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PROBLEMS OF ARCTIC SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY A paper about the dialogue - April 11, 12, 2008- co-convened by the Simons Foundation and the School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, BC, Canada by Adele Buckley, Canadian Pugwash Group June 2, 2008 As the Arctic regions of the world enter into a period of unprecedented change, it would be well to plan now for policy and practice that will ensure and enhance the security of peoples, lands and oceans of the Arctic. This idea was the impetus for a dialogue of experts, representatives of indigenous peoples, and senior officials, representing the sovereign nations whose territories, in part, lie above the Arctic Circle. The organizers expressed the rationale for the conference this way: …….. Climate change is bringing about a shrinking of the ice-cap and a reduction in the area of sea-ice, which may allow navigation through Arctic waters and will make for easier access to seabed resources. This, in turn, is already leading to the mobilization of competing claims to sovereignty, and in the absence of a clear and comprehensive legal regime, the countries of the region are seeking to increase their military presence there. …. the United States and Russia have historically confronted each other across the Arctic. …… [there will be] a profound effect on the livelihoods of indigenous peoples, both directly and through its implications for the militarization of the region. The Arctic Security dialogue is intended to strengthen the search for cooperative security solutions, in the interests of environmental protection, demilitarization (particularly with regard to nuclear weapons and the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone) and the livelihoods and human rights of Arctic peoples. Whilst it is intended to bring the best scholarship to bear, the purpose of the Dialogue is ……..to inform policy making and to promote the establishment of an appropriate, clear and comprehensive legal regime for the regulation of human activity, and international relations in the Arctic. The common interest of the global community, not just the Arctic nations, prompted the comprehensive discussion themes. The impact of Arctic climate change profoundly influences both human security and military security. The Arctic peoples must be deeply involved in political decisions about the rapidly changing land, water and air. Military decisions and implementation inevitably affect human security, so the discourse covered facets of both. National sovereignty is maintained within a world that must accept international dependence, and advance the cause of common cooperative security. The conference considered the existing framework of international law, since no individual state, alone, has either the power or the resources to solve its Arctic security issues. 1 FIGURE 1 – THE ARCTIC REGION 2 The Arctic Environment and the Impact of Climate Change The impact of climate change on the Arctic is already evident, since the relative warming is extreme near the poles, in comparison to lower latitudes. Many factors interact in climate change, and the integrated result is seen in sea ice changes. Sea ice measurement over a period of years is possibly the best scientific method of tracking the magnitude of the change. By means of in-situ observations, aircraft, remote sensing technology and satellites, Arctic ocean data has been collected over the whole of the twentieth century. Microwave-derived sea ice time series are now among the longest continuous satellitederived geophysical records, extending over thirty years. The coupled ice-oceanatmosphere regime has been analysed for trends in salinity, seasonal variation, and the relative ice cap content of multi-year ice (MYI) and first year ice (FYI). Open water has different radiative properties than ice, and also radiative absorption differs between MYI and FYI. The negative trend in MYI is much greater than that in FYI, indicating an ice cover in transition. These are major factors in accelerated global warming. The ice cover is in also in transition due to natural variability, such as the North Atlantic Oscillation (NOA) and its coupling to regional sea ice fluctuations. However, statistical analysis has shown1 that 90% of the decreasing ice extent can be explained by increasing CO2 in the atmosphere. The years of accumulated data have made it possible for models to make revealing projections. The coupled global atmosphere-ice-ocean simulations using the ECHAM4 model from the Max-Planck Institute for Meteorology, as well as a dataset from the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute in Russia, have enabled examination of warming cycles early in the 20th century as well as those late in the century. The late century global warming anomaly can only be simulated by including observed anthropogenic forcing. Current models 2 ECHAM-4 and HadCM3 have made projections to 2100. In these models, the ice extent is reduced even faster than the predictions from the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, as modeled to 2050. Consequences of sea ice changes are that open water allows for much more heat absorption, but at the same time it could become an important sink of atmospheric CO2. The rapid changes in the Greenland ice sheet will impact both northern (and global) sea level rise, and the thermohaline circulation (the Gulf Stream), but this “wild card” has not yet been included in model simulations. Great alterations in the climate of the Arctic and the adjacent regions in Europe are anticipated. The observation-prediction system needs to continue in support of the planning of the entire spectrum of societal and natural changes in the Arctic. When the ice climate is altered, there arises the possibility of abrupt change due to “surprise” feedbacks.3 As yet, the time series data that would show consequential trends for biological and geochemical systems, and thermohaline circulation are urgently 1 O. M. Johannessen ,(2008). Decreasing sea ice mirrors increasing CO2. Environmental Research Letters, in revision 2 O. M. Johannessen; Arctic Climate , Present and Future Perspectives; Problems of Arctic Security in the 21st Century, Vancouver BC Canada, April 2008 [abbreviated - (ArcSec 21Vanc 08) ] 3 R.W. Macdonald, Consequences of Warming in the Arctic with Reference to Northern Security, ArcSec 21Vanc 08 3 required, but do not exist. Sea level rise, with lack of ice cover will put several northern communities at risk of coastal erosion, especially in the western Arctic. There may or may not be a net benefit to northerners through increased shipping in northern waters. Hazards will be present due to inexperience with conditions for offshore oil production and industrial transport. Arctic security, in Canada and elsewhere, requires development of charts, coastal pilots and overall control of shipping. Complex foodwebs will alter in terms of availability of food and access to food. This applies to both the marine, animal and human populations. There will be invasive species and diseases, so that populations will be displaced or absorbed. The extent of changes in organic systems due to exposure to contaminants, such as POPs (persistent organic pollutants) and mercury is unpredictable, but certainly unfavourable. Food and water security are threatened by thawing of permafrost. Another source of vulnerability is pH change in oceans and lakes. There is potential for ecosystem collapse; at the same time there is potential for new commercial harvesting of marine resources. Accurate assessment of these situations is vital. To minimize suffering and maximize opportunity for adaptation, northerners must be fully engaged, and integrated into planning and scientific work. In summary, the consequences of warming in the Arctic and the preservation of Arctic security, requires extensive northern planning and this needs to intensify immediately. Issues to be considered are wide ranging, including: Rivers and lakes are undergoing very rapid change Models are Arctic-wide and are not usually applicable for revealing regional trends Inuit are accustomed to making their living from the ocean, and land. As well as adaptation assistance, policies and strategies of adaptation need to be jointly developed, with more resources applied, between northerners and southerners. Permafrost thaw is a huge problem for pipelines and infrastructure (e.g. sewage) Traditional knowledge of Inuit and native peoples, embedded within their methodology of storytelling, have accumulated 1000 years of data on snow melt, and water nutrients, caribou herd size and migration, to give just a few examples. This is an important area of exchange of information with southerners, to add useful scientific data. Youth are unprepared for the nature of the new Arctic; learning models and their education must fit the needs of the north For accurate transmission of information, media and scientists need better communication The climate change solution is extra-Arctic, but commencement of the Arctic adaptation work is urgent Military Security in the Arctic With the opening of Arctic waters, and then opening of shipping lanes, comes the potential for economic gains in international trade and the search for seabed oil and gas and other resources. There is guaranteed territorial jurisdiction within the 200-nautical- 4 mile limit, but elsewhere nations are taking measures to assure national access, rights and, in some cases, sovereignty over portions of the seabed. Security concerns will be raised; and security strategy will dictate the deployment of an increased military capability. Territorial claims and counter claims will be a source of tension that could degenerate into open conflict. Naval operations4 of both Russia and the United States will increase when there are open waters, creating a potential for military confrontation, especially because both have nuclear-armed submarines. The Arctic regions are host to the two major nuclear powers, and nowhere else are they in such close proximity to each other. There exists a potential for additional nuclearization, for both sea and land. Prudence suggests that nuclearization must diminish and sooner, rather than later, there must be no role for nuclear weapons in the Arctic (as it is now in the Antarctic). Nuclear weapons overtly stationed in the region present a multi-faceted danger to the Arctic lands and peoples, and, before it is too late, preventive measures must be taken. So while this issue may, at first, seem peripheral to adaptation to the new Arctic climate, it is actually central to the Arctic security environment. Creation of legal structures and functioning multilateral procedures are already beginning to be discussed. A strategic negotiations agenda between the