Download PDF - MUSE - Johns Hopkins University

The Pirate Connection: Roman Politics, Servile Wars, and the East
Aaron L. Beek
TAPA, Volume 146, Number 1, Spring 2016, pp. 99-116 (Article)
Published by Johns Hopkins University Press
For additional information about this article
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/619102
Accessed 30 Apr 2017 08:05 GMT
TAPA 146 (2016) 99–116
The Pirate Connection: Roman Politics,
Servile Wars, and the East*
aaron l. beek
University of Minnesota
summary: In 102 b.c.e., the Romans sent Marcus Antonius Orator to Cili-
cia with an army, opening a new theater of campaigns. The timing seems
strange: in 102, Rome had a manpower shortage and Roman forces were
still bogged down in Gaul, Sicily, and quite probably Africa. I argue that the
beginning of Roman involvement in Cilicia was rooted in Roman reactions
to the ongoing struggles in Sicily and a Roman perception (whether true
or false) that the slave wars in Sicily were actually instigated by Easterners.
Moreover, this perception continued to affect Rome’s legislation in and
control of Cilicia for years afterward.
despite the chronological overlap at the end of the second century,
the Second Servile War and the first campaign in Cilicia are rarely imagined
to have much in common. They were, in fact, tightly connected conceptually and politically. The Romans, after their defeats at the hands of slaves
in Sicily, suspected these slaves of having foreign backing from Asia Minor
(specifically from the freelance mercenaries or pirates of Cilicia). They also
believed that, in order to crush these slaves, the Cilicians had to be dealt with
as well. Accordingly, the eastern command of Marcus Antonius (Orator)
was considered to be (or promoted as) a useful complement to the ongoing
Part of this paper was originally presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for
Classical Studies (New Orleans, 2015). For their helpful feedback on this project, I would
like to thank the valiant attendees of that Sunday afternoon panel at the SCS, Professors
Andrew Gallia and Philip Sellew at the University of Minnesota, and the two anonymous
readers of this article. I obtained funding for the original project through the University
of Minnesota’s GRPP Fellowship. The text for the quoted passages is taken from the CIL,
the 1959–77 Henry edition of Photius (the Diodorus fragments), the 1852–53 Meineke
Teubner (Strabo), and the 1910 Rossbach Teubner (Periochae of Livy). All translations
are my own.
* © 2016 by the Society for Classical Studies
100
The Pirate Connection: Roman Politics, Servile Wars, and the East
Sicilian affair, not as a totally separate matter. Moreover, the probable connection between these two events has ramifications for the interpretation of
a fragmentary second-century law, namely the Lex de Provinciis Praetoriis.
Desire for glory and politics hampered Roman campaigning in this period.
While a more famous example of this is seen in Sallust’s Jugurthine War in
the struggle between Marius and the Metelli, the Second Servile War also
exemplifies this. The praetor Lucullus, upon learning that he would not be
prorogued an additional year in Sicily, dismissed his auxiliaries and dismantled
or burned his defenses, presumably so that his political enemy, Servilius, would
fail ignominiously.1 Shortly before, in 104, the quaestor Cn. Pompeius Strabo
had attempted to prosecute his own commander, the propraetor T. Albucius,
who celebrated a triumph in Sardinia when denied one in Rome.2 Such situations serve as evidence that campaigns and politics in Rome were cynically
linked at the end of the second century, perhaps even more so than usual.
The Second Servile War (ca. 104–100 b.c.e.) was a serious conflict, and
the ex-slaves handed the Romans a series of defeats.3 The slaves insisted that
they had been wrongfully enslaved and were rightfully free. This insistence
may have had roots in the Lex de Plagiariis recently passed in Rome, which
required slave-owners to free slaves who had been enslaved irregularly. In 104,
the praetor Nerva began holding hearings and freeing slaves in Sicily until
he was convinced to stop by local landowners. When he stopped, the slaves
revolted.4 As in the slave revolts of the First Servile War four decades earlier,
See Diod. Sic. 36.9. This would be L. Licinius Lucullus (propraetor 103, RE 4) and C.
Servilius (praetor 102, RE 3). See also Broughton, MRR 1.564 for Lucullus and 568 for
Servilius. Later Servilius would bring charges of peculation in Sicily against Lucullus (and
so also the sons of Lucullus against Servilius). Both men went into exile.
2 See Cic. Div. Caec. 63, Off. 2.50, Prov. cons. 15; Broughton, MRR 1.560.
3 The clearest ancient account of this war is Diod. Sic. 36.1–11, which has clear similarities to his (longer) account of the First Servile War (Diod. Sic. 34.2). For bibliography
on the Servile Wars as a whole, see Morton 2014, 2013, and 2012; Urbainczyk 2008;
Grünewald 2004: 57–71; Shaw 2001; Bradley 1989; Baldwin 1967. Shaw 2001 contains a
comprehensive listing (with translations) of the ancient accounts. For Sicily in this period
more broadly, see Verbrugghe 1972.
4 Diod. Sic. 36.3.2: τῆς δὲ συγκλήτου ψηφισαμένης ὅπως μηδεὶς σύμμαχος ἐλεύθερος
ἐν ἐπαρχίᾳ δουλεύῃ καὶ τῆς τούτων ἐλευθερώσεως οἱ στρατηγοὶ πρόνοιαν ποιῶνται, τότε
κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ὢν στρατηγὸς Λικίνιος Νέρουας ἀκολούθως τῷ δόγματι συχνοὺς τῶν
δούλων ἠλευθέρωσε, κρίσεις προθείς, ὡς ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις πλείους τῶν ὀκτακοσίων
τυχεῖν τῆς ἐλευθερίας. καὶ ἦσαν πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν νῆσον δουλεύοντες μετέωροι πρὸς
τὴν ἐλευθερίαν. (“And the Senate decreed that no freeborn allied man should be a slave in
any province and the praetors should see to it that any such were all freed. Accordingly, in
Sicily, Licinius Nerva, praetor, after setting hearings in accordance with the decree, freed
1 Aaron L. Beek
101
the more numerous force of the Sicilian ex-slaves defeated the Romans while
smaller revolts on the Italian mainland were rapidly quashed.
