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US-Soviet relations have been driven by a complex interplay of
ideological, political, and economic factors of two distinct systems,
leading to postwar tensions and alternating periods of cautious cooperation and bitter
superpower rivalry over the duration of the ‘Cold War’ (1945-1990). This often prevented
them from reaching a mutual understanding on key policy issues, e.g. regarding PostWorld- War II Germany and in the case of the Berlin Wall, brought them at the verge of a
confrontation over Berlin, ending in a potential nuclear war. Howbeit, there is no doubt
among historians that the Berlin Wall not only marked a key moment in history but can
be viewed as a hallmark of the change in direction-US-Soviet relations took. Yet, to what
extent did the erection of the Berlin Wall impact upon US-Soviet relations?
The Berlin Wall acted as a barrier which silenced a ‘…subsequent international crisis,
that threatened the world with the risk of a military conflict, one that could escalate at any
time into nuclear confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union.’1 According to post
revisionist historian Gaddis it eased postwar tensions between the US and the Soviet
Union as it halted a confrontation over Berlin, escalating into a potential nuclear war
‘Even fraternal socialist solidarity, had its limits. To die for Berlin- or even to sacrifice
greatly for it-was no more attractive an option in Moscow than in Washington’.2 Clearly, it
was of interest to them to avoid such a conflict since it would be costly on their
economies on the one hand, and requires popular support on the other- at a time where
both seemed difficult to attain. Especially the Soviet Union found itself in an atmosphere
of economic recovery from the effects of World War II, unlike the US which was nearly
untouched afterwards. To Hachette, however the Berlin Wall even represented a means
‘…of preventing that a Third World war does not burst.’3 So, the Berlin Wall allowed the
emergence of an immediate military conflict that could escalate into nuclear
confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union-to be silenced.
Although the Berlin Wall might have eased postwar tensions between the US and Soviet
Union, there’s no denying the fact that it did less to improve their relations. Quite on the
contrary, it showed evidence of divergent views regarding their policy. In that respect, it
is thought that the US as much as the Soviet Union attempted to maintain their part of
Berlin under their sphere of influence to exert –either capitalist or communist influence
there. There was no sense of cooperation as both acted in accordance with their
interests-and in isolation of one another. This reflected the Soviets’ vision of peaceful
coexistence. Thereby, it is argued for instance that ‘…The objectives of the USSR
remained the same ones - fight against capitalism and export of Communism -, the
strategy, only, had changed’ 4This strategy is the build-up of the Berlin Wall since it not
only presented them with the opportunity to ‘…fight against capitalism’ in their sphere of
influence-East Berlin -but also to ‘…export communism’ to their sphere of influence.
Considering the Berlin Wall divided East Berlin from West Berlin, it similarly posed to the
US an opportunity of creating an entirely capitalist-dominated West Berlin. This may
have suited US-interests. The US-President Kennedy admittedly said himself in a
dramatic television address on the 25th July, 1961 that ‘…we cannot and will not permit
1
Frederick Taylor, The Berlin Wall: A Secret History, History Today, UK, February 2007, pp.43-49
John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, Oxford University Press, UK, 1998, p.149
3
Hachette, Peaceful Coexistence, Memo-Travel through History, 2008
http://memoonline.com/en/article.aspx?ID=CON_LGF_003
4
Hachette, Peaceful Coexistence, Memo-Travel through History, 2008
http://memoonline.com/en/article.aspx?ID=CON_LGF_003
2
4
the Communists to drive us out of Berlin, either gradually or by force.5’ It is implicated
through this that Kennedy wanted to prevent the growth of an entirely communistdominated Berlin and to ensure that the US remained in control of West Berlin by any
means necessary. The Berlin Wall consequently marked a turning point in US-Soviet
relations since it became a symbol of mutual mistrust& distance.
Most importantly, the Berlin Wall in fact was more or less a convenient solution to both
as it gave assurance on the Berlin-question that had been subject to heated discussions
in the past, e.g. in a meeting between US-President Kennedy and Soviet leader
Khrushchev at the Vienna Summit in 1960. Historian Taylor emphasizes that the wall
was indeed an exemplar of mutual convenience when he stresses that it ‘…was more
convenient to the Western democracies than their rhetoric suggested’6 and further raises
the question whether ‘…the leaders of the West genuinely loathed the Wall, or was it –
whisper if you dare – actually rather convenient to all the powers concerned?’7 Gaddis
on the contrary regards the Berlin Wall as a temporary solution as to his mind both were
driven into accepting its erection due to their unwillingness, or one might say incapability
to ‘…attack one another’ but rather demonstrate a ‘…kind of redirected aggression
certain animal species go through when they want to intimidate but not attack one
another: they make loud noises, but rarely go much beyond that’.8 In this sense, the wall
can be interpreted as having liberated both the Russians of the fear of a ‘…unified,
capitalist Germany, armed with nuclear weapons…backed by the United States, raising
the specter once again of an aggressor’ 9and the Americans of a communist-dominated
Berlin.
Conclusively, the question to what extent the erection of the Berlin Wall actually
impacted upon US-Soviet relations can be answered in acknowledging its ability to ease
postwar tensions between the US and Soviet Union as acting as a barrier silencing the
risk of a military conflict that was on the brink of escalating into a nuclear war. At the
same time, it nevertheless proved that US-Soviet relations did not improve with the
Berlin Wall but took the opposite direction since the US and the Soviets perceived their
own ideological interests regarding Berlin-and most importantly functioned in isolation of
the other. The Berlin Wall thus became to symbolize a continuous division between the
US and Soviet Union in the course of the ‘Cold War’.
5
John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, 25th July 1961
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03BerlinCrisis072
51961.htm
6
Frederick Taylor, The Berlin Wall: A Secret History, History Today, UK, February 2007, pp.43-49
7
Frederick Taylor, The Berlin Wall: A Secret History, History Today, UK, February 2007, pp.43-49
8
John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, Oxford University Press, UK, 1998, p.148
9
Jeremy Isaacs& Taylor Downing, Cold War, Transworld Publishers Ltd., UK, 1998, p.166
5