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Gi annini FON Library Illlrn 1111 11111Hll ~I IH11111111 002300 ... ·. - December 1984 No. 231 ..Jroper t y Rights and Ec ~ nor:iic I ri.cenc.i•,es in Resc1.1rc.e. and Environmental ~ystcms by Daclel W. Broml ey PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVESl IN RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS Daniel W. Bromley Department of Agricultural Economics University of Wisconsin Madison It is fitting at a session concerned with ''The Political Economy of Natural Resource and Environmental Use" that we devote some time to the consideration of property rights and economi c incentives. I take as my charge the presentation of a conceptual view of property rights as they influence resource control and hence resource use. It comes as little surprise to most of you that property rights have moved to cent~r stage in the work of most resource economists. I suspect that it is· not so well understood that a large part of the literature concernin5 pr opert y ri ghts is both logically circular, and explicitly prescriptive in terms of how natural resources ought to be controlled. This attention to the current literature is necessitated by the fact that some economists nay not appreciate the fact that there are at least two different "propertyrights" approaches to resource economics. I have no interest in arguments about how natural resources ought to be controlled--except to the extent that normative arguments are used to prescribe what ought to be from a set of logical premises that are 1 Paper presented to the Southern Natural Resource Economics Committee meeting, Charleston, South Carolina, October 18, 1984. 2 strictly positive in nature. Hence my discussion today will focus on the problem of normative prescri ptions being derived from a body of theory that most would agree is best suited to description and explanation. Because my appointed title mentions both rights and economic incentives I will be able to talk to you about mutually causal analysis. That is, we can address the ques tion of how property rights _influence economic incentives, aud how economic incentives influence the structure of property rights. What follows is divided into several major sections. I will first discuss the conceot of property rights as represented by a group of economists operating under the label of the "property-rights" school. My major point in that part of the paper will be to argue that the so-called "prope!'ty-rights approacl1" has come to represent a particular political outcome vis-a-vis n aturaJ resource control. Since the conclusions of the school cannot help but follow from the premises employed, economists who nay wish to approach natural resource matters from a slightly more agnostic stance regarding which particular institutional structure best serves social goals are forced to sear ch for a label other than the one alread y preempt ed by the "property rights" group. I will sugge st that the term "institutional economics" adequately describes this domain of work--just as it has for some years until read out of the mainstream of ' economics by the post-World War II outbreak of physics envy. I will then turn to a discussion of "rent-seeking behavior" since this class of human activity has recently began to occupy an important place in natural resource economics theory. We will see how the pejorative 3 connotations attaching to rent seeking are derivative of the conceptual views adopted by those employing the property-rights approach--or, as recently described, the "property rights, public choice, Austrian economics" methodology [Anderson]. I will close with some suggestions for incorporating institutional considerations iuto our re source economics paradigm. THE CIRCULARITY OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS MODEL Simply put, the property-rights approach to resource economics starts with the premise that society is best served by a large numbe r of atomistic economic agents doing what homo oecon omicus does best --buying and selling. But in order to buy and sell, the wo rld must consist of tangible and divisible commodities about which very good information is available, and over which ownership has been defined and is not in dispute. Since this approach starts with the assertion that such a structure will lead to the best of all possible worlds, it takes little imagination to reach the conclusion that therefore the world ought to be structured that: way. This part of the approach owes its intellectual heritage to the Austrian school. There is another strand in this approach that is traceable to some persistent confusion in the very concept of property. For an approach t ha t place s so much emphasis on property rights it does not seem unreasonable to expect that the concept be studied and under stood in its entirety. This does not seem to be the case. Property is a social relation that defines expectations with respect to a thing or an act--expectations on the part of at least two parties. There must be at least three aspects to property--the thing "owned", the 4 "owner", and all others. Because property is a set of social relations and expectations, the core of property is security; security with respect to the actions of others vis-a-vis the thing of value. It is the very fact that others in society want what you have that gives security its meaning; property is the ability to exclude others from enjoying what you have. ·. Where there is nu exclusion there is no security, and there can thus be no property--by definition. If this simple ~spect of property were understood it would be impossible for economists to continue to perpetuate the confusion between open access resources (res nullius) and common property resources (res communis) [C i riacy-Wantrup