While this conflict (among others) was ongoing, Antonius was assigned
Cilicia and the pirates in 102, presumably as a praetor with proconsular powers.5 While Antonius would celebrate a triumph for a victory over them (late
in December 100), it is altogether unclear how effective or extensive this campaign actually was.6 Following this action, the borders of Cilicia were poorly
defined and poorly understood, the Syrian kings still claimed possession of
it, and the Cilician pirates were still around and causing trouble.7 Some were
struck by the irony of his daughter (or granddaughter) being abducted by
Cilician pirates decades later.8 If we are to see his campaign as having been
effective and triumph-worthy, then we must also presume some motivations
beyond the obvious goal of conquest. And if we are to see it as a specifically
anti-pirate campaign, it is also the first such Roman campaign we know of.9
The overall timing of the campaign in Cilicia is a serious issue. Cilicia
had not been, historically, of much interest to Rome. Second century b.c.e.
Cilician piracy is not a problem much discussed: there is virtual silence in the
sources for its occurrence prior to 103, yet Strabo asserts that Cilician piracy
had begun decades earlier under the Syrian pretender Diodotus Tryphon.
Cilician piracy does not seem to have been a pressing issue. On the other
hand, Rome’s need for manpower was pressing; some troops were surely still
in Africa with the recent close of the war with Jugurtha, and great losses had
been incurred recently both at the battle of Arausio and in the first battles
in Sicily against the slaves. Moreover, Marius had not yet fought with the
many of the slaves, so that in a few days more than 800 obtained their freedom. And then,
all those who were slaves in the island were eager for freedom.”) Cf. Dio Cass. 27 (F93).
5 So Broughton, MRR 1.568, 572, 576. There is some difficulty in the dating, part of
which comes from a certain Gaius Norbanus who accompanied Antonius as quaestor
(possibly to avoid his legal troubles in Rome; see Broughton, MRR 1.565–66).
6 For the campaign, see Livy, Per. 68.1; Obsequens 44; ILLRP 1.342; de Souza 1999:103.
Though little survives regarding the campaign of Antonius, we can date this triumph by
a reference in Appian (B Civ. 1.32–33; cf. Cic. Rab. Post. 26), which shows that Antonius
was just then approaching (or possibly waiting outside) the city on the first day of the
tribunate (i.e., December 10th). See Broughton 1946 for the full argument.
7 To compound the trouble, little distinction was made between Cilicia Tracheia
(“Rough” Cilicia) and Cilicia Pedias (“Flat” Cilicia, which was more urbanized and
Hellenized).
8 See Tansey 2010 for more on this Antonia.
9 While this motivation has been argued for Rome’s earlier actions against the Volscians
at Antium or against Teuta’s Illyrians, I find these arguments unconvincing.
102
The Pirate Connection: Roman Politics, Servile Wars, and the East
Germans at Aquae Sextiae, still another army had been sent into Spain, and
the reinforcements sent to Sicily were newly recruited, not veterans.10 We see
such a lament in Diodorus Siculus, who notes that the Romans were paralyzed
with indecision (36.1):
… ὡς ἂν στρατιωτῶν ἐπιλέκτων σχεδὸν ἑξακισμυρίων ἐν τῷ πρὸς Κίμβρους
κατὰ Γαλατίαν πολέμῳ διολωλότων, καὶ ἀπόρων ὄντων εἰς ἀποστολὴν
στρατιωτῶν λογάδων.
… since nearly sixty thousand veteran soldiers had been lost in the war against
the Cimbri and the Gauls, and since there was a lack of veteran soldiers to send
on the mission [sc. to Sicily].11
Additionally, Madsen argued that the pressure of the Germans and Numidians
prevented the Romans from intervening in events in Paphlagonia in 107 and
101, even without adding Sicily or Cilicia to the mix.12 With such pressures
on the Roman military machine, we might have expected a delay in opening
up a new theater with a campaign in Cilicia. Nevertheless, that is precisely
what we see occurring in 102.
Now, modern discussions of the 102–100 campaign of Antonius (e.g.,
Freeman 1986, de Souza 1999) are necessarily limited, and modern commentators have generally followed Ormerod in suggesting that Roman clients and
allies had called Rome to protect them against the pirates of Cilicia.13 This
explanation is suspect. True, Rome had never been shy about campaigning
in multiple theaters simultaneously before. Yet insofar as such appeals could
be effective, it seems that the allies, such as Rhodes, should have been asking
Rome for the past thirty years to do something about Cilician piracy. Why
now? Why not earlier? If the general activity of piracy had been the provocation for a Cilician campaign, there had been many better opportunities in the
past for Roman action. Past examples of Roman magistrates opening a new
10 Some may argue that Roman soldiers would not still be in Africa at such a time of
need, yet it is clear that Saturninus attempted to grant land in Africa to the Marian veterans
there (though this law may not have been passed until 100; see Broughton, MRR 1.565n3)
and also that Marius desired new recruits for his northern campaign (see Frontin., Str.
4.2). My thanks to the anonymous reader who suggests a comparison with the campaigns
of the 190s in Greece. Despite the victory at Cynoscephalae in 197, Roman troops did
not fully depart until 194.
11 Diod. Sic. 36.1.
12 Madsen 2009: 194–95. For the actions of Mithridates in Paphlagonia remaining
ignored by Rome, see Florus 3.5.
13 Ormerod 1924: 208–9.
Aaron L. Beek
103
theater of war had usually entailed either a governor taking action across the
border or a magistrate acting in defense of Roman or allied territory. This
situation is no exception; while there is no indication that the governor of
Asia was involved, the Cilician campaign appears to have been understood
as a defense of Sicily.
