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Transcript
Hilbert’s Program Then and Now
415
These unresolved problems of axiomatics led Hilbert to devote significant effort
to work on logic in the following years. In 1917, Paul Bernays joined him as
his assistant in Göttingen. In a series of courses from 1917–1921, Hilbert, with
the assistance of Bernays and Behmann, made significant new contributions to
formal logic. The course from 1917 [Hilbert, 1918b], in particular, contains a
sophisticated development of first-order logic, and forms the basis of Hilbert and
Ackermann’s textbook Principles of Theoretical Logic [1928]. In 1918, Bernays
submitted a treatise on the propositional calculus of Principia mathematica as a
Habilitationsschrift; it contains the first completeness proof of the propositional
calculus for truth-functional semantics.3
The 1917–18 lectures were only the beginning of a strand of work on logic
and metalogic in Hilbert’s school, including work on the decision problem. The
decision problem for first-order logic was tightly bound up with the aim of finding a
completeness proof for the first-order predicate calculus (the “restricted calculus of
functions” in Hilbert’s terminology). This aim was stated in the 1917–18 lectures,
but since completeness does not hold for first-order logic in any purely syntactic
sense (an early result due to Ackermann), a development of the semantics of firstorder logic was needed first. The decision problem, one of Hilbert’s main aims for
metamathematics in the 1920s, was already an issue in the lectures from 1905, and
has its roots in Hilbert’s belief, first explicitly stated in the Paris address, that
“in mathematics, there is no ignorabimus,” i.e., that every mathematical question
can be solved either affirmatively or negatively. The questions of completeness
and decidability thus became closely linked in the 1920s, with Behmann, Bernays,
Schönfinkel, and later Ackermann working on special cases of the decision problem
for first-order logic throughout the 1920s.
2.2
The consistency program, finitism, and proof theory
In about 1920, Hilbert came to reject Russell’s logicist solution to the consistency
problem for arithmetic, mainly for the reason that the axiom of reducibility cannot
be accepted as a purely logical axiom. In lectures from the Summer term 1920, he
concluded that “the aim of reducing set theory, and with it the usual methods of
analysis, to logic, has not been achieved today and maybe cannot be achieved at
all” [Hilbert, 1920]. At the same time, Brouwer’s intuitionist mathematics gained
currency. In particular, Hilbert’s former student Hermann Weyl converted to
intuitionism. Weyl’s 1920 address to the Hamburg Mathematical Seminar, “The
new foundational crisis in mathematics” [1921] was answered by Hilbert in three
talks in Hamburg in the Summer of 1921 [1922b]. Here, Hilbert presented his own
mature proposal for a solution to the problem of the foundation of mathematics.
This proposal incorporated Hilbert’s ideas from 1904 regarding direct consistency
proofs, his conception of axiomatic systems, and also the technical developments
in the axiomatization of mathematics in the work of Russell as well as the further
3 See [Moore, 1997], [Sieg, 1999] and [Zach, 1999] for more detail on the development of logic
in Hilbert’s school around 1918.