propertied classes by 403 BCE.16 16 Strauss 1987, 78-81. Note: I have slightly modified the historical population figures to better suit the balanced population at the start of the game. 9 ATHENS 403: THE POPULATION OF ATHENS DURING THE WAR It should come as no surprise that the population of Athens fluctuated greatly over the course of the fifth century. A period of rapid growth, however, was cut short in 431 BCE. The chart below reveals the demographic catastrophe that the city suffered during the Peloponnesian War.17 Year 480 431 425 403 Hoplite Census Thetes Total Adult Males % Change Total Citizens Total Population of Attica 15,000 25,000 16,500 9,000 20,000 18,000 12,500 9,000 35,000 43,000 29,000 18,000 — + 23% - 33% -38% 140,000 172,000 11,6000 85,000 ? 315,500 218,000 ? By the end of the war, the total citizen population of Attica had declined by over 50%, with the population of adult males falling even further, by over 58%. To put this in context, in World War II the nations that suffered the greatest causalities as a percentage of their populations were Poland (16%) and Russia (14%; although recent studies suggest Russian losses may have been closer to 20%). Were the United States to suffer a catastrophe analogous to that endured by Athens in the Peloponnesian War, our population would be reduced from 304 million to less than 155 million. The dead would be the equivalent of every man, woman, and child in the 8 most populous states (California, Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan). Although the total number of dead is smaller in Athens than in these modern states–in the many tens of thousands rather than millions–remember that Athens, for all its size, was essentially a large village. Everyone would know many who had died. If you were over the age of 40, you would remember many relatives and friends who died from the plague. Everyone would know someone cut down in the war. Most would know many, many who had died before their time. 17 Strauss 1987, 78-81 and 173; Gomme 1933, 24–29. 10 SOME NOTES ON THE DEMOGRAPHY OF ANCIENT ATHENS Beyond the manifold cultural differences that separate the cultures of ancient Athens and the modern world, we would do well to remember differences in life expectancy produce a radically different demographic reality in ancient Athens than the one with which we are familiar in contemporary developed economies. In what follows, I will walk through a few of these differences. The result is a picture of an Athenian population whose composition is quite different than our own. Low Mortality in United States The most substantial difference between the United States and ancient Athens is the radically different rates of childhood mortality. In the United States, nearly every child who is born will survive into adulthood. Table 1: Annual Child Mortality Rates in United States (2007)18 Age 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 10 Male Mortality 0.7% 0.05% 0.03% 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% Female Mortality 0.6% 0.04% 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% Or, to put it another way, if we imagined a cohort of 10,000 live births (5,000 boys and 5,000 girls), 4,963 boys and 4,970 girls would live to see their first birthdays. 4,964 girls and 4,957 boys would live to see their fifth birthdays. And 4,953 boys and 4,961–or over 99% of our cohort– would live to see their tenth birthdays. If we graphed the members of this cohort over their natural lifespan, we would see a very little change in population, at least until old age inevitably takes its toll. “Actuarial Period of Life Table 2007”, Social Security Administration [http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html]. 18 11 The Effect of High Childhood, Maternal, and War Mortality on Athenian Demography Child mortality rates in pre-modern societies were considerably, even shockingly, higher than those found in modern, developed countries. Over a third of children died before their first birthdays, and over a half before they reached their fifth birthdays. Table 2: Estimated Annual Child Mortality Rates in Pre-Modern Europe19 Age 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-10 Mortality Rate 35.85% 23.7% 10.0% 8.0% 6.4% 4.8% Sample Population 10,000 6,415 4,895 4,405 4,053 3,611 Once a child reached his or her fifth birthday, his or her chances of surviving to adulthood were quite good. Once they reached adulthood, however, Athenians faced other risks. Men would face an increased risk of dying in battle. Women were much more likely to die in childbirth, although the extent of this is often overstated. In all probability, Athenian women had around a 1-2% chance of dying during each pregnancy.20 Taking these factors into account, we can graph the population of Athens at the start of the Peloponnesian War, when its population and power were at their highest. Note the number of children who will die before their second birthdays, and also how the increased mortality caused by illness and disease–as well as childbirth for women; and battle for men–leads to a rapid reduction of the population as it ages. Athenian Citizen Population, 431 BCE 91 Women 85 Men 79 73 67 61 55 49 43 37 31 25 19 13 7 1 4000300020001000 0 1000200030004000 19 The demographics of ancient societies remains highly disputed, but these figures give a sense of what was probable in ancient Athens; information derived from Frier 1982 and 1983, and Golden 1990, 83. 20 For comparison, in 2000 the highest rate of maternal mortality was 2% in Sierra Leone; in the United States it is around 0.01%, or 1 out of every 10,000 women who gave birth. 12 Of course, during the Peloponnesian War, Athens experienced a number of population shocks. None of these was more dramatic than the plague that struck Athens at the start of the war and killed perhaps as many as a third of Athenians. As a result of this epidemic, and the increased mortality of men as a result of the lengthy war, the reduction of Athenian population with age is even more dramatic.21 The war had altered the center of gravity for the polity. Athens was younger, and more female, than it had been before the war. In the graph above, you can see the significant effect of the Plague on older cohorts (the steep reduction of cohorts older then 28), and the generally higher rate of male mortality due to the accumulated losses during the War. 21 This very simple model excludes immigration (likely not large) and that population is not static, but in the absence of external factors tends to grow by a few percent a year. If a reasonable growth factor were incorporated into the model, the effect shown above would be more dramatic, with a population that was even younger on average than that shown. 13 Bibliography Akrigg, B. 2011. “Demography and Classical Athens” in Demography and the Graeco-Roman World: New Insights and Approaches Holleran, C. and A. Pudsey (eds.). New York: Cambridge University Press, 37–59. Andreades, A. M. 1933. A History of Greek Public Finance, revised and translated by Brown, C. N. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Aperghis, G. G. “A Reassessment of the Laurion Mining Lease Records” [http://bit.ly/laurion] Frier, B. 1983. “Roman Life Expectancy: The Pannonian Evidence.” Phoenix 37.4: 328-344. Freir, B. 1982. “Roman Life Expectancy: Ulpian's Evidence.” HSCP 86: 213-251. Gabrielsen, V. 1994. Financing the Athenian Fleet: Public Taxation and Social Relations. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Golden, M. 1990. Children and Childhood in Classical Athens. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Gomme, A. W. 1933. The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Herman Hansen, M. 1988. Three Studies in Athenian Demography. Danske Videnskabernes Selskab. Hopper, R. J. 1961. The Mines and Miners of Ancient Athens. Greece & Rome 8.2: 138-151. Lauffer, Siegfried. 1957. Die Bergwerkssklaven von Laureion. Wiesbaden: Steiner. Meiggs, R. 1972. The Athenian Empire. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ober, J. 1989. Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Peck, R. Athenian Naval Finance in the Classical Period: The trierarchy, its place in Athenian society, and how much did a trieres cost? (diss.) [http://www.triremetrust.org.uk/tt-thesis.htm] Pickard-Cambridge, A. 1953. The Dramatic Festivals of Athens. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Rhodes, P. J. 1972. The Athenian Boule. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Stanier, R. S. 1953. “The Cost of the Parthenon.” Journal of Hellenic Studies 73: 68-76. [http://www.jstor.org/stable/628237]. Strauss, Barry. 1987. Athens After the Peloponnesian War: Class, Faction and Policy 403-386 BC. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Xenophon, “Poroi” [http://bit.ly/poroi] Zimmern, A. 1931. Greek Commonwealth: Politics & Economics in Fifth-Century Athens. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 14