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CIMIC IN NATO TRANSFORMATION
CIVIL- MILITARY COLLABORATION IN AFGHANISTAN
This paper identifies opportunities for military-civilian collaboration in Afghanistan and
the ground rules for such collaboration. It considers the complexities of the country
and new asymmetric threats that have revealed inadequacies in the evolving CIMIC
doctrine, provoking a revision of the same. The following should be read in tandem
with the appended draft “Principles Guiding the Civil Military Interface in Afghanistan
which are in need of broader input and further refinement, particularly regarding the
following:
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Clear delineation of task between civilian-military entities
Identification of areas for collaboration and procedural guidance
Revision of Guiding Principles with input from all key actors
Clarification of permissible and non-permissible civilian-military interaction
Inclusive and representative CIMIC Coordination mechanisms
ISAF-Coalition Coordination
Unity of Command to ensure national military units adhere to NATO/ISAF
doctrine
SITUATION ANALYSIS
1. Despite recent political and economic progress, Afghanistan remains a fractured
state and a breeding-ground for the drug trade, inter-group rivalry, and internecine
violence. It is also a testing-ground for a new form of multilateral intervention that has
yet to achieve its mission. Warlords/druglords operate independently throughout the
country, jockeying for both the spoils-of-war and the dividends-of-peace. The
Government lacks the capacity to control various factions and to extend physical and
social security to remote areas of the country. While this capacity is being gradually
enhanced, the majority of Afghans remain poverty-stricken, unemployed, food
insecure, and frustrated by expectations that rise but remain unmet.
2. Drought continues in the southern regions, where a reduction of pasturelands and
winter fodder has reduced livestock numbers and associated income to their lowest
levels. Underground aquifers across the country are still not replenished, preventing
farmers from undertaking spring or kariz irrigation. The problem has discouraged
large Kuchi and other IDP populations from returning home, rendering them
dependent on external assistance. Distress sales of family assets by desperate
farmers, combined with high rent and mortgages, have propagated a cycle of
indebtedness and reliance on larger landowners. The absence of security and
physical infrastructure at district levels undermines the ability of central Government
to ensure coherence between aid operations, military operations and national
priorities.
3. Feelings of frustration, alienation and distrust are highest in remote areas of the
country and amongst ethnic, religious and political minorities who have not been
adequately integrated into the political-economic mainstream and have yet to
measurably benefit from the peace. They perceive themselves as marginalized and
traditional ethnic divisions combined with new foreign alliances have fed their
suspicion of central Government authorities. Incident reports reflect increasing intergroup competition and rivalry for scarce resources and jobs. The continued absence
of employment opportunities alongside widening disparities between groups has
encouraged some to remain sympathetic to the Taliban, which continues to launch
daily strikes in the south-east as drug related violence and social tension racks nearly
all other regions to varying degrees.
4. The aid community has the expertise and capacity to provide humanitarian and
reconstruction assistance at required levels, however insecurity has prevented
regular humanitarian access to those remote areas where food and livelihood
insecurity and rising tensions are most prevalent. Continuing security incidents
involving the local population and aid personnel have further undermined public trust
in the ability of the Government, NATO/ISAF and Coalition forces to deal effectively
with armed elements and prevent the country from sliding towards chaos.
RISK FACTORS:
5. The same conditions that originally fuelled the conflict in Afghanistan will continue
to exist beyond the up-coming elections. The more important risks to stability, which
need to be rapidly addressed, include the following:
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Social exclusion based on ethnicity, gender and political affiliation.
Visible lack of central government presence/authority at provincial/district levels.
Highly visible presence of foreign military ‘perceived as’ occupation forces.
Inequitable/regional distribution of resources, with income disparities/imbalances
Lack of both social and physical infrastructure and market access
Extremely poor nutrition and health conditions
Large-scale displacement (Kuchi, etc.) of
populations lacking minimum
assistance
Domination of rogue leaders in north/south, illegal taxation, criminalized
economies
Anti-personnel mines of unknown location
Lack of national, provincial, district community capacity and basic services
Absence of employment opportunities/alternatives to conflict/drug economy
Human rights abuses and lack of intervention
Untapped opportunities for civic engagement
Lack of civilian confidence in central authorities and international community
Alienation, apathy and feelings of helplessness amongst marginalized groups
Inappropriate assistance of limited duration and sustainable impact
Lack of coherent, integrated programmes and adherence to basic principles
Long tradition of support for low-risk, low-opportunity initiatives. Tendency to put
development ‘on-hold’ or fail to exploit opportunities when they present
themselves.