nations requires nuclear weapons issues on that agenda, because otherwise the status quo will become ingrained. Existing agreements as well as the present status in the Arctic provide a hopeful start because there is already a seabed treaty in force that prevents stationing of nuclear weapons, and related structures, on the Arctic Ocean floor or in the subsoil thereof. Strategic bombers in Arctic air space are much less significant now than in the cold war. Some parts of the Arctic are already defacto nuclear weapon free zones, and these could be gradually extended. Negotiations could begin now on military Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). Of note is the Antarctic Treaty, where each Contracting Party has the right to send observers to every base of any country in that region, thus producing a very powerful confidence-building measure for ensuring full compliance5. It is hoped that strategic arms reduction talks between the U.S. and Russia will begin again. While it would be beneficial to have the Arctic regions free of nuclear weapons, there are many obstacles.6 The United States and Russia both regularly deploy nuclear-capable submarines in Arctic waters. Russia’s main naval base at Zapadnaya Litsa maintains their most advanced ballistic missile submarines and patrol areas are mainly in the Arctic, in the waters of the Barents, White and Kara Seas. Thus, discussion of establishment of an Arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) could only be attempted after complementary disarmament measures by the United States. There is a new trend supporting abolition; and in addition a group of influential abolitionists has come forward 4 R. Ekeus, Military Security in the Arctic, ArcSec 21Vanc 08 S. Duarte, Keynote Address, ArcSec 21Vanc 08 6 M. Wallace, Towards an Arctic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, ArcSec 21Vanc 08 5 5 - January 4, 2007, and January 15, 2008 - and published op-eds in the Wall Street Journal calling for a policy agenda to ride the world of nuclear weapons. These op-eds were authored by a group of formerly top national security officials in both Republican and Democratic administrations, and urge U.S. leadership. The outcome of their conference at the Hoover Institute called for a 500 warhead limit for both U.S. and Russia. If such a reduction were to be achieved, by both Russia and the United States, it would be in the best interests of Russia to place its reliance on road-mobile ICBMs and the result could be closure of nuclear submarine facilities in the Arctic, thus clearing the way for a defacto nuclear free zone in the Russian Arctic. A different, but potentially productive approach would be for all Arctic states that are presently non-nuclear to work together on a regional treaty “to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons from their respective territories”, as allowed for in Article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Norway, Sweden and Finland, all with sovereign territory north of the Arctic Circle are nuclear weapon free. Greenland has a U.S. military base at Thule, but is part of Denmark, a NNWS. Canada is already a defacto nuclear free country, with reference to its land mass. The northwest passage, a ship channel which passes many islands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, is a very unfavourable passageway for submarines because it is narrow and shallow, posing severe difficulty to both maneuverability and undetectability of a submarine. Although the United States would neither “confirm nor deny”, this passage is very probably a defacto nuclear weapons free zone. For surface travel through the northwest passage, maritime safety in these dangerous waters would certainly dictate obtaining an international agreement to ban nuclear fissile materials. A most important distinction between Russia and the other Arctic nations is that Russia has four million people in the region, and many are not indigenous. Others Arctic regions are thinly populated, with the majority of the population being the aboriginal peoples. The geopolitical reality, as seen from Russia7, is that military security is inseparable from energy security. Access to the Arctic is, in the Russian part of the Arctic basin, likely to be through the “northeast” passage, a Eurasian sea route. In preparation for greatly enhanced activity in the Arctic, billions of dollars have been or will be spent by both the East (Russia) and the West (U.S. and Canada) for icebreakers, nuclear powered vessels, Arctic patrol ships, oil platforms, ice-class ships, army bases, coast guard facilities, satellite surveillance (Radarsat-2) and deployment of personnel. At present, Russia has much more equipment, and appears better prepared than the West. Over a fourteen year consultation period, Russia and nine other countries in the region developed the Central Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (CANWFZ). The 2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk regarding Central Asia, encompassing an area five times larger than France, has been signed but has not entered into force. This is the first NWFZ wholly in the northern hemisphere. This treaty includes former NW states, has nuclear weapon sites, and honours the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). The countries have agreed to IAEA8 inspection – verification site visits could use some of the protocols of 7 8 A. Nikitin, Geopolitics and the Russian Arctic, ArcSec 21Vanc 08 IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 6 START-1. While some problems remain, the accomplishments so far on the CANWFZ offer experience applicable to an Arctic NWFZ. While extensive negotiations are in store, this idea is very timely, and the Russian experience tells us that work should start now. Each denuclearized zone is different9, not only because of geography, but because of the scope of the obligations assumed by the parties; the rights and responsibilities of extrazonal states; the verification arrangements and the conditions for the entry into force of the agreement. The major powers have not accepted particular provisions of the NWFZs. United States and China have objections to the Bangkok Treaty on Southeast Asia. The United Kingdom and the United States object to the Treaty of Pelindaba (not yet ratified). One saving provision, where there could be objection by a NWS, is that in nearly all NWFZ, visits and transits of ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons may be permitted by the zonal state (but this requires declaration of NW, usually unacceptable). Moving forward to declare only a portion of the Arctic regions and waters to be a NWFZ could be problematic. On the other hand, partial solutions, taken together, could be the right path. Given that the NNWS of the Arctic are unlikely to place unlimited resources into negotiation on nuclear disarmament, the most important policy direction for these nations is to press for full compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. For the reasons outlined above, it is realistic to expect that the two NWS must make significant reductions in their nuclear arms deployments before they turn their attention to an Arctic NWFZ. In addition, there are going to be a wide range of negotiations between the Arctic sovereign states over many issues. Pressure to move forward on a NWFZ at this time would introduce an element of tension, whereas it would be mutually far more beneficial to maintain an atmosphere of cooperation. In spite of these difficulties, and even as military activity is expected to increase, the Arctic peoples have a right to be secure from the threat of nuclear weapons, and to be involved in preventing nuclearization. In the background of the interactions of the Arctic nations, there is acceptance of a goal to achieve a NWFZ. Thus, individual nations will need to prepare for this eventuality by starting to work now, possibly through bilateral strategic talks. Comparison with the legal and political framework9 of the other polar region – the Antarctic – is of interest, but the situation differs greatly. Nations might resort to use of force to defend economic activities such as oil or mineral exploration, and for this reason, the Antarctic was known to be vulnerable to unwanted rivalry, and possible militarization. The Wellington Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource activities (CRAMRA) was adopted in 1988. In 1991, the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, known as the Madrid Protocol provided a comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment, designated Antarctica as a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science, and prohibited mining exploration activities indefinitely. Environmental protection is one area where the Madrid Protocol and the Wellington Convention might serve as useful starting points, as it is certain that opening of the Arctic will endanger the 9 J. Goldblat, NWFZ in the Arctic?, ArcSec 21Vanc 08 7 environment in new and threatening ways. International agreement is vitally necessary on, for instance, handling of oil spills, and on rules for resource exploitation. Human Security In the Canadian north, considering federal devolution10 of program and resource responsibilities to the three northern territories (Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut) is a key to understanding the security environment for the peoples of the Arctic. From the beginning of British government rule, First Nations had collective ownership of their lands, and there was recognition of First Nations governments as negotiators of land settlements. Treaties for the south were negotiated in the 19th century, while those for the north were negotiated in the late 20th century. The Canadian constitution of 1982 recognizes “existing Aboriginal rights”, the first country in the world to do so. Aboriginal land claims along the route of the Arctic Gas pipeline down the Mackenzie River Valley were settled in 1984, 1992, 1993, and 2003, giving ownership to four peoples, totalling 193,769 square kilometers. In Nunavut in the Eastern Arctic, the Inuit hold title to 350,000 square kilometers, 20% of the territory. It is apparent that one pillar of human security rests on economic advancement. However, the Canadian northerners, noting the economic changes that are to come with climate change, seek the powers that provinces enjoy, but this is constitutionally difficult. This would give them jurisdiction and management of the natural resources of the lands and waters within their respective political boundaries, allowing them to derive the deserved economic benefits. Further, indigenous peoples jurisdiction of the marine bed resources and the land would strengthen and maintain sovereignty for Canada since these areas, 3.8 million square kilometers of land and