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Transcript
Impact of Macroprudential Policy Measures
on Economic Dynamics: Simulation Using
a Financial Macro-econometric Model
Some comments by
David Hargreaves, RBNZ
• Very interesting and useful approach
• Impact of macroprudential policy subtly
different to RBNZ view
• 1 Key suggestion for model
development
The FMM model
• Bank balance sheets with risk based
credit pricing
• Estimated empirical asset prices and
credit flows
• Ability to induce expectation driven
cycles
• Policy can restrain aggregate credit
growth
Big advantages of approach
• Able to test various ‘signal values’ for
implementation, and recognition lags.
• Can shift regulatory perimeter and alter
details/strength of regulation
• Empirically founded dynamics: hopefully
realistic lags/magnitudes
But nothing comes free
• Inevitably aspects of structure are
arbitrary
- Banks can’t raise capital
- Boom is always ‘false’ and of fixed duration
- No household or firm balance sheets or
‘debt overhang’
Macro-pru: FMM vs RBNZ view
FMM
RBNZ (LVRs)
Restrains overall/sectoral Restrains riskier lending
credit growth in boom
during boom
Limited impacts during
bust because credit
demand weak
Reduces cycle in land
prices, GDP
Limits
distress/bankruptcy of
borrowers in bust
Reduce cycle in land
prices, GDP (more)
Reduces average level of Impact on average GDP
GDP
not clear
• Could consider adding
corporate/household balance sheet
• When expectation boom ends,
borrowers seek to deleverage.
• Recession worse if more/risky debt
extended – key role for policy
• Ideally mix ‘false’ and ‘true’ productivity
shocks: create diagnostic problem for
regulator
Adding balance sheets in ‘semistructural’ way
• Caballero/Krishnamurthy?
• Gray and Malone