and Bishop]. In open access there is no property since thtre are no secure expectations of gain . Open access is nothing more than that--access. The oft-used phrase "everybody 's property is noLody's property 11 is therefore logically inconsistent. If one is searching for aphorisms, we are stuck with ''open access is nobody's property." Common property is characterized by t~o important characteristics: (1) a well defined group of users; and (2) a set of rules for deciding use rates of the group. There is property in common property. If you do not believe me try going to a Swiss commons with a herd of cattle. The extended economic zone of ten years ago converted open access fisheries to common property. The same can be said for the Taylor Grazing Act in the · western United States. This is not a mere semantic game . The property-rights approach would have us believe that there are only three possible property regimes--a free - for-all (variously called open access, common property, or communal 5 property), public property (what the state controls, viz. national forests and military bases) and private property. Since we are all in agreement that a free-for-all is almost certain to result in destruction of the resource, and since there are many economists who believe that the state can only mess things up, that leaves proponents of the property-rights approach with only one viable alternative--private property. Happily for them, this is the same outcome that was guaranteed by tha assumptions with which the property-rights approach started. Most economists trained in the western tradition would agree with the conclusion that if the conditions are conducive to the operation of markets, then by all means let markets work. The argument comes uver whether or not the conditions exist for the operation of markets. A second argument of greater social import is whether or not functioning markets will correctly reflect the marginal social values that will command wide assent. It is one thing for markets to work; it is quite another to conclude that the outcomes of market processes are socially preferred. One only need go back to child labor in the 1800's for an example of functioning markets with anti-social performance. There are other, more recent , examples. If we are careful to distinguish between explanation and advocacy then resource economists would do well to heed some of the insights of the property-rights approach. Property rights do arise when the benefi ts of defining and enforcing rights exceed the transaction costs attached thereto. But we must be wary pf the circularity in even this appealing logic. It is, after all, property rights that facilitate exchange and hence an expression of value in a market sy stem . To say that property 6 rights arise when the benefits e xcee d the costs is also to say that if no rights (and hence markets) exist then it must be optimal that the y not exist. It should be obvious that this imbues the status quo with some rather powerful claims. It should also be obvious that those currently protected by rights will look upon iastitutional change with suspicion, while tho se currently exposed to the ri ghts and presumptive rights of others Mill view institutional change as ~ liberati n e opportuni ty. To anticipate a theme to be elaborated upon b~low, the shifting of ~conomic The rela~ionship property relations ~re it is inevitable that institutional change is about advantage among members of society . between institutional arrangements--of which of greatest interest to us here--and the economic behavior of individua ls a nd groups finds its clearest expression in the recent interest amon8 some resource economists in "rent seeking." Let us consider r ent seeking with the aid of an institutionalist perspective. THE OTHER SIDE OF RENT SEEKING2 The original wor k on rent seeking is attributed to Krueger and _others in the context of international trade. Specifically, quotas, tari ffs , and non-tariff barriers to trade intercede to cause a divergence between trade patterns--and relative prices--in the real world and what the situation would be in the absence of these institutional realities [Krueger]. Rent seeking then becomes a description of that activity directed toward the establishment of these instit uti onal arrangements; there are economic 2 For other critical views of the current developments in rent-seeking theory see Bhagwati 1980, 1982; Bhagwati and Srinivasan; and Samuels. 7 gains to be obtained by certain parties if only these institutional arrangements might be perpetuated. Rent seeking occurs when the expected value of the economic gains exceeds the costs. It is these costs that are considered to be dead-weight losses to the economy. Rent seeking is a negative-sum game. It is using the " ... coercive power of the government to increase persona: wealth for some at the expense of others [Anderson, p. 932). 11 Of direct interest to us today, rent seeking is said to occur when public agencies manage natural resources. Again to quote Anders on: " ... when the Department of [the] Interior decides whether public lands will be used for timber, g raz ing , recreation, or wildlife, they are affecting the distribution of benefits to consumers. It is not surp r ising that interest g roups employ va luable resources trying to influence these decisions. When the entrepreneur discovers unforeseen op?ortunities to use government to increase his wealth, rent creation--a positive -s um garue - -is replaced with rent seeking--a negative-sum game [p. 932)." The important distinction between rent creation and rent seeking merits careful consideration. To reiterate, rent creation is preneu~s ~hat entre- do when they seek profits within a status-quo structure of entitlements; this is said to be good. On the other hand: rent