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The Pirate Connection: Roman Politics, Servile Wars, and the East Aaron L. Beek TAPA, Volume 146, Number 1, Spring 2016, pp. 99-116 (Article) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/619102 Accessed 30 Apr 2017 08:05 GMT TAPA 146 (2016) 99–116 The Pirate Connection: Roman Politics, Servile Wars, and the East* aaron l. beek University of Minnesota summary: In 102 b.c.e., the Romans sent Marcus Antonius Orator to Cili- cia with an army, opening a new theater of campaigns. The timing seems strange: in 102, Rome had a manpower shortage and Roman forces were still bogged down in Gaul, Sicily, and quite probably Africa. I argue that the beginning of Roman involvement in Cilicia was rooted in Roman reactions to the ongoing struggles in Sicily and a Roman perception (whether true or false) that the slave wars in Sicily were actually instigated by Easterners. Moreover, this perception continued to affect Rome’s legislation in and control of Cilicia for years afterward. despite the chronological overlap at the end of the second century, the Second Servile War and the first campaign in Cilicia are rarely imagined to have much in common. They were, in fact, tightly connected conceptually and politically. The Romans, after their defeats at the hands of slaves in Sicily, suspected these slaves of having foreign backing from Asia Minor (specifically from the freelance mercenaries or pirates of Cilicia). They also believed that, in order to crush these slaves, the Cilicians had to be dealt with as well. Accordingly, the eastern command of Marcus Antonius (Orator) was considered to be (or promoted as) a useful complement to the ongoing Part of this paper was originally presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Classical Studies (New Orleans, 2015). For their helpful feedback on this project, I would like to thank the valiant attendees of that Sunday afternoon panel at the SCS, Professors Andrew Gallia and Philip Sellew at the University of Minnesota, and the two anonymous readers of this article. I obtained funding for the original project through the University of Minnesota’s GRPP Fellowship. The text for the quoted passages is taken from the CIL, the 1959–77 Henry edition of Photius (the Diodorus fragments), the 1852–53 Meineke Teubner (Strabo), and the 1910 Rossbach Teubner (Periochae of Livy). All translations are my own. * © 2016 by the Society for Classical Studies 100 The Pirate Connection: Roman Politics, Servile Wars, and the East Sicilian affair, not as a totally separate matter. Moreover, the probable connection between these two events has ramifications for the interpretation of a fragmentary second-century law, namely the Lex de Provinciis Praetoriis. Desire for glory and politics hampered Roman campaigning in this period. While a more famous example of this is seen in Sallust’s Jugurthine War in the struggle between Marius and the Metelli, the Second Servile War also exemplifies this. The praetor Lucullus, upon learning that he would not be prorogued an additional year in Sicily, dismissed his auxiliaries and dismantled or burned his defenses, presumably so that his political enemy, Servilius, would fail ignominiously.1 Shortly before, in 104, the quaestor Cn. Pompeius Strabo had attempted to prosecute his own commander, the propraetor T. Albucius, who celebrated a triumph in Sardinia when denied one in Rome.2 Such situations serve as evidence that campaigns and politics in Rome were cynically linked at the end of the second century, perhaps even more so than usual. The Second Servile War (ca. 104–100 b.c.e.) was a serious conflict, and the ex-slaves handed the Romans a series of defeats.3 The slaves insisted that they had been wrongfully enslaved and were rightfully free. This insistence may have had roots in the Lex de Plagiariis recently passed in Rome, which required slave-owners to free slaves who had been enslaved irregularly. In 104, the praetor Nerva began holding hearings and freeing slaves in Sicily until he was convinced to stop by local landowners. When he stopped, the slaves revolted.4 As in the slave revolts of the First Servile War four decades earlier, See Diod. Sic. 36.9. This would be L. Licinius Lucullus (propraetor 103, RE 4) and C. Servilius (praetor 102, RE 3). See also Broughton, MRR 1.564 for Lucullus and 568 for Servilius. Later Servilius would bring charges of peculation in Sicily against Lucullus (and so also the sons of Lucullus against Servilius). Both men went into exile. 2 See Cic. Div. Caec. 63, Off. 2.50, Prov. cons. 15; Broughton, MRR 1.560. 3 The clearest ancient account of this war is Diod. Sic. 36.1–11, which has clear similarities to his (longer) account of the First Servile War (Diod. Sic. 34.2). For bibliography on the Servile Wars as a whole, see Morton 2014, 2013, and 2012; Urbainczyk 2008; Grünewald 2004: 57–71; Shaw 2001; Bradley 1989; Baldwin 1967. Shaw 2001 contains a comprehensive listing (with translations) of the ancient accounts. For Sicily in this period more broadly, see Verbrugghe 1972. 4 Diod. Sic. 36.3.2: τῆς δὲ συγκλήτου ψηφισαμένης ὅπως μηδεὶς σύμμαχος ἐλεύθερος ἐν ἐπαρχίᾳ δουλεύῃ καὶ τῆς τούτων ἐλευθερώσεως οἱ στρατηγοὶ πρόνοιαν ποιῶνται, τότε κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ὢν στρατηγὸς Λικίνιος Νέρουας ἀκολούθως τῷ δόγματι συχνοὺς τῶν δούλων ἠλευθέρωσε, κρίσεις προθείς, ὡς ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις πλείους τῶν ὀκτακοσίων τυχεῖν τῆς ἐλευθερίας. καὶ ἦσαν πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν νῆσον δουλεύοντες μετέωροι πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν. (“And the Senate decreed that no freeborn allied man should be a slave in any province and the praetors should see to it that any such were all freed. Accordingly, in Sicily, Licinius Nerva, praetor, after setting hearings in accordance with the decree, freed 1 Aaron L. Beek 101 the more numerous force of the Sicilian ex-slaves defeated the Romans while smaller revolts on the Italian mainland were rapidly quashed. While this conflict (among others) was ongoing, Antonius was assigned Cilicia and the pirates in 102, presumably as a praetor with proconsular powers.5 While Antonius would celebrate a triumph for a victory over them (late in December 100), it is altogether unclear how effective or extensive this campaign actually was.6 Following this action, the borders of Cilicia were poorly defined and poorly understood, the Syrian kings still claimed possession of it, and the Cilician pirates were still around and causing trouble.7 Some were struck by the irony of his daughter (or granddaughter) being abducted by Cilician pirates decades later.8 If we are to see his campaign as having been effective and triumph-worthy, then we must also presume some motivations beyond the obvious goal of conquest. And if we are to see it as a specifically anti-pirate campaign, it is also the first such Roman campaign we know of.9 The overall timing of the campaign in Cilicia is a serious issue. Cilicia had not been, historically, of much interest to Rome. Second century b.c.e. Cilician piracy is not a problem much discussed: there is virtual silence in the sources for its occurrence prior to 103, yet Strabo asserts that Cilician piracy had begun decades earlier under the Syrian pretender Diodotus Tryphon. Cilician piracy does not seem to have been a pressing issue. On the other hand, Rome’s need for manpower was pressing; some troops were surely still in Africa with the recent close of the war with Jugurtha, and great losses had been incurred recently both at the battle of Arausio and in the first battles in Sicily against the slaves. Moreover, Marius had not yet fought with the many of the slaves, so that in a few days more than 800 obtained their freedom. And then, all those who were slaves in the island were eager for freedom.”) Cf. Dio Cass. 27 (F93). 5 So Broughton, MRR 1.568, 572, 576. There is some difficulty in the dating, part of which comes from a certain Gaius Norbanus who accompanied Antonius as quaestor (possibly to avoid his legal troubles in Rome; see Broughton, MRR 1.565–66). 6 For the campaign, see Livy, Per. 68.1; Obsequens 44; ILLRP 1.342; de Souza 1999:103. Though little survives regarding the campaign of Antonius, we can date this triumph by a reference in Appian (B Civ. 1.32–33; cf. Cic. Rab. Post. 26), which shows that Antonius was just then approaching (or possibly waiting outside) the city on the first day of the tribunate (i.e., December 10th). See Broughton 1946 for the full argument. 7 To compound the trouble, little distinction was made between Cilicia Tracheia (“Rough” Cilicia) and Cilicia Pedias (“Flat” Cilicia, which was more urbanized and Hellenized). 8 See Tansey 2010 for more on this Antonia. 9 While this motivation has been argued for Rome’s earlier actions against the Volscians at Antium or against Teuta’s Illyrians, I find these arguments unconvincing. 102 The Pirate Connection: Roman Politics, Servile Wars, and the East Germans at Aquae Sextiae, still another army had been sent into Spain, and the reinforcements sent to Sicily were newly recruited, not veterans.10 We see such a lament in Diodorus Siculus, who notes that the Romans were paralyzed with indecision (36.1): … ὡς ἂν στρατιωτῶν ἐπιλέκτων σχεδὸν ἑξακισμυρίων ἐν τῷ πρὸς Κίμβρους κατὰ Γαλατίαν πολέμῳ διολωλότων, καὶ ἀπόρων ὄντων εἰς ἀποστολὴν στρατιωτῶν λογάδων. … since nearly sixty thousand veteran soldiers had been lost in the war against the Cimbri and the Gauls, and since there was a lack of veteran soldiers to send on the mission [sc. to Sicily].11 Additionally, Madsen argued that the pressure of the Germans and Numidians prevented the Romans from intervening in events in Paphlagonia in 107 and 101, even without adding Sicily or Cilicia to the mix.12 With such pressures on the Roman military machine, we might have expected a delay in opening up a new theater with a campaign in Cilicia. Nevertheless, that is precisely what we see occurring in 102. Now, modern discussions of the 102–100 campaign of Antonius (e.g., Freeman 1986, de Souza 1999) are necessarily limited, and modern commentators have generally followed Ormerod in suggesting that Roman clients and allies had called Rome to protect them against the pirates of Cilicia.13 This explanation is suspect. True, Rome had never been shy about campaigning in multiple theaters simultaneously before. Yet insofar as such appeals could be effective, it seems that the allies, such as Rhodes, should have been asking Rome for the past thirty years to do something about Cilician piracy. Why now? Why not earlier? If the general activity of piracy had been the provocation for a Cilician campaign, there had been many better opportunities in the past for Roman action. Past examples of Roman magistrates opening a new 10 Some may argue that Roman soldiers would not still be in Africa at such a time of need, yet it is clear that Saturninus attempted to grant land in Africa to the Marian veterans there (though this law may not have been passed until 100; see Broughton, MRR 1.565n3) and also that Marius desired new recruits for his northern campaign (see Frontin., Str. 4.2). My thanks to the anonymous reader who suggests a comparison with the campaigns of the 190s in Greece. Despite the victory at Cynoscephalae in 197, Roman troops did not fully depart until 194. 