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Al-Qaeda's Radicalization Doctrine: Concept and Execution Yoram SCHWEITZER and Sean LONDON 1 Abstract. Over the last two decades, AQ's worldview has led it to evolve, and to enshrine as a core capacity, the ability to induce significant numbers of Muslims, particularly youths, to adhere to its extremist path and doctrine. This has effectively rendered Bin Laden's organization into one of the foremost actors on the international terrorist stage. After a brief introduction, then, this article will explore AQ's radicalization doctrine and the manner in which it is being prosecuted. The article will close with a brief overview of the methods requisite to contain and defeat AQ's subversive campaign. Keywords: al Qaeda, global jihad, Islamism, extremism, radicalization, deradicalization. Introduction AQ's guiding narrative flows from the convictions, first, that Allah has mandated that Muslims resurrect the historical caliphate and extend its borders to span the globe—"I was ordered" says Bin Laden, paraphrasing the Prophet "to fight the people until they say there is no god but Allah and his prophet Muhammad 2"; and second, that the western nations, helmed by the crusader-zionist axis and with the full cooperation of apostate Muslims leaders, are bent upon enslaving the Muslim peoples and looting their treasure. In order, then, both to revive and extend this supra-national entity and remove the western boot from their throat, Muslims must wage an aggressive jihad against the west and its (un)Islamic enablers. However, recognizing that "when Muslims realize what is truly expected of them in their religion, about fighting the infidels, it will mean the end of their amoral rule 3", the west, with the cooperation of degenerate eastern allies, has been acting strongly to dilute, or even eliminate, the Umma's sense of itself and its faith. Muslims have thus been reduced to a state tantamount to Jahiliya, i.e. barbaric, apathetic, pre-Mohammedan ignorance, and are incapable of taking the steps requisite to both serve Allah and redeem themselves. As such, they require frontrunners to blaze the trail forward. AQ has assumed this mantle. 1 Yoram Schweitzer is the Director of the Terrorism and Low Intensity Warfare Project at Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies. Sean London is a project associate. Published in: Homegrown Terrorism—Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Radicalization Among Groups with an Immigrant Heritage in Europe. NATO Science for Peace and Security Series-E: Human and Societal Dynamics. Volume 60, 2009. Pick, Thomas; Speckhard, Anne; Beatrice Jacuch, Eds. 2 Efraim Karsh, Islamic Imperialism: A History (New haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 1. 3 Muhammad 'Abdus Salam Faraj, Jihad: The Absent Obligation, p44 At base, then, AQ is something of an "Islamist revivalist program4": the jihad's, and ultimately the global caliphate's, vanguard (tahlia); a torch in the night lit to waken Muslims both to their straits and to their divinely mandated obligation to "give jihad the status of worship5", to "fight and slay the pagan where ye find them, seize them, beleaguer them and lie in wait for them in every stratagem of war6". Accordingly, Thus, at the organization's rudder, Bin Laden has launched a global outreach campaign, the twin pillars of which are active message and propaganda dissemination, to include a direct "marketing and preaching7" effort, and the organization's signature, almost "boutique", globe-spanning suicide operations—AQ having adopted the latter as their MO due to their heavy psychological impact, capable both of jarring Muslims out of their apathy and modeling the appropriate degree of commitment to the Umma and Jihad, as well as of undermining the west's confidence in its ability to defeat so committed an enemy. AQ supplements these efforts to jumpstart the Umma's engines by serving as something of a terrorist finishing school, attracting quality recruits, ensuring that they are fully infected with the Jihadist virus and redeploying them to hasten the infection of the Islamic peoples as a whole. It is worth noting here, that both the organization's attacks and its marketing and preaching efforts are managed by dedicated organs—the special operations and al Dawa apparatuses, respectively. In the past, the al Dawa apparatus was headed by Seif al A'del 8. The Message Campaign In keeping with Zawahiri's stated determination to fight the infidels in all spheres, AQ wages this war in both the on- and offline arenas. The online campaign is prosecuted primarily, if not exclusively, through audio and video clips created in al Sahab, or "The Clouds", AQ's sophisticated, multi-media production studio, and distributed through outlets such as the al Fajr media center. The corresponding realtime effort revolves primarily around leaflets, pamphlets and hardcopies of online material. Both real-life and virtual campaign literature are dedicated to purveying AQ's core arguments and (supposedly) iron-clad substantiating evidence. The argument that, with the full complicity of corrupt Arab enablers, the west is preying upon Muslims, is substantiated first, through images and clips of Muslims being brutalized around the world, and second, through renditions of current and historical events that are distorted to an almost Orwellian extent. Thus, for instance, the recruiting tape titled "The Situation of the Muslim Community9", after providing audiences with a portrayal of the misery inflicted upon Muslims in the Kashmir region, purveys