ocean, have been continuously utilized by them for up to 1000 years. Another pillar of human security rests on environmental protection. The 1993 Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, even at this date, not been fully implemented11. Article 12, for example, requires a plan to monitor Nunavut’s natural environment. Such a plan, managed by its in-territory land users, would assert sovereignty, and it would also be a source of valuable data on ongoing effects of climate change. Similarly, Article 15, which calls for a Nunavut Marine Council could provide oversight for offshore activities, whether they have to do with marine wildlife or rules for shipping channels. Failing to achieve action by other means, the peoples of Nunavut organized and have launched a court case to force the implementation of the negotiated settlement of a sovereign state of Canada with an aboriginal people. Arctic communities are now exposed to a greater risk of environmental degradation than ever before, not only because of arctic warming but also by the effects of increased economic development. The time is right for comprehensive negotiations to ensure that there is proper governance for environmental protection and regulatory safety regimes 10 11 T. Penikett, Political Climate Change in the Canadian Arctic, ArcSec 21Vanc 08 U. Hanson, Arctic Sovereignty and the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, ArcSec 21Vanc 08 8 The relationship between Greenland and Denmark, has led to home rule for Greenland and a resource-sharing arrangement for oil, gas and minerals. This illustrates an arrangement tailored to the needs of both parties, adding to human security for the people of Greenland. Internationally, the Arctic Council, and the Inuit Circumpolar Conference are just two vehicles that foster cooperation and solving of common problems, such as the effects of climate change. Although northern peoples have been “canaries in the coal mine” for climate change and there are already far-reaching effects, their apparent concern is only moderate, as each nation believes itself to be skilled at adaptation. The Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC)12 is an international treaty organization that represents joint interests of Canadian and United States First Nation governments in Arctic Council fora. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in its 2007 report, noted that many Arctic human communities are already adapting to climate change. An early response is to institute changes in wildlife management regimes and shift behaviours of travelling and hunting, for example, because these are recognized as having impacts on food security, personal safety and subsistence activities. The resilience of indigenous populations is being severely challenged. Feedbacks into the global climate from the rapid rate of climate change in the Arctic will produce major disruptions globally. What will be the feedback into the Arctic economy and environment from these global changes? Continuity of support systems for Arctic security could be in jeopardy. Thus, the AAC has recognized that adaptation requires not just technical and regulatory changes, but also increased capacity and improved governance. First Nations land agreements contain rights of ownership of land and heritage resources, rights of participation in territorial land use planning, certain water rights, and harvesting rights. Treaty implementation and partnership is vital to northerners’ sense of security. To support adaptation, new work is important in areas of food security, Arctic resilience and diversity, health risk from contaminants such as mercury, and community land use plans. . Human security is usually categorized as a condition in which an individual or a community enjoys freedom from want – sufficient food, water, clothing, shelter; and freedom from fear – dignity of the person, and absence of violence or threats of violence. In the global community, human security is a relatively recent concept13, preceded in the 20th century by ideas of national and collective security. Such ideas stood in the way of transnational efforts for disarmament and abolition, and have been a constant in the discourse ever since. Even though we want to shift the discourse to “peace”, it is evident that there are many other “securities” now in play – economic, environmental, cultural, societal, energy, food. Each of these has their own interconnection with human security. There is no foreseeable need to exercise the “responsibility to protect”, as each of the Arctic basin governments values its northern people, although allowing only partial selfgovernment. Human rights, and fundamental freedoms are as important in the north as elsewhere. However, human security in the north is not usually framed in this way, and there is no discourse there on achieving “human security” by that name. The northern 12 13 D. Matthiessen, Climate Change and Human Security in Northern Canada, ArcSec 21Vanc 08 F. Griffiths, Not a Good Fit? ‘Human Security‘ and the Arctic, ArcSec 21Vanc 08 9 peoples occupy a vast landscape, and there is usually no direct threat to their lives in a military sense. But the threat to life of humans and other living populations in the north is a consequence of climate change, and it is deep and real. Because coastal settlements are the norm, the threat that there will be environmental refugees is real. The human security needs of the Inuit of Canada’s north are for relief from the threat of cultural erosion and language loss, and the threat to their traditional way of life. Indeed some of this is in place, because the use of indigenous languages in educational and government institutions is honoured. Integrity of Arctic school systems is a key to success. Certain agreements in the land claims treaties are given such faint attention that the indigenous peoples do not trust in their eventual implementation. Environmental and wildlife protection in the face of climate change and new economic development is one of many imperatives. Most important of all is the need for social equity, and a constant unquestioned “place at the table”. Who will be their champion? Arctic communities, relative to the south, are all small and vulnerable. Human security in the Arctic will be best served by focusing on the security of the community, and buttressing its continuing viability. Still to be decided is whether the community can best be held safe from harm by retaining their traditional culture as far as possible, or by raising the community to Western standards of prosperity and societal behaviour. Governance mechanisms like the Arctic Council may have passed their usefulness. All Arctic problems cannot be solved in the Arctic; the issues are global. National Sovereignty and International Law The issues of Arctic security are not susceptible to solution by any individual sovereign state, and cooperative responses to the broad spectrum of climate change ramifications is necessary To address the challenges, consider5 what international instruments are already agreed, and available to apply. The United Nations Charter, Article 52 specifically recognizes the legitimacy of regional arrangements for international peace and security issues. The Seabed Treaty establishes a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone on the seabed and its subsoil. Existing and pending NWFZs are established under the UN. An applicable legal regime is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which was signed in 198214, and has been ratified by 154 States. All countries that border the Arctic basin have ratified it, except the United States, (the matter is now before the U. S. Congress, and is thought likely to pass.) 14 H.J. Rajan, An International Legal Regime for the Arctic, ArcSec 21Vanc 08 “Sovereignty under the Convention: Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal States are entitled to territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf over which they have specific rights and jurisdiction. These zones have to be drawn from certain baselines, which is the low water line along the coast (normal baselines) or straight or archipelagic baselines defined by reference to lists of geographical coordinates of points. Waters on the land-ward side of the baseline are internal waters of the State or, in the case of archipelagic baselines, archipelagic waters.” 10 Under UNCLOS, both sovereignty and sovereign rights are established14, and no special regime is envisaged for the Arctic. The key to establishing zones over which sovereign states have rights is establishment of baselines, along the coast, and archipelagic baselines. Figure 2 illustrates the status of claims, as presently submitted to the UNCLOS Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Figure 2 – Status of Territorial Claims in the Arctic 11 Articles of UNCLOS provide rigorous definitions so that international disputes may be minimized. Essential elements of the rights established under UNCLOS are listed in Table 1. (The reader is referred to the Convention for accurate text re sovereignty). TABLE 1 – Essential Elements of Rights Established under UNCLOS Sovereign Rights Under the Convention RIGHT Territorial sea Contiguous zone Exclusive economic zone Continental shelf and its delineation Delineation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles Exploration of the continental shelf or exploitation of its natural resources DEFINITION Not exceeding 12 nautical miles from the baseline; complete sovereignty, including resources Not extending beyond 24 nautical miles from the baseline; regulatory rights relating to infringement in the territorial sea Not extending beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline; coastal State has sovereign rights for natural resources, living or non-living, as well as sea-bed and subsoil. Jurisdiction on structures, artificial islands, marine research, protection of marine environment. Right to regulate for prevention of marine pollution and control vessel source pollution. Natural prolongation of the landmass of the coastal state to the outer edge of the continental margin up to 200 nautical miles, or if it is less, coincides with the exclusive economic zone. The limit is 350 nautical miles, or 100 nautical miles from the 2500 metre isobath Supporting scientific and technical data is submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which shall make recommendations to the coastal States Only with express consent of the coastal State Two Arctic states have made submissions to the Commission regarding extensions to the continental shelf and these are Russia and Norway. These involve the Barents Sea, the Bering Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Central Arctic Ocean, and three separate areas in the North East Atlantic and the Arctic (re Norway). All of these are accompanied by supporting scientific and technical data. The Commission has made recommendations on some of the submissions, and requested revised submissions in other cases. For a partial submission, the Commission has stated that such submission “shall not prejudice questions relating to the delimitation of boundaries between States in the south for which a submission might subsequently be made, notwithstanding the provisions regarding the 10-year time limit….”