11 Diod. Sic. 36.1. 12 Madsen 2009: 194–95. For the actions of Mithridates in Paphlagonia remaining ignored by Rome, see Florus 3.5. 13 Ormerod 1924: 208–9. Aaron L. Beek 103 theater of war had usually entailed either a governor taking action across the border or a magistrate acting in defense of Roman or allied territory. This situation is no exception; while there is no indication that the governor of Asia was involved, the Cilician campaign appears to have been understood as a defense of Sicily. This was actually a fundamentally reactive campaign rooted in immediate political concerns. Again, the communis opinio appears to be that Antonius was indeed acting in defense of Roman or allied territory. But the nature of that conflict and Antonius’s response to it are not recorded in the surviving sources with any precision. The Servile Wars, however, provide potential solutions for this ambiguity. the second servile war Diodorus Siculus is our main source for the Servile Wars, about which there is otherwise little ancient evidence extant. One seemingly trivial revelation in his account, however, is that the ex-slaves were mainly Syrians and Cilicians.14 Moreover, their leaders, Eunus and Salvius, called themselves King Antiochus and King Tryphon, respectively.15 This information is a little puzzling. The choice of Antiochus as a regal name is logical, but what would prompt the choice of Tryphon? It is not a common name for kings, and the clearest regal referent is Diodotus Tryphon, who was a Seleucid pretender of the 140s and early 130s. He had support among the Cilicians and is typically given credit for organizing the pirate bands into a threatening force.16 Overall, the choice of such an obscure figure is intriguing. This Tryphon had died at least thirty years earlier, and so it is unlikely that Salvius was pretending to actually be the Cilician king. He must have chosen the name as a way of invoking the past. This raises an intriguing question: Why does Salvius invoke Tryphon, of all people? After all, if Tryphon’s Cilician pirates were the source of the slaves put to work in Sicily, Tryphon would be 14 Throughout this paper, I refer to Syrian and Cilician Greeks as Syrians and Cilicians to distinguish them from Sicilian Greeks. In this period, these are Hellenized peoples who speak Greek as their first language. 15 Diod. Sic. 34/35.2.5, 17, 20, 24, 43; 34/35.8; 36.5; 36.7. E.g., Diod. Sic. 34/35.2.24: Ὅτι ὁ τῶν ἀποστατῶν βασιλεὺς Εὔνους ἑαυτὸν μὲν Ἀντίοχον, Σύρους δὲ τῶν ἀποστατῶν τὸ πλῆθος ἐπωνόμασεν (“And the king of the rebels, Eunus, called himself Antiochus and his mass of rebels Syrians”). 16 So hold most modern accounts, stemming from Strabo (14.5.2). See, in particular, Desideri 1991 for perceptions of the Cilicians. 104 The Pirate Connection: Roman Politics, Servile Wars, and the East the last figure one would expect to be invoked and praised. I would argue that the name “Tryphon,” like “Antiochus,” reinforces Diodorus’s claim that the main supporters were Syrian and Cilician. I further argue that these names were deliberately chosen to play upon a connection to the east that would be attractive to the audience. “Tryphon” was likely chosen to appeal specifically to Cilician supporters, some of whom may even have been supporters of Diodotus Tryphon in the past. The name suggests that these slaves were not the victims of Cilician piracy under Tryphon, but the Cilicians themselves. There is a second looming problem for the narrative: in 104, two years before the first Roman campaign in Cilicia, what are any Cilicians doing in Sicily? Surely these cannot all be descendants of a few captives taken during the war with Antiochus nearly a century earlier. I suspect the solution is to be found in Strabo (14.5.2). In the same passage in which he mentions Tryphon, he indicates that it was principally the Syrians being sold into slavery, while the Rhodians, Egyptians, Cypriots, and Romans stood by and let it happen. Thus at the end of the second century, two waves of Syrians and Cilicians hit the slave markets, first captives from the civil war that ended with the death of Diodotus Tryphon, and second, those captured by pirates operating like Tryphon’s organization in the absence of higher authority (supplemented by captives in further civil wars). According to Strabo, this weakened Cilicia and Syria to the extent that the Armenians were able to conquer them, though they left the sea in Cilician hands, making no attempt to control the pirates (Strabo 14.5.2): τοῦτο δὲ συμβὰν τῆς μὲν χώρας ἐποίησε κυρίους Παρθυαίους, οἳ τὰ πέραν τοῦ Εὐφράτου κατέσχον, τὸ τελευταῖον δὲ καὶ Ἀρμενίους, οἳ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς τοῦ Ταύρου προσέλαβον μέχρι καὶ Φοινίκης, καὶ τοὺς βασιλέας κατέλυσαν εἰς δύναμιν καὶ τὸ γένος αὐτῶν σύμπαν, τὴν δὲ θάλατταν τοῖς Κίλιξι παρέδωκαν. εἶτ᾽ αὐξηθέντας ἠναγκάσθησαν καταλύειν Ῥωμαῖοι πολέμῳ καὶ μετὰ στρατιᾶς οὓς αὐξομένους οὐκ ἐκώλυσαν. ὀλιγωρίαν μὲν οὖν αὐτῶν χαλεπὸν καταγνῶναι· πρὸς ἑτέροις δὲ ὄντες τοῖς ἐγγυτέρω καὶ κατὰ χεῖρα μᾶλλον οὐχ οἷοί τε ἦσαν τὰ ἀπωτέρω σκοπεῖν. And this event