Download PDF

Survey
yes no Was this document useful for you?
   Thank you for your participation!

* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project

Document related concepts

Jesús Mosterín wikipedia , lookup

Infinity wikipedia , lookup

Peano axioms wikipedia , lookup

Halting problem wikipedia , lookup

Axiom of reducibility wikipedia , lookup

First-order logic wikipedia , lookup

Naive set theory wikipedia , lookup

Foundations of mathematics wikipedia , lookup

Intuitionistic type theory wikipedia , lookup

Set theory wikipedia , lookup

Model theory wikipedia , lookup

Interpretation (logic) wikipedia , lookup

Homotopy type theory wikipedia , lookup

Mathematical logic wikipedia , lookup

Truth-bearer wikipedia , lookup

List of first-order theories wikipedia , lookup

Principia Mathematica wikipedia , lookup

Transcript
Intro to Formal Methods
CS 5860 Fall 2014
Lecture 10
Mon, Oct 6, 2014
Lecture 10
Topics:
1. Continue defining and exploring first-order theory of simple arithmetic, iQ.
i Q is a first-order finite axiomatization of a “number-like” domain. Even though i Q
is extremely weak as you see from Problem Set 3 from Boolos & Jeffrey, we can,
nevertheless, show in constructive type theory, either CTT (of Nuprl) or CIC (of Coq),
that it can represent every (total) recursive function.
2. The representation theorem allows us to prove that i FOL, i Q, and number theory are
undecidable in the sense that we cannot tell whether there is a proof of the sentences
of the theory.
3. We will in due course explore the notion of constructive “truth” or evidence. We will
see that we can’t decide whether there is evidence for a given proposition, i.e. whether
a programming task is solvable.
4. The notion of evidence/truth depends on a theory of types and programs which we are
gradually developing with the help of Thompson’s book and other readings.
Topic 1. We have given many of the properties of equality as expressed in first-order logic.
For numbers, we also expect that the equality is decidable, and we need that. How do we
say it?
Equality on D is decidable:
∀x, y : D.(Eq(x, y) ∨ ∼ Eq(x, y))
What is the evidence, e.g. the realizer? We might expect λ(x.λ(y.eq(x, y))) where for d1 , d2
in D, eq(d1 , d2 ) realizes Eq(x, y) ∨ ∼ Eq(x, y).
What does this entail, and is it reasonable?
One of the subproblems of PS3 is to show that i Q cannot prove ∀x.(x < x0 ). We would
write this as ∀x, y.(S(x, y) ⇒ x < y). Recall that x < y is defined by Boolos & Jeffrey as
∃z.(S(z) + x = y). We would write ∃z.∃u.(S(z, u) & u + x = y)
For extra credit, discuss whether i Q can prove
∀x.∃y.(x < y).
We think of N as a type which is unbounded or potentially infinite, but not as a completed
infinite type. Can we account for this in i Q?
1