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PENSION REFORMS: EXPERIENCES IN LATIN AMERICA Seminar “The Future and the Reform on Pension Funds” Madrid, Spain October 2003 Guillermo Arthur E., President of FIAP Author: Asociación de AFP de Chile CONTENTS I. II. III. IV. V. Countries with Reform Bases of the New Pension Systems Results of the Reforms Political Economics of the Capitalization Systems Final Remarks I. Reforms in Latin America Chile (1981) Peru (1993) Argentina (1994) Colombia (1994) Uruguay (1995) Bolivia (1997) Mexico (1997) El Salvador (1998) Costa Rica (2000) Dominican Rep. (2003) Ecuador (*) Nicaragua (*) (*) Not yet implemented I. Reforms in Central Europe, Eastern Europe and Asia Hungary (1998) Kazakhstan (1998) Poland (1999) Latvia (2001) Estonia (2002) Bulgaria (2002) Croatia (2002) Macedonia (2003) Lithuania (*) Rep. of Slovakia (*) Ukraine (*) (*) In process of reform II. Bases of the Pension System OLD SYSTEM NEW SYSTEM - Pay-as-you-go - Individual capitalization - State administration - Private, competitive administration - Inflexibility - Individual freedom: w To choose and change AFP w How much to contribute (over the minimum) w When and how to become a pensioner w Which fund to choose (Multifunds) - Discretionary - Standard - Without fund accumulation - Net worth separation: AFP and Pension Funds - Role of the State: Administrator - Role of the State: w Supervisory w Subsidiary - Benefits: Old age, disability and survivorship pensions - Benefits: Old age, disability and survivorship pensions Disability and survivorship insurance: collective and mutually supportive Characteristics of the New Pension Systems: Latin America COUNTRIES LATIN AMERICA INDIVIDUAL SAVING AND CAPITALIZATION SYSTEM Single Integrated Mixed Mixed in Competition (Individual Cap.) (PAYG and Indiv. Cap.) (PAYG and Indiv. Cap.) a Argentina Bolivia a a Colombia a Costa Rica Chile a a Ecuador El Salvador a Mexico a Nicaragua a a Peru Dominican Rep. Uruguay a a Characteristics of the New Pension Systems: Europe and Asia COUNTRIES EUROPE AND ASIA INDIVIDUAL SAVING AND CAPITALIZATION SYSTEM Single Integrated Mixed Mixed in Competition (Individual Cap.) (PAYG and Indiv. Cap.) (PAYG and Indiv. Cap.) Bulgaria a Croatia a Estonia a Hungary a Kazakhstan a Latvia a Macedonia a Poland a New Pension Systems Proportion of the pension financed by the PAYG system Costa Rica Uruguay Argentina Dominican R Colombia El Salvador Chile Mexico 0 Source: Palacios (2003) 25 50 75 100 III. Results of the Reforms 1.- Return of the Funds The rates of return of the funds exceed the growth of real wages and per capita income. Country Argentina Bolivia Colombia Chile El Salvador Mexico Peru Uruguay Return of Funds 11.70% 16,20% 11,80% 10,50% 11,30% 10,60% 5,70% 9,50% Source: Palacios (2003) Growth of Real Wages -0,80% 8,80% 1,40% 1,80% -0,20% 0,00% 1,80% 3,60% Difference Return FundsGrowth Wages 12,50% 7,60% 10,40% 8,70% 11,50% 10,60% 3,90% 5,90% Ratio Growth Maximum Real Returns to income per Minimum capita Returns 1,17 n.d. 1,13 1,05 1,3 n.d. 1,06 1,06 -0,40% 0,40% -0,30% 4,50% 0,50% 2,80% 2,40% -0,30% Difference Return FundsGrowth Income per capita 12,10% 15,80% 12,10% 6,00% 10,80% 7,80% 3,30% 9,80% 2.- Rapid growth of the funds MM US$ PENSION FUNDS IN LATIN AMERICA 45000 40000 Total (30.06.2003): 35000 MM US$ 106.018 Mexico 30000 25000 Argentina 20000 Chile 15000 Peru Colombia 10000 5000 Uruguay 0 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 Bolivia C. Rica Jun’ 98 99 '00 '01 '02 03 El Salvador Pension Funds and GDP (June 2003) Country Fund (MM US$) Latin America Argentina (2) Bolivia Colombia Costa Rica (1) Chile (1) El Salvador (1) Mexico (2) Peru Uruguay Europe and Asia Bulgaria Kazakhstan Poland (1) GDP as of 31.12.2001 (2) GDP as of 30.09.2002 Source: FIAP GDP (MM US$) Fund/GDP 15,328 1,258 6,403 218 39,672 1,289 35,405 5,296 1,149 236,631 8,160 71,297 15,781 67,236 14,000 584,147 30,592 12,321 4.82% 15.42% 8.98% 1.38% 59.00% 9.20% 6.06% 17.31% 9.33% 113 1,432 9,486 15,563 6,987 343,934 0.73% 20.49% 2.76% 3.- Rapid growth of membership MEMBERSHIP IN LATIN AMERICA 35000000 30000000 Total (30.06.2003): Mexico 58.747.165 25000000 20000000 15000000 Argentina 10000000 Chile 5000000 Colombia Peru Bolivia C. Rica 0 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 '00 '01 '02 Jun’ El Salvador 03 4.- Economic Effects of the Reforms QUALITATIVE EFFECTS: • It offers investors the possibility of combining risk (better combination of risk return and diversification). • It reduces intermediation costs. • It encourages the creation of innovative long-term financial instruments. • It improves transparency and corporate governance. • It boosts the industry in custodial services, risk assessment, etc. SOME EXAMPLES - Corporate Bonds CHILE PERU MEXICO Corporate Bonds (MM of US$ as of 2002) Corporate Bonds (MM of US$ as of 2002) Debentures or Coporarte Bonds (MM of US$ as of 2002) 7.459 8.000 12.000 12.000 7.000 10.000 10.000 8.000 8.000 4.000 6.000 6.000 3.000 4.000 4.000 6.000 5.000 2.000 1.105 2.000 1.000 71,4 0 0 1994 2002 Share of Social Security Funds 2002 5.039 2.000 85 0 1981 11.626 2002 1997 Share of Social Security Funds 2002 2002 Share of Social Security Funds 2002 25,1 % 34,3% AFP 35% 53% 47% 62% 40,7% CSV 3% AFP C.S.V. Others AFP Others AFP C.S.V. Others Note for Chile: Average life of bonds in the first five years of the 1990s: between 10 and 15 years. Currently between 15 and 20 years. They have been issued at 30 years. - Equities 50.000 45.000 40.000 35.000 30.000 25.000 20.000 15.000 10.000 5.000 0 CHILE PERU Stock Market Net Worth (Millions of US$ as of 2002) Stock Market Net Worth (Millions of US$ as of 2002) 47.430 660 1985 50.000 45.000 40.000 35.000 30.000 25.000 20.000 15.000 10.000 5.000 0 12.593 5.084 1993 2002 Share of Social Security Funds 2002 2002 Share of Social Security Funds 2002 7,5% 11,3% 0,7% 91,8% 88,8% AFP C.S.V. Others AFP Others - Mortgage-Backed Securities and Bank Bonds CHILE 10.000 MBS and Bank Bonds (Millions of US$ as of 2002) Share of Social Security Funds 2002 8.431 9.000 2,5 % 8.000 7.000 55,2% AFP 6.000 5.000 4.000 3.000 2.000 1.000 42,4% CSV 513 0 1981 2002 AFP N° Loan Operations Housing MBS Stock of Housing Financed with MBS 600.000 529.321 500.000 400.000 300.000 200.000 100.000 31.918 0 1980 2002 C.S.V. Others - Investment Fund Shares CHILE Investment Fund Shares (Millions of US$ as of 2002) 1.117 1.200 Share of Social Security Funds 2002 78,6% AFP 10,9% CSV 1.000 800 10,5% 600 400 200 0 0 1981 AFP 2002 C.S.V. Others 5.- Projection of the Fiscal Deficit of the Reform: Chilean Case % GDP 4 3,5 3 2,5 2 1,5 1 0,5 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 Recognition Bond 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Fiscal Contribution to Old System 2011 2012 2013 Total Fiscal Cost 2014 2015 6.- Coverage • When the costs of the formal sector decrease sector increases. • A strong link is formed between contributions paid and benefits received. • Incentives are created for both workers and employers to pay contributions into the pension system: lowering of contribution rates, increasing credibility in the system. Employment in this GREATER COVERAGE HOWEVER, THERE IS STILL MUCH TO BE DONE TO ENLARGE THE FORMAL SECTOR IN THE ECONOMY IV. Political Economics of the Individual Capitalization Systems • Relative political risk: • Government pressures: - Capitalization - Pay-as-you-go - Fiscal - Redistributive • Resistance of the Individual Capitalization system: - Individual “defined contribution” accounts - Visibility of redistributions - Redistribution of stocks and not flows - Redistribution produces greater impact - Ownership Rights - Private management •Two examples: Chile and Argentina • Political economics of adjustment: - Market versus political system - Visibility V. Final Remarks • In addition to making a significant contribution towards solving the problem of pensions, this reform has positive economic effects. • The macroeconomic, labour market and capital market reforms contribute to increasing the positive effects of the pension reform on the economy. • Although the capitalization system has suffered considerable political threats, it is still stronger than the pay-as-you-go system when it comes to facing up to “political risk”. V. Final Remarks • The effects on the pension funds of the economic crisis of the past few years would have been less if their investment portfolios had been better diversified. Latin America: Investment Diversification (2002) Country Argentina Bolivia Chile Colombia Costa Rica El Salvador Mexico Peru Uruguay State instruments 78% 69% 30% 49% 67% 85% 83% 15% 64% Source: Palacios (2003) Local Foreign Investment Investment 11% 14% 32% 34% 19% 1% 15% 53% 6% 9% 1% 17% 5% 0% 0% 0% 7% 0% Cash and Fixed Income Time Deposits 2% 90% 16% 100% 21% 75% 12% 93% 14% 100% 14% 99% 2% 100% 25% 71% 30% 100% Equities 10% 0% 25% 7% 0% 1% 0% 29% 0% V. Final Remarks • The inadequate diversification is explained by the combined effect of limited development in some local capital markets and regulations. Latin America: Differences in Investment Limits State and Bank Deposits Private Investments and Mutual Funds Chile Argentina Bolivia El Salvador Peru Dominican Rep. Nicaragua Uruguay Colombia Costa Rica 0% Source: Palacios (2003) 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% V. Final Remarks • Fortunately there is evidence that regulation may move in this direction in the near future, and in some cases that is has already done so: CHILE: MEXICO: ARGENTINA: PERU: - Multifunds - Increase in limit for investment abroad - Multifunds (Reform to SAR Law) - Investment allowed in foreign securities - Possibility for the AFJPs to buy dollars without limits (Project) - Multifund - Increase in limit for investment abroad Chile : Results of the Multifunds (October 2003) FUNDS (Millions US$) Fund A Fund B Fund C Fund D Fund E TOTAL 1.912,88 6.590,38 31.426,23 4.779,30 2.057,03 46.765,82 % YIELD (Jan. – Oct. 03) 24,7% 14,9% 10,0% 8,3% 3,1% 4,09 14,09 67,20 10,22 4,40 100,00 The Funds are differentiated by their minimum and maximum proportion of equities. Fund Fund A Fund B Fund C Fund D Fund E Maximum L. Minimum L. 80% 40% 60% 40% 20% 0% 25% 15% 5% 0%