This was actually a fundamentally reactive campaign rooted in immediate
political concerns. Again, the communis opinio appears to be that Antonius
was indeed acting in defense of Roman or allied territory. But the nature of
that conflict and Antonius’s response to it are not recorded in the surviving
sources with any precision. The Servile Wars, however, provide potential
solutions for this ambiguity.
the second servile war
Diodorus Siculus is our main source for the Servile Wars, about which there
is otherwise little ancient evidence extant. One seemingly trivial revelation in
his account, however, is that the ex-slaves were mainly Syrians and Cilicians.14
Moreover, their leaders, Eunus and Salvius, called themselves King Antiochus
and King Tryphon, respectively.15 This information is a little puzzling. The
choice of Antiochus as a regal name is logical, but what would prompt the
choice of Tryphon? It is not a common name for kings, and the clearest regal
referent is Diodotus Tryphon, who was a Seleucid pretender of the 140s and
early 130s. He had support among the Cilicians and is typically given credit
for organizing the pirate bands into a threatening force.16 Overall, the choice
of such an obscure figure is intriguing.
This Tryphon had died at least thirty years earlier, and so it is unlikely that
Salvius was pretending to actually be the Cilician king. He must have chosen
the name as a way of invoking the past. This raises an intriguing question:
Why does Salvius invoke Tryphon, of all people? After all, if Tryphon’s Cilician
pirates were the source of the slaves put to work in Sicily, Tryphon would be
14 Throughout this paper, I refer to Syrian and Cilician Greeks as Syrians and Cilicians
to distinguish them from Sicilian Greeks. In this period, these are Hellenized peoples who
speak Greek as their first language.
15 Diod. Sic. 34/35.2.5, 17, 20, 24, 43; 34/35.8; 36.5; 36.7. E.g., Diod. Sic. 34/35.2.24:
Ὅτι ὁ τῶν ἀποστατῶν βασιλεὺς Εὔνους ἑαυτὸν μὲν Ἀντίοχον, Σύρους δὲ τῶν ἀποστατῶν
τὸ πλῆθος ἐπωνόμασεν (“And the king of the rebels, Eunus, called himself Antiochus
and his mass of rebels Syrians”).
16 So hold most modern accounts, stemming from Strabo (14.5.2). See, in particular,
Desideri 1991 for perceptions of the Cilicians.
104
The Pirate Connection: Roman Politics, Servile Wars, and the East
the last figure one would expect to be invoked and praised. I would argue that
the name “Tryphon,” like “Antiochus,” reinforces Diodorus’s claim that the
main supporters were Syrian and Cilician. I further argue that these names
were deliberately chosen to play upon a connection to the east that would be
attractive to the audience. “Tryphon” was likely chosen to appeal specifically
to Cilician supporters, some of whom may even have been supporters of
Diodotus Tryphon in the past. The name suggests that these slaves were not
the victims of Cilician piracy under Tryphon, but the Cilicians themselves.
There is a second looming problem for the narrative: in 104, two years
before the first Roman campaign in Cilicia, what are any Cilicians doing in
Sicily? Surely these cannot all be descendants of a few captives taken during
the war with Antiochus nearly a century earlier. I suspect the solution is to be
found in Strabo (14.5.2). In the same passage in which he mentions Tryphon,
he indicates that it was principally the Syrians being sold into slavery, while
the Rhodians, Egyptians, Cypriots, and Romans stood by and let it happen.
Thus at the end of the second century, two waves of Syrians and Cilicians hit
the slave markets, first captives from the civil war that ended with the death
of Diodotus Tryphon, and second, those captured by pirates operating like
Tryphon’s organization in the absence of higher authority (supplemented by
captives in further civil wars). According to Strabo, this weakened Cilicia and
Syria to the extent that the Armenians were able to conquer them, though
they left the sea in Cilician hands, making no attempt to control the pirates
(Strabo 14.5.2):
τοῦτο δὲ συμβὰν τῆς μὲν χώρας ἐποίησε κυρίους Παρθυαίους, οἳ τὰ πέραν
τοῦ Εὐφράτου κατέσχον, τὸ τελευταῖον δὲ καὶ Ἀρμενίους, οἳ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς
τοῦ Ταύρου προσέλαβον μέχρι καὶ Φοινίκης, καὶ τοὺς βασιλέας κατέλυσαν εἰς
δύναμιν καὶ τὸ γένος αὐτῶν σύμπαν, τὴν δὲ θάλατταν τοῖς Κίλιξι παρέδωκαν.
εἶτ᾽ αὐξηθέντας ἠναγκάσθησαν καταλύειν Ῥωμαῖοι πολέμῳ καὶ μετὰ στρατιᾶς
οὓς αὐξομένους οὐκ ἐκώλυσαν. ὀλιγωρίαν μὲν οὖν αὐτῶν χαλεπὸν καταγνῶναι·
πρὸς ἑτέροις δὲ ὄντες τοῖς ἐγγυτέρω καὶ κατὰ χεῖρα μᾶλλον οὐχ οἷοί τε ἦσαν
τὰ ἀπωτέρω σκοπεῖν.
And this event made, as lords of some of their lands, the Parthians, who gained
the lands on the edge of the Euphrates, and also at the end [sc. of the kingdom]
the Armenians, who took the lands beyond the Taurus up to and including
Phoenicia, and eliminated the kingship and its power and its line as well, but
they [i.e., the Parthians and the Armenians] left the sea to the Cilicians. And
the Romans were compelled to destroy these people [i.e., the Cilicians], having grown in power, by war and with an army, though they had not hindered
their growing. It is difficult to hold the Romans at fault for this, for being more
Aaron L. Beek
105
consumed by other matters nearer and more at hand, they were unable to pay
attention to those farther away.17
Admittedly, the role of the pirates (rather than armies) in capturing the
slaves cannot be readily downplayed. At this time, the Hellenistic East was
far more concerned with ransoming or keeping the slaves rather than selling
them openly and at once.18 Thus, such selling of slaves was at private initiative rather than state initiative. The potential overlap between pirate and
mercenary further muddies the waters. Finally, the Romans had not acquired
many slaves in recent wars, so the owners of the Sicilian latifundia perhaps
had fewer options in where their slaves came from. Large numbers of Syrian
and Cilician slaves—many of them war captives—were probably sold at Delos
to the owners of the Sicilian latifundia.
Recalling Nerva’s actions just prior to the outbreak of the Second Servile
War, we also see that there was an acknowledgement in Rome that some slaves
had been sold under false pretenses and by Roman law and custom deserved
to be free.19 While the praetor Nerva tried to institute this in Sicily, he soon
stopped. We cannot say that this situation formed a foundation for the revolt
(for what slave ever agreed with his enslavement?), but it seems particularly
likely that this brief period of manumission that was abruptly stopped played
some role in the outbreak of violence.
The resulting suppositions are 1) the slave market of the second half of
the second century was disproportionately and unusually populated with
Syrians or Cilicians and this was particularly true of Sicily, 2) the backbone
of the slave armies of the Second Servile War had a Syrian/Cilician origin,
and 3) many of the Syrian and Cilician slaves had been born free. Even if they
were not the most numerous slaves in Sicily, the Syrians and Cilicians were
the most likely source of slaves with a military background, and accordingly,
more likely to rise to prominent positions in the rebellion. This situation also
bears similarities to the First Servile War: Eunus/Antiochus, the Syrian slave
leader of the First Servile War, similarly had a Cilician commander, Cleon,
and he also named his followers as Syrians.20 When Salvius invokes Tryphon,
Strabo 14.5.2.
See Andreau and Descat 2011: 54–56, who argue that slavery was generally at this
time a secondary consideration to ransom. It had not always been so.
19 See above, n4.
20 Diod. Sic. 34/35.2.24 (see above, n15). I believe Diodorus intends us to understand
that the king renamed all his supporters Syrians, just as he had renamed himself Antiochus.
I think it more likely, however, that he was simply calling them Syrians because they were,
for the most part, Syrian or of Syrian extraction, and that Diodorus misunderstood.
17 18 106
The Pirate Connection: Roman Politics, Servile Wars, and the East
he is not simply picking a regal name from thin air, but invoking past loyalties of the war captives. Again, this suggests that the slaves rebelling in Sicily
had been largely born free.
Nothing in the sources mentions Cilician pirates in connection with these
slaves, positively or negatively (though a connection is mentioned in the third
war, that of Spartacus).21 Nor should we assume, even if Romans viewed
Cilicians as pirates generally, that other Cilicians thought the same way. I
suggest that the slaves were either in contact or trying to come into contact
with Cilicians, perhaps for military aid or supplies, perhaps for transport to
the mainland, and the Roman discovery of this either led the Romans to send
Antonius to Cilicia to head this off or led Antonius to do so on his own initiative. Naturally, any Cilician involvement with the slaves, whether by public
or private initiative, would be seen as piracy (i.e., theft of property) in Rome.
marcus antonius orator
It is not improbable that the involvement of Cilicians at a high level in the first
two slave wars substantially affected Roman attitudes toward Cilicia and that
the naming of Tryphon explicitly invoked a Cilician identity. The Cilicians
may thus have seemed as big a threat as the Sicilians to the Romans. Whatever
the slaves’ connection to the eastern states or whether such a connection even
existed, the Romans had good reason to believe that the Syrian and Cilician
slaves were somehow in collusion with some outside force in Syria or Cilicia.
Furthermore, the presence of Cilicians in roles of authority in the slave army
would have supported such a conclusion.
It is not, then, necessary to assume that Antonius was dispatched to the
region of Cilicia. The brief entry in the Periochae of Livy (Per. 68.1) suggests
that Antonius was reacting to an event of the previous year, and furthermore,
to something likely happening outside of Cilicia: M. Antonius praetor in
Ciliciam maritimos praedones {id est piratas} persecutus est (“Marcus Antonius,
praetor, pursued the pirates into Cilicia”).22 The verb persequor in a military
context most logically means “to chase,” especially with the directional in
Ciliciam.23 So either earlier in this year or in the previous one these praedones
21 Though the Cilician connection to Spartacus has entered the modern imagination,
it is recorded only once, by Plutarch (Crass. 8–11).
22 One manuscript of the Periochae replaces Ciliciam with Siciliam. This is a natural
mistake, and, though tempting, it should not be taken as evidence of a connection between the two places.
23 Were this an ablative Cilicia, something like “sought for” might be a plausible alternative. For a similar usage, see Cic. Fam. 12.15.5: classem fugientem persecuti sumus usque
Aaron L. Beek
107
did something at some distance from Cilicia so that now they could retreat
into it. This pursuit thus appears to be rooted in a specific act of piracy, not
the general activity. This passage is peculiar for an additional reason: no more
is said about this campaign, but the Periochae generally notes campaigns in
terms of victories, defeats, or triumphs rather than “pursuit.”24 Indeed, we do
not really know where Antonius went during his campaign, and in fact, our
direct evidence for Antonius’s presence points only to the port of Side and
perhaps Corinth.25 Instead of further discussion of Antonius, the Periochae
returns to the campaigns of Marius and then the subject of the slave war in
Sicily. Antonius was quite possibly assigned not Cilicia, but the Cilicians, who
had been more successful on the western half of the island than the Syrians
on the east.26 If Livy described the campaign as an adjunct to the Servile War,
then the epitomator’s wording is more consistent.
Whether the region Cilicia posed a real danger or not, Antonius was most
likely sent there (or allowed to head there) out of fear that some foreign force
there would attempt to take advantage of a weakened Sicily. But strangely,
Antonius traveled to Side without his fleet, instructing his subordinate, Hirrus,
to bring it along after it had crossed the diolkos at Corinth (CIL I2.2662: ll. 3–6):
... auspicio [Antoni Marc]i pro consule classis
Isthmum traductast missaque per pelagus.
ipse iter eire profectus Sidam, classem Hirrus Atheneis
pro praetore anni e tempore constituit ....
Under the proconsular auspices of Marcus Antonius, a fleet was drawn across
the Isthmus and sent through the sea. Antonius himself set off on a trip for Side.
Hirrus, propraetor, stationed the fleet in Athens because of the time of year ....27
Sidam (“We pursued the fugitive fleet all the way to Side”). This sense of “pursuit into”
also appears to be promoted by Sherwin-White 1976: 4.
