Download doc - Canadian Pugwash Group

PROBLEMS OF ARCTIC SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
A paper about the dialogue - April 11, 12, 2008- co-convened by the Simons
Foundation and the School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University,
Vancouver, BC, Canada
by Adele Buckley,
Canadian Pugwash Group
June 2, 2008
As the Arctic regions of the world enter into a period of unprecedented change, it would
be well to plan now for policy and practice that will ensure and enhance the security of
peoples, lands and oceans of the Arctic. This idea was the impetus for a dialogue of
experts, representatives of indigenous peoples, and senior officials, representing the
sovereign nations whose territories, in part, lie above the Arctic Circle.
The organizers expressed the rationale for the conference this way:
…….. Climate change is bringing about a shrinking of the ice-cap and a reduction in the area of
sea-ice, which may allow navigation through Arctic waters and will make for easier access to
seabed resources. This, in turn, is already leading to the mobilization of competing claims to
sovereignty, and in the absence of a clear and comprehensive legal regime, the countries of the
region are seeking to increase their military presence there. …. the United States and Russia have
historically confronted each other across the Arctic. …… [there will be] a profound effect on the
livelihoods of indigenous peoples, both directly and through its implications for the militarization
of the region.
The Arctic Security dialogue is intended to strengthen the search for cooperative security solutions,
in the interests of environmental protection, demilitarization (particularly with regard to nuclear
weapons and the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone) and the livelihoods and human
rights of Arctic peoples. Whilst it is intended to bring the best scholarship to bear, the purpose of
the Dialogue is ……..to inform policy making and to promote the establishment of an appropriate,
clear and comprehensive legal regime for the regulation of human activity, and international
relations in the Arctic.
The common interest of the global community, not just the Arctic nations, prompted the
comprehensive discussion themes. The impact of Arctic climate change profoundly
influences both human security and military security. The Arctic peoples must be deeply
involved in political decisions about the rapidly changing land, water and air. Military
decisions and implementation inevitably affect human security, so the discourse covered
facets of both. National sovereignty is maintained within a world that must accept
international dependence, and advance the cause of common cooperative security. The
conference considered the existing framework of international law, since no individual
state, alone, has either the power or the resources to solve its Arctic security issues.
1
FIGURE 1 – THE ARCTIC REGION
2
The Arctic Environment and the Impact of Climate Change
The impact of climate change on the Arctic is already evident, since the relative warming
is extreme near the poles, in comparison to lower latitudes. Many factors interact in
climate change, and the integrated result is seen in sea ice changes. Sea ice measurement
over a period of years is possibly the best scientific method of tracking the magnitude of
the change. By means of in-situ observations, aircraft, remote sensing technology and
satellites, Arctic ocean data has been collected over the whole of the twentieth century.
Microwave-derived sea ice time series are now among the longest continuous satellitederived geophysical records, extending over thirty years. The coupled ice-oceanatmosphere regime has been analysed for trends in salinity, seasonal variation, and the
relative ice cap content of multi-year ice (MYI) and first year ice (FYI). Open water has
different radiative properties than ice, and also radiative absorption differs between MYI
and FYI. The negative trend in MYI is much greater than that in FYI, indicating an ice
cover in transition. These are major factors in accelerated global warming. The ice cover
is in also in transition due to natural variability, such as the North Atlantic Oscillation
(NOA) and its coupling to regional sea ice fluctuations. However, statistical analysis has
shown1 that 90% of the decreasing ice extent can be explained by increasing CO2 in the
atmosphere.
The years of accumulated data have made it possible for models to make revealing
projections. The coupled global atmosphere-ice-ocean simulations using the ECHAM4
model from the Max-Planck Institute for Meteorology, as well as a dataset from the
Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute in Russia, have enabled examination of warming
cycles early in the 20th century as well as those late in the century. The late century
global warming anomaly can only be simulated by including observed anthropogenic
forcing. Current models 2 ECHAM-4 and HadCM3 have made projections to 2100. In
these models, the ice extent is reduced even faster than the predictions from the IPCC
Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, as modeled to 2050. Consequences of sea ice
changes are that open water allows for much more heat absorption, but at the same time it
could become an important sink of atmospheric CO2. The rapid changes in the Greenland
ice sheet will impact both northern (and global) sea level rise, and the thermohaline
circulation (the Gulf Stream), but this “wild card” has not yet been included in model
simulations. Great alterations in the climate of the Arctic and the adjacent regions in
Europe are anticipated. The observation-prediction system needs to continue in support of
the planning of the entire spectrum of societal and natural changes in the Arctic.
