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Panel on Financial Stability and Debt Management Guillermo A. Calvo Ankara, Turkey, September 12, 2006 Bonds: Recent Evidence All recent currency crises involved runs on bonds, i.e., serious difficulty in rolling over significant amounts of bonds as they mature or come due. Thus, especially dangerous are: bunching of maturities. foreign-exchange denominated bonds also bonds indexed to a domestic price level, although these are easier to finance with money creation. However, even short-maturity nominal bonds are dangerous because they could result in high and sustained inflation (Brazil, Turkey) or be turned to dollar bonds (1994 Mexico) 2 Run on Bonds: Why? Insolvency of some kind gov’t that for political reasons cannot raise enough taxes to repay debt after negative terms-of-trade shock. self-fulfilling insolvency crisis under distorting taxation. Crisis takes place as expectations are coordinated on a “bad” equilibrium. Lenders’ financial difficulties, e.g., a liquidity crunch that hits specialists in those bonds (Russian 1998 crisis). There is room for self-fulfilling crises here too. Expectation of strategic default (a rare event). 3 A Bond-Run Crisis (Sudden Stop) Central bank (C-bank) sterilizes capital inflows by issuing short-term C-bank obligations. Private banks (P-banks) borrow short run in dollars and lend to private sector in dollars. There is a Sudden Stop and P-banks cannot roll over their dollar debts. Hence, P-banks try to roll back their loans to private sector. Private sector cannot repay, partly because of the real currency depreciation caused by the Sudden Stop. Thus, C-bank bails out P-banks by using its international reserves. However, SS implies that C-bank’s debt cannot be rolled over either. Call the Fund! 4 Policy Options Spread out bond maturities to avoid significant maturity bunching. De-dollarization. However, the above policies are costly if not outright impossible to implement. Thus, in the short run the best available options are likely to be: Decrease the supply of bonds, e.g., lowering the fiscal deficit. Stop non-budget deficit, e.g., prevent bank crises! Get international credit lines, accumulate international reserves. (This could be costly!) 5 Effect of Debt Management Debt over GDP ratio Distribution 0.7 Debt-GDP ratio 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 2000 2001 2002 Foreign Currency 2003 2004 2005 Foreign Currency - Local Currency 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Foreign Currency - Local Currency - GDP linked 6 Latin America: Debt growth due to non-budget items (balance-sheet effects, skeletons, etc.) 18 16 14 Percent of GDP 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Simple average for: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela 2002 2003 2004 2005 7 Controls on Capital Inflows The objective is to control the inflow of shortterm capital flows (“hot capital”) by taxing those flows. Empirical studies show that K-controls do not change much total K-flows, but succeed in lengthening the maturity of K-inflows. However, K-controls do not prevent Sudden Stops (Chile 1998/9) and tend to discriminate against the “small guy.” 8 International Cooperation Necessary because it is still very costly for EMs to unilaterally protect themselves from deep crisis. Options: Contingent Credit Lines, CCL Emerging Market Fund to stabilize EMBI Improving information about new financial instruments, their risks, etc. Helping to develop local-currency debt instruments. 9 Panel on Financial Stability and Debt Management Guillermo A. Calvo Ankara, Turkey, September 12, 2006