Download On July 3, 1863 outside the town of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania

Justifications Advocating General Robert E. Lee’s
Orders on July 3, 1863
Jonathan Doblix
History 299
Dr. Al-Tikriti
November 9, 2009
“I hereby declare upon my word of honor that I have neither given nor received unauthorized aid
on this work”
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On July 3, 1863, outside the town of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, General Robert E. Lee,
the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia (ANV), ordered his men to participate in a
military maneuver, known as Pickett’s Charge, which forever encompassed the annals of military
history. Scholars, however, from the 1870’s to the modern day have debated Lee’s motives and
methods of attack, as well as the defenses, he utilized in the placement and deployment of his
troops on July 1 to July 3, 1863. Lee presented carefully sculpted and planned orders to his
Division and Brigade commanders only to watch his directives ultimately crumble when his men
failed to dislodge the Union forces. Nevertheless, Lee, with the backing of Jefferson Davis, the
President of the Confederate States of America (CSA), believed that a swift and complete victory
on Union soil would clear a path to Washington, thus allowing the ANV an unopposed march to
the enemy’s capital.
Nevertheless, scholars from the 1860’s to the present day have debated Lee’s rationale
and motivations for ordering the vast bulk of his army forward on what some individuals term a
suicidal charge. In fact, historians have posited the following question when pondering Lee’s
orders – After his experiences at Malvern Hill where the ANV defeated a charging enemy, why
did Lee commit his troops to a similar fate when he reversed their roles and became the attacking
force during Pickett’s Charge? Additionally, historians have not only critically examined
virtually every order given by Lee to his subordinates, but also the manner in which those
officers relayed Lee’s original plans of attack to the rank and file. Even though a majority of the
most recent scholars have lauded his tactical judgment, others have questioned his motives and
analyzed every action leading up to and following Pickett’s Charge. General Lee’s decision to
thrust over fifteen thousand men onto the field of battle against a fortified enemy represented one
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of the most debated and scrutinized orders throughout the Civil War .1 Numerous scholars,
however, have irrefutably justified Lee’s orders and affirmed his rationale for attacking the
Union and attempting to break the resolve of his enemy.
Undoubtedly, Lee questioned his own plan of attack as he carefully committed the Army
of Northern Virginia on its quest to dislodge Union troops from their fortified hilltop position.
However, with the addition of General Jed Stuart’s cavalry, as well as General George Pickett’s
Division of Virginians, Lee firmly believed that his men would overwhelm an entrenched
enemy. Confident with the ability of his forces, Lee expounded, “. . . with proper concert of
action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the
assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed.”2 In fact, subsequent to the action on July 2,
1863, three Federal Corps – the First, Third, and Eleventh – had ceased to exist along with
several additional divisions mauled by the Confederate onslaught.3 Furthermore, the ANV had
broken through several crucial sections of the Union line, thus highlighting possible areas where
the assaulting force would ultimately cause the entire Union line to buckle and fail. With the
utilization of that logic, the fate of the ANV and the remainder of the Civil War unfolded on the
bloodied fields outside the town of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.
Even though Lee possessed complete faith in the success of the ANV, several of his
officers did share their commander’s optimism. In fact, General James Longstreet, the
commander of the Eleventh Corps, and E. Porter Alexander, the commander of the artillery,
firmly adhered to the philosophy that a defensive maneuver would ultimately ensure the ANV’s
Earl J. Hess, Pickett’s Charge – The Last Attack at Gettysburg (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
Press, 2001), 160.
1
2
The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,
Compiled by Russell A. Alger, Series I, Vol. 27, Reports (Harrisburg: Broadfoot Publishing Company, 1985), 320.
George R. Stewart, Pickett’s Charge: A Micro History of the Final Attack at Gettysburg, July 3, 1863
(Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1959), 84.
3
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success on the battlefield.4 While Lee acknowledged their concerns and suggestions, he still
believed that on the fields of Gettysburg the Army of the Potomac would suffer a great defeat,
thereby subsequently allowing the Confederate forces a clear path to the capital in Washington
D. C. While both men disagreed with the rationale presented by their commanding officer, they
realized that it remained their duty to act upon his orders. Longstreet, however, continued to
dissuade Lee from initiating his tactics.
Nevertheless, Lee maintained the belief that if he ordered a defensive strategy, then the
Union would ultimately emerge victorious because the South would fail to properly supply and
maintain the Confederate troops located in an enemy land. Consequently, Lee fervently
concluded that a continued defensive mentality would weaken the resolve, as well as the pride,
of the ANV, thus contributing to a defeat on Southern soil. In fact, Lee affirmed his desire to
end the war quickly when he wrote, “[The lives of my men] are too precious to be sacrificed in
the attainment of success that inflicts no loss upon the enemy beyond the actual loss in battle.
Every victory should bring us nearer to the great end which is the object of this war to reach.”5
Lee’s sentiment epitomized his ideology that a resolution to the conflict required victory on
Northern soil.6 As a result, he devised a strategy that would not only cripple the Army of the
Potomac, but also break its resolve to continue the war.
Shelby Foote, The Civil War – A Narrative: Fredericksburg to Meridian (New York: Random House, 1963),
463, 539.
4
5
Clifford Dowdey and Louis H. Manarin, The Wartime Papers of Robert E. Lee (New York: Da Capo Press,
1987), 356.
6
Intent upon winning a stunning victory, Lee, with the backing of Jefferson Davis, firmly adopted the belief that
his battle-hardened and tested troops could carry the day upon the fields of Gettysburg. In fact, Lee carried a
document which he wished to present to President Abraham Lincoln requesting the United States of America to sue
for peace, thus bringing the war to an end. Additionally, reports had circulated stating that Lee believed that with
the grace of the Almighty the South would gain its independence on the same day, July 4th, that the United States
achieved her freedom from England.
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Lee carefully sculpted his plans to ensure a victory against Union infantry with his
battered yet battle-hardened and tested infantry and artillery. The commanding general wished
to employ an offensive maneuver which would pin pivotal elements of the Federal Army into
their previously occupied and disposed positions, thereby allowing a column of troops to overrun
the entire front. As he explained to his subordinates on the evening of July 2, 1863, Lee
indicated, “[The main force would consist of] Longstreet, re-enforced by Pickett’s three brigades
. . . [They would] attack the next morning. . . General Ewell was directed to assail the enemy’s
right at the same time.”7 Through the usage of such a maneuver, the Confederates hoped that an
exploitation of a ruptured Union line would ensue. Lee ascertained that the vast majority of the
assault force would march toward a copse, a small thicket of trees, situated at the hang or center
of the Union defensive fishhook in order to secure a decisive victory. Since General Lee
believed that the hang of the Union line possessed the least amount of defense, he ordered his
men to focus toward that crucial point, thus securing the Confederate Army a significant victory
on Pennsylvania soil. (Refer to Appendices A and B on pages 14 and 15, respectively to visually
substantiate Lee’s strategies.) Unbeknownst to Lee, General George Meade, the Union
commanding officer, had chosen to position his troops in a fishhook shape in order to fortify his
flanks and center simultaneously, thereby creating a seemingly impenetrable line of defense.8
In order to prepare for the advance of the infantry, the majority of the assault force, Lee
sought to collect virtually every artillery piece which the ANV possessed and ordered General E.
Porter Alexander to begin a furious cannonade in the early morning hours of July 3, 1863.
Consequently, that barrage helped to soften the main points of the assault and silence the enemy
7
8
The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Vol. 27, 320.
Bradley M. Gottfried, The Maps of Gettysburg: An Atlas of the Gettysburg Campaign June 3- July 13, 1863
(New York: Savas Beatie LLC, 2007), 238-239.
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artillery, thus preparing for a decisive blow, a coup de main, against the hinge of the enemy
line.9 Subsequently, Lee ordered his Corps and Division commanders to attack along the entire
occupied front of the Union line with a force of nine Brigades, approximately twelve to fifteen
thousand men, including some of the finest Division and Brigade commanders ever in the service
of the Confederacy.10 Notwithstanding, the achievement of a breakthrough could only occur
through a coordinated effort of a large scale artillery bombardment and sufficient support with a
second wave of infantry to augment the first Corps and Divisions already engaged on the field.
Under that carefully orchestrated battle plan, the Federal Army’s positions would succumb and
an unprecedented Southern victory would result.
Contrary to General Robert E. Lee’s strategy to ensure a Northern defeat, the Union
artillery opened fire on the Confederate left at approximately 4:30 A.M. on July 3, 1863.11 As a
result, Lee not only realized that he had lost the element of surprise, but that he had to enact his
commands immediately in order to secure a tactical advantage. As Lee departed from his
command center in order to confirm the Confederate infantry’s preparation for attack, he
discerned that Longstreet had ignored his orders for the ANV’s planned assault. Although Lee
had rebuffed Longstreet’s plan for a tactical flanking march at least twice during the preceding
days, his most trusted subordinate stubbornly clung to his own stratagem even though it
represented an unsound tactical feint. (Refer to Appendix C on page 16 to visualize simplified
versions of the battle plans proposed by both Lee and Longstreet.) In fact, Lee further dismissed
Longstreet’s decision based upon the assumption that committing his entire army, except one
9
Stewart, 95.
