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Transcript
Three Interpretations:
Orthodox
Revisionist
Post-Revisionist
CNN: Cold War, episode 1 (intro-11:53)
Iron Curtain Speech (29:20-32:15)
‘…conditions are rather gloomy here- almost
mid-war conditions, overcrowding, poverty.
As for Communism- my dear [friend] a short
visit here is enough to make one decide
that Capitalism is worth fighting for. Black
as that may be, with all its bloodstains, it is
less gloomy and arid and hopeless than this
inert ghastly police state.”

Lawrence Durrell writing a friend from Belgrade (late 1949s)
“Say what you will- the Communists were
more intelligent. They had grandiose
program, a plan for a brand-new world in
which everyone would find his place…From
the start there were people who realized
they lacked the proper temperament for the
idyll and wished to leave the country. But
since by definition an idyll is one world for
all, the people who wished to emigrate were
implicitly denying its validity. Instead of
going abroad, they went behind bars.”

Milan Kundera
“Stalinism means the killing of the inner man.
And no matter what the sophists say, no
matter what lies the communist intellectuals
tell, that’s what it all comes down to. The
inner man must be killed for the communist
Decalogue to be lodged in the soul.”

Alexander Walt
Assigns fault of Cold War to USSR
 Stalin refused to abide by Yalta agreement
 Stalin’s efforts to expand communism in Europe,
Middle East and Far East
 Grand Alliance collapse was inevitable
 The ideological incompatibility made rivalry only
natural


Historian Arthur S. Schlesinger:

“Stalin and his associates, whatever Roosevelt or Truman
did or failed to do, were bound to regard the United
States as the enemy…America was the leading capitalist
power and thus… unappeasedly hostile…to oppose,
encircle and destroy Soviet Russia. Nothing the U.S. could
have done… would have abolished this hostility…”
 Political



Scientist, Hans Morgenthau argues:
Russian history of expansion was Stalin’s guiding
light- not communism
Communism was a means to an end- the end was
Russian power- power came with expansion
Morgenthau contends that an extent of the Cold
War was misunderstanding between Americans
and Soviets


Soviet historians argue that the U.S. overreacted to
Soviet actions and exaggerated Soviet strength
They argue Soviets too crippled after WWII to pose
real threat to U.S.
Mere Ideological Conflict?
 Revisionists
argue the U.S. was aggressor during
Post-WWII years
 The U.S. had military and economic
power/superiority after WWII

Michael Parenti wrote:


“The Soviets lost more than 20 million citizens in WWII,
fifteen large cities were either completely or
substantially ruined; 6 million buildings were
obliterated, depriving 25 million people of
shelter…thousands of bridges, power stations, oil wells,
schools and libraries were destroyed…
Parenti wrote of America:
 “The United States possessed 67% of the world’s
industrial capacity and had 400 longe-range bomber
bases, in addition to naval carrier forces around the
Eurasian Perimeter…”
 Gabriel
and Joyce Kolko stress economic
factors as being the cause of the Cold War


Truman created a myth of Soviet power to win
support for intervention in Europe and Asia
U.S. gov’t wanted open trade, multilateral
cooperation and private enterprises
 Parenti
argues that the U.S. did not fear a
Soviet attack
 Instead they feared losing economic
dominance and markets in Europe

“The ‘Giant Red Menace’ was conjured up to win
public support for military and economic…aid to
European and Asian nations.”
Most recent of the three: incorporates ideas
from both orthodox and revisionist
 John Lewis Gaddis considers internal & external
forces, domestic policies, quirks of personality
and inaccurate and accurate perceptions of
Soviets as important in shaping U.S. policy
 Robert Pollard argues that the desire for
Capitalist markets in Europe & Asia was not antiCommunist

Instead the U.S. feared a closed, unilateral system
that led to world depression and competing countries
before the war
 The U.S. relied on economic power to drive strategic
aims- strategic aims being the most important










The study of three interpretation provide insight into the complexity of
the Cold War
Ideological differences can not be under-emphasized
WWII needed cooperation, not ideological conflict- differences were
suppressed but waiting to re-appear
The two countries came out of WWII as superpowers- this intensified
incompatibility
Truman did not believe Stalin’s desires for expansion into Eastern
Europe only- Soviet interference in Iran, Turkey and Greece caused
more distrust
Both Soviets and U.S. would not back down to German question- Stalin
underestimated Truman’s resolve to sustain Berlin during Blockade
A continued effort to ‘work with’ Stalin came be seen as ‘appeasement’
to American critics of Truman administration
European status quo was frozen- West and East Europe were solidifiednext arena for conflict was naturally elsewhere- Asia next
Economic concerns are valid, but U.S. did not limit offer of aid to its
‘allies.’
 Soviets saw this as ploy manipulation




History of Cold War has
been world history
between 1945-1991
Martin Walker argues
that it still continues
today
Global conflict reaching
Korea, Vietnam,
Venezuela, Cuba,
Turkey, Afghanistan and
Greece to name a few
places
War fought by proxynever ‘hot’ between
Soviets and Americans
 Good
and evil according to U.S. and U.S.S.R.
 Cold War was a war of perceptions

Perceptions became reality
 No
matter the viewpoint, a definitive evil
existed
 Propaganda used to influence and dictate
domestic & foreign policy
 Fax machines, cell phones, satellite TV made
that definition all too cloudy




East Berlin and Fall of Berlin Wall
Glasnost
Poland’s ‘Solidarity’
Tiananmen Square in Beijing
U.S. strategy adopted to deter war
 Massive weapons build-up; ready military forces;
political will to use them
 Nukes would be ultimate deterrent
 Is this a balanced deterrent? Amt of nukes would
be disproportional to threat
 Deterrence and collective security- UN
introduced- championed by U.S.


This foreign policy/military strategy known as MAD


Mutually Assured Destruction
Both parties (Soviets & American) would have to mind
one another’s military weaponry when determining
foreign policy
History of Nuclear Warhead Stockpiles: 1945-1995
* Notes: totals are estimates. Lists include strategic and non-strategic
warheads, as well as warheads awaiting dismantling
1945
1955
1965
1975
1985
1995
UNITED STATES
6
3,057
31,265
26,675
22,941
14,766
SOVIET UNION
0
200
6,129
19,443
39,197
27,000
BRITAIN
0
10
310
350
300
300
FRANCE
0
0
32
188
360
485
CHINA
0
0
5
185
425
425
Source: National Resources Defense Council
 Distrust
of the ideological differences
intensified the arms race between the two
countries
 Ideological, political and economic
differences created deep sense of animosity
and frustration

Led to battlefields, proxy wars, propaganda wars
between two powers





Mutual Assured Destruction (introduction, 03:48-10:45
Doomsday Device (Dr. Strangelove)
Duck and Cover (1951 Civil Defense film)
Time Lapse Nuclear Test Sites
Rise and Fall of the Berlin Wall