made, as lords of some of their lands, the Parthians, who gained the lands on the edge of the Euphrates, and also at the end [sc. of the kingdom] the Armenians, who took the lands beyond the Taurus up to and including Phoenicia, and eliminated the kingship and its power and its line as well, but they [i.e., the Parthians and the Armenians] left the sea to the Cilicians. And the Romans were compelled to destroy these people [i.e., the Cilicians], having grown in power, by war and with an army, though they had not hindered their growing. It is difficult to hold the Romans at fault for this, for being more Aaron L. Beek 105 consumed by other matters nearer and more at hand, they were unable to pay attention to those farther away.17 Admittedly, the role of the pirates (rather than armies) in capturing the slaves cannot be readily downplayed. At this time, the Hellenistic East was far more concerned with ransoming or keeping the slaves rather than selling them openly and at once.18 Thus, such selling of slaves was at private initiative rather than state initiative. The potential overlap between pirate and mercenary further muddies the waters. Finally, the Romans had not acquired many slaves in recent wars, so the owners of the Sicilian latifundia perhaps had fewer options in where their slaves came from. Large numbers of Syrian and Cilician slaves—many of them war captives—were probably sold at Delos to the owners of the Sicilian latifundia. Recalling Nerva’s actions just prior to the outbreak of the Second Servile War, we also see that there was an acknowledgement in Rome that some slaves had been sold under false pretenses and by Roman law and custom deserved to be free.19 While the praetor Nerva tried to institute this in Sicily, he soon stopped. We cannot say that this situation formed a foundation for the revolt (for what slave ever agreed with his enslavement?), but it seems particularly likely that this brief period of manumission that was abruptly stopped played some role in the outbreak of violence. The resulting suppositions are 1) the slave market of the second half of the second century was disproportionately and unusually populated with Syrians or Cilicians and this was particularly true of Sicily, 2) the backbone of the slave armies of the Second Servile War had a Syrian/Cilician origin, and 3) many of the Syrian and Cilician slaves had been born free. Even if they were not the most numerous slaves in Sicily, the Syrians and Cilicians were the most likely source of slaves with a military background, and accordingly, more likely to rise to prominent positions in the rebellion. This situation also bears similarities to the First Servile War: Eunus/Antiochus, the Syrian slave leader of the First Servile War, similarly had a Cilician commander, Cleon, and he also named his followers as Syrians.20 When Salvius invokes Tryphon, Strabo 14.5.2. See Andreau and Descat 2011: 54–56, who argue that slavery was generally at this time a secondary consideration to ransom. It had not always been so. 19 See above, n4. 20 Diod. Sic. 34/35.2.24 (see above, n15). I believe Diodorus intends us to understand that the king renamed all his supporters Syrians, just as he had renamed himself Antiochus. I think it more likely, however, that he was simply calling them Syrians because they were, for the most part, Syrian or of Syrian extraction, and that Diodorus misunderstood. 17 18 106 The Pirate Connection: Roman Politics, Servile Wars, and the East he is not simply picking a regal name from thin air, but invoking past loyalties of the war captives. Again, this suggests that the slaves rebelling in Sicily had been largely born free. Nothing in the sources mentions Cilician pirates in connection with these slaves, positively or negatively (though a connection is mentioned in the third war, that of Spartacus).21 Nor should we assume, even if Romans viewed Cilicians as pirates generally, that other Cilicians thought the same way. I suggest that the slaves were either in contact or trying to come into contact with Cilicians, perhaps for military aid or supplies, perhaps for transport to the mainland, and the Roman discovery of this either led the Romans to send Antonius to Cilicia to head this off or led Antonius to do so on his own initiative. Naturally, any Cilician involvement with the slaves, whether by public or private initiative, would be seen as piracy (i.e., theft of property) in Rome. marcus antonius orator It is not improbable that the involvement of Cilicians at a high level in the first two slave wars substantially affected Roman attitudes toward Cilicia and that the naming of Tryphon explicitly invoked a Cilician identity. The Cilicians may thus have seemed as big a threat as the Sicilians to the Romans. Whatever the slaves’ connection to the eastern states or whether such a connection even existed, the Romans had good reason to believe that the Syrian and Cilician slaves were somehow in collusion with some outside force in Syria or Cilicia. Furthermore, the presence of Cilicians in roles of authority in the slave army would have supported such a conclusion. It is not, then, necessary to assume that Antonius was dispatched to the region of Cilicia. The brief entry in the Periochae of Livy (Per. 68.1) suggests that Antonius was reacting to an event of the previous year, and furthermore, to something likely happening outside of Cilicia: M. Antonius praetor in Ciliciam maritimos praedones {id est piratas} persecutus est (“Marcus Antonius, praetor, pursued the pirates into Cilicia”).22 The verb persequor in a military context most logically means “to chase,” especially with the directional in Ciliciam.23 So either earlier in this year or in the previous one these praedones 21 Though the Cilician connection to Spartacus has entered the modern imagination, it is recorded only once, by Plutarch (Crass. 