When the ice climate is altered, there arises the possibility of abrupt change due to
“surprise” feedbacks.3 As yet, the time series data that would show consequential trends
for biological and geochemical systems, and thermohaline circulation are urgently
1
O. M. Johannessen ,(2008). Decreasing sea ice mirrors increasing CO2. Environmental Research Letters,
in revision
2
O. M. Johannessen; Arctic Climate , Present and Future Perspectives; Problems of Arctic Security in the
21st Century, Vancouver BC Canada, April 2008 [abbreviated - (ArcSec 21Vanc 08) ]
3
R.W. Macdonald, Consequences of Warming in the Arctic with Reference to Northern Security, ArcSec
21Vanc 08
3
required, but do not exist. Sea level rise, with lack of ice cover will put several northern
communities at risk of coastal erosion, especially in the western Arctic. There may or
may not be a net benefit to northerners through increased shipping in northern waters.
Hazards will be present due to inexperience with conditions for offshore oil production
and industrial transport. Arctic security, in Canada and elsewhere, requires development
of charts, coastal pilots and overall control of shipping.
Complex foodwebs will alter in terms of availability of food and access to food. This
applies to both the marine, animal and human populations. There will be invasive species
and diseases, so that populations will be displaced or absorbed. The extent of changes in
organic systems due to exposure to contaminants, such as POPs (persistent organic
pollutants) and mercury is unpredictable, but certainly unfavourable. Food and water
security are threatened by thawing of permafrost. Another source of vulnerability is pH
change in oceans and lakes. There is potential for ecosystem collapse; at the same time
there is potential for new commercial harvesting of marine resources. Accurate
assessment of these situations is vital. To minimize suffering and maximize opportunity
for adaptation, northerners must be fully engaged, and integrated into planning and
scientific work. In summary, the consequences of warming in the Arctic and the
preservation of Arctic security, requires extensive northern planning and this needs to
intensify immediately. Issues to be considered are wide ranging, including:
 Rivers and lakes are undergoing very rapid change
 Models are Arctic-wide and are not usually applicable for revealing regional
trends
 Inuit are accustomed to making their living from the ocean, and land. As well
as adaptation assistance, policies and strategies of adaptation need to be
jointly developed, with more resources applied, between northerners and
southerners.
 Permafrost thaw is a huge problem for pipelines and infrastructure (e.g.
sewage)
 Traditional knowledge of Inuit and native peoples, embedded within their
methodology of storytelling, have accumulated 1000 years of data on snow
melt, and water nutrients, caribou herd size and migration, to give just a few
examples. This is an important area of exchange of information with
southerners, to add useful scientific data.
 Youth are unprepared for the nature of the new Arctic; learning models and
their education must fit the needs of the north
 For accurate transmission of information, media and scientists need better
communication
 The climate change solution is extra-Arctic, but commencement of the Arctic
adaptation work is urgent
Military Security in the Arctic
With the opening of Arctic waters, and then opening of shipping lanes, comes the
potential for economic gains in international trade and the search for seabed oil and gas
and other resources. There is guaranteed territorial jurisdiction within the 200-nautical-
4
mile limit, but elsewhere nations are taking measures to assure national access, rights and,
in some cases, sovereignty over portions of the seabed. Security concerns will be raised;
and security strategy will dictate the deployment of an increased military capability.
Territorial claims and counter claims will be a source of tension that could degenerate
into open conflict. Naval operations4 of both Russia and the United States will increase
when there are open waters, creating a potential for military confrontation, especially
because both have nuclear-armed submarines. The Arctic regions are host to the two
major nuclear powers, and nowhere else are they in such close proximity to each other.
There exists a potential for additional nuclearization, for both sea and land. Prudence
suggests that nuclearization must diminish and sooner, rather than later, there must be no
role for nuclear weapons in the Arctic (as it is now in the Antarctic). Nuclear weapons
overtly stationed in the region present a multi-faceted danger to the Arctic lands and
peoples, and, before it is too late, preventive measures must be taken. So while this issue
may, at first, seem peripheral to adaptation to the new Arctic climate, it is actually central
to the Arctic security environment.