a current-affairs overview by Sheikh Abu Hafts Al Masri (AKA Mohamed Atef the chief of AQ's military committee). This begins by revisiting the claim that the Muslim world is under attack, particularly emphasizing the threats posed to the Muslim holy places in Arabia 4 Assaf Moghadam. The Globalization of Martyrdom. P. 62 Assaf Moghadam. The Globalization of Martyrdom. P. 69 6 Assaf Moghadam. The Globalization of Martyrdom. P. 69 7 http://www.ceifit.com/?categoryId=27211&itemId=42270 8 http://www.ceifit.com/?categoryId=27211&itemId=42270 5 9 http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00/video/excerpts/excerpts_index.html and Jerusalem. Abu Hafts then decries the fact that infidel nations representing Crusaders and Jews have attacked the Muslim Umma and Muslim countries, have robbed them of their fortunes and resources, and have not only destroyed them but, more importantly, have violated and controlled the most sacred places in Islam: Mecca, Medina (particularly the Prophet Muhammad’s Mosque), and the al-Aqsa Mosque and Dome of the Rock in Palestine. Likewise, in his 1998 address "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders 10", Bin Laden presents as commonly known facts, several interpretations of east-west relations that smacks of "Big Brother" to an astonishing degree: "No one argues today about three facts that are known to everyone; we will list them, in order to remind everyone: First, for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples. If some people have in the past argued about the fact of the occupation, all the people of the Peninsula have now acknowledged it. The best proof of this is the Americans' continuing aggression against the Iraqi people using the Peninsula as a staging post, even though all its rulers are against their territories being used to that end, but they are helpless. Second, despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance, and despite the huge number of those killed, which has exceeded 1 million... despite all this, the Americans are once again trying to repeat the horrific massacres, as though they are not content with the protracted blockade imposed after the ferocious war or the fragmentation and devastation. So here they come to annihilate what is left of this people and to humiliate their Muslim neighbors. Third, if the Americans' aims behind these wars are religious and economic, the aim is also to serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there. The best proof of this is their eagerness to destroy Iraq, the strongest neighboring Arab state, and their endeavor to fragment all the states of the region such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan into paper statelets and through their disunion and weakness to guarantee Israel's survival and the continuation of the brutal crusade occupation of the Peninsula". The case that Muslims must act en-masse to defend the Umma is made through one-dimensional readings of the Koran and the Hadiths. Bin Laden caps, for instance, the aforementioned review of world affairs by stating that "All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on Allah, his messenger, and Muslims and Ulema have throughout Islamic history unanimously agreed that the jihad is an individual duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim countries. This was revealed by Imam Bin-Qadamah in "Al- Mughni," Imam al-Kisa'i in "Al-Bada'i," alQurtubi in his interpretation, and the sheikh of al-Islam in his books, where he said: "As for the fighting to repulse [an enemy], it is aimed at defending sanctity and religion, and it is a duty as agreed [by the Ulema]. Nothing is more sacred than belief except repulsing an enemy who is attacking religion and life." ZXZXZXZXZXZXZXZXZXZXZXZXZXZXZXZX—what is the problem here? The idea that the west is a paper tiger is advanced, first and foremost, through AQ's spectacular attacks, which, by their very nature, showcase western vulnerability; and second, through endlessly recycled images of these actions, as well as of those of other 10 http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00/video/excerpts/excerpts_index.html operations carried out around the world by self-styled Mujahedin organizations, which, though less pointed, still seem to evidence the west's weakness. Muslims from disparate areas of the world are often more divided by ethnicity, mores, folkways and so on, than they are united by faith. To remind Muslims, then, as these materials do, of the bonds that unite all Sunna is to foster a sense of connection, of community, that might otherwise barely exist, between the viewer and far-flung fellow believers. To then show these Muslims, with whom the viewer presumably now relates on a profound level, being brutalized, is to create a sense of personal injury in the viewer and hence, a greater propensity to take action against the brutalizer, i.e. the west. Rooting this call to action in religious imperatives makes it all the more powerful, and exposing the west's weakness lessens the fear of retribution, which might otherwise deter viewers from answering this call 11. In very real ways, AQ's propaganda and propaganda-furthering attacks have fulfilled their purpose nicely, sparking the emergence of just the sort of nascent global jihad, centering around what one ideologue called AQ's "system", towards which Bin Laden and co. were aiming. This is not the only way, though, in which AQ forwards its cause. The Finishing School Owing to reasons which have yet to be fully ascertained, but which are thought to include some combination of economic, personal, or cultural trauma "that shakes certainty in previously accepted beliefs12", many young Muslims develop a chink in their psychological armor—aka "cognitive openings13"—which render them vulnerable to Islamist infection. If this contagion is not treated speedily, the individual often starts to "self identify14", i.e. gradually begins to construct and embrace a new identity rooted in radical teachings and then to seek out and socialize, with an increasing degree of exclusivity, the like-minded. According to a recent Adelphi Papers article, this search tends to occur in "places of congregation15" such as mosques, "places of vulnerability16", such as universities or prisons; and, to a lesser degree, "recruitment magnets17" such as radical bookstores, or smaller, radical mosques. Having found others who are treading down the Islamist path, self-identifying individuals often begin to coalesce into proto-groups. 11 These issues are discussed at length in Scot Atran's Who Becomes a Terrorist Today. http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=37 12 Joining al Qaeda: Jihadist recruitment in Europe. http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a907741304&fulltext=713240928 13 Joining al Qaeda: Jihadist recruitment in Europe. http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a907741304&fulltext=713240928 14 Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf 15 Joining al Qaeda: Jihadist recruitment in Europe. http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a907741304&fulltext=713240928 16 Joining al Qaeda: Jihadist recruitment in Europe. http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a907741304&fulltext=713240928 17 Joining al Qaeda: Jihadist recruitment in Europe. http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a907741304&fulltext=713240928 Fully aware of this pattern, AQ dispatched scores of recruiters—e.g. Abu Qatada and Abu Dahdah18—to nab these self-identifiers and usher them on down the Jihadist road. Organizations around the world that, while not directly affiliated with AQ, share their "system" (so-called gateway organizations) soon began to tread in AQ's footsteps i. Subsequent to identification, individuals are banded into small groups and the process of indoctrination or "frame alignment 19" begins. Groups that coalesce outside of prison (which, increasingly, are becoming radicalization hotspots) often meet, during this phase, in small, private mosques, or outdoors, wherein teaching sessions are interspersed with strenuous activities such as long treks, or paintball matches. These are the most common settings, not only because they enable the team to duck the authorities, but because they facilitate the radicalization process: small lessons in mosques create a sense of being special, different from others, elite, even; overcoming strenous physical challenges endows one with a sense of pride, and fosters camaraderie amongst those who help each other along the way—and these twinned sensations are the cornerstone of efforts to radicalize young, excitement prone, respect-craving males20 ii.Individuals who successfully complete this "gradual process of manipulation and monitoring, during which the recruit is encouraged to join the jihad 21" and express interest in fully enacting violent Jihad, are dispatched to an Islamic front, where they receive advanced "military and ideological instruction to enable them to become mujahidin22". It is here that candidates who took their first Jihadist steps elsewhere link up with AQ. Those who prove their Jihadist mettle are often invited to advanced training camps—pre 9/11 in afghanistan, post 9/11 in both major cities and lawless border regions of Pakistan—to undergo more sophisticated ideological and operational training. Those who stand out during this process are referred, singly or in groups, to AQ's external operations section for a personalized course of training. Actualization: Subsequent to their stint with the external operations apparatus, elite candidates are banded together into what the Adelphi report refers to in self-explanatory terms as "chain of command cells23" and dispatched, under close supervision, and with ongoing support from, AQ, to carry out "boutique operations". Other recruits are returned to their home countries to serve as sophisticated agitators and/or to carry out operations at the head of their own "guided cell24"—a term denoting the fact that, while these cells 18 Qatada and Dahdah are two of the "senior imams and clerics, most of them veterans of the Afghan war, who were appointed by the [afore-referenced] al Dawa apparatus, in different locations throughout the world". http://www.ceifit.com/?categoryId=27211&itemId=42270 19 Joining al Qaeda: Jihadist recruitment in Europe. http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a907741304&fulltext=713240928 20 Who Becomes a Terrorist Today? http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=37 21 http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue3/jv10no3a1.html 22 http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue3/jv10no3a1.html 23 Joining al Qaeda: Jihadist recruitment in Europe. http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a907741304&fulltext=713240928 24 Joining al Qaeda: Jihadist recruitment in Europe. http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a907741304&fulltext=713240928 might be supported to a certain degree by AQ, benefiting from, say, strategic direction and sometimes even finance, they are not supervised directly by the organization. Another product of the dragon's teeth that AQ has scattered so liberally around the globe is the so-called "self radicalized cell25". "Consisting of genuine self-starters, they are self recruited and maintain no formal or informal association with the al-Qaeda network. Similar in many respects to street gangs, these cells have no access to resources from the wider movement, which means that they are entirely self-reliant in terms of funding, training and planning. Members of self-starter cells may be inspired by statements from al-Qaeda leaders such as Osama Bin Laden and Ayman alZawahiri, and they may seek contact with other members elsewhere…but they define their own agenda and decide for themselves when they wish to act". AQ's radicalization strategy is realized, then, through these three cell types: chain of command, guided, and self radicalized (AKA hardcore, affiliated, and inspired, cells). As has been reported extensively, the bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania as well as the USS Cole and the subsequent 9/11 attacks were executed by chain-of-command cells. In the years since, guided cells have come to feature almost as prominently on the global terrorist map: the November 2003 attacks on synagogues and British targets in Turkey were executed by a cell that which, having been trained and indoctrinated in Afghani camps, was dispatched with Bin Laden's blessing to wreak havoc in whatever way they saw fit—and throughout the run-up to the operation, the cell's leaders communicated online regularly with AQ factors in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran26. Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shazad Tanzeer, the ringleaders of the July 2005 mass transit bombings in the UK, far from being "selfselected, self-radicalized, disaffected Muslims", were in fact trained by AQ's external operations wing, and later set free to follow their destructive muse 27. The thwarted plot to carry out suicide attacks on the major financial targets in New York, New Jersey and Washington DC, traced from a London cell comprised of British Muslims back to a "protégé of the 9/11 mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, operating in Lahore" and from thence to "al Qaeda commanders operating out of Waziristan". The foiled August 2006 aviation plot was also the work of a cell of British Muslims of Pakistani heritage operating under the auspices of Abu Ubaydah al-Masri. In recent years, many global jihad organizations have also begun to deploy guided cells. This growing trend was on display in the 4 September 2007 plot, wherein, with the support and guidance of the Uzbekistani Islamic Jihad Union, three locals were came within inches of dealing a devastating blow to American targets in Germany28. Self-radicalized cells as well have been making headlines of late. The 2004 Madrid train bombings appear to have been executed by just such a group29 as were the 21 July 2005 transit bombings in London30, and Theo Van Gogh was murdered by the founder of the homegrown "Hofstaad Network"31. 25 Joining al Qaeda: Jihadist recruitment in Europe. http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a907741304&fulltext=713240928 26 "AQ and Internationalization of Suicide Terrorism". Yoram Schweitzer, Sari Goldstein Farber. 27 http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20071106144427-54947.pdf 28 http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2007/09/07/ap4094092.html 29 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4502950/ 30 http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/07/31/london.tube/index.html 31 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article543212.ece Anecdotal evidence suggests, it is worth noting, that AQ's efforts may also have birthed a sub-category of self-radicalizers: virtual terrorists. Consider for instance, the twinned cases of Younis Tsouli, AKA "irhabi 007" and Irfan Raja. In less than a year, Tsouli, first, rendered himself into a "key hub in the world of 'jihadism online" and then "concluded that he wanted to participate in a suicide attack", apparently deciding to "blow himself up in London during the Christmas period that year". In a similar period of time, Raja, after "spending hundreds of hours downloading videos, posting messages and chatting to others in web forums", decided to join the jihad. Facilitated by a radical imam (apparently based in the US), Raja made an online connection with other activists "living 350 miles from his hometown" and eventually with an experienced Jihadist who gave the group of virtual friends "instruction[s] on how to make their way to a training camp in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province". The group made plans to depart and, had Raja's parents not accidentally found a suicide letter shortly before Raja's planned departure and notified the authorities, there is every indication that the group would have followed through32. In both cases, in other words, catalyzed solely by online materials, the subjects in question not only self-recruited, but propelled themselves through most, if not all, of the radicalization process' stages. This represents a marked departure from the standard group-centric radicalization pattern seen in past cases and, while these instances do not suffice to declare that human contact is no longer a pre-requisite for Islamist radicalization, they certainly suggest that "we will soon have to reassess widely held ideas about group dynamics and their centrality to radicalization". Closing thoughts Some reflections on the measures requisite to restrict AQ's ability to radicalize the masses33: al Zawahiri claimed, long ago, that the media was the arena in which AQ would battle the west and complicit Arab regimes for Muslim hearts and minds. It is crucial to move globally, then, to deny AQ access to both the online and real-time media arenas, enacting and enforcing laws like those on the books in Western Europe making it illegal to host AQ websites or to possess/disseminate AQ printed material. Anticipating that AQ will find ways to swiftly resurrect websites that are removed from western servers, we must, as an added measure, create cyber strike teams dedicated solely to taking down radical sites. Only AQ/violent Islamist material, though, and not just any Muslim message that deviates from the mainstream of moderate discourse, can be targeted in this fashion. Impinging more widely upon freedom of speech and/or dissent will constitute not only a betrayal of democratic principles, but will neatly make AQ's point that the so-called free societies are anything but. AQ, though, must not merely be blocked from entering this arena: they must be disarmed and defeated within it. To this end, a strong counter-propaganda campaign dedicated both to derailing AQ's grand religious and sociopolitical narratives, as well as to luring moderate Muslims into the western fold—or at least to ensuring that they 32 Joining al Qaeda: Jihadist recruitment in Europe. http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a907741304&fulltext=713240928 33 As indicated earlier, AQ's Global Jihadist disciples have adopted many of AQ's MOs. By extension, these prescriptions apply to them as well. reject violent Islamism—must be fielded. In order to ensure that these messages are not only delivered to, but internalized by, Muslims, it is strongly recommended that corresponding community outreach programs be launched, targeting both adults and minors. And what to do about captured radicals? Soldiers do not emerge from their version of indoctrination uniformly committed to their militaries' ideologies. Nor do they completely shed their civilian personalities in favor of ones more suited to military imperatives. In kind, not all of those who undergo radical indoctrination emerge as what Norman Lihou, of the Non-Governmental Intelligence Agency, refers to in selfexplanatory terms as "true believers34". Some emerge as "believers35", i.e. individuals who largely, but not entirely, accept extremist teachings and have embraced, but not to the extent of completely eliminating every trace of their earlier personalities, the new, radical self they've constructed for themselves with the help of their mentors. Less committed still are what the NGIA researchers term "rivergrass36" members, i.e. those who's commitment to violent Islamism, while perhaps more significant than any commitment they've made previously, isn't profound, and who retain more than just vestiges of their earlier selves. Different approaches, then, tailored to our estimation of the rung each person occupies on the radical scale, seem to be called for here. Individuals apprehended during the "self-identifying37" stage must be handled delicately, in such a way as to leave the subject certain that worse could come, thereby deterring them from walking down the Jihadist path; but not so aggressively that they become convinced them that AQ's take on Western or allied Arab/Muslim regimes is correct. Such an approach would not only prevent the impressionable from becoming recruits, but would play very well into our overarching narrative of moderation, thus elegantly undermining AQ's portrayal of us and our governments as brutes who understand only force. Handling believers and true believers seems to call for an approach similar to one currently being implemented by the US in Iraq 38, wherein extremists are isolated from moderates and subjected to a steady diet of both religious and professional re-training—with the religious indoctrination circling heavily around "vigorous debates over non-extremist interpretations of the Koran". A similar approach could work very neatly with those caught in the indoctrination stage: Teenagers and young adults nabbed, for instance, in training camps, who've not yet taken the final steps towards becoming radicals, could be incarcerated in separate facilities, wherein a program similar to the one discussed above will be enacted. Two final points: During WWII, the British took great care to ensure that official government communiques were completely honest. Consequently, by the middle of the war, the BBC became the battlefield standard for information—to the point where German troops were forbidden to tune into the channel. If the voice of moderation is to receive similar credibility in our times, then, it too must be scrupulously honest. 34 Talking to Terrorists. http://ezinearticles.com/?Talking-to-Terrorists-A-Psychological-Approach&id=1013279 35 Talking to Terrorists. http://ezinearticles.com/?Talking-to-Terrorists-A-Psychological-Approach&id=1013279 36 Talking to Terrorists. http://ezinearticles.com/?Talking-to-Terrorists-A-Psychological-Approach&id=1013279 37 Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf 38 Anti-Jihad U. http://www.city-journal.org/2008/eon0502jm.html It is beyond the scope of this article to provide policy prescriptions. However, it is crucial to remember that words alone cannot fully redress the keen sense of alienation and ill-treatment felt by so many Muslims today and which so often spark interest in extremist teachings and abet the process of radicalization. Without capitulating, even for a moment, to terrorism, then, it is crucial to act strongly to reduce the very real discriminatory and unjust acts that lead so many down this path. Muslims must be treated more equitably in Europe; there should not be another Abu-Ghraib; a satisfactory and reasonable solution to the problem of Guantanamo Bay must be agreed upon, and so on. No matter how well crafted our message is, until we address these concerns and others, too many will turn us a deaf, and to AQ an attentive, ear. Endnotes i Underscoring the increasing adeptness of these second generation recruiters is a 2006 MERIA report titled Middle East Salafism's Influence and the Radicalization Of Muslim Communities in Europei, stating that recruiters have advanced so far as to identify three key demographics as being particularly vulnerable to their message and have begun to tailor specific "sales-pitches" to appeal to each: "First-generation Muslims: This group accounts for the bulk of activists in European countries where immigration is a recent phenomenon. As the investigations into the Madrid attacks have shown, this group includes immigrants who have integrated with their host society, as well as others who have not and who have turned to crime for a living, thus evidencing the close ties between Islamist networks of Maghrebi origin in Europe and common crime perpetrated by Maghrebi immigrants. Conversion of common criminals to radical Islamism helps activate both networks jointly. The recruitment process need not necessarily take place in mosques. Prisons, refugee centers, and shelters for needy immigrants are also venues for activities designed to convert young Muslims into terrorist militants. Second or third-generation immigrants: This group constitutes the bulk of recruits in European countries where Muslim immigration has existed for several decades. Identity problems lead these young people to the path of jihad, where they find respect, brotherhood, and a new identity offered by Islamist fighters who guide them through the recruitment process. They feel part of a battle between good and evil. The recruiter guides them in the right direction while also addressing their existential concerns. The identity crisis suffered by these generations is compounded by the perception that they are ostracized by the rest of society, which views them as a “foreign body” that has failed to integrate properly. In these cases, mosques controlled by Salafi preachers (al-Quods in Hamburg, Finsbury Park in London, Chatenay-Malabry in Paris, or al-Tawfik in Brussels) become the main recruitment posts, attracting young persons on the edges of society. Recruitment of students and young professionals is also being carried out increasingly in universities. Finally, the third group targeted by the recruiters is the converts: Although fewer in number, their ranks are growing faster in terms of their importance in Muslim communities. Some—usually the leaders—are from middle-class backgrounds and convert to Islam because Muslims are “the only ones who fight the system.” In the 1980s, they would have signed up to radical left-wing movements. Today, however, conversion to Islam is one of the options for European rebels to find a cause. The cases of John Walker Lindt, the American of Christian origin who was arrested in Afghanistan during the U.S. offensive against the Talibans; Richard Reid, the Briton arrested with a bomb in his shoes on a flight to the United States in December 2001; or José Padilla, who was arrested in the Chicago airport in May 2002 and charged with passing information to al-Qa’ida to help them build a radioactive bomb, are good illustrations of how converts can radicalize". ii Radicalization efforts, at this stage, revolve around "achiev[ing] convergence between the views of the recruits and the movement's grand narrativeii", i.e., inducing candidates to accept as absolute and all embracing, and to fully submit to, Islamist ideas and principles; to isolate themselves from the society around them; and to accept "the urgent need for 'jihad'"ii. Thus, a recent report from the Intelligence and Security Committee of the British House of Commonsii states that at first "group conversation may be around being a good Muslim and staying away from drugs and crime, with no hint of an extremist agenda". As the group becomes more radical, individuals are gradually "exposed to propaganda about perceived injustices to Muslims across the world with international conflict involving Muslims interpreted as examples of widespread war against Islam; leaders of the Muslim world perceived as corrupt and non-Islamic; with some domestic policies added as ‘evidence’ of a persecuted Islam; and conspiracy theories abounding". Once firmly into the Indoctrination stage, the group often "move on to what the extremists claim is religious justification for violent jihad in the Quran and the Hadith…and——if suicide attacks are the intention—— the importance of martyrdom in demonstrating commitment to Islam and the rewards in Paradise for martyrs; before directly inviting an individual to engage in terrorism". Throughout, the report notes "there is little evidence of overt compulsion. The extremists appear rather to rely on the development of individual commitment and group bonding and solidarity". Bibliography: Karsh, E. (2006). Islamic Imperialism: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press. Abdus Salam, F.M. Jihad: The Absent Obligation. Available from: http://www.islamistwatch.org/texts/faraj/obligation/oblig.html Moghadam, A. (2008). The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 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