8–11). 22 One manuscript of the Periochae replaces Ciliciam with Siciliam. This is a natural mistake, and, though tempting, it should not be taken as evidence of a connection between the two places. 23 Were this an ablative Cilicia, something like “sought for” might be a plausible alternative. For a similar usage, see Cic. Fam. 12.15.5: classem fugientem persecuti sumus usque Aaron L. Beek 107 did something at some distance from Cilicia so that now they could retreat into it. This pursuit thus appears to be rooted in a specific act of piracy, not the general activity. This passage is peculiar for an additional reason: no more is said about this campaign, but the Periochae generally notes campaigns in terms of victories, defeats, or triumphs rather than “pursuit.”24 Indeed, we do not really know where Antonius went during his campaign, and in fact, our direct evidence for Antonius’s presence points only to the port of Side and perhaps Corinth.25 Instead of further discussion of Antonius, the Periochae returns to the campaigns of Marius and then the subject of the slave war in Sicily. Antonius was quite possibly assigned not Cilicia, but the Cilicians, who had been more successful on the western half of the island than the Syrians on the east.26 If Livy described the campaign as an adjunct to the Servile War, then the epitomator’s wording is more consistent. Whether the region Cilicia posed a real danger or not, Antonius was most likely sent there (or allowed to head there) out of fear that some foreign force there would attempt to take advantage of a weakened Sicily. But strangely, Antonius traveled to Side without his fleet, instructing his subordinate, Hirrus, to bring it along after it had crossed the diolkos at Corinth (CIL I2.2662: ll. 3–6): ... auspicio [Antoni Marc]i pro consule classis Isthmum traductast missaque per pelagus. ipse iter eire profectus Sidam, classem Hirrus Atheneis pro praetore anni e tempore constituit .... Under the proconsular auspices of Marcus Antonius, a fleet was drawn across the Isthmus and sent through the sea. Antonius himself set off on a trip for Side. Hirrus, propraetor, stationed the fleet in Athens because of the time of year ....27 Sidam (“We pursued the fugitive fleet all the way to Side”). This sense of “pursuit into” also appears to be promoted by Sherwin-White 1976: 4. 24 See, e.g., Per. 90.7 and 93.1, where a similarly brief mention of Servilius is later followed up by a mention of conquests. 25 By chance, we have an inscription from Greece which indicates that he was headed to the Pamphylian city of Side. See De Souza 1999:105; Ormerod 1924: 208n4. The inscription is CIL 12.2662 (= ILLRP 1.342), which is quoted below. Others (such as Sherwin-White 1976: 4) attribute this expedition to the M. Antonius (the so-called “Creticus”) who held the Cretan command in 74. 26 See Morton 2014, esp. 34–36 for the areas of activity in the Second Servile War. While the addition of a second praetor to the Sicilian campaign suggests that the Romans took Sicily a little more seriously, it does accord well with Morton’s observation that the Romans sent increasingly more and higher ranked commanders as the wars continued. 27 This is an inscription from Corinth praising Hirrus. Cf. IGRom. 4.1116, for a Rhodian inscription suggesting that there were Rhodians serving under Antonius in this campaign. 108 The Pirate Connection: Roman Politics, Servile Wars, and the East The unknown event referred to so obliquely in the Periochae may have occurred off the coast of Sicily, leading to the appointment of two praetors to deal with the southern threat: Servilius to take charge in Sicily, and Antonius to prevent suspected foreign interference. In pursuing a group of maritimos praedones, Antonius was led to Cilicia itself. Other factors complicate the simple account of Antonius being assigned Cilicia. If his fleet was forced to winter in Athens en route, Antonius must have arrived in the east fairly late. For the Roman fleet to be reaching Athens perhaps around October, we might well wonder where he had been until then. The sailing time alone would not account for the delay. Corinth is two weeks’ sail from Rome, and Side an additional week and a half. Difficulty in recruiting or manning ships might offer a plausible explanation. Yet in that case, there would be little reason not to remain in Italy. Moreover, Antonius appears to have relied primarily on local recruits when he arrived in the east. A trip to Sicily to support Servilius, however, would also explain this apparent tardiness. Political concerns provide further complications for the situation. More cynical readers could presume that the late start of a Cilician expedition was due to a lack of real threat from Cilicia. This delay might have been politically or personally expedient for Antonius, hoping to be prorogued repeatedly (as he was). Furthermore, we should note that Antonius and Aquilius,28 the magistrate in charge of Sicily 101–99, were also closely connected politically. Antonius won a triumph on his return in 100, Aquilius an ovatio in 99, and notably, Antonius defended Aquilius in court