24 See, e.g., Per. 90.7 and 93.1, where a similarly brief mention of Servilius is later followed up by a mention of conquests.
25 By chance, we have an inscription from Greece which indicates that he was headed to
the Pamphylian city of Side. See De Souza 1999:105; Ormerod 1924: 208n4. The inscription
is CIL 12.2662 (= ILLRP 1.342), which is quoted below. Others (such as Sherwin-White
1976: 4) attribute this expedition to the M. Antonius (the so-called “Creticus”) who held
the Cretan command in 74.
26 See Morton 2014, esp. 34–36 for the areas of activity in the Second Servile War.
While the addition of a second praetor to the Sicilian campaign suggests that the Romans
took Sicily a little more seriously, it does accord well with Morton’s observation that the
Romans sent increasingly more and higher ranked commanders as the wars continued.
27 This is an inscription from Corinth praising Hirrus. Cf. IGRom. 4.1116, for a Rhodian
inscription suggesting that there were Rhodians serving under Antonius in this campaign.
108
The Pirate Connection: Roman Politics, Servile Wars, and the East
The unknown event referred to so obliquely in the Periochae may have occurred off the coast of Sicily, leading to the appointment of two praetors to
deal with the southern threat: Servilius to take charge in Sicily, and Antonius
to prevent suspected foreign interference. In pursuing a group of maritimos
praedones, Antonius was led to Cilicia itself.
Other factors complicate the simple account of Antonius being assigned
Cilicia. If his fleet was forced to winter in Athens en route, Antonius must have
arrived in the east fairly late. For the Roman fleet to be reaching Athens perhaps
around October, we might well wonder where he had been until then. The
sailing time alone would not account for the delay. Corinth is two weeks’ sail
from Rome, and Side an additional week and a half. Difficulty in recruiting
or manning ships might offer a plausible explanation. Yet in that case, there
would be little reason not to remain in Italy. Moreover, Antonius appears to
have relied primarily on local recruits when he arrived in the east. A trip to
Sicily to support Servilius, however, would also explain this apparent tardiness.
Political concerns provide further complications for the situation. More
cynical readers could presume that the late start of a Cilician expedition was
due to a lack of real threat from Cilicia. This delay might have been politically
or personally expedient for Antonius, hoping to be prorogued repeatedly
(as he was). Furthermore, we should note that Antonius and Aquilius,28 the
magistrate in charge of Sicily 101–99, were also closely connected politically.
Antonius won a triumph on his return in 100, Aquilius an ovatio in 99, and
notably, Antonius defended Aquilius in court in 98 on a variety of charges.
If Antonius was tasked with supporting Sicily, then he might hold back from
assisting Servilius so that his ally would have a better chance to complete the
victory in the following year.29 Yet another potential motive appears in the form
of profit. Despite little mention of his victories in sources like the Periochae,
we hear from Cicero that Antonius had substantial Cilician spoils both for his
triumph in 100 and for decorating the rostra during his censorship in 97.30 It
is possible that the man Cicero considered one of the greatest orators of his
generation (and one who nearly talked his assassins out of killing him) was
able to convince an audience in Rome that a campaign in Cilicia was to their
Alternatively spelled Aquillius, with a second “l.”
This sort of campaign sabotage had already occurred in Sicily (see n1 above for
Lucullus and Servilius).
30 Cic. De or. 3.10. Again, nowhere does it assert that these Cilician spoils were from
Cilicia and not from Cilicians: they were the spoils gained when he was called imperator
by his men.
28 29 Aaron L. Beek
109
benefit.31 Thus we have two plausible rationales for the Romans’ initiation
of a campaign in Cilicia: first, a real material connection between Sicily and
Cilicia, and second, the possibility that the great orator Antonius made a fictitious argument on such grounds for a campaign, motivated by personal profit.
Moreover, the triumph Antonius celebrated in 100 was probably a grand
triumph not over Cilicia, but over a potential alliance between the Cilician
slaves in Sicily and Cilicians on the mainland that threatened to expand the
war. His achievement was thus seen as greater than his individual conquests
in Cilicia. His close association with Manlius Aquilius, who had succeeded
where three others had failed, could only support him and lend credence to
his claims of victory. It also made sense for Antonius to stress the location
of Cilicia, as defeating an external foe was intrinsically more glorious than
putting down a rebellion.
Each of the campaigns (in Cilicia and Sicily) has problems for which I
believe a useful solution is posed by the other campaign. Taken individually,
the evidence is relatively flimsy. Yet, in sum, a pattern forms. Certainly, the
phrase in Ciliciam in the Periochae could instead be taken as referring to an
expedition from coastal Cilicia into the mountains, yet this does not correspond well with the Corinth inscription’s description of the Roman fleet,
which suggests naval action. The presence of Cilician slaves in Sicily prior to
any Roman campaigning in Cilicia is a mere oddity. A campaign emerging in
Cilicia after the revolt of Cilician slaves in Sicily is unlikely to be coincidence.
Understanding a connection between Cilicia and Sicily, real or imagined,
offers explanations for several unresolved puzzles: 1) why the Romans sent
forces to Cilicia in 102 rather than another year; 2) the name correspondence
and origins of the slave leaders; 3) the late arrival of Antonius’s fleet in the
east, 4) Rome’s sudden interest and persistence in chasing Cilician pirates,
and 5) why a campaign with such little lasting effect justified a triumph for
Antonius. It also highlights the otherwise little-known military and political
cooperation (and potential collusion) between Marcus Antonius Orator and
Marcus Aquilius.
Furthermore, if we were to posit that the Romans had a fear of enemies
escaping into other lands to cause future trouble (as Jugurtha had fled to
Mauretania) and/or a fear of enemies calling in foreign powers to assist them,
we would expect that this fear would be documented in some form of public
letter or communicated to foreign allies in some way. I would argue that this
For Cicero’s opinion, see De oratore (throughout), where M. Antonius Orator is
one of the main interlocutors. For Antonius and his assassins, see Vell. Pat. 22.3; Plut.
Mar. 44.1–4.