seeking . .. is what entrepreneurs do when they devote financial resour ces to altering the structure of enti tlement s; this is said to be bad. Rent creation is "pie enlarging"; rent seeking is simply redividing a pie of a fixed size. If this looks like the familiar distinction between "efficiency" and "distribution" do not be surprised. It is only a short leap from this rediscovery of an emotive--yet 8 persistent--d istinction in economics to the conclusion that public control of natural resources is a negative-sum game. It follows therefore that private ent itlements for natural resources should be established so that we can get on with the happy business of creating rents--as opposed to merely fighting over them. Let us look at this normative prescription in the harsh light of theory. Simply put, it is the structure of ~t o perty ent~ tlements that defines the buying and selling domain of che above -ce lebrated entrepreneurs. It is also that institutional structure which permits certain social costs to go unrecorded in the books maintained by these entrepreneurs. Need I remind you of toxic chemicals b~in e dumped into t he nearest watercourse ? Of automobile emissions? Of the scars of sc~ip-mined land that companies consider "too expensive" to r estore to pre-mined conditions? Of health problems and o verall safety among coal miners ? This audience needs no elaboration on externalities. Rent-s~eking activity is present here too--first in the f orm of the victims attempting to change the institutional structure that gives current emitters these presumptive rights. Second, rent seeking is a description of the entrepreneurial behavior of emittors as they spend mone y to influence the political system in order to retain their current privilege (presumptive rights). • . .. What sort of normative model is required to label the political struggle to correct these externalities as "nega tive-sum games"? Those who lament rent seeking as a drain on the economy seem to wish for the state to step aside and let entrepreneurs buy and sell in some stylized version of the world where all entitlements (property) have been determined once and for all in the secular analogue of the immaculate conception. It is 9 the state--acting on the petition of those who desire change- - that seems to stand accused of fostering rent seeking. The implication seems to be that if we could only get the state out of this business--along with the pernicious ''special interests''--then all dead-weight losses would be eliminated . Th e other side of rent seeking behavior has to do precisely with the political struggle over entitlements, and the costs that are then shifted to other parties. Resource economics cannot seriously entertain a model that is locked in a time warp of the present with no recognit ion of the ever- changing nature of resource scarcities, conflicts, and ecological threats. And it is here that we encounter the third leg of the "property rights, public choice, Austrian'' view of resource economics . The public choice aspect is properly concerned with the ~ays in which non-market processes operate to allocate resources; the theoretical c~ntribution~ this branch of economics are far reaching and legend. But for resource economists the public-choice approach--at least in its Wicksellian variant--is seriously preferential toward the status quo structure of entitlements. The prevailing structure of entitlements gives certain economic agents rights and privileges, and it leaves others with duties and exposure . Strip miners have privilege ( presumptive rights) to ignore the interests of those who despa i r about a scarred landscape; coal-burning · utilities have privilege (presumptive rights ) to ignore the costs of acid deposition now borne by a number of individuals in the upper midwest and the northeast--not to mention Canada; paper mills, at least until recently, had privilege (presumptive rights) to ignore the costs imposed on 10 those who liked trou t. The Wicksellian approach to public choice theory would ask that all changes of existing entitlements be accompanied by compensation; only with actual compensation can we be certain that we are avoid ing Pareto-inferior changes. On its face this has a nice ring to it; few of us relish the thought of t he state continuously shi fting opportunity sets and hence economic advantage. It reminds one of the famous phrase to the effect that no ma n 's property is safe while tte le gislature is in session. But on ref l ection, we are led to quite another position . The Wicksellian demand for unanimity is the equivalence of the ''first-come, first-served'' doctrine that is a favorite among a subset of the population- - most particularly those who managed to be first. Econohlic theory, philosophy, and the courts have yet to find compelling argumen t s to support the idea that fortuitous first arr ival offers a gene r al claim to much of anything--except being able to claim that you we r e first. The reason that resource economists need to be wo rr ied about Wicksel lian grid-lock is that many resource problems are of recent vintage . How long have we had among us kepone, aldicarb, dioxin, 2,4 D, 2,4,5-t, and PCB's? As new knowledg~ permits us to find new ways to pose environmental threats, there does not. seem any compelling reason to suppose that we must buy out every possible offending action. New knowledge wo rks in another way as well. The famous Virginia Cedar-rust statute discussed by Warre n Samuels and Jim Buchanan permitted the destruction of rust-infested Red Cedar trees on pe tition of 10 apple orchardists [Buchanan 1972, Samuels 1971, 1972]. The critical element in this dispute was the ability to establish causality between the rust on • 11 Cedars, and the ultimate damage to apple trees . In the absence of