in 98 on a variety of charges. If Antonius was tasked with supporting Sicily, then he might hold back from assisting Servilius so that his ally would have a better chance to complete the victory in the following year.29 Yet another potential motive appears in the form of profit. Despite little mention of his victories in sources like the Periochae, we hear from Cicero that Antonius had substantial Cilician spoils both for his triumph in 100 and for decorating the rostra during his censorship in 97.30 It is possible that the man Cicero considered one of the greatest orators of his generation (and one who nearly talked his assassins out of killing him) was able to convince an audience in Rome that a campaign in Cilicia was to their Alternatively spelled Aquillius, with a second “l.” This sort of campaign sabotage had already occurred in Sicily (see n1 above for Lucullus and Servilius). 30 Cic. De or. 3.10. Again, nowhere does it assert that these Cilician spoils were from Cilicia and not from Cilicians: they were the spoils gained when he was called imperator by his men. 28 29 Aaron L. Beek 109 benefit.31 Thus we have two plausible rationales for the Romans’ initiation of a campaign in Cilicia: first, a real material connection between Sicily and Cilicia, and second, the possibility that the great orator Antonius made a fictitious argument on such grounds for a campaign, motivated by personal profit. Moreover, the triumph Antonius celebrated in 100 was probably a grand triumph not over Cilicia, but over a potential alliance between the Cilician slaves in Sicily and Cilicians on the mainland that threatened to expand the war. His achievement was thus seen as greater than his individual conquests in Cilicia. His close association with Manlius Aquilius, who had succeeded where three others had failed, could only support him and lend credence to his claims of victory. It also made sense for Antonius to stress the location of Cilicia, as defeating an external foe was intrinsically more glorious than putting down a rebellion. Each of the campaigns (in Cilicia and Sicily) has problems for which I believe a useful solution is posed by the other campaign. Taken individually, the evidence is relatively flimsy. Yet, in sum, a pattern forms. Certainly, the phrase in Ciliciam in the Periochae could instead be taken as referring to an expedition from coastal Cilicia into the mountains, yet this does not correspond well with the Corinth inscription’s description of the Roman fleet, which suggests naval action. The presence of Cilician slaves in Sicily prior to any Roman campaigning in Cilicia is a mere oddity. A campaign emerging in Cilicia after the revolt of Cilician slaves in Sicily is unlikely to be coincidence. Understanding a connection between Cilicia and Sicily, real or imagined, offers explanations for several unresolved puzzles: 1) why the Romans sent forces to Cilicia in 102 rather than another year; 2) the name correspondence and origins of the slave leaders; 3) the late arrival of Antonius’s fleet in the east, 4) Rome’s sudden interest and persistence in chasing Cilician pirates, and 5) why a campaign with such little lasting effect justified a triumph for Antonius. It also highlights the otherwise little-known military and political cooperation (and potential collusion) between Marcus Antonius Orator and Marcus Aquilius. Furthermore, if we were to posit that the Romans had a fear of enemies escaping into other lands to cause future trouble (as Jugurtha had fled to Mauretania) and/or a fear of enemies calling in foreign powers to assist them, we would expect that this fear would be documented in some form of public letter or communicated to foreign allies in some way. I would argue that this For Cicero’s opinion, see De oratore (throughout), where M. Antonius Orator is one of the main interlocutors. For Antonius and his assassins, see Vell. Pat. 22.3; Plut. Mar. 44.1–4. 31 110 The Pirate Connection: Roman Politics, Servile Wars, and the East is precisely what we see in the provisions of the contemporaneous Lex de Provinciis Praetoriis. the lex de provinciis praetoriis A connection between Sicily and Cilicia has ramifications for our understanding of future policy in Cilicia. The Lex de Provinciis Praetoriis (hence LdPP) is a fragmentary law that has caused much dispute. Among its many provisions, it mentions Cilicia as a province to be assigned a governor, attempts to preemptively adjudicate conflicts of jurisdiction, and requires the consuls to send a letter to Rome’s eastern allies concerning pirates. The law dates from the end of the second century, either 101 or 100, and is preserved in two sets of fragments (in Greek) found at Delphi and Cnidos.32 A law passed per saturam, it was probably a plebiscite and probably belongs to the controversial body of legislation passed by Saturninus.33 Before the discovery of the second set of fragments, this law was understood by most scholars to be principally anti-pirate legislation. After more of the law was discovered, this remained the ostensible purpose of a section of the decree. Yet this solution seems implausible, because Roman actions explicitly against pirates do not start appearing until the 70s. Moreover, if seen as a method of deterring piracy or of creating an eastern anti-piracy coalition, this law would seem to have been a miserable failure: eastern monarchs like the Ptolemies continued to hire pirates as mercenary forces.34 We have external corroboration that at least some of the missives were sent: one town in Anatolia, Syedra, sent a delegation to Delphi to inquire whether they should obey the Romans.35 32 For the law and translations, as well as some discussion of past scholarship, see Crawford 1996: 231–70, which follows upon the earlier publication of Hassall, Crawford, and Reynolds 1974. Since Crawford 1996, the most relevant discussion is probably Tarwacka 2009: 37–43. 