31 110
The Pirate Connection: Roman Politics, Servile Wars, and the East
is precisely what we see in the provisions of the contemporaneous Lex de
Provinciis Praetoriis.
the lex de provinciis praetoriis
A connection between Sicily and Cilicia has ramifications for our understanding of future policy in Cilicia. The Lex de Provinciis Praetoriis (hence LdPP)
is a fragmentary law that has caused much dispute. Among its many provisions, it mentions Cilicia as a province to be assigned a governor, attempts to
preemptively adjudicate conflicts of jurisdiction, and requires the consuls to
send a letter to Rome’s eastern allies concerning pirates. The law dates from
the end of the second century, either 101 or 100, and is preserved in two sets of
fragments (in Greek) found at Delphi and Cnidos.32 A law passed per saturam,
it was probably a plebiscite and probably belongs to the controversial body
of legislation passed by Saturninus.33
Before the discovery of the second set of fragments, this law was understood
by most scholars to be principally anti-pirate legislation. After more of the
law was discovered, this remained the ostensible purpose of a section of the
decree. Yet this solution seems implausible, because Roman actions explicitly
against pirates do not start appearing until the 70s. Moreover, if seen as a
method of deterring piracy or of creating an eastern anti-piracy coalition,
this law would seem to have been a miserable failure: eastern monarchs like
the Ptolemies continued to hire pirates as mercenary forces.34 We have external corroboration that at least some of the missives were sent: one town in
Anatolia, Syedra, sent a delegation to Delphi to inquire whether they should
obey the Romans.35
32 For the law and translations, as well as some discussion of past scholarship, see
Crawford 1996: 231–70, which follows upon the earlier publication of Hassall, Crawford,
and Reynolds 1974. Since Crawford 1996, the most relevant discussion is probably
Tarwacka 2009: 37–43.
33 Lintott 1976:71–72; Tarwacka 2009: 42.
34 According to Strabo (14.5.2), the Ptolemies in both Cyprus and Egypt were employing
pirates in the first century. Criscuolo 2013: 171 argues that the Ptolemies’ continuation of
pirate employment made the Romans distrustful of Egypt, which led to the later seizure
of Cyprus. See also Tarwacka 2009: 42–43, who suggests that this was the intended goal,
which failed due to a combination of the usefulness of pirates to the eastern allies and
eastern fears of Roman power.
35 The (unhelpful) response was apparently that the Syedrans “should do the right
thing.”
Aaron L. Beek
111
The purpose of the decree remains unclear. It could be understood as
a diplomatic effort to reinforce the claim of Antonius to have defeated the
Cilicians. With the lack of a clear, overwhelming victory, there was some question about the control of the interior, even if the status of the coastal cities
was clear.36 Yet there is little emphasis on asserting Roman claims to Cilicia
and Lycaonia, and the proposed list of the recipients does not bode well for
this: many of the states closest to Cilicia were not listed, though we appear to
have the inscription’s full list.37
table 1: states that were indicated in the ldpp to
receive the decreed letters
(Assuming a date of 100 b.c.e.)
Recipients
Presumed Non-recipients
The Rhodian Republic
Mithridates VI (Pontus)
Ptolemy Apion (Cyrene)
Mithridates II (Parthia)
Ptolemy Alexander (Egypt)
Mithridates I (Commagene)
Ptolemy Soter Lathyros (Cyprus)
Artavasdes (Armenia)
Antiochus Grypus (Syria [north])
Nicomedes III (Bithynia)
Antiochus Cyzicenus (Syria [south])
Ariarathes VIII (Cappadocia)
Bakru (Osroene)
Some have taken this decree as provisionally creating a super-command in
the east for Marius along the lines of the later Gabinian law. While plausible,
this interpretation does not provide a rationale for the missives to Rome’s
allies. Furthermore, if the decree was intended as a form of imperium maius
36 Suggested by Hassall, Crawford, and Reynolds 1974; see note on Col.III, ll.35–37
p.211, but see also Crawford 1996: 258, disagreeing with the earlier statement written in
part by him. For additional modern scholarship suggesting that Antonius’s (permanent)
gains in Cilicia were negligible, see Broughton 1938: 519; Levick 1967: 22. Sherwin-White
1976 asserts that a portion of the law does constitute a formal Roman claim to “Rough”
Cilicia.
37 The end of Cnidos Column III l.41 and beginning of Delphi Block B ii.8 appear to be
the same line, so unless the lists were reordered, we have the full list. However, we should
also note that the city of Syedra was apparently informed, and is not included on the list.
112
The Pirate Connection: Roman Politics, Servile Wars, and the East
for Marius, it was not taken up, and we do not know of anyone who held the
command in Cilicia after Antonius until Sulla (perhaps as early as 96, but
the date of his command is debated).38 These are problematic solutions to
an admittedly baffling inscription.
A Sicilian connection to this law may offer some solutions. If the Cilicians
mentioned were either fugitive Cilician slaves from Sicily that had somehow
managed to return to Anatolia or Cilician cities that had offered asylum to
fugitive slaves, then this warning in the LdPP is a warning not against piracy
as we understand it, but against harboring fugitive slaves.39 In that case, this
would not be a general prohibition of piracy, but instead a response to a
specific political situation.
Fugitives were important. In ancient accounts of the servile wars, special
care is taken to insist that most slaves were accounted for, whether killed or
recaptured.40 There was investment, moral as well as economic, in ensuring
that slaves did not escape. In the Roman mindset, allowing fugitives to escape
would show a weakness that would cause more slaves to attempt escape. In
effect, the terms of the inscription would serve as a warning not to offer
asylum to Rome’s enemies.41
Moreover, there is an excellent reason for the letter not to refer to these
individuals directly as fugitivi. The Lex de Plagiariis of approximately 4–5 years
earlier had addressed the issue of slaves who were citizens of eastern allies.
Those allies had requested the return of their citizens. The letter mentioned
38 There is no space here to reiterate the arguments concerning the date of Sulla’s
command, which have ranged from 96 to 92. The most relevant ancient references are
Vell. Pat. 2.15.3, Plut. Sull. 5, and Sid. Apoll. Carm. 2.440 and 7.70. Sulla’s praetorship
and subsequent governorship is put in 93–92 by Broughton, MRR 2.18, 19nn3, 6 and
Arnaud 1991, but in 97–96 (or 96–95) by Freeman 1986, Badian 1959 and 1962, and
Keaveney 1980, 1982, and 1995. Sherwin-White 1977, Sumner 1978, and McGing 1986:
78 argue for 95–94 (but see also Sherwin-White 1984). See McGing 1986: 78, esp. n45 for
discussion. Regarding the issue of imperium maius, this too would require great space,
though Ehrenberg 1953 and Tarwacka 2009: 43–55 may suffice. The key ancient accounts
for understanding this issue are Vell. Pat. 2.31 and Tac. Ann. 15.25, both in reference to
Pompey’s later extraordinary command.
39 In this period, asylia is, of course, a Greek custom, not a Roman custom. See Dench
2005: 16–21 for some understanding (albeit later) of the Roman attitudes toward asylum.
For the Greek practice of asylia generally, see Rigsby 1997.
40 E.g., Diod. Sic. 36.10; Flor. 3.19–20.
41 As a much later example, Cicero claimed that the inhabitants of Pindenissum were
harboring fugitivi (Cic. Fam. 5.10.4). Though the word in this passage often is translated
“deserters,” I believe Cicero intends “fugitive slaves.”
Aaron L. Beek
113
in the LdPP is sent to these allies, and it would naturally be best to avoid that
topic while the slave/citizenship status of these individuals was under any
dispute whatsoever. The remnants of a defeated force automatically became
considered “bandits” or “pirates” if they did not surrender. Thus, the decree
would have the additional aim of stopping pirates—not a generalized piracy
in the abstract, but rather this specific group of Cilicians the Romans had
already been fighting. This is not a moral injunction, but one rooted in specific Roman interests.
If understood in the greater Mediterranean context, this otherwise problematic law and letter both justify the Roman invasion of Cilicia and warn
the other powers of the east not to repeat the mistake the Cilicians (supposedly) made. If the law is read in this way, and not as “anti-pirate legislation,”
it may have been quite effective in curtailing Cilician resistance. In that case,
it would have both hindered Cilicians from leaving and held up the Cilicians
as an example to others. Moreover, if I am correct in understanding the campaign of Antonius as punitive, then a failure to punish the Cilicians would be
politically unacceptable, which would offer another explanation for why the
Romans were so invested in Cilicia in the following years.
conclusion
It is unfortunate that Livy’s full account is lost to us. Nevertheless, despite
the individual weaknesses of the available evidence, I submit the following
version of events as clearer, less problematic, and more likely than the currently accepted version.
table 2: revised chronology (all dates b.c.e.)
130s?–100sCilician and Syrian captives taken in the Seleucid civil wars are
sold abroad as slaves, many at Delos to owners of latifundia in
Sicily.
ca. 106Roman allies complain about their citizens being held in slavery
by Roman slave-owners.
105 or 104By the request of Rome’s eastern allies, a Lex de Plagiariis is
passed, requiring slave-owners to free any slave who was born
a citizen of a state currently allied to Rome (which, at this time,
includes the Syrian kingdom).
104The praetor P. Licinius Nerva attempts to enforce this law in
Sicily, but, under pressure from local landlords after freeing 800
slaves, calls off future hearings.
114
The Pirate Connection: Roman Politics, Servile Wars, and the East
table 2, cont.
104Slaves (of Cilician and Syrian extraction) revolt in Sicily after
hearings are called off; the revolters choose a king and name
him Tryphon.
104-3Slave forces in Sicily under the Cilician Athenion defeat the
armies first of Nerva, then of Lucullus. Lucullus, upon learning
he would be replaced by Servilius, burns down his defenses and
disbands his army.
Early 102Two praetors are assigned to the Sicilian/Cilician problem:
Servilius is assigned the land forces in Sicily, and Antonius is
assigned the naval forces to protect Sicily.
Mid 102Servilius is also defeated by the ex-slaves; Antonius pursues
Cilician praedones to Cilicia to punish them.
Late 102Antonius leaves the fleet in Athens, travels to Side without his
naval force, and enlists local forces among the Pamphylians and
Rhodians to campaign in Cilicia.
101A political ally of Antonius, Aquilius, wins the consulship and
the Sicilian command. Antonius continues campaigning in
Pamphylia and Rough Cilicia.
Late 101/
Lex de Provinciis Praetoriis is passed, including provision to
early 100 write letters of explanation to Roman allies. These letters are
meant to prevent others from aiding or sheltering Cilicians.
100Antonius continues his campaign in Anatolia, and Aquilius
finally defeats the ex-slave army in Sicily.
Dec. 100Antonius returns to Rome and receives a triumph.
99Aquilius returns to Rome and wins an ovatio. Antonius holds
the consulship.
98Antonius defends Aquilius against a charge of peculation.
97Antonius, now censor, decorates the rostra with his spoils.
Ahenobarbus, praetor in Sicily, bans weapons.
ca. 96 or laterAntonius is charged with (but acquitted of) ambitus (see Cic.
De. or. 2.274).
In this account, I argue that Antonius either reinterpreted his orders or was
given new orders to pursue Cilicians to Cilicia. It is not necessary to see any
Aaron L. Beek
115
provocation originating from Anatolia. An attempt of Cilicians in Sicily to flee
to Cilicia would be sufficient. At the same time, it is necessary to recognize
that the end of the second century was a period of extreme political infighting
and that this infighting in Rome had repercussions for Roman acts outside
of Rome. Thus the proposed rationales are not necessarily the real rationales.
We are perhaps too ready to think of “Cilicia” as a specific place and provinciae as territories. Antonius, assigned a fleet, was probably not actually
assigned a campaign against the land Cilicia, but rather one against a people:
the Cilicians. Athenion and the slave rebels in Sicily were Cilicians, even if
they were not in the land of Cilicia. Having arrived in Sicily, Antonius later
determined to pursue some Cilicians to Cilicia and continued his campaign
there. This interpretation of his charge was ultimately held as justified and
he was praised and rewarded for it, the more so because he was able to point
at not one, but two victories as a result of his actions.
works cited
Andreau, J. and Descat, R. 2011. The Slave in Greece and Rome. Trans. by M. Leopold.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Arnaud, P. 1991. “Sylla, Tigrane, et les Parthes. Un nouveau document pour la datation
de la propréture de Sylla, Sidoine Apollinaire, Paneg. Aviti 79–82.” REA 93: 55–64.
Badian, E. 1959. “Sulla’s Cilician Command.” Athenaeum 37: 279–303.
———. 1962. “Waiting for Sulla.” JRS 52: 47–61.
Baldwin, B. 1967. “Two Aspects of the Spartacus Slave Revolt.” CJ 62: 289–94.
Bradley, K. R. 1989. Slavery and Rebellion in the Roman World, 140 B.C.–70 B.C. London:
Batsford.
Broughton, T. R. S. 1946. “Notes on Roman Magistrates. I. The Command of M. Antonius
in Cilicia. II. Lucullus’ Commission and Pompey’s Acta.” TAPA 77: 35–43.
Brunt, P. A. 1971. Italian Manpower 225 B.C.–14 A.D. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Crawford, M. H. 1996. Roman Statutes. 2 vols. London: Institute of Classical Studies.
Criscuolo, L. 2013. “Ptolemies and Piracy.” In Buraselis, K., Stefanou, M., and Thompson,
D. J. eds. The Ptolemies, the Sea and the Nile: Studies in Waterborne Power. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. 160–71.
de Souza, P. 1999. Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Dench, E. 2005. Romulus’ Asylum: Roman Identities from the Age of Alexander to the Age
of Hadrian. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Desideri, P. 1991. “Strabo’s Cilicians.” Anatolia Antiqua 1: 299–304.
Ehrenberg, V. 1953. “Imperium Maius in the Roman Republic.” AJP 74: 113–36.
Epstein, D. F. 1987. Personal Enmity in Roman Politics 218–43 BC. London: Croom Helm.
Erim, K. 1958. “Morgantina.” AJA 62: 79–90.
Ferrary, J.–L. 1977. “Recherches sur la législation de Saturninus et de Glaucia.” MEFRA
89: 619–60.
116
The Pirate Connection: Roman Politics, Servile Wars, and the East
Freeman, P. 1986. “The Province of Cilicia and its Origins.” In Freeman, P. and Kennedy,
D. L., eds. The Defence of the Roman and Byzantine East. Oxford: B.A.R. 253–75.
Giovannini, A. and Grzybek, E. 1978. “La lex de piratis persequendis.” MH 35: 33–47.
Grünewald, T. 2004. Bandits in the Roman Empire: Myth and Reality. Trans. by J. Drinkwater.
London: Routledge.
Hassall, M., Crawford, M., and Reynolds, J. 1974. “Rome and the Eastern Provinces at the
End of the Second Century B.C.” JRS 64: 195–220.
Henry, R. 1959–77. Photius: Bibliothèque. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Keaveney, A. 1980. “Deux dates contestées de la carrière de Sylla.” LEC 48: 149–59.
———. 1995. “Sulla’s Cilician Command: The Evidence of Apollinaris Sidonius.” Historia
44: 29–36.
Levick, B. 1967. Roman Colonies in Southern Asia Minor. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lintott, A. W. 1976. “Notes on the Roman Law Inscribed at Delphi and Cnidos.” ZPE
20: 65–82.
Madsen, J. M. 2009. “The Ambitions of Mithridates VI: Hellenistic Kingship and Modern
Interpretations.” In Højte, J. M. ed. Mithridates VI and the Pontic Kingdom. Aarhus:
Aarhus University Press. 191–201.
McGing, B. C. 1979. “Appian, Manius Aquillius, and Phrygia.” GRBS 21: 35–42.
———. 1986. The Foreign Policy of Mithridates VI Eupator, King of Pontus. Leiden: Brill.
Meineke, A. 1852–53. Strabonis Geographica. Leipzig: Teubner.
Morton, P. 2012. Refiguring the Sicilian Slave Wars: From Servile Unrest to Civic Disquiet
and Social Disorder. Diss. University of Edinburgh.
———. 2013. “Eunus: The Cowardly King.” CQ 63: 237–52.
———. 2014. “The Geography of Rebellion: Strategy and Supply in the Two ‘Sicilian
Slave Wars.’” BICS 57: 20–38.
Ormerod, H. A. 1924. Piracy in the Ancient World: An Essay in Mediterranean History.
Liverpool: University Press of Liverpool Ltd.
Rigsby, K. J. 1996. Asylia: Territorial Inviolability in the Hellenistic World. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Rossbach, O. 1910. Periochae Omnium Librorum. Fragmenta Oxyrhynchi Reperta. Iulii
Obsequentis Prodigiorum Liber. Leipzig: Teubner.
Sherwin-White, A. N. 1976. “Rome, Pamphylia, and Cilicia, 133–70 B.C.” JRS 66: 1–14.
———. 1977. “Roman Involvement in Anatolia, 167–88 B.C.” JRS 67: 62–75.
———. 1984. Roman Foreign Policy in the East 168 B.C. to A.D. 1. London: Duckworth.
Sumner, G. V. 1978. “Sulla’s Career in the Nineties.” CP 56: 395–96.
Syme, R. 1939. “Observations on the Province of Cilicia.” In Calder, W. M. and Keil, J.
eds. Anatolian Studies Presented to William Hepburn Buckler. Manchester: Manchester
University Press. 299–332.
Tansey, P. 2010. “Antonia and the Pirates.” CQ 60: 656–58.
Tarwacka, A. 2009. Romans and Pirates: Legal Perspective. Warsaw: University of Warsaw.
Urbainczyk, T. 2008. Slave Revolts in Antiquity. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Verbrugghe, G. P. 1972. “Sicily 210–70 B.C.: Livy, Cicero and Diodorus.” TAPA 103:
535–59.