Hess, 160.
10
11
Scott Bowden and Bill Ward, Last Chance for Victory: Robert E. Lee and the Gettysburg Campaign
(Cambridge: Savas Publishing Company, 2001), 430.
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Corps, to complete a flank attack would equate to a monumental disaster. During the course of
their lengthy discussion, Lee convinced Longstreet to continue the attack as previously ordered
when he stated, “The enemy is there, and I am going to strike him.”12 He also bestowed upon his
subordinate the authority to command every Brigade within the First and Third Corps.13 In
essence, a parallelism existed between Lee’s tactical command structure at Pickett’s Charge and
the Battles of the Second Manassas and Gaines’ Mill.14 Lee previously utilized those strictures
in order to gain decisive and effective victories over the Federal Army.
Moreover, the commanding officer of the Confederacy firmly advocated a plan of attack
that simulated Napoleon’s victory over the British on the second day in the battle of Wagram in
1809. Unlike Napoleon who relied solely on his infantry and artillery, Lee wanted to utilize all
three elements of his combat arm – infantry, artillery, and cavalry – in order to achieve a
crushing victory.15 Scholars, however, continually debate whether or not Lee had actually
systematically recalled such famous and decisive victories that he had learned while studying at
West Point Military Academy. Nevertheless, modern historians realize that Lee had been well
versed on the subject of classic military strategies, thus discerning that Lee had incorporated
those tactics when contemplating his overall military visions of victory. Through the usage of a
prolonged artillery bombardment – a feu d’enfer or “Hell’s Fire,” a term coined by Napoleon –
Lee would dislodge General Meade’s Union forces, thereby clearing a path for his infantry, a
force he personally deemed unstoppable.16
12
Hess, 6.
13
Foote, The Civil War – A Narrative: Fredericksburg to Meridian, 575-579.
Bowden and Ward, 439.
14
15
Bowden and Ward, 439.
Ernest Butner, “Napoleonic Arithmetic,” The Papers of the late Dr. Ernest Butner, http://www.civilwarhome.
com/napolmath.htm (accessed August 31, 2009).
16
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The Confederate bombardment, under the command of Edward Porter Alexander,
commenced after every available gun possessed in the ANV artillery faced the copse of trees
where Lee had determined the Federal line would ultimately buckle, thus granting him and his
men victory on Union soil. Lee fervently adhered to the ideology that his peerless infantry in
conjunction with the artillery bombardment concentrated on the Union centre and right would
allow his men the opportunity to occupy Cemetery Ridge, the high ground, and overrun the
enemy’s line. Furthermore, the commanding general realized that if he did not pursue the
immediate military opportunity presented before him, then he would have to disengage and
retreat westward to the South Mountain Range. Lee reasoned that any course of action other
than an outright victory would equate to a defeat, thus negating any thoughts of refusing battle.
Since the commanding general inherently knew that he had to attack, he ordered his men to
charge a fortified position with the faith that his famed infantry and crushing artillery would
carry the day.
The infantry did not assume their positions until after high noon; and at 1:00 P.M., the
Washington Artillery broke the eerie silence which had descended upon the field by firing the
opening salvo to the Confederate bombardment.17 The Confederate cannons dueled with their
Union counterparts for approximately twenty-five minutes when Alexander sent a note to
General Pickett stating, “For God’s sake come quick. Come quick or I can’t support you.”18
Already, Lee’s carefully sculpted plans of battle had begun to crumble under a surprising
onslaught of direct, as well as indirect, Union artillery fire. Upon approaching Longstreet for
17
James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War (New York: Barnes and Noble,
2004), 328-329.
18
Longstreet, 330.
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orders, Pickett presented him with Alexander’s note and asked for advice. Overcome with
emotion, Longstreet simply nodded in affirmation to commence with the attack as planned.
Pickett rode to his men and addressed them with this salutation: “Remember Old Virginia!”19
Immediately, nearly fifteen thousand men stepped off to begin an assault, known as Pickett’s
Charge, which forever lives in the annals of American history.
Simultaneously, Longstreet addressed Alexander and conferred his opinion that even
though he did not want to proceed with the charge, he would honor Lee’s orders and issue the
appropriate commands. Consequently, veterans of the charge proudly remembered that the men
of the ANV stepped off in perfect parade ground order determined to conquer their objective.20
By the time the lead elements of the Confederates made it halfway across the open wheat field,
the Federal line had already commenced firing with its full might. The Federals severely
punished the advancing enemy who marched unwavering forward almost impervious to the nonslackening fire which they had encountered in order to continue to their target, the copse of trees.
