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The financial stability implications of increased capital flows for emerging market economies Dubravko Mihaljek Bank for International Settlements Presentation at the Economics Institute Zagreb Zagreb, 11 November 2008 The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the BIS. 1 Outline 1. Data description 2. Recent trends in capital flows to/from EMEs 3. Financial stability implications of increased capital flows – Focus on bank-intermediated capital inflows and CEE – Policy responses – Financial stability implications of debt portfolio outflows 2 Data description Focus (mostly) on private capital flows Gross vs. net flows • Gross flows: to study financial integration, financial stability issues; composition of flows important for macroeconomic management • Net flows: key for macroeconomic (demand) management Sample • Mostly 2001-2006 • Some comparisons with 1990s • 3 EM regions: Asia and Latin America, CEE (Baltics, central Europe, SEE) 3 Data description (2) Data sources • BoP data (IMF, International Financial Statistics) • BIS: locational and consolidated statistics Look at average of countries in the region, and regional totals: n n 1 KFi vs. n i 1 Yi KF i i 1 n Y i 1 i 4 Recent trends – gross inflows All emerging markets Asia 16 16 Gross inflows Gross outflows 12 12 8 8 4 4 0 0 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 -4 -4 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 % of GDP, regional totals 10 22 8 5 Recent trends – gross inflows (2) Central and eastern Europe Latin America 10 22 8 16 6 10 4 4 2 -2 0 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 % of GDP, regional totals 6 Recent trends: regional distribution Share in gross inflows of private capital to EMEs, % 1995 2006 CEE 11 26 Asia 51 47 Latin America 29 12 Other EMEs 9 19 7 Gross inflows and outflows for CEE Inflows Outflows % of GDP, unweighted country average; except net flows (regional average). 8 Net flows to CEE - latest data Net private capital flows to CEE - Oct. 2008 WEO % of GDP, regional total 12 9.5 10 8.2 7.8 8 3.1 7.5 5.8 6 4.0 3.5 0.5 0.6 3.3 3.4 2008 2009 0.7 4 2 4.4 0 4.1 -0.4 -2 2006 Direct investment, net 2007 Private portfolio flows, net Other private capital flows, net 9 Recent trends – breakdown of gross inflows 10 Recent trends – breakdown of gross outflows 11 Portfolio outflows - mostly for purchases of foreign debt securities - mostly from China (70% of Asian total, $140 bn. from 2002-06) - “private” sector probably includes SOCBs 12 % of gross outflows Two main developments from FS perspective: (a) “other” investment inflows; (b) portfolio outflows “Other” investment: flows to banks and to other sectors nonfinancial corporations, NBFIs, households 80 Gross inflows of other investment 80 60 60 40 40 20 20 0 0 -20 -20 Trade credit EME total Loans Asia Currency and deposits Latin America Other liabilities CEE Gross outflows of other investment Trade credit EME total Loans Asia Currency and deposits Latin America % of gross inflows/gross outflows of “other investment”; unweighted country average for 2004-06. Other assets CEE 13 Other investment flows increased very strongly in CEE External positions of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis emerging market countries Amount outstanding USD billions Emerging markets1 Vis-à-vis all sectors Vis-à-vis non-bank private sector Asia2 Vis-à-vis all sectors Vis-à-vis non-bank private sector Latin America3 Vis-à-vis all sectors Vis-à-vis non-bank private sector Central and eastern Europe4 Vis-à-vis all sectors Vis-à-vis non-bank private sector Per cent of GDP 1998 2002 2007 1998 2002 2007 1,017 366 865 354 2,290 914 19.3 6.9 14.6 6.0 17.3 6.9 574 105 442 87 1,068 270 26.6 4.9 14.7 2.9 16.9 4.3 263 170 233 156 350 213 13.9 9.0 15.1 10.1 11.1 6.8 82 44 118 70 579 289 12.1 6.5 16.5 9.8 32.4 16.2 Assets of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis individual emerging market countries; end of period. Totals for positions in US dollars; simple averages for positions as a percentage of GDP. Sources: IMF; BIS locational banking statistics. 14 The increase was most pronounced in the past three years Cross-border claims of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis emerging markets Changes in amounts outstanding at end-period, as a percentage of GDP Cumulative increase in CEE since 2005: 7.5% of GDP 5.7% of GDP Vis-à-vis banks Vis-à-vis non-the bank private sector 4.0 4.0 3.4 Asia Latin America CEE 3.0 2.9 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.0 1.5 2.0 1.5 1.2 1.2 0.7 3.0 3.0 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.0 -1.0 -0.7 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.9 -0.4 -0.5 -0.8 -0.2 -1.0 -2.0 -0.8 -2.0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2002 Source: BIS, Locational Banking Statistics; IMF, World Economic Outlook. 2003 -1.6 -1.6 2004 2005 2006 2007 15 Cross-border loans account for a large share of domestic credit in CEE Cross-border and domestic bank credit in emerging market economies As a percentage of total bank credit 100 75 68 50 85 87 0 13 15 2002 2007 Asia 2002 63 39 37 2002 2007 78 25 32 61 22 2007 Latin America Cross-border loans Sources: IMF; national data; BIS locational banking statistics. CEE Domestic bank credit 16 Financial stability implications of cross-border loans In the past, “pure” cross-border loans • Latin America in 1980s debt crisis • Asia in 1990s 1997/98 crisis Now parent banks loans to subsidiaries in EMEs “Pure” cross-border loans mainly to large corporations from EMEs 17 Financial stability implications of cross-border loans (2) Parent banks loans to subsidiaries • Most pronounced in CEE and Mexico, where banking systems are 80-95% foreign-owned • In CEE, cross-border loans are convergence flows – economic, financial, institutional integration with EU, which is different from Asia in the 1990s • Cross-border loans were taking place in financially repressed banking systems in Latin America in the 1980s and Asia in the 1990s; banking systems in CEE are competitive and open • Cross-border loans were financing import-substituting development in Latin America, not the case in CEE 18 Financial stability implications of cross-border loans (3) Risk of a solvency crisis smaller • Parent banks large, well-capitalised, well supervised, focus on traditional commercial banking, did not invest in subprime/structured products But the risk to sustainability of cross-border flows still large • Underestimation of credit risk during credit boom • High targets for ROE (to exploit franchise value) 19 Financial stability implications of cross-border loans (4) Return on equity for banks in major home and host countries, 2005 Host countries ROE (%) Major home countries ROE (%) Asia Indonesia Korea Malaysia 24.0 19.1 14.1 Netherlands UK US 16.0 17.3 17.7 Latin America Brazil Chile Mexico 27.7 17.3 24.4 Spain UK US 16.0 17.3 17.7 Central Europe Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia Estonia Latvia Lithuania Bulgaria Croatia Romania Turkey 32.1 27.0 20.6 13.7 17.0 19.4 25.1 16.0 21.4 20.2 14.9 17.8 Austria Belgium France Germany Italy Denmark Sweden Finland Austria Greece Italy 14.8 19.2 14.4 13.9 14.0 18.9 20.7 9.4 14.8 15.3 14.0 Baltic states South-eastern Europe 20 Financial stability implications of cross-border loans (5) Risk of regional contagion • Parent banks pursue similar strategies across regions (eg, lending to households) • Transmission of shocks from home countries (eg, via funding in wholesale markets) • Asymmetry of host country vs. parent bank exposures • Other channels: short maturity of cross-border loans, concentration of foreign creditors, common creditors across region 21 Financial stability implications of cross-border loans (5) 22 Risks at the current juncture: sudden stop/reversal of bank intermediated flows Net cross-border loans by BIS reporting banks to banks in EMEs1 30 In billions of US dollars 29 22 20 2008:Q1 2006 2002 15 10 8 10 6 0 0 0 -1 -2 -10 -4 -20 -19 -160 -30 RO HU LV LT EE CZ HR BG RS PL TR ZA RU Cross-border loans to banks in EMEs, less deposits of EME banks in BIS reporting banks; end-period. Source: BIS, locational banking statistics. 23 Risks at the current juncture: sudden stop/reversal of bank intermediated flows (2) 70 Net cross-border loans by BIS reporting banks to the non-bank sector in EMEs1 61 In billions of US dollars 55 2002 50 30 2006 2008:Q1 27 18 18 17 14 7 10 4 4 3 -1 -10 -30 PL RO HR HU CZ BG LT LV EE RU TR ZA Cross-border loans to the non-bank sector in EMEs, less deposits of the EME non-bank sector in BIS reporting banks; end-period. Source: BIS, locational banking statistics. 24 Risks at the current juncture: sudden stop/reversal of bank intermediated flows (3) Private sector deposits 100 80 As a percentage of total liabilities 74 1 2002 69 64 60 63 62 59 58 52 52 57 49 2008 48 42 46 40 40 25 20 24 43 36 34 32 38 32 22 12 16 13 0 IN TH ID PH CN MY KR AR BR CL PE CO MX VE HR RS BG RO PL CZ HU LT EE LV TR ZA RU 1 Total private sector deposits; domestic banking system, end-period levels (for 2008, May). Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 25 Risks at the current juncture: sudden stop/reversal of bank intermediated flows (4) Ratio of total loans to total deposits1 3.0 2.6 2.4 2008 2.1 2.0 1.9 2002 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.5 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.0 KR TH ID MY IN CN PH CO CL VE MX BR PE AR LV EE LT RO HU BG HR RS PL CZ RU ZA TR 1 Private sector loans divided by private sector deposits (end of period; for 2008, May), domestic banking system. Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 26 Policy responses – how to deal with these risks? 1. Macroeconomic policies • Allow greater exchange rate flexibility – trade-off between the consequences of ER appreciation and sterilisation • Reduce policy rates – trade-off between the consequences of capital inflows and domestic objectives (inflation target, domestic credit growth) • May have limited room for manoeuvre on ER, IR • Relax controls on capital outflows – eg, for institutional portfolio investors • Fiscal tightening – best approach; should focus on expenditure restraint 27 Policy responses (2) 2. Macroprudential and microprudential responses • Tighten oversight of banks’ management of credit risk (to make sure banks hold sufficient capital) • Improve quality of creditor information (accurate company financial reports, credit registry for households, tighter debt/income & debt service/ income ratios, etc) • Diversify sources of bank funding • Temporary capital controls 28 Policy responses (3) Funding sources of EME banks are poorly diversified Bank borrow ing from other dom estic financial institutions 1 As a percentage of total liabilities Domestic money market instruments and bonds1 As a percentage of total liabilities 28 30 25 25 21 2002 2002 20 2008 2008 20 12 15 12 8 10 8 10 4 0 0 6 1 0 5 0 CL CO ZA MY MX BR RO KR CN VE 9 4 3 3 1 PE 1 0 0 0 Money market instruments 1 End-period levels (for 2008, May), domestic banking system. Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. Domestic bonds issued by banks CO CN BR ZA TH MX CL MY ID TR 1 Liabilities to other domestic banking institutions and non-bank financial institutions; end-period levels. Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 29 Policy responses (4) 3. Home-host supervisory cooperation – International scope of banking institutions vs. national scope of regulation and supervision – Conflict between macroeconomic and financial stability concerns in small economies hosting large international banks – Divided responsibilities for financial stability and financial sector supervision within home and host countries 30 Policy responses (5) 3. Home-host supervisory cooperation (cont’d) – Subsidiaries vs. branches – MOUs, supervisory colleges, joint supervision – Resolution of cross-border bank failures 31 Are there any financial stability implications of EME investments in foreign portfolio capital? Redirecting FX inflows helps macroeconomic policy (no need to deal with impact of capital inflows) But is it good investment? • Interest rate differential vis-à-vis US • Assets denominated in depreciating currency (USD) If investments are made by SWFs, additional issues: • Protectionist backlash • SWFs might not be subject to supervisory oversight in their home jurisdictions 32