Inadequate cohesion, coordination and joint programming at the operational level
CIVIL- MILITARY RESPONSE
6. Arrayed against poverty and instability in Afghanistan are 13 (military) Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), 18 UN agencies, 232 INGOs/NGOs, several donor
aid missions, numerous communities and associations, and the Government of
Afghanistan. The success of their mission is dependent on the ability of this loosely
knit group to achieve cohesion and unity of purpose; to reach consensus on
objectives, strategies, operational modalities, and roles and to adhere to the same.
Above all, they must respect and be guided by the authority of Government and the
will of the Afghan people. The general public nevertheless remains confused about
the civil-military relationship in Afghanistan, the mandates and terms of reference of
both having not been clearly defined amongst the actors themselves, least of all
communicated to the public in manner that would gain public understanding and
confidence. This has given rise to misunderstanding and has compromised
acceptance by the wider aid community.
7. The problem is complicated by the presence of two distinct foreign military forces
operating in the country, one (the Coalition Forces (CF) under Operation Enduring
Freedom) on a war-footing but occasionally involving itself in humanitarian,
reconstruction, political reform, information gathering, psychological operations and
special operations, and the other (NATO/ISAF) under UN mandate. Both appear,
outwardly, to be conducting Phase III and Phase IV type operations simultaneously
and/or in close proximity. Both forces are in uniform and are, irrespective of their
functions/affiliations/mandates, indistinguishable to the public, with the image
portrayed by one, inevitably affecting the acceptance of the other.
8. The exceptions include an array of narcotics/drug control personnel, special
forces, Operational Detachment-Alpha (OD-A), intelligence and security personnel
who dress in civilian clothes and are frequently observed in public and increasingly
driving white 4x4 vehicles similar to those employed by UN and NGO agencies.
Though visibly armed, they give the appearance of being a civilian-military hybrid or
something covertly in the middle, raising concern by aid agencies that the public
confusion created will forfeit their neutrality, independence and impartiality,
jeopardize existing and longstanding relationships with local communities and place
humanitarian workers at risk of reprisal.
The potential risk to UN agency and NGO staff arising from confusion between
military and NGO actors needs to be acknowledged and communicated down the
chain of command. While armed and on active duty, military personnel should be
in uniform and clearly identifiable as military personal and distinguishable from
civilian actors. Unless minimum transparency is maintained in military
involvement, we risk placing civilian actors in harm's way.
9. The respective mandates, tasks and responsibilities of military units and civilian
aid agencies have been blurred, with the engagement of the military in reconstruction
activities adding to existing tension and confusion and setting a precedent with farranging consequences. Aid agencies are concerned that:
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involvement of military in humanitarian and reconstruction activities has/will
detract/distract the military from its role in supporting Security Sector Reform.
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perceived attempts by military forces to assume the recovery functions of
Government (needs assessments, gap analysis, the coordination and
targeting of assistance) might undermine Government authority.
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some PRTs are involved in reconstruction activities and needs assessments
in areas where military operations are active, leading the public to suspect
that aid is being used as a cover for intelligence gathering.
9.1 Needs assessments and close contact between foreign military and the
civilian population risks misinterpretation. Assessments undertaken by military
personnel in civilian clothing, heightens the risk. The assessments should be
abandoned or undertaken by the aid community on behalf of or in association
with Government representatives.
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the new trend for some PRTs is to deploy donor aid officials alongside the
military to identify and fund reconstruction projects, a move that could
potentially duplicate the aid coordination role of the UN/UNAMA (SC
Resolution 1383).
9.2 PRTs should not act as a conduit for assistance except under those
exceptional circumstances where lives are at risk and there is no government or
civilian assistance workers willing and able to respond, or where they otherwise
lack the competencies or capacities to respond in an appropriate and timely
manner. This is clearly stated in the Oslo Guidelines on the Use of MCDA in
Complex Emergencies -- ‘military and civil defence assets supporting United
Nations humanitarian activities will normally not be used in the direct delivery of
assistance
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the absence of regular information-sharing meetings between the military and
relevant UN agencies and NGOs, increases the scope for duplication, waste
and inefficiencies, with the left hand not knowing what the right is doing, and
vice versa. Agencies are concerned that the visible lack of coordination (in
sectors where civilian-military actors are mutually dependent and where
coordination is necessary) will result in imbalanced aid flows, with excess
assistance provided to some areas/groups relative to others, thereby
widening existing disparities and discontent. There is also concern that the
lack of forums/mechanisms for coordination at the strategic and operational
levels will undermine donor support for agency activities.