scientific knowledge of this sor t the hostile environment for apple trees might have been attributed to "natural conditions." And, natural conditions are I not amenable to policy ~hanges; Red Cedar rust is. I : The concept of rent seeking has been employed by some resource economists as another tack in a general position favoring pervasive market processes in natural resource control. It has, interestingly enough, the j I I I I I I appear.ance of a backlash against received doctrine that market failure is J ' I botl1 necessary and sufficient for collective action regarding resource I I use . The early work in resource economics was built upon a rationale that collect ive action could correct the failu re s of atomjstic choice. The ·i counter attack has caused advocates of the conventi ona l wisdom to retreat ' somewha t, and to admit that while market failure mav persist as a necessary condition for collective action, it is surely not sufficient. ~1hat is required is that col lect i ve action --and that will usually mean the state on behalf of involuntary cost bearers--be shown to be better than the status quo market processes . However the fallac y in this new approach is the same one thct plagued the earlier view; that fallacy is strict adherence to the efficiency norm as a means to evaluate ins titutional arrangements . The conventional view · -believed in markets, but also recognized social costs not re f lected in markets. It was a reluctant admission that col lective action was necessary to avoid the more serious outcome. The contemporary reaction to that approach is based upon the optimistic theory of economists who were writing at a time of extreme social and economic proscription against the individual in 18th century Europe . That writing is optimistic because it l ... I .. ' r I I I I I I I I I 12 confused material production of a bundle of goods and services at the lowest outlay of financial resources with the nebulous concept of social welfare; that confusion persists even today. The original view of resource economists was to minimize the social costs of imperfect markets . The more recent approach is interested in maximizing the economic dividend from natural resources--and the view persists that uhiquitous markets are the appropriate means to that end. However, neither view addresses the institutional question in a logically consistent manner~ and both views fail to recognize the crucial fact that economic efficiency only has analytical meaning within a particular struc~ure 0f entitlements (institutions). Two efficient outcomes, one under institutional structure A and the other under institutional structure B are usually Pareto non-comparable. More importantly, a status quo that is Pareto -in ferior to some possible outcomes can quite easily be Pareto non-comparable to a larger number of other possible outcomes. In the strictest sense it . might even be said that all instances of institutional change are Pareto non-comparable. This is so for the simple reason that welfare economics is concerned with marginal changes from within a basic structure of resource endowments (property rights) and income positions . If that insti tut ional str~cture changes then the concept of Pareto-comparability is seriously threatened [Bromley). Many resource economists now seem to recognize this, but to abandon conventional efficiency analysis is seen as giving up on the dimension that economists feel most comfortable doing. But are the prospects that bleak? Let us see what is left for economists to do. 13 PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS Neoclassical economics teaches us to look at the world as an arena of commodity relations. The focus is on things, and on the participants engaged in the process of exchanging these things. The prices of these things are usually considered to reflect marginal social values. Someresource economists are now spending an inc~ea s in g share of their time attempting to simulate market-like processes s o as tc ascertain values . Part of this emphasis is motivated by the purely scho l arly desire to know; another part is driven by the demands of the political process that is seeking these measures of relati ve value to tacilitate tradeoffs against goods and services bearing market ?rices. But the resource e c onomist tends to look at co!L.Illocities, discommodities (poliutants), and their real or simulated mar ket&. The interest is generally motivated by concern for prices and quantities in the present, as well as 1ntert emporally. An economist inclined toward an institutional perspective would not be as interested in prices and quantities. That i s , the world of commodity relations is only of secondary interest to the structure of institutions that define individual opportunity s ets, and hence th~ domain of choice over which economic agents can buy, sell, and shift costs to others. This subset of the institutional setup is usuall y referred to as "property rights." A study of property rights and economic incentives would start by recognizing the dual nature of the issue as discussed at the outset. 14 Specifically, property institutions determine economic conditions and so incentives, and economic conditions in turn determine property relations. Let us consider the first of these relationships--property institutions influencing economic conditions. This is the simplest and most familiar to economists. After all, we constantly deal with the manifestations of a particular property structure, namely the status quo. The prevailing institutional structure defines who it is thot must consider which costs, and who is able to shift costs to others . The status quo also defines the level and incidence of transaction costs; this is well understood among resource economists. The other direction of causality represents not the static conditions of the present but rather the press for institutional change in the legislature and in the courts; here economists feel less comfortable. The current struggle over acid deposition, strip-mine reclamat i on, nuclear waste disposal, soil erosion, and toxic chemicals is precisely one of economic conditions influencing institutional (property) arrangements. An effluent tax on waste discharges is a property change since the emittor was formerly enjoying privilege or presumptive rights, whi!e the victims had no rights. An effluent tax is a manifestation of a change in property relations among emittors and victims. On the one hand it is curious why this dimension of political economy should be so troublesome for economists. But then economics is a science that works best at the margin; much institutional change is inframarg~nal in nature. Secondly, institutional change is not something that is bought and sold as are conventional commodities. The third reason is that contemporary economics is almost exclusively dominated by an interest in 15 what is "optimal"--and optimality is least elusive when captured in a mathematical expression. Finally, institutional change involves e xt ramarket processes about which economists are notoriously innocent--considering it unclean. I consider it most helpful to begin any enquiry by asking about the current incidence of costs--that is "who is bearing which costs?" In the case of acid deposition it is fairly obvious who the cost bearers are. The same can be said for such i~sues as strip-mine reclamation, disposal of toxic chemicals, and soil erosion. Once we have determined who is benefiting and who is bearing costs from the status quo, the next question is to enquire about the in$t ituti onal structure that permits this situation. We would r.ext be interested in the nature and incidence of transaction costs . The aggregate of this information would reveal the reasons for the current pressure for institutional change, as well as the forces that prevent any movement from the status quo. Our insights into the nature and magnitude of costs and benefits are critical in defining the problem, in formulat i ng possible solutions, and in evaluating these solutions. While a full-blown cost-benefit analy sis may not be possible, it will usually by possible to conduct an analysis of the co~t-effectiveness of certain solutions. We often tend to downplay the importance of these contributions. Now the conventional way of addressing this situation is to argue that there is market failure and that therefore collective action is called for. Those resource economists with more faith in market processes · would be inclined to demur, and to insist that it be proven that collective action is really superior. They would ask us to consider at least one 16 possibility--a clearer definit io n of propert y rights so that consensual bargainers mi gh t try to eliminate the undesirable conditions of the status quo. Only as a last resort would they entertain the idea of some form of regulation. This is as it should be; received doctrine in resource economics has been too quick to assume that gove rnment rule making is the only way to address resource problems. But both groups of economists will be ~isled if they believe that public policy is motivated by a single-minded commitment to economic efficiency. It is here that economists will need to make the greatest break with their intellectual heritage. This does not mean that efficiency is irrelevant. It only means that effiency as we define it is but one dimension of th~ public's interest in policy outcomes. I suggest that the incidence of costs is a much more pertinent c0ncern. After all, people cannot feel "efficiency"; they do feel unwanted costs. It is here that economi sts often become moral advisors--paople "should care" about efficiency, and if they don't we will try to convince them of the errors of their ways . That is fine, but if economists disre gard--or dismiss as irrelevant --the incidence of costs then there is a danger of being disregarded. Economics seems to have a little bit of a "merit good" about it in the sense that we often try to tell people what they should care about. Over 40 years of academic preaching about the sundry abuses of proper . .. benefit-cost procedures by the several public-works agencies may have purchased tenure for a number of aspiring scholars, but it has had only minimal effect on the agenc i es or on the legislative process upon which those agencies are so dependent. A meaningful economics of property rights 17 and economic incentives would be concerned with cost incidence of the status quo, with the level and incidence of transaction costs, with the institutional structure that fosters those costs, and with the pulling and hauling that goes into defending the status quo - -as well as attempting to alter that status quo. It would not require that we abandon any of our science. But it does require that we build more pertinent analy tical models where ins~ t tutions are variables rather than parameters . We do a little of that now, but t here seems to be demand for more of it. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NATURAL RESOURCE USE This entire program is about the political economy of resource use, and an interest in the institutional aspects of natural resources--particular.ly property rights--i s certainly consistent with a political-economy theme. Some of the ~conomists do~ain may de spair that this takes resource economics out of an objective science and into the soft and squishy world of values and norms, power and politics. Indeed one could interpret the mission of the "propert y r ights, public choice, Austrian" school of ~trlving to keep resource allocations out of the political domain where the " •.• lack of economic information forces the public land mana ger into trading off in terms of political currencies, and this currency, at best, provides distotted measure s of value [Anderson, p. 930)." Nowhere could one find a more explicit statement of the central issue within resource economics. Political tradeoffs distort measures of value--indeed. I quickly recognize that to disagree with this charming statement will place me i n a minority position among economists. But let us be clear about the issue under consideration. To believe that the political process 18 distorts economic values--or those prices that would be given off from a "pure" economic process--demands that we entertain thoughts about some fictional world in which markets preceeded the state. The institutional structure is fashioned out of whole cloth, and then--once defined--economic agents go about the business of maximizing collective happiness. It is only when the legislative, admi nistrative, and judicial busybodies arrive on the scene that the trouble begins. The notion that there is a vi rgin market sys tem ur.3ullied by the realities of life on earth is persistent among some cconomis ts--but alas it is simply a dream. After all, what is the value of a ton of coal? Is it that price in current markets--where certain offs ite cos ts go unaccounted for? Is it some ether price after certain rtc! amation costs have been paid? Who is to know? The idea that there is some pure way ta allucate resources is too funny to be taken seriously . There may indeec be opportunities for introducing more market incentives into some administrative and judicial prescriptions. But the Am~rican people seem to have spoken quite clearly to the effect that not all natural resources should be ~ought and sold. It is, after all, one of the most fun damental o f social acts to determine collectively which of our assets are not ·to become commodities. Do we really believe that the prohibition of slavery dist o rted the economics of 0 cotton production in a way that warrants teeth- gnash ing about lost .. - "efficiency" ? The political economy of natural resources will ensure itself of being ignored if its practioners act as though they take seriously the notion that the political process distorts "real" values. The political 19 system defines for us the institutional structure within which buying and selling occurs. It has always been thus. One is tempted to ask those who think otherwise to name an instant in human history when economic values were "pure and correct." • Economic values--prices and costs--are derivative of the institutional structure that defines markets; change that structure . and you get a different constellation of prices and costs. About thi9 there can be little mystery. fhe hard pact comes when economists worry excessively about which particular cons t ellation is the correct--or optimal--one. Such contempiation will get us nowhere. What matters is that we admit the legitim~cy of the politi~al sys tem--as the operational . arm of our socie ty --to define the institutional environment within which natural resource use will occur. Some pa1t of the resource bas e will be allocated by atomi8itic b~rg~ining; another part will not. I believe that t hP. most promising areas of work for resource economists will be found within these two general domains, rather than attempt5.ng to establi s h the wrrc,ngheadedness of either. In the domain of marketed resources we can help to improve the performance of those markets. Where non-market proce sses operate we can al s o offer assistance in rationalizing those alloca tions. Margi~ality , private and social cos ts, intertemporal implications, and t he incidence of transaction costs are all extremely 0 pertinent to an improved allocation process. ... A necessary condition, however, is that we recognize the legitimacy of the political process in the first instance. If that is impossible to do, then the economist is relegated to a life of isolation from public policy influence. 20 REFERENCES •• Anderson, Terry L. 1982. "The New Resource Economics: Old Ideas and New Applications" AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 64(Dec.):928-34. Bhagwati, Jagdish. 1980. "Lobbying and Welfare" JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 14(Dec.) : 355-63. Bhagwati, Jagdish. 1982 . "Directly Unproductive, Profit - Seeking (DUP) Activities" JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 9U(~c.t . ):988 -1 002. Bhagwati, Jagdish and T. N. Srinivasan. 1980 . "RevenuP. S~eking: A Generalization of the Theory of Tariffs" JOURNAL OF POLITICfl. ECONOMY 88(Dec .):1069-87. Bromley, Daniel W. 1982. "Land and Water Problems; An Institutional Perspective" AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ~CO"rWMICS 64(Dec. ) : 83444. Buchanan, James N. 1972. "Politics ~ Propert y and the Law: An Alternative Interpretation of Miller, et. al. v. Schoene" JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 15(0ct.):439-52. Ciriacy-Wantrup, S.V. and Richard C. Bishop. 1975. '!Com.:non Property as a Concept in Natural Resources Policy" HATITP..AL RESOURCES JOURNAL lS(Oct.):713-27. Krueger, Ann. 1974. "The Political Economy of· the Rent-Seeking Society" AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 64(June):291- 303. Samuels, Warren. 1984. "A Critique of Rent-Seeking Theory" i n NEOCLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY, ed. by David C. Colander, Cam~~idge, Mass.: Ballinger. Samuels, Warren. 1971. "Interrelations Betwcer. Legal ~nd Economic Processes" JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 14(0ct.):435-SO . .J • .. , Samuels, Warren. 1972. "In Defense of a Positive Approach to Government as an Economic Variable", JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 15(0ct.):453-59. ·