Creation of legal structures and functioning multilateral procedures are already beginning
to be discussed. A strategic negotiations agenda between the nations requires nuclear
weapons issues on that agenda, because otherwise the status quo will become ingrained.
Existing agreements as well as the present status in the Arctic provide a hopeful start
because
 there is already a seabed treaty in force that prevents stationing of nuclear
weapons, and related structures, on the Arctic Ocean floor or in the subsoil
thereof.
 Strategic bombers in Arctic air space are much less significant now than in the
cold war.
 Some parts of the Arctic are already defacto nuclear weapon free zones, and these
could be gradually extended.
 Negotiations could begin now on military Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).
 Of note is the Antarctic Treaty, where each Contracting Party has the right to send
observers to every base of any country in that region, thus producing a very
powerful confidence-building measure for ensuring full compliance5.
 It is hoped that strategic arms reduction talks between the U.S. and Russia will
begin again.
While it would be beneficial to have the Arctic regions free of nuclear weapons, there are
many obstacles.6 The United States and Russia both regularly deploy nuclear-capable
submarines in Arctic waters. Russia’s main naval base at Zapadnaya Litsa maintains
their most advanced ballistic missile submarines and patrol areas are mainly in the Arctic,
in the waters of the Barents, White and Kara Seas. Thus, discussion of establishment of
an Arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) could only be attempted after
complementary disarmament measures by the United States. There is a new trend
supporting abolition; and in addition a group of influential abolitionists has come forward
4
R. Ekeus, Military Security in the Arctic, ArcSec 21Vanc 08
S. Duarte, Keynote Address, ArcSec 21Vanc 08
6
M. Wallace, Towards an Arctic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, ArcSec 21Vanc 08
5
5
- January 4, 2007, and January 15, 2008 - and published op-eds in the Wall Street Journal
calling for a policy agenda to ride the world of nuclear weapons. These op-eds were
authored by a group of formerly top national security officials in both Republican and
Democratic administrations, and urge U.S. leadership. The outcome of their conference
at the Hoover Institute called for a 500 warhead limit for both U.S. and Russia. If such a
reduction were to be achieved, by both Russia and the United States, it would be in the
best interests of Russia to place its reliance on road-mobile ICBMs and the result could
be closure of nuclear submarine facilities in the Arctic, thus clearing the way for a
defacto nuclear free zone in the Russian Arctic.
A different, but potentially productive approach would be for all Arctic states that are
presently non-nuclear to work together on a regional treaty “to assure the total absence of
nuclear weapons from their respective territories”, as allowed for in Article VII of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Norway, Sweden and Finland, all with sovereign territory
north of the Arctic Circle are nuclear weapon free. Greenland has a U.S. military base at
Thule, but is part of Denmark, a NNWS. Canada is already a defacto nuclear free
country, with reference to its land mass. The northwest passage, a ship channel which
passes many islands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, is a very unfavourable
passageway for submarines because it is narrow and shallow, posing severe difficulty to
both maneuverability and undetectability of a submarine. Although the United States
would neither “confirm nor deny”, this passage is very probably a defacto nuclear
weapons free zone. For surface travel through the northwest passage, maritime safety in
these dangerous waters would certainly dictate obtaining an international agreement to
ban nuclear fissile materials.
A most important distinction between Russia and the other Arctic nations is that Russia
has four million people in the region, and many are not indigenous. Others Arctic
regions are thinly populated, with the majority of the population being the aboriginal
peoples. The geopolitical reality, as seen from Russia7, is that military security is
inseparable from energy security. Access to the Arctic is, in the Russian part of the
Arctic basin, likely to be through the “northeast” passage, a Eurasian sea route. In
preparation for greatly enhanced activity in the Arctic, billions of dollars have been or
will be spent by both the East (Russia) and the West (U.S. and Canada) for icebreakers,
nuclear powered vessels, Arctic patrol ships, oil platforms, ice-class ships, army bases,
coast guard facilities, satellite surveillance (Radarsat-2) and deployment of personnel.
At present, Russia has much more equipment, and appears better prepared than the West.
Over a fourteen year consultation period, Russia and nine other countries in the region
developed the Central Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (CANWFZ). The 2006 Treaty
of Semipalatinsk regarding Central Asia, encompassing an area five times larger than
France, has been signed but has not entered into force. This is the first NWFZ wholly in
the northern hemisphere. This treaty includes former NW states, has nuclear weapon
sites, and honours the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). The countries have
agreed to IAEA8 inspection – verification site visits could use some of the protocols of
7
8
A. Nikitin, Geopolitics and the Russian Arctic, ArcSec 21Vanc 08
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
6
START-1. While some problems remain, the accomplishments so far on the CANWFZ
offer experience applicable to an Arctic NWFZ. While extensive negotiations are in store,
this idea is very timely, and the Russian experience tells us that work should start now.
Each denuclearized zone is different9, not only because of geography, but because of the
scope of the obligations assumed by the parties; the rights and responsibilities of extrazonal states; the verification arrangements and the conditions for the entry into force of
the agreement. The major powers have not accepted particular provisions of the NWFZs.
United States and China have objections to the Bangkok Treaty on Southeast Asia. The
United Kingdom and the United States object to the Treaty of Pelindaba (not yet ratified).
One saving provision, where there could be objection by a NWS, is that in nearly all
NWFZ, visits and transits of ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons may be
permitted by the zonal state (but this requires declaration of NW, usually unacceptable).
Moving forward to declare only a portion of the Arctic regions and waters to be a NWFZ
could be problematic. On the other hand, partial solutions, taken together, could be the
right path. Given that the NNWS of the Arctic are unlikely to place unlimited resources
into negotiation on nuclear disarmament, the most important policy direction for these
nations is to press for full compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. For the reasons
outlined above, it is realistic to expect that the two NWS must make significant
reductions in their nuclear arms deployments before they turn their attention to an Arctic
NWFZ. In addition, there are going to be a wide range of negotiations between the
Arctic sovereign states over many issues. Pressure to move forward on a NWFZ at this
time would introduce an element of tension, whereas it would be mutually far more
beneficial to maintain an atmosphere of cooperation.
In spite of these difficulties, and even as military activity is expected to increase, the
Arctic peoples have a right to be secure from the threat of nuclear weapons, and to be
involved in preventing nuclearization. In the background of the interactions of the Arctic
nations, there is acceptance of a goal to achieve a NWFZ. Thus, individual nations will
need to prepare for this eventuality by starting to work now, possibly through bilateral
strategic talks.
Comparison with the legal and political framework9 of the other polar region – the
Antarctic – is of interest, but the situation differs greatly. Nations might resort to use of
force to defend economic activities such as oil or mineral exploration, and for this reason,
the Antarctic was known to be vulnerable to unwanted rivalry, and possible militarization.
The Wellington Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource activities
(CRAMRA) was adopted in 1988. In 1991, the Protocol on Environmental Protection to
the Antarctic Treaty, known as the Madrid Protocol provided a comprehensive protection
of the Antarctic environment, designated Antarctica as a natural reserve, devoted to peace
and science, and prohibited mining exploration activities indefinitely. Environmental
protection is one area where the Madrid Protocol and the Wellington Convention might
serve as useful starting points, as it is certain that opening of the Arctic will endanger the
9
J. Goldblat, NWFZ in the Arctic?, ArcSec 21Vanc 08
7
environment in new and threatening ways. International agreement is vitally necessary
on, for instance, handling of oil spills, and on rules for resource exploitation.
Human Security
In the Canadian north, considering federal devolution10 of program and resource
responsibilities to the three northern territories (Yukon, Northwest Territories and
Nunavut) is a key to understanding the security environment for the peoples of the Arctic.
From the beginning of British government rule, First Nations had collective ownership of
their lands, and there was recognition of First Nations governments as negotiators of land
settlements. Treaties for the south were negotiated in the 19th century, while those for the
north were negotiated in the late 20th century. The Canadian constitution of 1982
recognizes “existing Aboriginal rights”, the first country in the world to do so.
Aboriginal land claims along the route of the Arctic Gas pipeline down the Mackenzie
River Valley were settled in 1984, 1992, 1993, and 2003, giving ownership to four
peoples, totalling 193,769 square kilometers. In Nunavut in the Eastern Arctic, the Inuit
hold title to 350,000 square kilometers, 20% of the territory.
It is apparent that one pillar of human security rests on economic advancement. However,
the Canadian northerners, noting the economic changes that are to come with climate
change, seek the powers that provinces enjoy, but this is constitutionally difficult. This
would give them jurisdiction and management of the natural resources of the lands and
waters within their respective political boundaries, allowing them to derive the deserved
economic benefits. Further, indigenous peoples jurisdiction of the marine bed resources
and the land would strengthen and maintain sovereignty for Canada since these areas, 3.8
million square kilometers of land and ocean, have been continuously utilized by them for
up to 1000 years.
Another pillar of human security rests on environmental protection. The 1993 Nunavut
Land Claims Agreement, even at this date, not been fully implemented11. Article 12, for
example, requires a plan to monitor Nunavut’s natural environment. Such a plan,
managed by its in-territory land users, would assert sovereignty, and it would also be a
source of valuable data on ongoing effects of climate change. Similarly, Article 15, which
calls for a Nunavut Marine Council could provide oversight for offshore activities,
whether they have to do with marine wildlife or rules for shipping channels. Failing to
achieve action by other means, the peoples of Nunavut organized and have launched a
court case to force the implementation of the negotiated settlement of a sovereign state of
Canada with an aboriginal people. Arctic communities are now exposed to a greater risk
of environmental degradation than ever before, not only because of arctic warming but
also by the effects of increased economic development. The time is right for
comprehensive negotiations to ensure that there is proper governance for environmental
protection and regulatory safety regimes
10
11
T. Penikett, Political Climate Change in the Canadian Arctic, ArcSec 21Vanc 08
U. Hanson, Arctic Sovereignty and the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, ArcSec 21Vanc 08
8
The relationship between Greenland and Denmark, has led to home rule for Greenland
and a resource-sharing arrangement for oil, gas and minerals. This illustrates an
arrangement tailored to the needs of both parties, adding to human security for the people
of Greenland. Internationally, the Arctic Council, and the Inuit Circumpolar Conference
are just two vehicles that foster cooperation and solving of common problems, such as
the effects of climate change. Although northern peoples have been “canaries in the coal
mine” for climate change and there are already far-reaching effects, their apparent
concern is only moderate, as each nation believes itself to be skilled at adaptation.
The Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC)12 is an international treaty organization that
represents joint interests of Canadian and United States First Nation governments in
Arctic Council fora. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in its
2007 report, noted that many Arctic human communities are already adapting to climate
change. An early response is to institute changes in wildlife management regimes and
shift behaviours of travelling and hunting, for example, because these are recognized as
having impacts on food security, personal safety and subsistence activities. The
resilience of indigenous populations is being severely challenged.
Feedbacks into the global climate from the rapid rate of climate change in the Arctic will
produce major disruptions globally. What will be the feedback into the Arctic economy
and environment from these global changes? Continuity of support systems for Arctic
security could be in jeopardy. Thus, the AAC has recognized that adaptation requires not
just technical and regulatory changes, but also increased capacity and improved
governance. First Nations land agreements contain rights of ownership of land and
heritage resources, rights of participation in territorial land use planning, certain water
rights, and harvesting rights. Treaty implementation and partnership is vital to
northerners’ sense of security. To support adaptation, new work is important in areas of
food security, Arctic resilience and diversity, health risk from contaminants such as
mercury, and community land use plans.
. Human security is usually categorized as a condition in which an individual or a
community enjoys freedom from want – sufficient food, water, clothing, shelter; and
freedom from fear – dignity of the person, and absence of violence or threats of violence.
In the global community, human security is a relatively recent concept13, preceded in the
20th century by ideas of national and collective security. Such ideas stood in the way of
transnational efforts for disarmament and abolition, and have been a constant in the
discourse ever since. Even though we want to shift the discourse to “peace”, it is evident
that there are many other “securities” now in play – economic, environmental, cultural,
societal, energy, food. Each of these has their own interconnection with human security.
There is no foreseeable need to exercise the “responsibility to protect”, as each of the
Arctic basin governments values its northern people, although allowing only partial selfgovernment. Human rights, and fundamental freedoms are as important in the north as
elsewhere. However, human security in the north is not usually framed in this way, and
there is no discourse there on achieving “human security” by that name. The northern
12
13
D. Matthiessen, Climate Change and Human Security in Northern Canada, ArcSec 21Vanc 08
F. Griffiths, Not a Good Fit? ‘Human Security‘ and the Arctic, ArcSec 21Vanc 08
9
peoples occupy a vast landscape, and there is usually no direct threat to their lives in a
military sense. But the threat to life of humans and other living populations in the north
is a consequence of climate change, and it is deep and real. Because coastal settlements
are the norm, the threat that there will be environmental refugees is real.