. There is sufficient complexity that some disputes have arisen, 12 even while all the States are very actively engaged in gathering further scientific and technical data in support of their claim For example, Spain, a non-Arctic nation, has referred to the Paris Treaty of 1920 as obliging Norway to allow free access to the Svalbard archipelago’s biological and mineral resources. Norway, in response to Spain’s Note to the Commission, says that these issues do not affect the application of the rules of the Convention and have no bearing on the work of the Commission. Clearly cooperative security solutions will be made in the context of some of the decisions of the Commission. Although there is indication already that conflicts will arise over the continental shelf delineations, military confrontation is unlikely, but not impossible. It is to be hoped that parties realize that cooperation is the only way to keep the nations safe. While UNCLOS deals with the oceans and baselines related to the coastlines, there is no Arctic Treaty that could be a comprehensive legal framework. The Antarctic Treaty is suggested by some as a model, but, since there are no rights of territorial sovereignty there, the terms of reference are very different. The declaration of an International Polar Year has benefit for the affairs of both polar regions. There could be a Scientific Committee on Arctic Research, just as there is in the Antarctic. Cooperative environmental protection is essential in the Arctic, especially since the rush to develop economic activity in the Arctic is already beginning. In the Antarctic issue-based regulatory mechanisms are said to have produced practical solutions. One consequence of climate change for the Arctic can be summed up as a geo-economic shift to the North15. Its magnitude could be compared to the geo-political shift after the end of the Cold War, but this change has an economic motivation. Natural resources are the draw, not only for the five Arctic coastal states, but for other countries, All see potential in participating in what is a great technical and human ingenuity challenge. Territorial claims mean that all participants have to work in conjunction with the coastal states that have the right to benefits, as prescribed by UNCLOS. It is instructive to consider the future scenarios for global energy and climate that have been created by the Shell Group15. These have the revealing labels “Scramble” and “Blueprint”. Scramble, as a strategy, leads to competition for natural resources, increased political tension and an adverse impact on the natural environment. Unfortunately, it is the main, or perhaps the only, mechanism operative at present. Sustainable use of Arctic resources would require the Blueprint scenario. A binding plan for cooperation, by another name, could be the Arctic Treaty. Canada has unveiled plans for new naval patrol vessels, a deep-water port, and a coldweather training centre, and now will retain control of radar surveillance via satellite Radarsat-2. Overall, this amounts to an increase in militarization of the Canadian north, for the purpose of exercising sovereignty, rather than in anticipation of conflict. It seems virtually certain that the United States and Russia will view the newly ice-free waters of the Arctic as an opportunity for increased naval operations. There is an understanding, 15 T. Vaahtoranta, Territorial Claims as an Example of the Geo-economic Shift to the North, ArcSec 21Vanc 08 13 in the south, of how the consequences of climate change may cause conflict. First there will be physical impacts of climate change, and imperfect adaptation. Then there will be vulnerability to livelihoods, and scarcity of multiple resources. This could lead to mass migration and national or sub-national armed conflicts – “resource wars”. However, the root cause is scarcity, and the Arctic is an example of abundance. Altogether, the factors for conflict are weak, because the states of the Arctic countries are strong, and sub-national violence is unlikely. According to the 2008 Environmental Performance Index16, five Arctic states – Sweden, Finland, Norway, Iceland and Canada – have some success in reduction of environmental stresses on human health, promotion of ecosystem vitality and sound natural resource management. Russia, Denmark and the United States have not done as well. Unless there is a plan for sustainable use of the Arctic’s energy resources, the already alarming rise in greenhouse gases will continue to force rapid climate change. Thus there remains a defacto war against natural ecosystems, species, possibly even the human species. The Arctic resources, indirectly, could be a cause of armed conflict, but in the south, rather than the north. One of the means of control of this scenario is good governance. The ability of the Arctic Council to handle this massive challenge has been questioned. Arctic issues are global issues. That could mean a change in both governance and mandate for the Arctic Council, while still incorporating the indigenous peoples and the Arctic nations. Additional extra-national governance will evolve, and perhaps as an Arctic Treaty under the leadership of the United Nations. The over-riding impression17 of states arriving at action plans to handle the consequences of climate change for Arctic security, or any of the many other necessary climate change action plans is that it is too slow, too reliant on normal, gradual, policy development and diplomatic processes. We have five to ten years to respond, to avoid consequences that are beyond human capacity to manage. Conclusions, Comments and Reflections The developing Arctic security regime calls for consciousness of international interdependence. There is agreement on the need for cooperative and multilateral approaches to security. Taking the Canadian momentum as an example, there are discussions on common cooperative security in the Arctic between Canada and Denmark Canada and Russia Canada and the United States Canada, Denmark and Russia Canada and Norway Many countries are involved in scientific meetings about mapping of the continental shelf. New scientific techniques are developing. Canada and Denmark are acquiring data, and will prepare submissions to UNCLOS, for 2013 and 2014 respectively. 16 17 2008 Environmental Performance Index, http://epi.yale.edu M. Byers, International Law and National Sovereignty, ArcSec 21Vanc 08 14 There have now been about 100 transits of the northwest passage, 50% of them by Canada. The United States insists on free access to the northwest passage, which Canada claims as internal waters. To date, this conflict has been readily resolved by Canada allowing access, and continuing to exercise sovereignty. However, issues of shipping, pollution, search and rescue, criminal activity, and international security pertain to this newly open Arctic passage, and need cooperative solutions before commercial shipping commences. Canada is the only Arctic country without a deep-water port in the Arctic, yet such infrastructure is vital to shipping. The potential shipping route through the Arctic is going to be significantly more dangerous than traditional routes. Ice-capable ships, crews with Arctic expertise and surveillance of shipping conditions such as small icebergs will be vital. The Arctic Council has had to accommodate more non-Arctic observers of late, some of whom are state representatives. These include China, United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Italy, Spain. In addition NGOs such as the World Wildlife Fund have been present, and the oil and gas industry is seeking a relationship. The concern is that this may interfere with accomplishing urgent work of the Council. There was agreement that an Arctic NWFZ is desirable. Participants did not have the same views on priority for moving forward. Is it of little importance at this juncture in plans for Arctic security, because other items are urgent, for example protection of marine life or prevention of deposition of mercury from many new coal burning power plants in India and China? OR Is it of vital importance because two nuclear powers have coastlines on the Arctic basin and, in the absence of a zonal treaty, achievable perhaps in under ten years, the Arctic region would be increasingly militarized? Having a partial territory of a NW state free of nuclear weapons, would be a significant step toward compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), because it would have to be preceded by reductions in nuclear weapons, both states. On the other hand, putting the emphasis on negotiations for a NWFZ could divert the eyes of policymakers and delay achievement of key steps (e.g. signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) toward compliance with Article VI of the NPT. Russia faces NATO countries in proximity to its Arctic territories. Russia is said to be willing to reduce its nuclear submarine fleet, and if the U.S. and Russia would restart the protocols of the Arms Control Treaties, it could be possible to deal seriously with arms reductions. An Arctic security regime would be multi-faceted; confidence-building measures would be appropriate to prevent conflicts involving conventional forces. Promoting constructive security relations18 between Russia and the U.S. would be in the direct national interest of Canada, and could be seen as one of Canada’s global security . responsibilities. To promote common cooperative security, Canada and Russia could , 18 C. Westdal, Russia and Arctic Security, ArcSec 21Vanc 08 15 for example, practice joint search and rescue drills. The media’s negative perspective on Russia could be dampened and instead, the media could be encouraged to recognize the great achievements of Russia in stability and economic progress since the end of the Cold War. The Arctic security dialogue has begun, and what should be the continuation? Outcome Suggestions for future meeting venues were diverse. The list includes a meeting in Russia, sponsored by Russian Pugwash; a meeting in Finland, a meeting in Iqualuit, a high Arctic location; and a meeting in conjunction with the Arctic Council meeting in Spring ’09. Publication of the outcome of the Arctic security dialogue is deemed important, and Simon Fraser University, School of International Studies will provide a permanent link between these participants. 16