Download Division and Umma - White Plains Public Schools

yes no Was this document useful for you?
   Thank you for your participation!

* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project

Document related concepts

Islamic democracy wikipedia , lookup

War against Islam wikipedia , lookup

Islam and war wikipedia , lookup

Al-Nahda wikipedia , lookup

Fiqh wikipedia , lookup

History of Nizari Ismailism wikipedia , lookup

Succession to Muhammad wikipedia , lookup

Usul Fiqh in Ja'fari school wikipedia , lookup

Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan wikipedia , lookup

Islam and secularism wikipedia , lookup

Shia Islam wikipedia , lookup

Islam in Bangladesh wikipedia , lookup

History of Islam wikipedia , lookup

Ashura wikipedia , lookup

Caliphate wikipedia , lookup

Anti-Shi'ism wikipedia , lookup

Islam in Afghanistan wikipedia , lookup

Political aspects of Islam wikipedia , lookup

Islam in Iran wikipedia , lookup

Imamah (Shia) wikipedia , lookup

Isma'ilism wikipedia , lookup

Criticism of Twelver Shia Islam wikipedia , lookup

Schools of Islamic theology wikipedia , lookup

Islamic schools and branches wikipedia , lookup

Origin of Shia Islam wikipedia , lookup

Division and Umma
World History
E. Napp
Name: __________________
Date: __________________
Historical Context:
“The jockeying for power among various political, economic, tribal, and religious
interest groups precipitated a series of civil wars [in the Islamic community]. A
contingent of Arab troops from Egypt assassinated the third caliph, Uthman (r. 644656), complaining that under his administration their local governors were cruel,
their pay was inadequate, and class divisions were destroying Arab unity.
Uthman’s successor, Ali (r. 656-661) was elected despite considerable opposition.
Supporting his election most strongly was the shiat Ali, ‘the party of Ali,’ usually
referred to simply as the Shi’a or Shi’ites. This group felt that the caliph should be
chosen from the family of the Prophet. They had opposed the election of the first
three caliphs. Ali, as the cousin and also the son-in-law of Muhammad, having
married his daughter Fatima, was the first caliph to fit their requirement. In
opposition, members of Uthman’s family, the Umayyad clan, preferred one of their
own. They argued for acceptance of the first three caliphs as legitimate since they
were chosen by the umma [Muslim community] and reflected the sunna, or example,
of the Prophet. They and their followers called themselves Sunnis. Finally, a third
group, who had long opposed the Umayyad for their own reasons, feared that Ali
might reach an accommodation with their rivals, and assassinated him.
After Ali’s assassination, the Umayyad leader, Mu’awiya (r. 661-680), declared
himself caliph. Moving the capital out of Arabia to Damascus in Syria, Mu’awiya
distanced himself from the original Muslim elite of the Arabian Peninsula. He
opened Islam to more cosmopolitan influences and a more professional style of
imperial administration.
Tension remained high among the various religious and tribal factions, however,
and civil war broke out again on Mu’awiya’s death in 680. His son, Yazid I (r. 680683), claimed the caliphate, but Husayn, son of the assassinated Ali, took the field
against him. When Husayn was killed in battle at Karbala, Iraq, in the year 680, he
joined his father as the second martyr of the Shi’a branch of Islam.
The Shi’as stressed the importance of religious purity and they wanted the caliph
to represent Islam’s religious principles rather than its imperial aspirations. They
felt that Ali, in addition to his heritage as a member of the family of the Prophet,
represented that purer orientation, and they would recognize only descendants of
Ali as imams, religious leaders who were also rightful caliphs. From 680 onward,
Shi’as went into battle for the appointment of their imams to fill the position of
One after another, all of the first eleven Shi’a imams are believed to have died as
martyrs, either in battle or through assassination. After the death of the eleventh
imam in 874, and the disappearance of his son, the hereditary line ended. From that
time onward, ‘twelver’ Shi’as have looked forward to the reappearance of the
‘hidden’ twelfth imam, referred to as the madhi, or the ‘rightly guided one,’ a
messiah, to usher in a new age of Islam, truth, and justice. Meanwhile, they have
usually been willing to accept the authority of the current government, while
stressing matters of the spiritual rather than the temporal world.
The great majority of Muslims, however, regarded the caliph as primarily a
political official, administering the empire of Islam. They accepted the rule of the
Umayyads, based on Sunni teachings and the importance of the umma in making
