Download The Ontological Proof

The Ontological Proof
• For around a thousand years, various
proofs for the existence of God have gone
by the name ‘The Ontological Proof.’
• The first person to give such a proof was
St. Anselm of Canterbury in the 11th
Century in his Proslogion.
• A Priori Proof: A proof the key premises
of which can be known independent of any
experience of the actual world.
• Anselm also provided a very influential, shorthand definition for God.
God = The Being than Whom none greater
can be conceived.
• Actually, Anselm gave two Ontological Proofs.
• We shall concentrate on a simplified version of
the second one.
• This Proof, in recent years, has been
developed by such philosophers as Charles
Hartshorne, Norman Malcolm, and Alvin
Plantinga.
Anselm’s Second Ontological Proof
(Simplified)
A. If it is possible for God to exist, then God
actually exists.
B. It is possible for God to exist.
C. Therefore, God actually exists.
•
Now, at first glance, it would appear that no
one could take this proof seriously.
God’s mere possibility implies His actuality?
• Many things are possible. For example,
– Polka Dot Zebras
– Striped Leopards
– Saddam Hussein – the Latrine Cleaner
• The mere fact that these things are
possible does not mean they actually exist.
Why should we believe that, in the case
of God, and God alone, His possibility
implies His actuality?
“It is possible to conceive of a Being which
cannot be conceived not to exist, and this [Being]
is greater than one which can be conceived not
to exist. Hence, if [the Being] than which nothing
greater can be conceived can be conceived not
to exist, [it] is not [the Being] than which nothing
greater can be conceived. But, this is an
irreconcilable contradiction. There is, then, so
truly a Being than which nothing greater can be
conceived . . . , that it cannot even be conceived
not to exist, and this Being Thou art, O Lord, our
God.”
St. Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion
• Now, this is very dense English
translated from even denser Latin.
What does Anselm mean here?
• We will restate the proof Anselm gives
here as Lemma Θ.
– A lemma is a smaller proof done
within the context of a larger proof.
– Here Lemma Θ is the proof for Step
(A.) of the simplified version of
Anselm’s Second Ontological Proof.
• Preliminaries
– God – The Being than Whom none greater can
be conceived, i.e. the Being Who is as perfect as
any being can be, the maximally perfect Being.
Some of God’s properties are omnipotence,
omniscience, and omnibenevolence.
– Possible Reality – A reality that can be. A
possible reality might or might not be actual.
• The possible reality in which George W. Bush
is the President of the USA is actual.
• The possible reality in which Saddam Hussein
is a latrine cleaner is not actual.
Lemma Θ is an example of the proof type
known as Reductio ad Absurdum.
– In a Reductio proof, one proves the
conclusion is true by proving its
opposite is false.
– One proves the opposite of the
conclusion is false by validly
deducing from the opposite a selfcontradiction.
• For example, ‘Today is and is not
Monday.’
– Any statement from which one can validly
deduce a self-contradiction, i.e any statement
that reduces to an absurdity, must be false.
– Therefore its opposite, in this case, the
conclusion one wants to prove, must be true.
Lemma Θ
Conclusion to Prove: If a Being, call the Being
D, is God in one possible reality, then D is God
in every possible reality.
1) Suppose not, i.e suppose that D is God
in some possible realities but not in other
possible realities. (Assumption for
Reductio)
2) It is greater to be God in every possible
reality instead of being God only in some
possible realities. (Premise)
3) In every possible reality in which D is
God, one can conceive of another being
D* who is God in every possible reality.
(from A in the proof)
4) In any possible reality in which D is
God, one can conceive of another
being D* who is greater than D. (from
2 & 3)
5) In any possible reality in which D is
God, one can conceive of another
being D* greater than the Being than
Whom none greater can be conceived.
(from 4 and the Definition of God)
[(5.) is a self-contradiction]
6) Thus, if a being, call the being D is God
in one possible reality, then D is God in
every possible reality. (from 1 thru 5 by
Reductio ad Absurdum)
Philosopher J. N. Findlay sums up the
insight of Lemma Θ (and Anselm’s
original proof).
“It is [contrary to the demands and claims inherent
in religious attitudes that their object] should
possess its various excellences in some merely
adventitious manner. It would be quite
unsatisfactory, from the religious standpoint, if an
object merely happened to be wise, good, powerful
and so forth, even to a superlative degree.”
J. N. Findlay, Mind, 57 (1948)
In other words, a being who happens to be God in one
possible reality, but who is, for example, Pee Wee
Herman in every other possible reality is not a being
worth worshipping in any possible reality.
• To be worthy of worship, to be truly God, in ANY
possible reality, a being must be maximally
perfect in EVERY possible reality.
• But, for a being to be anything in every possible
reality means the being must exist in every
possible reality.
• Thus, if a being is God in even one possible
reality, then the being is God in every possible
reality.
• Since actual reality is a possible reality, if a being
is God in even one possible reality (i.e if it’s
possible for God to exist), then God actually
exists.
• Today, thanks to the efforts of Hartshorne,
Malcolm, and Plantinga, almost everyone
concedes the truth of Step (A.) of the simplified
version of Anselm’s Second Ontological Proof.
• Today, if someone challenges Anselm’s
Second Ontological Proof, they tend to deny
Step (B.) of the simplified version, i.e. that it’s
possible for God to exist.
• “The only intelligible way of rejecting Anselm's .
. . [proof] is to maintain that the the concept of
God, as [the] Being greater than which cannot
be conceived, is self-contradictory or
nonsensical.”
Norman Malcolm, Knowledge and Certainty
• Various philosophers have take up
Malcolm’s challenge and have tried to
show the Anselmian concept of God is
self-contradictory. For example:
– Omnipotence is incompatible with
omniscience because an omnipotent
being cannot know what it’s like to be
afraid.
– Omnibenevolence is incompatible
with omniscience because an
omnibenevolent being cannot know
what it’s like to do evil.
– All these attempts tend to rest on dubious ideas
about the nature of knowledge or how knowledge
is acquired.
– Theists have reasonable, but not conclusive,
replies to these attempts to show that the
Anselmian concept of God is self-contradictory.
Plantinga has the final word on Anselm’s Second
Ontological Proof.
“[I]f we carefully ponder [Step (B.)], if we consider its
connections with other propositions we accept or reject
and still find it compelling, we are within our rights in
accepting it . . . . Hence . . . our verdict must be as
follows:
– “[Anselm’s Second Ontological Proof]
cannot, perhaps, be said to . . .
establish its conclusion, [i.e. God
actually exists]. But, since it is
rational to accept its central premise,
it does show that it is rational to
accept its conclusion. And, perhaps
that is all that can be expected of any
such argument.”
Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity