Download Al-Qaeda`s Radicalization Doctrine: Concept and Execution

Al-Qaeda's Radicalization Doctrine:
Concept and Execution
Yoram SCHWEITZER and Sean LONDON 1
Abstract. Over the last two decades, AQ's worldview has led it to evolve, and to
enshrine as a core capacity, the ability to induce significant numbers of Muslims,
particularly youths, to adhere to its extremist path and doctrine. This has
effectively rendered Bin Laden's organization into one of the foremost actors on
the international terrorist stage. After a brief introduction, then, this article will
explore AQ's radicalization doctrine and the manner in which it is being
prosecuted. The article will close with a brief overview of the methods requisite to
contain and defeat AQ's subversive campaign.
Keywords: al Qaeda, global jihad, Islamism, extremism, radicalization, deradicalization.
Introduction
AQ's guiding narrative flows from the convictions, first, that Allah has mandated
that Muslims resurrect the historical caliphate and extend its borders to span the
globe—"I was ordered" says Bin Laden, paraphrasing the Prophet "to fight the people
until they say there is no god but Allah and his prophet Muhammad 2"; and second, that
the western nations, helmed by the crusader-zionist axis and with the full cooperation
of apostate Muslims leaders, are bent upon enslaving the Muslim peoples and looting
their treasure. In order, then, both to revive and extend this supra-national entity and
remove the western boot from their throat, Muslims must wage an aggressive jihad
against the west and its (un)Islamic enablers. However, recognizing that "when
Muslims realize what is truly expected of them in their religion, about fighting the
infidels, it will mean the end of their amoral rule 3", the west, with the cooperation of
degenerate eastern allies, has been acting strongly to dilute, or even eliminate, the
Umma's sense of itself and its faith. Muslims have thus been reduced to a state
tantamount to Jahiliya, i.e. barbaric, apathetic, pre-Mohammedan ignorance, and are
incapable of taking the steps requisite to both serve Allah and redeem themselves. As
such, they require frontrunners to blaze the trail forward. AQ has assumed this mantle.
1
Yoram Schweitzer is the Director of the Terrorism and Low Intensity Warfare Project at Tel Aviv
University's Institute for National Security Studies. Sean London is a project associate. Published in:
Homegrown Terrorism—Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Radicalization Among Groups
with an Immigrant Heritage in Europe. NATO Science for Peace and Security Series-E: Human and Societal
Dynamics. Volume 60, 2009. Pick, Thomas; Speckhard, Anne; Beatrice Jacuch, Eds.
2
Efraim Karsh, Islamic Imperialism: A History (New haven: Yale University
Press, 2006), p. 1.
3
Muhammad 'Abdus Salam Faraj, Jihad: The Absent Obligation, p44
At base, then, AQ is something of an "Islamist revivalist program4": the jihad's,
and ultimately the global caliphate's, vanguard (tahlia); a torch in the night lit to waken
Muslims both to their straits and to their divinely mandated obligation to "give jihad
the status of worship5", to "fight and slay the pagan where ye find them, seize them,
beleaguer them and lie in wait for them in every stratagem of war6". Accordingly,
Thus, at the organization's rudder, Bin Laden has launched a global outreach campaign,
the twin pillars of which are active message and propaganda dissemination, to include a
direct "marketing and preaching7" effort, and the organization's signature, almost
"boutique", globe-spanning suicide operations—AQ having adopted the latter as their
MO due to their heavy psychological impact, capable both of jarring Muslims out of
their apathy and modeling the appropriate degree of commitment to the Umma and
Jihad, as well as of undermining the west's confidence in its ability to defeat so
committed an enemy. AQ supplements these efforts to jumpstart the Umma's engines
by serving as something of a terrorist finishing school, attracting quality recruits,
ensuring that they are fully infected with the Jihadist virus and redeploying them to
hasten the infection of the Islamic peoples as a whole. It is worth noting here, that both
the organization's attacks and its marketing and preaching efforts are managed by
dedicated organs—the special operations and al Dawa apparatuses, respectively. In the
past, the al Dawa apparatus was headed by Seif al A'del 8.
The Message Campaign
In keeping with Zawahiri's stated determination to fight the infidels in all spheres,
AQ wages this war in both the on- and offline arenas. The online campaign is
prosecuted primarily, if not exclusively, through audio and video clips created in al
Sahab, or "The Clouds", AQ's sophisticated, multi-media production studio, and
distributed through outlets such as the al Fajr media center. The corresponding realtime effort revolves primarily around leaflets, pamphlets and hardcopies of online
material.
Both real-life and virtual campaign literature are dedicated to purveying AQ's core
arguments and (supposedly) iron-clad substantiating evidence. The argument that, with
the full complicity of corrupt Arab enablers, the west is preying upon Muslims, is
substantiated first, through images and clips of Muslims being brutalized around the
world, and second, through renditions of current and historical events that are distorted
to an almost Orwellian extent. Thus, for instance, the recruiting tape titled "The
Situation of the Muslim Community9", after providing audiences with a portrayal of
the misery inflicted upon Muslims in the Kashmir region, purveys a current-affairs
overview by Sheikh Abu Hafts Al Masri (AKA Mohamed Atef the chief of AQ's
military committee). This begins by revisiting the claim that the Muslim world is under
attack, particularly emphasizing the threats posed to the Muslim holy places in Arabia
4
Assaf Moghadam. The Globalization of Martyrdom. P. 62
Assaf Moghadam. The Globalization of Martyrdom. P. 69
6
Assaf Moghadam. The Globalization of Martyrdom. P. 69
7
http://www.ceifit.com/?categoryId=27211&itemId=42270
8
http://www.ceifit.com/?categoryId=27211&itemId=42270
5
9
http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00/video/excerpts/excerpts_index.html
and Jerusalem. Abu Hafts then decries the fact that infidel nations representing
Crusaders and Jews have attacked the Muslim Umma and Muslim countries, have
robbed them of their fortunes and resources, and have not only destroyed them but,
more importantly, have violated and controlled the most sacred places in Islam: Mecca,
Medina (particularly the Prophet Muhammad’s Mosque), and the al-Aqsa Mosque and
Dome of the Rock in Palestine.
Likewise, in his 1998 address "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders 10", Bin Laden
presents as commonly known facts, several interpretations of east-west relations that
smacks of "Big Brother" to an astonishing degree:
"No one argues today about three facts that are known to everyone; we will list
them, in order to remind everyone: First, for over seven years the United States has
been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula,
plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its
neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to
fight the neighboring Muslim peoples. If some people have in the past argued about the
fact of the occupation, all the people of the Peninsula have now acknowledged it. The
best proof of this is the Americans' continuing aggression against the Iraqi people using
the Peninsula as a staging post, even though all its rulers are against their territories
being used to that end, but they are helpless. Second, despite the great devastation
inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance, and despite the huge
number of those killed, which has exceeded 1 million... despite all this, the Americans
are once again trying to repeat the horrific massacres, as though they are not content
with the protracted blockade imposed after the ferocious war or the fragmentation and
devastation. So here they come to annihilate what is left of this people and to humiliate
their Muslim neighbors. Third, if the Americans' aims behind these wars are religious
and economic, the aim is also to serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its
occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there. The best proof of this is their
eagerness to destroy Iraq, the strongest neighboring Arab state, and their endeavor to
fragment all the states of the region such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan into
paper statelets and through their disunion and weakness to guarantee Israel's survival
and the continuation of the brutal crusade occupation of the Peninsula".
The case that Muslims must act en-masse to defend the Umma is made through
one-dimensional readings of the Koran and the Hadiths. Bin Laden caps, for instance,
the aforementioned review of world affairs by stating that "All these crimes and sins
committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on Allah, his messenger,
and Muslims and Ulema have throughout Islamic history unanimously agreed that the
jihad is an individual duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim countries. This was
revealed by Imam Bin-Qadamah in "Al- Mughni," Imam al-Kisa'i in "Al-Bada'i," alQurtubi in his interpretation, and the sheikh of al-Islam in his books, where he said:
"As for the fighting to repulse [an enemy], it is aimed at defending sanctity and
religion, and it is a duty as agreed [by the Ulema]. Nothing is more sacred than belief
except repulsing an enemy who is attacking religion and life."
ZXZXZXZXZXZXZXZXZXZXZXZXZXZXZXZX—what is the problem here?
The idea that the west is a paper tiger is advanced, first and foremost, through AQ's
spectacular attacks, which, by their very nature, showcase western vulnerability; and
second, through endlessly recycled images of these actions, as well as of those of other
10
http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00/video/excerpts/excerpts_index.html
operations carried out around the world by self-styled Mujahedin organizations, which,
though less pointed, still seem to evidence the west's weakness.
Muslims from disparate areas of the world are often more divided by ethnicity,
mores, folkways and so on, than they are united by faith. To remind Muslims, then, as
these materials do, of the bonds that unite all Sunna is to foster a sense of connection,
of community, that might otherwise barely exist, between the viewer and far-flung
fellow believers. To then show these Muslims, with whom the viewer presumably now
relates on a profound level, being brutalized, is to create a sense of personal injury in
the viewer and hence, a greater propensity to take action against the brutalizer, i.e. the
west. Rooting this call to action in religious imperatives makes it all the more powerful,
and exposing the west's weakness lessens the fear of retribution, which might otherwise
deter viewers from answering this call 11.
In very real ways, AQ's propaganda and propaganda-furthering attacks have
fulfilled their purpose nicely, sparking the emergence of just the sort of nascent global
jihad, centering around what one ideologue called AQ's "system", towards which Bin
Laden and co. were aiming. This is not the only way, though, in which AQ forwards its
cause.
The Finishing School
Owing to reasons which have yet to be fully ascertained, but which are thought to
include some combination of economic, personal, or cultural trauma "that shakes
certainty in previously accepted beliefs12", many young Muslims develop a chink in
their psychological armor—aka "cognitive openings13"—which render them vulnerable
to Islamist infection. If this contagion is not treated speedily, the individual often starts
to "self identify14", i.e. gradually begins to construct and embrace a new identity rooted
in radical teachings and then to seek out and socialize, with an increasing degree of
exclusivity, the like-minded. According to a recent Adelphi Papers article, this search
tends to occur in "places of congregation15" such as mosques, "places of
vulnerability16", such as universities or prisons; and, to a lesser degree, "recruitment
magnets17" such as radical bookstores, or smaller, radical mosques. Having found
others who are treading down the Islamist path, self-identifying individuals often begin
to coalesce into proto-groups.
11
These issues are discussed at length in Scot Atran's Who Becomes a Terrorist Today.
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=37
12
Joining al Qaeda: Jihadist recruitment in Europe.
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a907741304&fulltext=713240928
13
Joining al Qaeda: Jihadist recruitment in Europe.
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a907741304&fulltext=713240928
14
Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat.
www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf
15
Joining al Qaeda: Jihadist recruitment in Europe.
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a907741304&fulltext=713240928
16
Joining al Qaeda: Jihadist recruitment in Europe.
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a907741304&fulltext=713240928
17
Joining al Qaeda: Jihadist recruitment in Europe.
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a907741304&fulltext=713240928
Fully aware of this pattern, AQ dispatched scores of recruiters—e.g. Abu Qatada
and Abu Dahdah18—to nab these self-identifiers and usher them on down the Jihadist
road. Organizations around the world that, while not directly affiliated with AQ, share
their "system" (so-called gateway organizations) soon began to tread in AQ's footsteps i.
Subsequent to identification, individuals are banded into small groups and the
process of indoctrination or "frame alignment 19" begins. Groups that coalesce outside
of prison (which, increasingly, are becoming radicalization hotspots) often meet,
during this phase, in small, private mosques, or outdoors, wherein teaching sessions are
interspersed with strenuous activities such as long treks, or paintball matches. These
are the most common settings, not only because they enable the team to duck the
authorities, but because they facilitate the radicalization process: small lessons in
mosques create a sense of being special, different from others, elite, even; overcoming
strenous physical challenges endows one with a sense of pride, and fosters camaraderie
amongst those who help each other along the way—and these twinned sensations are
the cornerstone of efforts to radicalize young, excitement prone, respect-craving
males20 ii.Individuals who successfully complete this "gradual process of manipulation
and monitoring, during which the recruit is encouraged to join the jihad 21" and express
interest in fully enacting violent Jihad, are dispatched to an Islamic front, where they
receive advanced "military and ideological instruction to enable them to become
mujahidin22".
It is here that candidates who took their first Jihadist steps elsewhere link up with
AQ. Those who prove their Jihadist mettle are often invited to advanced training
camps—pre 9/11 in afghanistan, post 9/11 in both major cities and lawless border
regions of Pakistan—to undergo more sophisticated ideological and operational
training. Those who stand out during this process are referred, singly or in groups, to
AQ's external operations section for a personalized course of training.
Actualization:
Subsequent to their stint with the external operations apparatus, elite candidates are
banded together into what the Adelphi report refers to in self-explanatory terms as
"chain of command cells23" and dispatched, under close supervision, and with ongoing
support from, AQ, to carry out "boutique operations". Other recruits are returned to
their home countries to serve as sophisticated agitators and/or to carry out operations at
the head of their own "guided cell24"—a term denoting the fact that, while these cells
18
Qatada and Dahdah are two of the "senior imams and clerics, most of them veterans of the Afghan war,
who were appointed by the [afore-referenced] al Dawa apparatus, in different locations throughout the
world". http://www.ceifit.com/?categoryId=27211&itemId=42270
19
Joining al Qaeda: Jihadist recruitment in Europe.
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a907741304&fulltext=713240928
20
Who Becomes a Terrorist Today?
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=37
21
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue3/jv10no3a1.html
22
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue3/jv10no3a1.html
23
Joining al Qaeda: Jihadist recruitment in Europe.
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a907741304&fulltext=713240928
24
Joining al Qaeda: Jihadist recruitment in Europe.
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a907741304&fulltext=713240928
might be supported to a certain degree by AQ, benefiting from, say, strategic direction
and sometimes even finance, they are not supervised directly by the organization.
Another product of the dragon's teeth that AQ has scattered so liberally around the
globe is the so-called "self radicalized cell25". "Consisting of genuine self-starters, they
are self recruited and maintain no formal or informal association with the al-Qaeda
network. Similar in many respects to street gangs, these cells have no access to
resources from the wider movement, which means that they are entirely self-reliant in
terms of funding, training and planning. Members of self-starter cells may be inspired
by statements from al-Qaeda leaders such as Osama Bin Laden and Ayman alZawahiri, and they may seek contact with other members elsewhere…but they define
their own agenda and decide for themselves when they wish to act".
AQ's radicalization strategy is realized, then, through these three cell types: chain
of command, guided, and self radicalized (AKA hardcore, affiliated, and inspired,
cells). As has been reported extensively, the bombing of the American embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania as well as the USS Cole and the subsequent 9/11 attacks were
executed by chain-of-command cells. In the years since, guided cells have come to
feature almost as prominently on the global terrorist map: the November 2003 attacks
on synagogues and British targets in Turkey were executed by a cell that which, having
been trained and indoctrinated in Afghani camps, was dispatched with Bin Laden's
blessing to wreak havoc in whatever way they saw fit—and throughout the run-up to
the operation, the cell's leaders communicated online regularly with AQ factors in
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran26. Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shazad Tanzeer, the
ringleaders of the July 2005 mass transit bombings in the UK, far from being "selfselected, self-radicalized, disaffected Muslims", were in fact trained by AQ's external
operations wing, and later set free to follow their destructive muse 27. The thwarted plot
to carry out suicide attacks on the major financial targets in New York, New Jersey and
Washington DC, traced from a London cell comprised of British Muslims back to a
"protégé of the 9/11 mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, operating in Lahore" and
from thence to "al Qaeda commanders operating out of Waziristan". The foiled August
2006 aviation plot was also the work of a cell of British Muslims of Pakistani heritage
operating under the auspices of Abu Ubaydah al-Masri. In recent years, many global
jihad organizations have also begun to deploy guided cells. This growing trend was on
display in the 4 September 2007 plot, wherein, with the support and guidance of the
Uzbekistani Islamic Jihad Union, three locals were came within inches of dealing a
devastating blow to American targets in Germany28. Self-radicalized cells as well have
been making headlines of late. The 2004 Madrid train bombings appear to have been
executed by just such a group29 as were the 21 July 2005 transit bombings in
London30, and Theo Van Gogh was murdered by the founder of the homegrown
"Hofstaad Network"31.
25
Joining al Qaeda: Jihadist recruitment in Europe.
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a907741304&fulltext=713240928
26
"AQ and Internationalization of Suicide Terrorism". Yoram Schweitzer, Sari Goldstein Farber.
27
http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20071106144427-54947.pdf
28
http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2007/09/07/ap4094092.html
29
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4502950/
30
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/07/31/london.tube/index.html
31
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article543212.ece
Anecdotal evidence suggests, it is worth noting, that AQ's efforts may also have
birthed a sub-category of self-radicalizers: virtual terrorists. Consider for instance, the
twinned cases of Younis Tsouli, AKA "irhabi 007" and Irfan Raja. In less than a year,
Tsouli, first, rendered himself into a "key hub in the world of 'jihadism online" and then
"concluded that he wanted to participate in a suicide attack", apparently deciding to
"blow himself up in London during the Christmas period that year". In a similar period
of time, Raja, after "spending hundreds of hours downloading videos, posting messages
and chatting to others in web forums", decided to join the jihad. Facilitated by a radical
imam (apparently based in the US), Raja made an online connection with other
activists "living 350 miles from his hometown" and eventually with an experienced
Jihadist who gave the group of virtual friends "instruction[s] on how to make their way
to a training camp in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province". The group made plans
to depart and, had Raja's parents not accidentally found a suicide letter shortly before
Raja's planned departure and notified the authorities, there is every indication that the
group would have followed through32. In both cases, in other words, catalyzed solely
by online materials, the subjects in question not only self-recruited, but propelled
themselves through most, if not all, of the radicalization process' stages. This represents
a marked departure from the standard group-centric radicalization pattern seen in past
cases and, while these instances do not suffice to declare that human contact is no
longer a pre-requisite for Islamist radicalization, they certainly suggest that "we will
soon have to reassess widely held ideas about group dynamics and their centrality to
radicalization".
Closing thoughts
Some reflections on the measures requisite to restrict AQ's ability to radicalize the
masses33: al Zawahiri claimed, long ago, that the media was the arena in which AQ
would battle the west and complicit Arab regimes for Muslim hearts and minds. It is
crucial to move globally, then, to deny AQ access to both the online and real-time
media arenas, enacting and enforcing laws like those on the books in Western Europe
making it illegal to host AQ websites or to possess/disseminate AQ printed material.
Anticipating that AQ will find ways to swiftly resurrect websites that are removed from
western servers, we must, as an added measure, create cyber strike teams dedicated
solely to taking down radical sites. Only AQ/violent Islamist material, though, and not
just any Muslim message that deviates from the mainstream of moderate discourse, can
be targeted in this fashion. Impinging more widely upon freedom of speech and/or
dissent will constitute not only a betrayal of democratic principles, but will neatly make
AQ's point that the so-called free societies are anything but.
AQ, though, must not merely be blocked from entering this arena: they must be
disarmed and defeated within it. To this end, a strong counter-propaganda campaign
dedicated both to derailing AQ's grand religious and sociopolitical narratives, as well as
to luring moderate Muslims into the western fold—or at least to ensuring that they
32
Joining al Qaeda: Jihadist recruitment in Europe.
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a907741304&fulltext=713240928
33
As indicated earlier, AQ's Global Jihadist disciples have adopted many of AQ's MOs. By extension,
these prescriptions apply to them as well.
reject violent Islamism—must be fielded. In order to ensure that these messages are not
only delivered to, but internalized by, Muslims, it is strongly recommended that
corresponding community outreach programs be launched, targeting both adults and
minors.
And what to do about captured radicals? Soldiers do not emerge from their version
of indoctrination uniformly committed to their militaries' ideologies. Nor do they
completely shed their civilian personalities in favor of ones more suited to military
imperatives. In kind, not all of those who undergo radical indoctrination emerge as
what Norman Lihou, of the Non-Governmental Intelligence Agency, refers to in selfexplanatory terms as "true believers34". Some emerge as "believers35", i.e. individuals
who largely, but not entirely, accept extremist teachings and have embraced, but not to
the extent of completely eliminating every trace of their earlier personalities, the new,
radical self they've constructed for themselves with the help of their mentors. Less
committed still are what the NGIA researchers term "rivergrass36" members, i.e. those
who's commitment to violent Islamism, while perhaps more significant than any
commitment they've made previously, isn't profound, and who retain more than just
vestiges of their earlier selves. Different approaches, then, tailored to our estimation of
the rung each person occupies on the radical scale, seem to be called for here.
Individuals apprehended during the "self-identifying37" stage must be handled
delicately, in such a way as to leave the subject certain that worse could come, thereby
deterring them from walking down the Jihadist path; but not so aggressively that they
become convinced them that AQ's take on Western or allied Arab/Muslim regimes is
correct. Such an approach would not only prevent the impressionable from becoming
recruits, but would play very well into our overarching narrative of moderation, thus
elegantly undermining AQ's portrayal of us and our governments as brutes who
understand only force. Handling believers and true believers seems to call for an
approach similar to one currently being implemented by the US in Iraq 38, wherein
extremists are isolated from moderates and subjected to a steady diet of both religious
and professional re-training—with the religious indoctrination circling heavily around
"vigorous debates over non-extremist interpretations of the Koran". A similar approach
could work very neatly with those caught in the indoctrination stage: Teenagers and
young adults nabbed, for instance, in training camps, who've not yet taken the final
steps towards becoming radicals, could be incarcerated in separate facilities, wherein a
program similar to the one discussed above will be enacted.
Two final points:
During WWII, the British took great care to ensure that official government
communiques were completely honest. Consequently, by the middle of the war, the
BBC became the battlefield standard for information—to the point where German
troops were forbidden to tune into the channel. If the voice of moderation is to receive
similar credibility in our times, then, it too must be scrupulously honest.
34
Talking to Terrorists.
http://ezinearticles.com/?Talking-to-Terrorists-A-Psychological-Approach&id=1013279
35
Talking to Terrorists.
http://ezinearticles.com/?Talking-to-Terrorists-A-Psychological-Approach&id=1013279
36
Talking to Terrorists.
http://ezinearticles.com/?Talking-to-Terrorists-A-Psychological-Approach&id=1013279
37
Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat.
www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf
38
Anti-Jihad U. http://www.city-journal.org/2008/eon0502jm.html
It is beyond the scope of this article to provide policy prescriptions. However, it is
crucial to remember that words alone cannot fully redress the keen sense of alienation
and ill-treatment felt by so many Muslims today and which so often spark interest in
extremist teachings and abet the process of radicalization. Without capitulating, even
for a moment, to terrorism, then, it is crucial to act strongly to reduce the very real
discriminatory and unjust acts that lead so many down this path. Muslims must be
treated more equitably in Europe; there should not be another Abu-Ghraib; a
satisfactory and reasonable solution to the problem of Guantanamo Bay must be agreed
upon, and so on. No matter how well crafted our message is, until we address these
concerns and others, too many will turn us a deaf, and to AQ an attentive, ear.
Endnotes
i
Underscoring the increasing adeptness of these second generation recruiters is a 2006 MERIA report
titled Middle East Salafism's Influence and the Radicalization Of Muslim Communities in Europei, stating
that recruiters have advanced so far as to identify three key demographics as being particularly vulnerable to
their message and have begun to tailor specific "sales-pitches" to appeal to each: "First-generation Muslims:
This group accounts for the bulk of activists in European countries where immigration is a recent
phenomenon. As the investigations into the Madrid attacks have shown, this group includes immigrants who
have integrated with their host society, as well as others who have not and who have turned to crime for a
living, thus evidencing the close ties between Islamist networks of Maghrebi origin in Europe and common
crime perpetrated by Maghrebi immigrants. Conversion of common criminals to radical Islamism helps
activate both networks jointly. The recruitment process need not necessarily take place in mosques. Prisons,
refugee centers, and shelters for needy immigrants are also venues for activities designed to convert young
Muslims into terrorist militants. Second or third-generation immigrants: This group constitutes the bulk of
recruits in European countries where Muslim immigration has existed for several decades. Identity problems
lead these young people to the path of jihad, where they find respect, brotherhood, and a new identity offered
by Islamist fighters who guide them through the recruitment process. They feel part of a battle between good
and evil. The recruiter guides them in the right direction while also addressing their existential concerns. The
identity crisis suffered by these generations is compounded by the perception that they are ostracized by the
rest of society, which views them as a “foreign body” that has failed to integrate properly. In these cases,
mosques controlled by Salafi preachers (al-Quods in Hamburg, Finsbury Park in London, Chatenay-Malabry
in Paris, or al-Tawfik in Brussels) become the main recruitment posts, attracting young persons on the edges
of society. Recruitment of students and young professionals is also being carried out increasingly in
universities. Finally, the third group targeted by the recruiters is the converts: Although fewer in number,
their ranks are growing faster in terms of their importance in Muslim communities. Some—usually the
leaders—are from middle-class backgrounds and convert to Islam because Muslims are “the only ones who
fight the system.” In the 1980s, they would have signed up to radical left-wing movements. Today, however,
conversion to Islam is one of the options for European rebels to find a cause. The cases of John Walker Lindt,
the American of Christian origin who was arrested in Afghanistan during the U.S. offensive against the
Talibans; Richard Reid, the Briton arrested with a bomb in his shoes on a flight to the United States in
December 2001; or José Padilla, who was arrested in the Chicago airport in May 2002 and charged with
passing information to al-Qa’ida to help them build a radioactive bomb, are good illustrations of how
converts can radicalize".
ii
Radicalization efforts, at this stage, revolve around "achiev[ing] convergence between the views of the
recruits and the movement's grand narrativeii", i.e., inducing candidates to accept as absolute and all
embracing, and to fully submit to, Islamist ideas and principles; to isolate themselves from the society around
them; and to accept "the urgent need for 'jihad'"ii. Thus, a recent report from the Intelligence and Security
Committee of the British House of Commonsii states that at first "group conversation may be around being a
good Muslim and staying away from drugs and crime, with no hint of an extremist agenda". As the group
becomes more radical, individuals are gradually "exposed to propaganda about perceived injustices to
Muslims across the world with international conflict involving Muslims interpreted as examples of
widespread war against Islam; leaders of the Muslim world perceived as corrupt and non-Islamic; with some
domestic policies added as ‘evidence’ of a persecuted Islam; and conspiracy theories abounding". Once
firmly into the Indoctrination stage, the group often "move on to what the extremists claim is religious
justification for violent jihad in the Quran and the Hadith…and——if suicide attacks are the intention——
the importance of martyrdom in demonstrating commitment to Islam and the rewards in Paradise for martyrs;
before directly inviting an individual to engage in terrorism". Throughout, the report notes "there is little
evidence of overt compulsion. The extremists appear rather to rely on the development of individual
commitment and group bonding and solidarity".
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