33 Lintott 1976:71–72; Tarwacka 2009: 42. 34 According to Strabo (14.5.2), the Ptolemies in both Cyprus and Egypt were employing pirates in the first century. Criscuolo 2013: 171 argues that the Ptolemies’ continuation of pirate employment made the Romans distrustful of Egypt, which led to the later seizure of Cyprus. See also Tarwacka 2009: 42–43, who suggests that this was the intended goal, which failed due to a combination of the usefulness of pirates to the eastern allies and eastern fears of Roman power. 35 The (unhelpful) response was apparently that the Syedrans “should do the right thing.” Aaron L. Beek 111 The purpose of the decree remains unclear. It could be understood as a diplomatic effort to reinforce the claim of Antonius to have defeated the Cilicians. With the lack of a clear, overwhelming victory, there was some question about the control of the interior, even if the status of the coastal cities was clear.36 Yet there is little emphasis on asserting Roman claims to Cilicia and Lycaonia, and the proposed list of the recipients does not bode well for this: many of the states closest to Cilicia were not listed, though we appear to have the inscription’s full list.37 table 1: states that were indicated in the ldpp to receive the decreed letters (Assuming a date of 100 b.c.e.) Recipients Presumed Non-recipients The Rhodian Republic Mithridates VI (Pontus) Ptolemy Apion (Cyrene) Mithridates II (Parthia) Ptolemy Alexander (Egypt) Mithridates I (Commagene) Ptolemy Soter Lathyros (Cyprus) Artavasdes (Armenia) Antiochus Grypus (Syria [north]) Nicomedes III (Bithynia) Antiochus Cyzicenus (Syria [south]) Ariarathes VIII (Cappadocia) Bakru (Osroene) Some have taken this decree as provisionally creating a super-command in the east for Marius along the lines of the later Gabinian law. While plausible, this interpretation does not provide a rationale for the missives to Rome’s allies. Furthermore, if the decree was intended as a form of imperium maius 36 Suggested by Hassall, Crawford, and Reynolds 1974; see note on Col.III, ll.35–37 p.211, but see also Crawford 1996: 258, disagreeing with the earlier statement written in part by him. For additional modern scholarship suggesting that Antonius’s (permanent) gains in Cilicia were negligible, see Broughton 1938: 519; Levick 1967: 22. Sherwin-White 1976 asserts that a portion of the law does constitute a formal Roman claim to “Rough” Cilicia. 37 The end of Cnidos Column III l.41 and beginning of Delphi Block B ii.8 appear to be the same line, so unless the lists were reordered, we have the full list. However, we should also note that the city of Syedra was apparently informed, and is not included on the list. 112 The Pirate Connection: Roman Politics, Servile Wars, and the East for Marius, it was not taken up, and we do not know of anyone who held the command in Cilicia after Antonius until Sulla (perhaps as early as 96, but the date of his command is debated).38 These are problematic solutions to an admittedly baffling inscription. A Sicilian connection to this law may offer some solutions. If the Cilicians mentioned were either fugitive Cilician slaves from Sicily that had somehow managed to return to Anatolia or Cilician cities that had offered asylum to fugitive slaves, then this warning in the LdPP is a warning not against piracy as we understand it, but against harboring fugitive slaves.39 In that case, this would not be a general prohibition of piracy, but instead a response to a specific political situation. Fugitives were important. In ancient accounts of the servile wars, special care is taken to insist that most slaves were accounted for, whether killed or recaptured.40 There was investment, moral as well as economic, in ensuring that slaves did not escape. In the Roman mindset, allowing fugitives to escape would show a weakness that would cause more slaves to attempt escape. In effect, the terms of the inscription would serve as a warning not to offer asylum to Rome’s enemies.41 Moreover, there is an excellent reason for the letter not to refer to these individuals directly as fugitivi. The Lex de Plagiariis of approximately 4–5 years earlier had addressed the issue of slaves who were citizens of eastern allies. Those allies had requested the return of their citizens. The letter mentioned 38 There is no space here to reiterate the arguments concerning the date of Sulla’s command, which have ranged from 96 to 92. The most relevant ancient references are Vell. Pat. 2.15.3, Plut. Sull. 5, and Sid. Apoll. Carm. 2.440 and 7.70. Sulla’s praetorship and subsequent governorship is put in 93–92 by Broughton, MRR 2.18, 19nn3, 6 and Arnaud 1991, but in 97–96 (or 96–95) by Freeman 1986, Badian 1959 and 1962, and Keaveney 1980, 1982, and 1995. Sherwin-White 1977, Sumner 1978, and McGing 1986: 78 argue for 95–94 (but see also Sherwin-White 1984). See McGing 1986: 78, esp. n45 for discussion. Regarding the issue of imperium maius, this too would require great space, though Ehrenberg 1953 and Tarwacka 2009: 43–55 may suffice. The key ancient accounts for understanding this issue are Vell. Pat. 2.31 and Tac. Ann. 15.25, both in reference to Pompey’s later extraordinary command. 39 In this period, asylia is, of course, a Greek custom, not a Roman custom. See Dench 2005: 16–21 for some understanding (albeit later) of the Roman attitudes toward asylum. For the Greek practice of asylia generally, see Rigsby 1997. 40 E.g., Diod. Sic. 36.10; Flor. 3.19–20. 41 As a much later example, Cicero claimed that the inhabitants of Pindenissum were harboring fugitivi (Cic. Fam. 5.10.4). Though the word in this passage often is translated “deserters,” I believe Cicero intends “fugitive slaves.” Aaron L. Beek 113 in the LdPP is sent to these allies, and it would naturally be best to avoid that topic while the slave/citizenship status of these individuals was under any dispute whatsoever. The remnants of a defeated force automatically became considered “bandits” or “pirates” if they did not surrender. Thus, the decree would have the additional aim of stopping pirates—not a generalized piracy in the abstract, but rather this specific group of Cilicians the Romans had already been fighting. This is not a moral injunction, but one rooted in specific Roman interests. If understood in the greater Mediterranean context, this otherwise problematic law and letter both justify the Roman invasion of Cilicia and warn the other powers of the east not to repeat the mistake the Cilicians (supposedly) made. If the law is read in this way, and not as “anti-pirate legislation,” it may have been quite effective in curtailing Cilician resistance. In that case, it would have both hindered Cilicians from leaving and held up the Cilicians as an example to others. Moreover, if I am correct in understanding the campaign of Antonius as punitive, then a failure to punish the Cilicians would be politically unacceptable, which would offer another explanation for why the Romans were so invested in Cilicia in the following years. conclusion It is unfortunate that Livy’s full account is lost to us. Nevertheless, despite the individual weaknesses of the available evidence, I submit the following version of events as clearer, less problematic, and more likely than the currently accepted version. table 2: revised chronology (all dates b.c.e.) 130s?–100sCilician and Syrian captives taken in the Seleucid civil wars are sold abroad as slaves, many at Delos to owners of latifundia in Sicily. ca. 106Roman allies complain about their citizens being held in slavery by Roman slave-owners. 105 or 104By the request of Rome’s eastern allies, a Lex de Plagiariis is passed, requiring slave-owners to free any slave who was born a citizen of a state currently allied to Rome (which, at this time, includes the Syrian kingdom). 104The praetor P. Licinius Nerva attempts to enforce this law in Sicily, but, under pressure from local landlords after freeing 800 slaves, calls off future hearings. 114 The Pirate Connection: Roman Politics, Servile Wars, and the East table 2, cont. 104Slaves (of Cilician and Syrian extraction) revolt in Sicily after hearings are called off; the revolters choose a king and name him Tryphon. 104-3Slave forces in Sicily under the Cilician Athenion defeat the armies first of Nerva, then of Lucullus. Lucullus, upon learning he would be replaced by Servilius, burns down his defenses and disbands his army. Early 102Two praetors are assigned to the Sicilian/Cilician problem: Servilius is assigned the land forces in Sicily, and Antonius is assigned the naval forces to protect Sicily. Mid 102Servilius is also defeated by the ex-slaves; Antonius pursues Cilician praedones to Cilicia to punish them. Late 102Antonius leaves the fleet in Athens, travels to Side without his naval force, and enlists local forces among the Pamphylians and Rhodians to campaign in Cilicia. 101A political ally of Antonius, Aquilius, wins the consulship and the Sicilian command. Antonius continues campaigning in Pamphylia and Rough Cilicia. Late 101/ Lex de Provinciis Praetoriis is passed, including provision to early 100 write letters of explanation to Roman allies. These letters are meant to prevent others from aiding or sheltering Cilicians. 100Antonius continues his campaign in Anatolia, and Aquilius finally defeats the ex-slave army in Sicily. Dec. 100Antonius returns to Rome and receives a triumph. 99Aquilius returns to Rome and wins an ovatio. Antonius holds the consulship. 98Antonius defends Aquilius against a charge of peculation. 97Antonius, now censor, decorates the rostra with his spoils. Ahenobarbus, praetor in Sicily, bans weapons. ca. 96 or laterAntonius is charged with (but acquitted of) ambitus (see Cic. De. or. 2.274). In this account, I argue that Antonius either reinterpreted his orders or was given new orders to pursue Cilicians to Cilicia. It is not necessary to see any Aaron L. Beek 115 provocation originating from Anatolia. An attempt of Cilicians in Sicily to flee to Cilicia would be sufficient. At the same time, it is necessary to recognize that the end of the second century was a period of extreme political infighting and that this infighting in Rome had repercussions for Roman acts outside of Rome. Thus the proposed rationales are not necessarily the real rationales. We are perhaps too ready to think of “Cilicia” as a specific place and provinciae as territories. Antonius, assigned a fleet, was probably not actually assigned a campaign against the land Cilicia, but rather one against a people: the Cilicians. 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