The human security needs of the Inuit of Canada’s north are for relief from the threat of
cultural erosion and language loss, and the threat to their traditional way of life. Indeed
some of this is in place, because the use of indigenous languages in educational and
government institutions is honoured. Integrity of Arctic school systems is a key to
success. Certain agreements in the land claims treaties are given such faint attention that
the indigenous peoples do not trust in their eventual implementation. Environmental and
wildlife protection in the face of climate change and new economic development is one
of many imperatives. Most important of all is the need for social equity, and a constant
unquestioned “place at the table”. Who will be their champion?
Arctic communities, relative to the south, are all small and vulnerable. Human security
in the Arctic will be best served by focusing on the security of the community, and
buttressing its continuing viability. Still to be decided is whether the community can best
be held safe from harm by retaining their traditional culture as far as possible, or by
raising the community to Western standards of prosperity and societal behaviour.
Governance mechanisms like the Arctic Council may have passed their usefulness. All
Arctic problems cannot be solved in the Arctic; the issues are global.
National Sovereignty and International Law
The issues of Arctic security are not susceptible to solution by any individual sovereign
state, and cooperative responses to the broad spectrum of climate change ramifications is
necessary To address the challenges, consider5 what international instruments are already
agreed, and available to apply. The United Nations Charter, Article 52 specifically
recognizes the legitimacy of regional arrangements for international peace and security
issues. The Seabed Treaty establishes a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone on the seabed and its
subsoil. Existing and pending NWFZs are established under the UN.
An applicable legal regime is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) which was signed in 198214, and has been ratified by 154 States. All
countries that border the Arctic basin have ratified it, except the United States, (the matter
is now before the U. S. Congress, and is thought likely to pass.)
14
H.J. Rajan, An International Legal Regime for the Arctic, ArcSec 21Vanc 08
“Sovereignty under the Convention:
Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal States are entitled to
territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf over which they have
specific rights and jurisdiction. These zones have to be drawn from certain baselines, which is the low
water line along the coast (normal baselines) or straight or archipelagic baselines defined by reference to
lists of geographical coordinates of points. Waters on the land-ward side of the baseline are internal waters
of the State or, in the case of archipelagic baselines, archipelagic waters.”
10
Under UNCLOS, both sovereignty and sovereign rights are established14, and no special
regime is envisaged for the Arctic. The key to establishing zones over which sovereign
states have rights is establishment of baselines, along the coast, and archipelagic
baselines. Figure 2 illustrates the status of claims, as presently submitted to the
UNCLOS Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.
Figure 2 – Status of Territorial Claims in the Arctic
11
Articles of UNCLOS provide rigorous definitions so that international disputes may be
minimized. Essential elements of the rights established under UNCLOS are listed in
Table 1. (The reader is referred to the Convention for accurate text re sovereignty).
TABLE 1 – Essential Elements of Rights Established under UNCLOS
Sovereign Rights Under the
Convention
RIGHT
Territorial sea
Contiguous zone
Exclusive economic zone
Continental shelf and its delineation
Delineation of the continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles
Exploration of the continental shelf or
exploitation of its natural resources
DEFINITION
Not exceeding 12 nautical miles from the
baseline; complete sovereignty, including
resources
Not extending beyond 24 nautical miles from
the baseline; regulatory rights relating to
infringement in the territorial sea
Not extending beyond 200 nautical miles from
the baseline; coastal State has sovereign rights
for natural resources, living or non-living, as
well as sea-bed and subsoil. Jurisdiction on
structures, artificial islands, marine research,
protection of marine environment. Right to
regulate for prevention of marine pollution and
control vessel source pollution.
Natural prolongation of the landmass of the
coastal state to the outer edge of the continental
margin up to 200 nautical miles, or if it is less,
coincides with the exclusive economic zone.