That focus caused the commanders of the lead elements to complete a series of oblique attacks at
a forty-five degree angle from their true mission, thereby diverting the Federal Army fire away
from the center, the intended crumbling point of the Union defensives.21
Although several Confederate assault units advanced to within one hundred yards of the
stone wall near their objective, the Federals repulsed the troops by an onslaught of murderous
and concentrated artillery and infantry barrage. However, General Armistead and members of
his Division who successfully mounted the wall immediately succumbed to fatal wounds.
Concurrently, other members of Pickett’s Division closed in on the copse of trees only to realize
19
20
21
Foote, The Civil War – A Narrative: Fredericksburg to Meridian, 551.
Michael Shaara, The Killer Angels (New York: Ballantine Books, 1974), 341.
Bowden and Ward, 469-472.
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that they had no alternative but to continue to press forward even though a Confederate report
acknowledged that Yankee guns enfiladed entire ranks, “with fearful effect, sometimes as many
as ten men being killed and wounded by the bursting of a single shell.”22 As the Federal fire
intensified, the Virginians attempted to seek cover around the copse of trees. In fact, Confederate
Captain J. B. Turney recalled, “For ten minutes still we remained the target, and each minute
perceptible weakened our gallant and made less possible our chance of retreat. All realized that
ours was a hopeless chance, yet General Lee desired that we remain, and that was sufficient.”23
Unable to contend with the overwhelming Federal onslaught, the men of Pickett’s Division
abandoned their attack, thereby never breaking the Union lines or presenting General Lee with
the victory that he had envisioned.
As his retreating men streamed around him, Lee accepted blame for the defeat of the
ANV and commented, “The fault is entirely my own.”24 On the night of July 4, 1863, Lee
executed a skillful retreat under the cover of rain and darkness, thereby allowing his battlewearied men a respite. The ANV re-crossed the Potomac, thus ending the campaign at
Gettysburg, as well as the South’s last foray onto Union soil. As Lee withdrew, he wrote a letter
to the President of the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis, putting forth his resignation as
commanding officer of the ANV. Upon receipt of the letter, Davis reaffirmed his faith in Lee
and essentially stated that he could find no one better to command the mighty armed forces of
the Confederacy.25 Subsequent to the Confederates’ final push at Gettysburg, they no longer
22
James M. McPherson, ed., The American Heritage: New History of the Civil War (New York: Penguin
Group, 1996), 321,
23
Richard Rollins, ed., Pickett’s Charge: Eyewitness Accounts at the Battle of Gettysburg (Mechanicsburg:
Stackpole Books, 1994), 278.
24
Rollins, Pickett’s Charge: Eyewitness Accounts at the Battle of Gettysburg, 353.
25
James D. McCabe, Life and Campaigns of General Robert E. Lee (New York: Blelock and Co., 1867), 412.
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attempted to engage the Army of the Potomac in offensive warfare, a tactic which may have sped
the ultimate defeat of a suddenly defensive enemy. Consequently, the events which occurred on
the hallowed grounds outside the town of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania sought to embody the glory
of the South, but instead only marked the spot where the soldiers hoped to achieve their goals.26
Although the Army of Northern Virginia under the command of General Robert E. Lee
did not emerge successful in its attempt to dislodge a superior number of troops from a fortified
position, the commanding officer’s strategies and rationale appeared justifiable. Prior to
Pickett’s Charge, the South registered continued successes through their adoption of defensive
tactics. Unfortunately, both General Lee and President Davis knew that without a quick
conclusion to the war, the South would suffer a slow and terrible defeat and death. Since
Gettysburg represented the gateway to Washington D.C., a victory there, as well as rapid
subsequent victories, would ultimately force the North to sue for peace, thus ending a bloody
War Between the States. Based upon an ever-decreasing time table, General Lee realized the
need to engage in offensive actions and ordered Pickett’s Charge even though the North had
secured a fortified high ground. When viewing Lee’s overall war strategies to secure an ultimate
victory, however, his decision to attack at Pickett’s Charge remained inevitable.
26
Destined to become the single most important battle in the annals of the Civil War, historians believed that the
final push by the ANV represented the High Water Mark of the Confederacy. Never again would the South attempt
to invade Northern soil at any other point throughout the war. Now a spot where the interred dead peacefully rest,
brother near brother, represented killing fields where both armies met to engage in bloody conflict which forever
altered the course of history.
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