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Where civilian-military actors are not mutually dependent, independent
military engagement in reconstruction activities necessitates increased
contact, collaboration and coordination that would not otherwise be the case if
a clear delineation of task existed to separate security and humanitarian
objectives/interventions. Agencies are concerned that the ‘unintended’ and
largely ‘unnecessary’ alliance and co-option of aid in conflict areas will affect
their neutrality and longevity long after the military departs.
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There is concern that the PRTs have overstated their capacity and generated
expectations that cannot be met, potentially fuelling frustrations and instability
but also leaving obvious gaps. The project selection and eligibility criteria
associated with existing PRT funding facilities have favoured humanitarian
relief assistance over the obvious need to provide physical infrastructure and
capacity-building for extending central government authority.
9.3 It is recommended that there be a complete and rapid shift by the PRTs
away from the implementation of assistance-type projects towards enabling and
supporting SSR and practical reconstruction projects to strengthen the central
government’s authority. This will also serve to reduce distrust and suspicion
regarding the ultimate purpose of PRTs in the eyes of ordinary Afghans and
agencies.
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Agencies are concerned that the involvement of some foreign military forces
in achieving combined military and political objectives may result in human
rights and protection issues being addressed unevenly, depending upon the
past/present political affiliations of certain groups. Similarly, there is concern
that those groups opposed to central government may receive less
humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.
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There is some evidence that the humanitarian aid system is being
manipulated to legitimize local factions. The local warlord’s ability to secure
assistance makes it appear that his particular warring faction or poppy
economy is benevolent, thus winning him the support and acceptance of the
people, particularly when those people are suffering from the ravages of war.
The winning of the “hearts and minds” of the local people is essential for the
warlord’s micro economy and for his power/influence to flourish. Yet, the
support of locals is ‘more’ essential for security reform, the electoral process
and stabilization efforts of government. Such contradictions suggest that CF
and NATO units are not be well coordinated or are focused on short-term
acceptance measures to the detriment of longterm stability.
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There is further evidence that national military units within NATO are, in
collaboration with their respective national aid missions and embassies,
working independently of NATO doctrine to further their own national
agendas. Lack of adherence to NATO (CIMIC) doctrine/processes may result
in fragmentation and undermine crucial command and control mechanisms.
9.4 It is recommended that PRT involvement in political maneuvering at
provincial and district level be discontinued, and that there be a full shift towards
the selection of projects that focus on practical measures to strengthen the
government’s authority provincially, such as the rebuilding of police stations,
customs houses and local administrative offices. Success of the ISAF mission will
depend on NATO’s ability to regain control over national units.
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In order to improve information flow and coordination, UNAMA established a
Weekly Technical Working Group that includes the Advisors to the SRSG and
other ‘relevant’ components of UNAMA and the Coalition. Similar
arrangements were, in theory, to exist in the field. Though intended to ensure
that the interests of the wider humanitarian community were taken into
consideration and that their programmes were well coordinated/synchronised
with PRT programmes – key stakeholders are not invited to these meetings
except on an ad-hoc basis. Agencies claim their absence effectively
precludes joint planning.
9.5 UNAMA must take immediate steps to establish internal mechanisms for
‘regular’ joint programming and coordination at the operational level, and at both
central and provincial levels, involving the active participation of all key actors.
Only by being informed through this process will UNAMA be able to adequately
represent the interests of the wider humanitarian community.
PRIORITY NEEDS: PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL SECURITY
10. The recent National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) revealed the
priority needs of Afghanistan, as identified by Afghans themselves, which provide
civilian and military actors with unique guidance for pooling and focusing scarce
resources to achieve maximum impact in an appropriate, timely, and collaborative
manner.
PHYSICAL SECURITY
11. Increasing insecurity and scarcity of employment opportunities are the greatest
concerns for the majority of Afghans. Insecurity continues to prevent access by aid
agencies to those in need. It impedes both the delivery of humanitarian and
reconstruction assistance and continues to undermine and delay the reform process.
Significant improvements in security are now vital to the success of free and fair
elections due in a few months time. All available combatant and non-combatant units
of the military, including PRTs, must be guided by the principle unity of force and
remain focused on enhancing physical security, including the protection and safety of
government and aid agency staff and access routes, while these same agencies take
immediate and simultaneous steps to restore public confidence and trust in the Bonn
process, and to:
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expand humanitarian provisions to vulnerable groups in remote/insecure
areas
implement activities that encourage social cohesion and generate community
trust and confidence which is also reflected at national level through
deepening the commitment of all sides to sustaining peace.
12. Programmes must be designed to deliver immediate, measurable and visible
peace and economic dividends, so as to:
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demonstrate national/international commitment to consolidate the peace
reassure the Afghan people that they are not alone in their struggle;
encourage investments for development at community level.
build and expand public confidence in the on-going political transition
process;
exemplify alternatives to conflict and the advantages of peaceful coexistence;
restore hope in a stable future and a just and durable peace
signal ‘psychologically’ an end to war and a cessation of ‘business-as-usual’
at community and national level
SOCIAL SECURITY AND LIVELIHOOD CREATION:
13. Alongside the need for physical security and sustained humanitarian access, is
the need to restore livelihoods, food security, physical infrastructure, water and
sanitation and good governance. Through comprehensive NRVA interviews, a
statistically representative cross-section of the Afghan public (throughout the country)
identified the following to be their priority needs – beyond the most obvious and
pressing need for security:
Ranking of priority needs at national level:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Improved drinking water quality and quantity
Rehabilitation of irrigation systems
Construction or repairing of rural roads
Improvement to health facilities
Improvement to education facilities
Priority Needs by Agro-Ecological Zone
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3
of
Irrigation
40%
33%
18%
Rehabilitation
system
Improved water supply
Rural Road Construction
Improved Health Facilities
Improved Education Facilities
Extension of Micro-credit
Employment Opportunities
Improved Veterinary Services
Improved Housing/Shelter
Literacy Training
24%
14%
12%
10%
18%
11%
20%
12%
3%
3%
Priorities for Afghan Government by Province- district data
31%
19%
14%
12%
Zone 4
7%
Zone 5
3%
54%
21%
10%
3%
41%
3%
8%
6%
5%
3%
3%
36%
3%
first priority for Afghan government to address
100%
90%
vocational skills training
80%
literacy training
employment
opportunities
micro-credit schemes
70%
60%
improved veterinary
services
improvement in housing
in the community
improvement to
education facilities
improvement to health
facilities
construction or repairing
of rural roads
rehabilitation irrigation
sytem
improved drinking water
quality/quantity
50%
40%
30%
20%
TOTAL
faryab
samangan
nimroz
kunduz
paktya
jawzjan
badakhs
balkh
baghlan
farah
nangarh
khost
ghazni
badghis
sari pul
kabul
parwan
kunar
hirat
bamyan
takhar
hilmand
ghor
uruzgan
logar
zabul
kandahar
wardak
nuristan
kapisa
laghman
0%
paktika
10%
HIP VS. HAM
14. The principles of mass and manoeuvre apply to humanitarian as well as military
operations. Interventions most suitable to meeting human requirements and restoring
hope (i.e. quick-start, high-impact projects (HIP), high visibility (as regards output),
low profile (as regards foreign military presence), + capacity building + sustainability)
are firmly grounded on the principle of least resistance, but differ from the
conventional ‘hearts-and-minds’ (HAM) doctrine being implemented in Afghanistan
through PRTs by both Coalition and NATO/ISAF forces. A precedent and mandate
has been established for the aid community to assist government in high-impact
projects for recovery and reconstruction, and the public generally accepts this
bilateral arrangement.
15. The challenge of policy makers is to recognize that there is a distinction between
the three endeavours of warfare, reconstruction and occupation. CF and NATO/ISAF
forces are trained to prevail in the first; they can be helpful in the second under
certain conditions; but if they undertake the reconstruction in a highly visible manner,
over an extended period of time, and combine reconstruction with information
gathering and other unrelated pseudo-military activities, they will be perceived by the
public as an occupying force, and they will risk losing hearts/minds as in the case of
Iraq and other parts of the Islamic world where any semblance of occupation is
simply not tolerated. If they raise expectations that they can “get the job done” and
later fail to “deliver-the-goods,” the self-inflicted damage extends worldwide and far
into the future.
16. Certainly U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine based on experience in Vietnam and
even as far back as the Philippine insurrection at the turn of the last century validates
this. Soviet experience in Afghanistan ‘re-validates’ the argument. Upon reviewing
progress in pacifying the Sunni Triangle, the Coalition there concluded that their
tactics were not dampening the insurgency and were not going to win the hearts as
long as former regime loyalists and insurgents (read drug/war lords) dominated the
people. Accordingly, military focus has now shifted to addressing security head-on,
albeit late and after HAM tactics proved not only unsuccessful in achieving
pacification but largely counterproductive. We need to heed the signals from Iraq.
17. A most daunting and important fight will continue to be the information war within
and outside Afghanistan’s borders. While there remains need for an overarching
strategic information campaign to restore favourable perceptions of the allied effort in
Afghanistan, the campaign needs to be undertaken in a more subtle and
sophisticated manner and to be supportive of, but separated from reconstruction. The
world (and Afghan people) are too intelligent to be swayed from their opinion/stance
by media spin, sensationalism or social engineering. Support to a free, democratic
media would however ensure that their opinions are at least shaped by the facts.
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES AND COMPETENCIES:
18. The problems affecting Afghanistan require a holistic approach that relies on
various civilian and military agencies and contingents working in an integrated
manner to achieve the common goals of peace, stability, reconstruction and
improved livelihoods.
19. Within the international assistance community, there is broad consensus that
PRTs could best contribute by focusing their operations more directly on security
sector reform (SSR) and on training, monitoring and providing technical and logistical
support for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and police during their first deployments
in the provinces. PRTs could play a limited role in monitoring the disarmament (DDR)
process and in ensuring that weapons are destroyed or not redistributed.
Additionally, by focusing on the reconstruction of local government and security
infrastructure, the PRTs could more effectively support the extension of central
government influence, as well as aid and complement the reconstruction process –
which is stated to be the PRTs raison d’etre.
20. PRT activities must complement, not overlap or duplicate assistance agency
roles. They must respect the competencies and comparative advantages of these
agencies, including accumulated lessons/best practices adopted from other countries
arsing from crisis, years of implementation experience, acute familiarity with local
culture, local business practices and operational conditions, expertise in need
assessment, instrumentation and analysis, wide geographical presence, long
established relations with, and acceptance by local communities, technical knowhow, and established coordinative structures and implementation mechanisms.
Moreover, PRT use of scarce funding for humanitarian type activities cannot be
justified given the existence of, and donor support to such assistance agencies and
their potential for supporting central administration and empowering local
communities.
DIVISION OF TASK
21. A review of all on-going and planned assistance projects in Afghanistan reveals
several gaps that are not covered or not covered ‘adequately’ by the aid community.
These ‘gaps’ represent the perimeters or areas of priority and legitimacy for PRT
involvement, in that they achieve stated objectives, preclude duplication, waste,
inefficiencies and confusion, reduce the extent of time-consuming coordination and
joint-programming tasks required, and are, in the public-eye, more understandable
and acceptable roles for the military:
NATO, COALITION AND GOVERNMENT
 Provision of key administrative structures at provincial and district level,
particularly local government administrative buildings, Governor’s offices,
customs and revenue collection offices;
 Heavy infrastructure projects in limited cases where the assistance
community does not have the capacity or funds. Examples include bridges,
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dams, arterial roads, landing strips, and excavation of water catchment
basins/reservoirs in drought prone areas;
Aerial broadcast planting of grass seed to improve grazing land and fodder
production for Kuchis and other pastoralists;
Augmentation of national livestock vaccination campaigns undertaken
through/by the Ministry of Agriculture
Fire stations and police stations;
Courts and other judicial buildings;
Communications installation, national radio network;
Power generation and transmission capacity, including hydroelectric power
plants;
Military barracks for the new ANA units;
Air traffic control, training and equipment;
Monitoring, and provision of training, equipment and technical and logistical
support for ANA and police deployment;
Monitoring of DDR and destruction or secure stockpiling/containment of arms;
Government, Donor Aid Missions, UN AGENCIES, NGOs:
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All remaining assistance sectors/project interventions.
22. Moving beyond its on-going programmes the UN, in consultation with government
and donor aid missions, has commenced preparation of the Common Country
Assessment (CCA) and will use it as a basis for “fast track” preparation of a UN
Recovery Strategy (for 2004/2005) as work commences on a Development
Assistance Framework (for 2005-2009). The Recovery Strategy and UNDAF will
identify the scope of the UN system’s contributions to humanitarian assistance and
short- term social and economic projects over a period of six years. This framework
will be negotiated and endorsed by all stakeholders. By November 2004, each UN
agency will have established long-term Country Programmes that will clarify their role
and contribution to an effective and efficient implementation of the UNDAF.
23. The UNDAF will be complimented by Word Bank support to the preparation of a
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) for Afghanistan with focus on
medium/long term development. It is expected that this strategy will be elaborated in
an inclusive and participatory way, including in-depth consultations with civil society
and all other stakeholders.
24. Programming Criteria: In addition to being immediate, measurable, and highly
visible, interventions under UNDAF will abide by the principles of impartiality, equity,
transparency and accountability, contribute to Millinium Development Goals (MDG),
and will meet the following criteria:
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focus on critical areas/pockets where impoverishment, food insecurity and
risks to peace are relatively higher and where ethnic and regional
imbalances/disparities are assessed as relatively acute; where large
populations are expected to return and settle, and/or where activities would
make a significant contribution to conflict prevention, grassroots peace
building and human rights promotion. NRVA data will be employed
extensively for sector, area, and demographic targeting.
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make an immediate, measurable difference in the socio-economic status of
the affected population and fill critical gaps or correct regional/ethnic
disparities.
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mainstream communities and women into the planning/decision-making
process and maximise their contribution to the stabilization process.
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reduce impediments to security and establish a firm base on which
subsequent recovery efforts and development will depend.
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adopt a rights-based and unified, interagency approach in programme design
and implementation
AREAS FOR COLLABORATION
25. Reaching consensus on a clear division of task and ground rules for the civilianmilitary interface will result in greater efficiencies, fewer complexities, more unity and
smoother relations. Additionally, there are several areas in which civilian-military
entities could pool or complement their respective resources to enhance servicedelivery as follows:
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Exchange of liaison officers
Flight/Air traffic control;
Telecommunications –SRCs + access to antennae/facilities;
Joint use of military and civilian medical facilities for emergencies;
Coordination of vital logistic common services as airlift and medivac/casevac
in close collaboration with UNHAS and UNAMA;
Search and rescue operations;
Security information: Exchanging information relevant to the security situation
inside Afghanistan, through the UNSECOORD/UNAMA CIMIC liaison officer;
Humanitarian information: Exchanging information concerning humanitarian
activities (objective, timing, locations and routes)
26. Information exchange may include:
o
o
o
o
o
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Humanitarian locations inside Afghanistan: Provision of coordinates of
UN/NGO/Government and civilian facilities and operations
Humanitarian plans and intentions;
Shared Space: provision of routes and timing of humanitarian convoys
and airlifts to avoid accidental strikes on humanitarian operations or to
warn of any conflicting activities;
Population movements: Providing and receiving information on major
population movements, e.g. satellite imagery.
Post-strike information: information on strike locations and explosive
munitions used during military campaigns to assist the prioritization and
planning of humanitarian relief and mine-action/UXO activities.
Medical (technical/equipment/capacity-building) support to civilian services
Joint training on respective mandates, roles and procedures;
Coordination of call signs, celcall systems and frequencies to meet standards
and avoid radio interference; to assist in establishing such standards where
possible;
Sharing of information technology and services that enable the Government
and community to deliver assistance more effectively;
Contingency planning and pre-deployment simulation/checklists/delineation of
task: develop, improve and maintain up-to-date information on preparedness
and response measures related to civ-mil support to emergencies;
preparedness measures for the exceptional use of military assets;
Explosive ordnance disposal, removal and deactivation;
In the event of major disasters, sharing of information/technical expertise for
transport support, medical assistance, power, engineering, water purification;
27. Use of Military assets would be in accordance with the following principles:
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Last resort: all civilian alternatives have been exhausted;
Unique capability: no appropriate alternative civilian resources exist;
Timeliness: the urgency of the task at hand demands immediate action;
Clear humanitarian direction in the use of the military assets;
COMMAND, CONTROL AND COORDINATION
28. Composition of the CIMIC Weekly Technical Working Group is being expanded at
this very moment to include a limited but more representative cross-section of key
actors and expertise. Work plans, including problems, solutions, and responsible
individuals/agencies are being prepared with clearly defined benchmarks and
deadlines. Work has commenced on the preparation of civilian-military training
programmes and simulation exercises to ensure better clarity of purpose and the
means by which such purposes can be achieved. Specifically, the training
programmes will:
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Discuss interagency lessons learned, current issues, and initiatives in
developing, planning, and managing an integrated response to complex
contingencies based on recent experiences.
Clarify and understand interagency tasks and responsibilities, and the
implications of these lessons for coordinating and developing a coordinated
response.
Involve participants in refining the draft CIMIC Guidelines (attached) and
familiarizing them with the evolving planning process through hands-on
experience in developing selected aspects of plans in interagency simulation
or peace-game exercises.
Create opportunities for networking and familiarity between individuals of
different agencies to enhance coordination and information sharing (if not
provide the same individuals with a form of entertainment under prevailing
security restrictions within Afghanistan). It is crucial that bridge building
occurs between the two diverse institutional cultures and that this be
accomplished at the individual level.
29. There is much scepticism that well-intended efforts to win hearts-and-minds and
to extend central Government authority will have the exact opposite effect if the
conventional, symmetric doctrine is pursued to deal with new and largely unforeseen
asymmetric threats. While military forces have the training and equipment, the
concurrent demands for humanitarian aid, police training, reconstruction and
reconciliation among different populations are, quite simply, beyond the scope and
abilities of these forces.
30. Government and aid agencies should/can be involved in high-impact, high
visibility recovery and reconstruction activities. However foreign military forces must
limit their involvement to security and pursue ‘low-visibility, low-profile’ interventions,
in limited sectors and geographical areas. The military must reduce its interaction
with the populations they are protecting (Afghanistan is not Haiti or DR Congo) if it is
to avoid the pitfalls of inter-cultural miscommunication and misinterpretation (and
there are may risks here), and if they are to obtain public acceptance and help
alleviate, rather than contribute to, instability.
31. The role of military forces should by definition be of a temporary, transient nature
whereas appropriate and effective reconstruction activities, by definition, require
long-term commitment and follow-up. The primary aim of military forces in
Afghanistan should be to create a security situation conducive to the work of
Government and civilian aid organizations, which is crucial for reconciliation and the
restoration of stability. Both military and civilian actors have essential and important
roles to play, and in some limited sectors they have a symbiotic relationship based
upon mutually-dependence and collaboration. Their roles however, are nevertheless
different and must remain clearly defined and distinguishable if mission goals are to
be achieved in a cost-effective manner.
32. CIMIC can assist the military with local authorities and can preserve military
assets by freeing them from non-military responsibilities where they have fewer
comparative advantages, competencies and legitimacy. Despite its substantial
logistical capabilities, the military is not capable of providing relief assistance for an
extended period of time, creating employment, providing individual protection or
engaging communities voluntarily and whole-heartedly in self-help endeavours.
Mission success will be dependent on this being acknowledged.
33. Rapid turnover of civilian-military officers/staff will also preclude efforts to
overcome the inherent mistrust between very different institutional cultures, rendering
unity of command impossible in most areas of endeavour. There has been a
proliferation of aid agencies in Afghanistan, some good, some useless, and many
simply unable or unwilling to collaborate with the military or with any other entity.
While Government is taking measures to register and weed-out those agencies with
questionable intent and competence, the path of least resistance would dictate that
the interventions of potential overlap and duplication that necessitate increased
coordination and collaboration - be minimized.
34. Many agencies have an aversion to outside direction and are not constrained by
consensus. Successful coordination will therefore often remain a function of
personalities and, at best, broad general agreement and adherence to guiding
principles. Informal, voluntary yet structured civilian-military interface aimed at
clarifying respective duties and responsibilities and avoiding duplication have proven
highly effective in previous campaigns. Indeed, more effective decisions and
collaborative actions have emanated from coffee breaks and pub encounters than
from formal conference tables.
35. Civil-military affairs is a relatively new field for both aid agencies and military
forces. Presently, there is only a handful of staff that has received CIMIC training. If
both actors were to conduct more joint workshops on a more regular basis, and were
to build relationships before a crisis erupts, the mutual understanding that is so
desperately needed would have time to develop and flourish and to be handed down
to subsequent replacements. Lack of joint training has meant that military forces and
aid agencies are forced to rely upon a very limited number of trained/experienced
officers in CIMIC roles at considerable risk of undermining original objectives.
36 We would encourage more CIMIC training and in the field where problems and
solutions can be more readily identified. This will bring us another step closer to
strengthening our co-existence and achieving our joint tasks.
APPENDIX
 Principles Guiding the Civil Military Interface in Afghanistan