The limit is 350 nautical miles, or 100 nautical
miles from the 2500 metre isobath
Supporting scientific and technical data is
submitted to the Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf, which shall make
recommendations to the coastal States
Only with express consent of the coastal State
Two Arctic states have made submissions to the Commission regarding extensions to the
continental shelf and these are Russia and Norway. These involve the Barents Sea, the
Bering Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Central Arctic Ocean, and three separate areas in the
North East Atlantic and the Arctic (re Norway). All of these are accompanied by
supporting scientific and technical data. The Commission has made recommendations on
some of the submissions, and requested revised submissions in other cases. For a partial
submission, the Commission has stated that such submission “shall not prejudice
questions relating to the delimitation of boundaries between States in the south for which
a submission might subsequently be made, notwithstanding the provisions regarding the
10-year time limit….”. There is sufficient complexity that some disputes have arisen,
12
even while all the States are very actively engaged in gathering further scientific and
technical data in support of their claim For example, Spain, a non-Arctic nation, has
referred to the Paris Treaty of 1920 as obliging Norway to allow free access to the
Svalbard archipelago’s biological and mineral resources. Norway, in response to Spain’s
Note to the Commission, says that these issues do not affect the application of the rules of
the Convention and have no bearing on the work of the Commission.
Clearly cooperative security solutions will be made in the context of some of the
decisions of the Commission. Although there is indication already that conflicts will
arise over the continental shelf delineations, military confrontation is unlikely, but not
impossible. It is to be hoped that parties realize that cooperation is the only way to keep
the nations safe.
While UNCLOS deals with the oceans and baselines related to the coastlines, there is no
Arctic Treaty that could be a comprehensive legal framework. The Antarctic Treaty is
suggested by some as a model, but, since there are no rights of territorial sovereignty
there, the terms of reference are very different. The declaration of an International Polar
Year has benefit for the affairs of both polar regions. There could be a Scientific
Committee on Arctic Research, just as there is in the Antarctic. Cooperative
environmental protection is essential in the Arctic, especially since the rush to develop
economic activity in the Arctic is already beginning. In the Antarctic issue-based
regulatory mechanisms are said to have produced practical solutions.
One consequence of climate change for the Arctic can be summed up as a geo-economic
shift to the North15. Its magnitude could be compared to the geo-political shift after the
end of the Cold War, but this change has an economic motivation. Natural resources are
the draw, not only for the five Arctic coastal states, but for other countries, All see
potential in participating in what is a great technical and human ingenuity challenge.
Territorial claims mean that all participants have to work in conjunction with the coastal
states that have the right to benefits, as prescribed by UNCLOS. It is instructive to
consider the future scenarios for global energy and climate that have been created by the
Shell Group15. These have the revealing labels “Scramble” and “Blueprint”. Scramble,
as a strategy, leads to competition for natural resources, increased political tension and an
adverse impact on the natural environment. Unfortunately, it is the main, or perhaps the
only, mechanism operative at present. Sustainable use of Arctic resources would require
the Blueprint scenario. A binding plan for cooperation, by another name, could be the
Arctic Treaty.
Canada has unveiled plans for new naval patrol vessels, a deep-water port, and a coldweather training centre, and now will retain control of radar surveillance via satellite
Radarsat-2. Overall, this amounts to an increase in militarization of the Canadian north,
for the purpose of exercising sovereignty, rather than in anticipation of conflict. It seems
virtually certain that the United States and Russia will view the newly ice-free waters of
the Arctic as an opportunity for increased naval operations. There is an understanding,
15
T. Vaahtoranta, Territorial Claims as an Example of the Geo-economic Shift to the North, ArcSec
21Vanc 08
13
in the south, of how the consequences of climate change may cause conflict. First there
will be physical impacts of climate change, and imperfect adaptation. Then there will be
vulnerability to livelihoods, and scarcity of multiple resources. This could lead to mass
migration and national or sub-national armed conflicts – “resource wars”. However, the
root cause is scarcity, and the Arctic is an example of abundance. Altogether, the
factors for conflict are weak, because the states of the Arctic countries are strong, and
sub-national violence is unlikely.
According to the 2008 Environmental Performance Index16, five Arctic states – Sweden,
Finland, Norway, Iceland and Canada – have some success in reduction of environmental
stresses on human health, promotion of ecosystem vitality and sound natural resource
management. Russia, Denmark and the United States have not done as well. Unless
there is a plan for sustainable use of the Arctic’s energy resources, the already alarming
rise in greenhouse gases will continue to force rapid climate change. Thus there remains
a defacto war against natural ecosystems, species, possibly even the human species. The
Arctic resources, indirectly, could be a cause of armed conflict, but in the south, rather
than the north. One of the means of control of this scenario is good governance. The
ability of the Arctic Council to handle this massive challenge has been questioned.
Arctic issues are global issues. That could mean a change in both governance and
mandate for the Arctic Council, while still incorporating the indigenous peoples and the
Arctic nations. Additional extra-national governance will evolve, and perhaps as an
Arctic Treaty under the leadership of the United Nations.
The over-riding impression17 of states arriving at action plans to handle the consequences
of climate change for Arctic security, or any of the many other necessary climate change
action plans is that it is too slow, too reliant on normal, gradual, policy development and
diplomatic processes. We have five to ten years to respond, to avoid consequences that
are beyond human capacity to manage.
Conclusions, Comments and Reflections
The developing Arctic security regime calls for consciousness of international
interdependence. There is agreement on the need for cooperative and multilateral
approaches to security. Taking the Canadian momentum as an example, there are
discussions on common cooperative security in the Arctic between
 Canada and Denmark
 Canada and Russia
 Canada and the United States
 Canada, Denmark and Russia
 Canada and Norway
Many countries are involved in scientific meetings about mapping of the continental shelf.
New scientific techniques are developing. Canada and Denmark are acquiring data, and
will prepare submissions to UNCLOS, for 2013 and 2014 respectively.
16
17
2008 Environmental Performance Index, http://epi.yale.edu
M. Byers, International Law and National Sovereignty, ArcSec 21Vanc 08
14
There have now been about 100 transits of the northwest passage, 50% of them by
Canada. The United States insists on free access to the northwest passage, which Canada
claims as internal waters. To date, this conflict has been readily resolved by Canada
allowing access, and continuing to exercise sovereignty. However, issues of shipping,
pollution, search and rescue, criminal activity, and international security pertain to this
newly open Arctic passage, and need cooperative solutions before commercial shipping
commences.
Canada is the only Arctic country without a deep-water port in the Arctic, yet such
infrastructure is vital to shipping. The potential shipping route through the Arctic is going
to be significantly more dangerous than traditional routes. Ice-capable ships, crews with
Arctic expertise and surveillance of shipping conditions such as small icebergs will be
vital.
The Arctic Council has had to accommodate more non-Arctic observers of late, some of
whom are state representatives. These include China, United Kingdom, France,
Netherlands, Italy, Spain. In addition NGOs such as the World Wildlife Fund have been
present, and the oil and gas industry is seeking a relationship. The concern is that this
may interfere with accomplishing urgent work of the Council.
There was agreement that an Arctic NWFZ is desirable. Participants did not have the
same views on priority for moving forward. Is it of little importance at this juncture in
plans for Arctic security, because other items are urgent, for example protection of
marine life or prevention of deposition of mercury from many new coal burning power
plants in India and China? OR Is it of vital importance because two nuclear powers have
coastlines on the Arctic basin and, in the absence of a zonal treaty, achievable perhaps in
under ten years, the Arctic region would be increasingly militarized?
Having a partial territory of a NW state free of nuclear weapons, would be a significant
step toward compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), because it would have
to be preceded by reductions in nuclear weapons, both states. On the other hand, putting
the emphasis on negotiations for a NWFZ could divert the eyes of policymakers and
delay achievement of key steps (e.g. signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty)
toward compliance with Article VI of the NPT.
Russia faces NATO countries in proximity to its Arctic territories. Russia is said to be
willing to reduce its nuclear submarine fleet, and if the U.S. and Russia would restart the
protocols of the Arms Control Treaties, it could be possible to deal seriously with arms
reductions. An Arctic security regime would be multi-faceted; confidence-building
measures would be appropriate to prevent conflicts involving conventional forces.
Promoting constructive security relations18 between Russia and the U.S. would be in the
direct national interest of Canada, and could be seen as one of Canada’s global security .
responsibilities. To promote common cooperative security, Canada and Russia could ,
18
C. Westdal, Russia and Arctic Security, ArcSec 21Vanc 08
15
for example, practice joint search and rescue drills. The media’s negative perspective on
Russia could be dampened and instead, the media could be encouraged to recognize the
great achievements of Russia in stability and economic progress since the end of the Cold
War.
The Arctic security dialogue has begun, and what should be the continuation?
Outcome
Suggestions for future meeting venues were diverse. The list includes a meeting in
Russia, sponsored by Russian Pugwash; a meeting in Finland, a meeting in Iqualuit, a
high Arctic location; and a meeting in conjunction with the Arctic Council meeting in
Spring ’09. Publication of the outcome of the Arctic security dialogue is deemed
important, and Simon Fraser University, School of International Studies will provide a
permanent link between these participants.
16