Download Athens 403: State of Athenian Finances

ATHENS 403: STATE OF THE ECONOMY AND THE TREASURY
Before the end of the War, the Athenian state had five primary sources of revenue:
1. Rents on State Property
15% of revenues
2. Indirect Taxes & fines (taxes on transactions & services) 15%
3. Direct Taxes (e.g. metic tax)
5% (much more during emergencies)
4. Tribute
50%
5. Liturgies
15%
The Athenian state had five areas of expenditures:
1. Military
2. Public Works
3. Pay for Jurors
4. Pay for other officials
5. Religious ceremonies
6. Support for orphans & invalids
7. Domestic policing
35% of expenditures
20%
12%
7%
10%
10%
6%
At the height of the Empire, Athens’ total state revenues from all sources may have exceeded 6,000 talents
per year.1 But in 403, Athens’ economy is in a state of significant turmoil. The War and its disastrous
conclusion caused a severe economic depression in Athens, with the loss of foreign tribute, control of trade,
and overseas possessions. The reign of the Thirty and the Phyle Campaign caused yet further disruptions of
trade and agriculture. All told, guaranteed revenues for the state have been cut by nearly 98%, to just over
100 talents. Expenses associated with maintaining the Empire, in particular military expenditures, have also
declined precipitously. But even so, many vital social services have been suspended, including pensions for
disabled veterans and war orphans, as well as payment for most government offices.
Thus, the situation in 403 is indeed dire. But there are signs that, at long last, matters are beginning to
stabilize: trade is resuming and the harvest can be gathered without risk for the first time in almost a decade.
At the start of the game Athens can anticipate a surplus of 30 talents. Details of governmental
income and expenses can be found in ATHENS 403: STATE OF ATHENIAN FINANCES, below.
A note about taxation: Athenians paid a wide range of (more and less onerous) taxes. But the kind of tax did
matter. There was a strong preference for indirect taxation of transactions and services (licensing and usage
fees, rents, import-export duties, etc.) over the direct taxation of people, their property, or income. Direct
taxation was problematic in ancient Athens for both ideological and practical reasons. Because the tyrant
Peisistratus had instituted a direct tax on wealth and property, such taxes were associated with tyrannical
governance. Also, because direct taxes were applied to metics and slaves, they carried with them the
suggestion that those who paid them were of inferior status, subjugated and marginalized. To this social
stigma must be added the more mundane difficulties of attempting to account for wealth and income in an
information poor society, and one in which a sizable percentage of economic activity was agricultural and
destined for personal use, rather than sale and trade. As a result, direct taxation of citizens was usually
restricted to times of crisis.
Units of Athenian Currency: 1 talent = 60 mina = 6,000 drachma
1 drachma = 6 obols = the daily wage for a rower or skilled craftsmen
1
Strauss 1987, 50, 51, and 54.
1
ATHENS 403: STATE OF ATHENIAN FINANCES
At the height of the Empire, Athens’ total state revenues from all sources (tribute, taxes, leases, liturgies,
etc.) may have exceeded 6,000 talents per year.2 But in 403, Athens’ economy is in a state of turmoil. The
War and its disastrous conclusion have caused a severe economic depression in Athens, compounded by the
disruption of agricultural production, and the loss of foreign tribute, control of trade, and overseas
possessions. The reign of the Thirty and the Phyle Campaign caused yet further disruptions. All told,
guaranteed revenues for the state have been cut by nearly 98%, to just over 100 talents.
Thus, the situation in 403 is indeed dire. But there are signs that, at long last, matters are beginning to
stabilize. Trade is resuming and the harvest can be gathered without risk for the first time in almost a decade.
Many details about Athenian finance are uncertain; but for the purposes of the game, it is safe to assume the
following:
CURRENT STATE INCOME = 100 TALENTS
• Trade Tax: 36 talents/year [2% tax on 1800 talents of total shipping].
With trade beginning to rebound, this amount can be expected to grow 10%+/year for the next few
years, more if pro-trade policies are enacted, and much, much more if the Empire can be reestablished: in 413 BCE over 30,000 talents of shipping moved through the Piraeus annually. Taxed
at 5%, this produced between 1,200 and 1,500 talents of revenue per year!
• Metic tax: 40 talents/year [22,500 metics each paying 12 drachmas/year].3
• Rents on State Property: 6 talents.
• Liturgies: at least 97 regular liturgies paid by plousioi (‘the wealthy’) designated by Ekklesia to cover
expenses of festivals, totaling no less than 18 talents.
Liturgies are “funds donated by an individual to support some state activity, including equipping a
trireme (trierarchy) and underwriting a group of plays or other performances at state festivals
(choregia). Liturgies may once have been largely voluntary contributions and as such served as
expressions of patriotism and personal goodwill toward the state” (Ober 1990). Over time, liturgies
became mandatory for wealthy Athenians (and metics), and were almost certainly compulsory
during times of hardship, as in the final years of the war.
Suspended sources of revenue
• Eisphora (emergency property tax): suspended.
Because of the depredations of the War, the total value of assessed property liable to the
eisphora is 3,000 talents; e.g. a 2% eisphora would raise 60 talents (3,000 * 2%).
• Tribute and Rents from Subject Allies: none.
• Mining revenues: negligible; if the mines are reopened, a standard 10% tax will produce 2 talents in first
year, increasing by 70% per year up to 100 talents as more mines are reopened.4
Units of Athenian Currency: 1 talent = 60 mina = 6,000 drachma
1 drachma = 6 obols = the daily wage for a rower or skilled craftsmen
2
Strauss 1987, 50, 51, and 54.
In practice, only male metics were liable to the 12 drachma tax; female metics without a working male in their
household were liable to a 6 drachma tax. But the numbers of such women were likely low (maybe 5% of the total).
4
There is, unfortunately, scant evidence for how the mines were operated between the end of the War and 367/6 BCE,
when Kallistratos seems to have (re-?) established a system of leases (Hopper 1961: 148). The State owned the ore
beneath the ground, but leased the right to extract it to private contractors. It seems likely that there was a tax of 1/24 or
1/10 of revenues assessed on mining in addition to the small licensing fee charged to operators.
3
2
CURRENT EXPENDITURES = 70 TALENTS
• Festivals: 18 talents, basic operation of existing festivals covered by existing liturgies.
• Other Cult Expenses: 7½ talents for processions, sacrifices, banquets, races and allowances for religious
officials.
• 2 State Triremes: used for ceremonial and state business: 7½ talents [assuming that sailors are on
emergency 1/2 pay = 2 obols/day; these triremes are required for religious and diplomatic service]
• Full-time minor officials necessary for maintaining commerce and order (such as the Eleven (jailers),
keepers of weights and measures, etc.): 7 talents [assuming officials are paid a reduced wage of 3
obols/day]
• Basic defense and policing: 30 talents, consisting primarily of the Scythian Archers (the police, reduced
to ½ force) and a skeleton force of guards, watchmen, etc. [600 Archers * 2 obols/day + 600 men * 3
obols/day]
Suspended expenditures
• Because of the recent chaos, payment for serving in the Haliaea, the Boule, and the Prytaneis, has
been suspended, as have payments for magistracies (archons, strategoi, etc.).
• Pensions for disabled veterans have also been suspended [1400 veterans * 2 obols/day = 28 talents]
• Allowances for war orphans [2000 orphans * 2 obols/day = 40 talents]
• Payments to the poor for attending public festivals and competitions (theorika) have also been
suspended [2 obols *15 days/yr * 9000 thetes = 7½ talents]
These figures omit a host of minor or unpredictable revenues (fines, fees, licenses, and other minor taxes,
like those to operate a brothel or set up a stall in the Agora) and expenses (scribes, salaries for priests, basic
maintenance of public shrine and buildings), but for our purposes, we will assume that these balance out.5
At the start of the game, therefore, Athens has a surplus of 30 talents.
This may seem like a look of money, but on the scale of city finances, it can go quickly. Reduced wages
make public officials disgruntled (and more susceptible to corruption). Many wounded soldiers expect that
their pensions will be restored. Demobilized veterans have no support. Many citizens have been reduced to
utter poverty by the War and its aftermath. The landless poor have grown dependent on the allowance for
serving in government positions and are without any visible means of support. Large numbers of colonists
have been forced to return to Athens and are landless, or dependent on family members who can ill afford
the added expense. Landed taxpayers and metics have also suffered terribly in the War and its aftermath.
Failure to satisfy any of these groups may lead to civil discord (or worse).
Important note on financial planning: Athenians did not have a “budget” in the sense that a modern
government will (or should) pass an annual and detailed projection of all anticipated revenues and
expenditures into and out of a general treasury. Athenians did, however, attempt to gauge revenues and
expenditures and attempted to strike a balance. The could (and often did) run small short term deficits.
Students interested in raising additional revenues may consult Xenophon’s enigmatic work, the Poroi
(‘Revenues’) [http://bit.ly/poroi]. Xenophon’s treatise was likely written after the Social War (357–355 BCE),
and so not all of his suggestions are relevant to the situation in 403 BCE. Nevertheless he provides an
example of an Athenian grappling with how to increase revenues for the state in the absence of a hegemonic
empire.
5
The most common fine was 1,000 drachmas, but they could in fact be quite substantial. For example, Kleon may have
been fined 5 talents.
3
SUMMARY OF SOME TYPICAL WAGES AND COSTS
• 2 obols/day: subsistence wage, the bare minimum required to keep a citizen clothed, sheltered, and fed.
Unskilled laborers earned this wage.
• 2 obols/day: cost to rent and provide food and lodging for an unskilled slave.
• 2 obol/day: allowance for disabled war veterans and for orphans of war dead (legitimate sons under 18).
• 3 obols/day: the daily allowance given to citizens serving in the courts (dikastikon) and political
assemblies (misthophoria). It was raised from 2 obols/day in 408 BCE. Currently suspended.
• 3 obols/day: absolute minimum cost to educate one student/day; a single session with famous Sophists ran
from several minas to upwards of a talent (!).
• 3 obols/day: wage for a soldier on garrison duty.
• 4 obols/day: average wage of an archer or hoplite soldier.
• 5 obols/day: the daily allowance that citizens received for serving in the Boule of the 500.
• 1 drachma/day: poverty line for a small family. Currently suspended.
• 1 drachma/day: the average wage for a skilled worker (skilled workers make between 3 obols and 5
drachmas/day depending on the job).
• 1 drachma to pay the stonecutters for engraving every 50 letters of every ratified law.
• 3 drachmas/day: cost of a small diplomatic mission (assuming that the ambassador travels on one of the
state triremes). Larger embassies might have a better chance of success.
• 1 talents: the cost to build and outfit one trireme; also the cost to maintain one trireme and sailors on war
footing for one month.6
• 1/4-1/2 talent: cost to stage a play. The expenditure was largely up to the discretion of the choregus,
although an archon would ensure that the choragus fulfilled his duty to produce a splendid
production worthy of the gods and Athens.7
• 0 talents: cost to enclose a small shrine.8
• 35 talents: cost to build a small temple, like the Temple of Athena Nike (although not nearly as refined).
Note: a golden cult statue could easily cost more than 100 talents.9
• 469 talents: cost to build the Parthenon.10
• 850 talents: cost of the chryselephantine cult statue of Athena Parthenos in the Parthenon.
• 8,000+ talents: cost of the entire Periclean building program in Athens, including the Acropolis temples,
Middle Long Wall, the expansion of Piraeus, and the Odeum.
• 10,000 or 40,000 man-days: the number of days worked by the members of the Ekklesia if they met once
per month (as they did in the early years of the democracy—remember that the Athenian calendar
had 10 months) or four times per month as they did in recent years. Example: if the misthophoria of
2 obols for attending a monthly meeting of the Ekklesia were reestablished, the expense would be:
10,000 men * 2 obols = 20,000 obols = a little more than ½ talent per meeting.
• 18,250 man-days: the number of days worked by the Prytaneis, the executive council of the Boule that
was on constant call in the Tholos in the Agora (in addition to their allowance for serving on the Boule,
they received a food allowance of 1 obol/day).
• 182,500 man-days: the number of days worked by the Boule of 500.
• 100,000-400,000 man-days: number of days worked by the members of the Ekklesia in 1 year
• 110,000 man-days: the minimum number of man-days needed to rebuild, in rudimentary fashion, the 16
stade (~ 2 mile) gap in the Long Walls. Workers would require a wage of at least 3 obols/day.
Assuming another talent for supplies, rebuilding would cost 10 talents.
• 1,200,000 man-days: the number of days worked by the 6000 members of the Haliaea in one year
(assuming a traditional number of court days).
6
The actual cost for a trireme was slightly more than a trireme, as the figure of one talent referred only to the hull and
not the rigging and other equipment. The exact expense of trireme, of course, varied with the cost of raw materials and
could cost nearly two talents (Gabrielsen 1994, 141).
7
Pickard-Cambridge 1953, 88–89.
8
The land for small shrines was leased for a nominal amount to a tenant, who was then responsible for enclosing the
area and maintaining the shrine (for example of a decree leasing and fencing a temenos, see Rhodes 1972, 97).
9
Zimmern 1931, 412.
10
Stanier 1953.
4
ATHENS 403: ECONOMIC STRATA AT THE END OF THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR
When considering the economic status of Athenians in 403 BCE, it is useful to distinguish between two
groups:
1. Thetes: the ~9,000 male Athenian citizens who are excused from all taxation and other financial
contributions to the state;
2. The other ~9,000 male Athenian citizens who possess property (i.e. land) equivalent to at least 2,000
drachmas and are responsible for a variety of monetary and material contributions to the state.
Within these two categories, it is possible to identify 6 economic strata in Athenian society the end of the
Peloponnesian War.11
1. The “Liturgical Class” or Plousioi (‘Wealthy’): the 300 or so wealthiest Athenians, possessing
property of more than 3 talents, who are able to afford liturgies, or public works.
2. The “Rentier/Leisure/Propertied Class”: the roughly 900 Athenians who have at least 500
drachmas of income and at least 1 talent of property. Although not wealthy enough to fund liturgies
by themselves, they can join with other wealthy individuals to participate in joint liturgies, especially
the cooperative outfitting of triremes (syntrierarchy). They were subjected to many of the same
financial pressures as the plousioi.
3. The “Eisphora Payers” or Hippies (‘Cavalrymen’): the 1,800 Athenians who possess at least 300
drachmas income and 3,600 drachmas (or 4/10 of a talent) in property. They have sufficient capital
to pay the direct tax known as the eisphora, which was levied in times of economic stress.
4. “Hoplites” or Zeugetai: 6,000 Athenians who have 150 drachmas of income and property valued at
over 1,800 drachmas.
5. “Thetes”: the 9,000 Athenian citizens with property valued at less than 2,000 drachmas. They are
judged incapable of purchasing a hoplite kit and are excluded from the eisphora. ~3,000 of these
own some amount of land.
6. “Ptochoi”: the indeterminate number of thetes who are genuinely destitute and entirely dependent on
charity and/or the state.
Note that in Athens, as in the contemporary United States, political affiliations cut across class lines. Basic
self-interest would lead many property owners to favor a more restricted government, while the landless
would favor a more radical democracy. But some of the most passionate democrats, like Thrasybulus, were
very wealthy. Small farmers in the Zeugetai were often among those the most supportive of limited
government and a curtailing of welfare for the Thetes and Ptochoi.
Athenian Tetradrachm; Source: Wikimedia
11
The exact relationship between these economic classes listed above the Solonic political classes
(Pentakosiomedimnoi, Hippies, Zeugetai, Thetes) is debated; but for the purposes of the game they can be assumed to
be the same.
5
ATHENS 403: DOWN ON THE FARM (WEALTH IN CONTEXT)
As citizens of a large and populous country, one who are accustomed to rapid transportation and the globespanning reach of modern telecommunications, it is easy for us to lose sight of the small scale of many
historical societies.
Ancient Athens–although very large for a Greek city-state or polis–was comparatively tiny by the standards
of modern states. All of Attica was barely 700 square miles, or less than a third the size of Delaware. And of
this, only 18-20% of Attica was suitable for grain farming, with another 5-10% capable of olive and grape
cultivation, and some smaller percentage for personal vegetable plots. It is important to keep this scale in
mind as you consider the resources available to Athens and its citizens.
The farmstead of an average Athenian was around 40-50
plethra or, in modern parlance, a mere 8-to-10 acres. To give
you a better sense of scale, a football field pitch is
approximately 1⅓ acres.
Wealthy Athenians, perhaps 2,000 to 3,000 citizens, did have
larger plots, but even here the sizes are surprisingly modest, and
never seem to expand much beyond 100 acres or so. To put it in
Source: source: http://en.wikipedia.org/
perspective, the largest single farm in Attica was likely less
than half the size of a small college campus. We learn, for example, that the patrimonial estate of Alcibiades,
an incredibly wealthy man by Athenian standards, was only 70 acres. Of course, wealthy families might own
more than one farm, or have holdings in Athenian colonies (the latter is especially true during the time of the
Empire). But in 403, almost all of those overseas holdings were lost.
6
ATHENS 403: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR
In this survey of Athens in 403, we will look at the socio-economic situation of the city after the
Peloponnesian War, focusing on the 1. loss of Empire, 2. economic cost in Attica, and 3. demographic
changes.
1. The Loss of Empire
The loss of their empire was the most significant change the confronted Athenians in 403 BCE.
• The Empire was extremely profitable for the Athenians.
In 431 BCE, tribute was over 600 talents; in 425: 1,500 talents; in 413: 900 talents.12
This revenue supported 6,000 jurors who received 3 obols per day for 150-200 days/year (75-100
drachmas/year); the salaries of thousands of other officials; as well as tens of thousands of
sailors and hoplites who earned drachma or more per day when deployed.
An additional 5,000-10,000 Athenians were kleruchs, who had received property around the
Aegean in the land of the subject allies. We should not underestimate the value of these
kleruchies, even for small-scale farmers. If a brother went to Amphipolis as a kleruch, the
remaining family did not have to share their property, with the effect that all were better off.
Many of the wealthier Athenians held extensive holdings and resource concessions in the colonies.
Athenians did not need to pay taxes on grain imported through the Hellespont (the narrow passage
between the Black Sea and the Aegean). With another power in control of the straight, the
cost of grain would be expected to rise.
• Under the Empire, all strategic goods, such as timber, wax, iron, flax, grain, were required to be shipped to
or through Piraeus. Since the Athenians assessed a 2% duty on goods imported into Piraeus, the
Athenians profited from the trade within their empire.
in 413 BCE, total trade in the Empire was valued at 18,000 talents (108 million drachmas); of
which 1/4 travelled through Piraeus (4,500 talents); from the trade that flowed into the
Piraeus, Athens received tax revenue over 60 talents per year.
in 402/1: trade at Piraeus totaled 1,800 talents, a reduction of 60% from the wartime high.
With the loss of Empire, therefore, the Athenians lost nearly all of their overseas property–a deprivation that
would have affected members of all economic classes, either directly through loss of property, or through the
return of family members who held kleruchies. The Athenians also lost revenues from tribute and taxations
in excess of 1,000 talents per year.
Of course, Athens was also no longer burdened by the immense expense of maintaining a large fleet on war
footing. Although revenues had declined precipitously, expenses had plummeted as well.
Units of Athenian Currency: 1 talent = 60 mina = 6,000 drachma
1 drachma = 6 obols = the daily wage for a rower or skilled craftsmen
12
Strauss 1987, 50–51. For 431 BCE: Thuc. I. 99. 3 & II. 13. 6-7; for 425: Meiggs 1972, 343.
7
2. The Economic Cost of the War in Attica
Near the start of the Peloponnesian War in 428 BCE, Athenians were able to raise 200 talents from
the eisphora, a 2% tax on metics and citizens in the three wealthiest economic classes. Thetes were exempt
from the eisphora. This implies that wealthy Athens had property (timema) worth between 10,000 and
12,000 talents. Based on data from the 4th century, it seems probable that the total value of property in Attica
in 403 was less than 5,000 talents, indicating a loss of at least 50% and perhaps more during the war.13
The losses sustained by Ischomachus, the subject of Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, are indicative of the
hardships endured by many of the wealthy: the value of his property fell from 70 to 20 talents during the war,
a decline of more than 70%. But 20 talents is still represents a sizable estate. For those who possessed less
than a talent of capital, however, their financial and property losses could have easily dropped their families
into the thetic class.
Agriculture: despite the raids from the Spartan garrison at Decelea, olive production likely experienced only
a small decline during the War. Animal husbandry, however, would have suffered significantly and taken
longer to return to peacetime levels. Of immediate concern, the 8 months of civil war in 403 likely caused
noticeable disruptions in agricultural production. We should assume that by 403, Athens was importing more
of its basic foodstuffs than at any point in memory.
Slaves: Part of the economic loss resulted from the more than 20,000 slaves who escaped their Athenian
masters to the Spartan garrison at Decelea (most from the mines in Laureion). At a value of 150-200
drachmas per slave, the flight of slaves represented a loss of more than 500 talents, before one reckons the
lost economic output if the slaves were not replaced.14
Commerce: the loss of preferential trading rights within the empire certainly damaged Athenian commercial
concerns, as did the collapse of silver mining. The necessity of importing so many basic foodstuffs, however,
likely mitigated the short-term damage to the import-export business. Certain businesses, such as fishing,
could immediately return to full production, although the sale of luxury foods and goods suffered because of
the general decline of demand.
Light Industry: these small-scale factories, which averaged 20-30 people (none were larger than 120) crafted
pots, knives, lamps, clothing, leather goods, weapons, ships, jewelry, etc. In times of great uncertainty, the
purchase of these goods would have been greatly curtailed.15 Light industry suffered less than mining and
farming during the War; but escaping slaves and the general decline of resources from 413-403 led to
lowered domestic demand. The provisioning of military materiel was, of course, the exception to this rule
until the end of hostilities.
Mining: after the investment of the Spartan garrison at Decelea, silver mining in Laurion was dramatically
reduced. The extent of the economic loss is unknown, but was certainly substantial.
13
Strauss 1987, 54.
Lauffer 1957, 63–65.
15
Strauss 1987, 46.
14
8
3. Demographic Change
The war altered the composition of the demos. The losses, however, were borne disproportionately by the
different classes of society during the different phases of the war. During the Archidamian War (431-421),
the majority of the military causalities were suffered by hoplites; in the war’s second phase, the IonianDeclean War (416-404), the loses by the thetes, who manned the vital triremes, continued to mount at an
alarming pace until the war ended.
As a result of the escalating thetic casualties, the demos was more or less evenly divided between thetes and
the propertied classes by 403 BCE.16
16
Strauss 1987, 78-81. Note: I have slightly modified the historical population figures to better suit the balanced
population at the start of the game.
9
ATHENS 403: THE POPULATION OF ATHENS DURING THE WAR
It should come as no surprise that the population of Athens fluctuated greatly over the course of the fifth
century. A period of rapid growth, however, was cut short in 431 BCE. The chart below reveals the
demographic catastrophe that the city suffered during the Peloponnesian War.17
Year
480
431
425
403
Hoplite Census
Thetes
Total Adult
Males
% Change
Total
Citizens
Total Population
of Attica
15,000
25,000
16,500
9,000
20,000
18,000
12,500
9,000
35,000
43,000
29,000
18,000
—
+ 23%
- 33%
-38%
140,000
172,000
11,6000
85,000
?
315,500
218,000
?
By the end of the war, the total citizen population of Attica had declined by over 50%, with the population of
adult males falling even further, by over 58%. To put this in context, in World War II the nations that
suffered the greatest causalities as a percentage of their populations were Poland (16%) and Russia (14%;
although recent studies suggest Russian losses may have been closer to 20%).
Were the United States to suffer a catastrophe analogous to that endured by Athens in the Peloponnesian
War, our population would be reduced from 304 million to less than 155 million. The dead would be the
equivalent of every man, woman, and child in the 8 most populous states (California, Texas, New York,
Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan).
Although the total number of dead is smaller in Athens than in these modern states–in the many tens of
thousands rather than millions–remember that Athens, for all its size, was essentially a large village.
Everyone would know many who had died. If you were over the age of 40, you would remember many
relatives and friends who died from the plague. Everyone would know someone cut down in the war. Most
would know many, many who had died before their time.
17
Strauss 1987, 78-81 and 173; Gomme 1933, 24–29.
10
SOME NOTES ON THE DEMOGRAPHY OF ANCIENT ATHENS
Beyond the manifold cultural differences that separate the cultures of ancient Athens and the modern world,
we would do well to remember differences in life expectancy produce a radically different demographic
reality in ancient Athens than the one with which we are familiar in contemporary developed economies. In
what follows, I will walk through a few of these differences. The result is a picture of an Athenian
population whose composition is quite different than our own.
Low Mortality in United States
The most substantial difference between the United States and ancient Athens is the radically different rates
of childhood mortality. In the United States, nearly every child who is born will survive into adulthood.
Table 1: Annual Child Mortality Rates in United States (2007)18
Age
0-1
1-2
2-3
3-4
4-5
10
Male Mortality
0.7%
0.05%
0.03%
0.02%
0.02%
0.01%
Female Mortality
0.6%
0.04%
0.02%
0.02%
0.01%
0.01%
Or, to put it another way, if we imagined a cohort of
10,000 live births (5,000 boys and 5,000 girls), 4,963 boys
and 4,970 girls would live to see their first birthdays. 4,964
girls and 4,957 boys would live to see their fifth birthdays.
And 4,953 boys and 4,961–or over 99% of our cohort–
would live to see their tenth birthdays. If we graphed the
members of this cohort over their natural lifespan, we
would see a very little change in population, at least until
old age inevitably takes its toll.
“Actuarial Period of Life Table 2007”, Social Security Administration
[http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html].
18
11
The Effect of High Childhood, Maternal, and War Mortality on Athenian Demography
Child mortality rates in pre-modern societies were considerably, even shockingly, higher than those found in
modern, developed countries. Over a third of children died before their first birthdays, and over a half before
they reached their fifth birthdays.
Table 2: Estimated Annual Child Mortality Rates in Pre-Modern Europe19
Age
0-1
1-2
2-3
3-4
4-5
5-10
Mortality Rate
35.85%
23.7%
10.0%
8.0%
6.4%
4.8%
Sample Population
10,000
6,415
4,895
4,405
4,053
3,611
Once a child reached his or her fifth birthday, his
or her chances of surviving to adulthood were
quite good.
Once they reached adulthood, however,
Athenians faced other risks. Men would face an
increased risk of dying in battle. Women were
much more likely to die in childbirth, although
the extent of this is often overstated. In all
probability, Athenian women had around a 1-2%
chance of dying during each pregnancy.20
Taking these factors into account, we can graph
the population of Athens at the start of the
Peloponnesian War, when its population and
power were at their highest.
Note the number of children who will die before
their second birthdays, and also how the
increased mortality caused by illness and
disease–as well as childbirth for women; and
battle for men–leads to a rapid reduction of the
population as it ages.
Athenian Citizen Population, 431 BCE
91
Women
85
Men
79
73
67
61
55
49
43
37
31
25
19
13
7
1
4000300020001000 0 1000200030004000
19
The demographics of ancient societies remains highly disputed, but these figures give a sense of what was probable in
ancient Athens; information derived from Frier 1982 and 1983, and Golden 1990, 83.
20
For comparison, in 2000 the highest rate of maternal mortality was 2% in Sierra Leone; in the United States it is
around 0.01%, or 1 out of every 10,000 women who gave birth.
12
Of course, during the Peloponnesian War, Athens experienced a number of population shocks. None of these
was more dramatic than the plague that struck Athens at the start of the war and killed perhaps as many as a
third of Athenians. As a result of this epidemic, and the increased mortality of men as a result of the lengthy
war, the reduction of Athenian population with age is even more dramatic.21
The war had altered the center of gravity for the polity. Athens was younger, and more female, than it had
been before the war. In the graph above, you can see the significant effect of the Plague on older cohorts (the
steep reduction of cohorts older then 28), and the generally higher rate of male mortality due to the
accumulated losses during the War.
21
This very simple model excludes immigration (likely not large) and that population is not static, but in the absence of
external factors tends to grow by a few percent a year. If a reasonable growth factor were incorporated into the model,
the effect shown above would be more dramatic, with a population that was even younger on average than that shown.
13
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