political decisions.
The division between Sunni and Shi’a, which began over the proper succession to
the caliphate, has continued to the present, long after the caliphate has ceased to
exist, as the principal sectarian division within Islam. Some 83 percent of the
world’s Muslims today are Sunnis, 16 percent Shi’as. This split is largely
geographical with Shi’as forming 95 percent of the population of Iran and about 60
percent of the population of Iraq. Ismailis, a branch of Shi’as, are found mostly in
Pakistan and India. Elsewhere Sunnis are the overwhelming majority.
The Sunni-Shi’a division is the most significant in Islam, but it is not the only one.
At the death of the sixth imam in 765, there was another conflict over acceptance of
the seventh. The majority chose the imam’s younger son, but a minority followed
the elder son Ismail. The Ismailis proselytized actively and led frequent rebellions
against the caliphate. Later the Ismailis also divided. One branch lives on today,
revering the Aga Khan as its leader.”
~ The World’s History
What are the main points of the passage?
12345678910The Article: Pakistan Reels with Violence against Shiites; New York Times,
December 3, 2012, Declan Walsh
QUETTA, Pakistan – Calligraphers linger at the gates of an ancient graveyard in
this brooding city in western Pakistan, charged with a macabre and increasingly indemand task: inscribing the tombstones of the latest victims of the sectarian death
squads that openly roam these streets.
For at least a year now, Sunni extremist gunmen have been methodically attacking
members of the Hazara community, a Persian-speaking Shiite minority that
emigrated here from Afghanistan more than a century ago. The killers strike with
chilling abandon, apparently fearless of the law: shop owners are gunned down at
their counters, students as they play cricket, pilgrims dragged from buses and
executed on the roadside.
The latest victim, a mechanic named Hussain Ali, was killed Wednesday, shot
inside his workshop. He joined the list of more than 100 Hazaras who have been
killed this year, many in broad daylight. As often as not, the gunmen do not even
bother to cover their faces.
The bloodshed is part of a wider surge in sectarian violence across Pakistan in
which at least 375 Shiites have died this year – the worst toll since the 1990s, human
rights workers say. But as their graveyard fills, Hazaras say the mystery lies not in
the identity of their attackers, who are well known, but in a simpler question: why
the Pakistani state cannot – or will not – protect them.
“After every killing, there are no arrests,” said Muzaffar Ali Changezi, a retired
Hazara engineer. “So if the government is not supporting these killers, it must be at
least protecting them. That’s the only way to explain how they operate so openly.”
The government, already battling Taliban insurgents, insists it is taking the threat
seriously. During the recent Mourning of Muhurram, when Shiites parade through
the streets over 10 days, the Interior Ministry imposed stringent security measures
such as blocking cellphone signals for up to 12 hours – to try to prevent remote
bomb detonations – and banning doubled-up motorcycle riding. Even so, Sunni
bombers struck at least five times, killing at least 50 Shiites and wounding several
hundred. The Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for the biggest attacks,
highlighting an emerging link between that group and traditional sectarian
militants that has worried many.
Yet the unchecked killings have also raised wider questions about Pakistani
society: about the spread of a cancerous sectarian ideology in a public that even just
a decade ago seemed more tolerant, and about what might be spurring the growing
audacity of the killers, some of whom are believed to have links to the country’s
security services.
What are the main points of the passage?
The murders in Quetta, for instance, involve remarkably little mystery. By
wide consensus, the gunmen are based in Mastung, a dusty agricultural village
18 miles to the south that is the bustling local hub of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the
country’s most notorious sectarian militant group.
Like so many Pakistani groups that combine guns with zealotry, Lashkar-eJhangvi thrives in a wink-and-nod netherworld: it is officially banned, but its
leader, Malik Ishaq, was released from jail last year amid showers of rose petals
thrown by supporters. Now Mr. Malik lives openly in southern Punjab Province,
protected by armed men who loiter outside his door, allowing him to deliver
hate-laced statements to visitors. Shiites are “the greatest infidels on earth,” he
told a Reuters reporter last month.
In Quetta, his followers are similarly unfettered. In targeting the Hazara – who,
with their distinctive Central Asian features, are easy to pick out – Lashkar-eJhangvi militants block busy highways as they search vehicles for Hazaras and
daub walls with hate slogans. “The face is the target,” said Major Nadir Ali, a
senior Hazara leader and retired army officer. “They see the face, then they
In the worst killing this year, militants dragged 26 Hazara men from a bus
headed for a religious pilgrimage site in Iran, and executed them in front of their
wives. The episode occurred near Mastung.
There is a growing sense of siege in the Hazara community here. Shards of
glass are still lodged in the head of Waqar Husain, an engineering student who
survived a bomb attack on a crowded university bus last June. Four students
died in the attack, and four lost their sight. “It changed my view of life in
Quetta,” he said.
Now largely confined to home, Mr. Hussain is still not safe. Threats come via
Facebook and Twitter, he said, through taunting messages about the “Shia
kaffir” – infidels.
The campaign of fear has forced the Hazara to retreat into ethnic enclaves on
the edge of the city. Businesses have moved from the city center to Alamgir
Road, a Hazara quarter where discreetly armed men stand watch on street
corners. Even the ambulance drivers are armed.
One driver cocked his pistol before leading the way to the site of a recent
attack. Across the street, the flag of a banned Sunni group fluttered from a shop
with graffiti that read: “There is one treatment for Shiites – it is called jihad.”
The rattle of attacks is just one of several conflicts plaguing Quetta, a once quiet
provincial capital now riven by a range of ethnic fissures and violent intrigues,
lending it an air of power-keg tension.
Most famously, the city is, or was, home to the “Quetta Shura,” the secretive
Afghan Taliban leadership council. But for the Pakistan Army, the main enemy
are ethnic Baluch separatists, who killed three soldiers in a bomb attack in
central Quetta on Nov. 21.
What are the main points of the passage?
1234567Foreigners are no longer safe, either treated as Western spies by suspicious
officials or abducted as part of a soaring trade in kidnapping. Last April the
decapitated body of Khalil Dale, a British Red Cross doctor, was found near
Quetta, three months after suspected militants abducted him for ransom.
With such a dizzy array of threats, it is perhaps unsurprising that the security
forces have failed to stem sectarian violence. But many analysts see a more
disturbing cause: a fatal ambivalence inside the police and military toward
jihadi groups.
While the military ostensibly severed its relationship with Islamist groups like
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi after 2001, some activists suspect that, at a local level, ties
linger. “The authorities are turning a blind eye,” said Ali Dayan Hasan of
Human Rights Watch. “The most charitable explanation is that they are
incompetent. The alternative is that the military enjoys an informal alliance with
Sunni extremists.”
A senior official with the Frontier Corps, the paramilitary force in charge of
securing Quetta, denied accusations of collusion. The situation is “challenging,”
he admitted, speaking on the condition of anonymity. “But there is no problem
with the Hazara. We pursue all criminals, irrespective of sect, caste or religion.”
Regional politics also plays a role. Iran and Saudi Arabia financed rival Shiite
and Sunni militant groups in the 1990s, as part of a proxy war for influence.
Experts say that, while the Iranian financing has slowed dramatically, private
Saudi funds continue to pour in.
In a State Department cable dated December 2009 and published by
WikiLeaks, Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton noted that “donors in
Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist
groups worldwide.”
The sense of siege has turned to flight for many younger Hazaras, who are
leaving their homes in Quetta for Australia, 6,000 miles distant and the largest
center of the Hazara diaspora. It is an expensive, dangerous journey: after
paying up to $15,000 per head to people smugglers, many are forced to brave
perilous journeys in rickety boats across the Indian Ocean. Too often, the boats
sink en route, taking hundreds of lives.
Muhammad Hussain, a 39-year-old teacher, said two of his brothers had left
for Australia in the past four years – one had almost certainly drowned, he
believed; the other, who left four months ago, had still not sent news.
“We just don’t know what happened,” he said, twisting his fingers anxiously as
he spoke.
What are the main points of the passage?
1234567Analyze the image regarding sectarian violence in Iraq: