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Wholesale versus Within Institution Change: Pacting Governance Reform in Brazil Aaron Schneider Institute of Development Studies April 28, 2005 World Bank Seminar Governance Reforms Accountability and Capacity Change in Institutions New “Rules of the Game,” new equilibrium Institutional change is discontinuous, significant But how does it happen? Punctuated Equilibrium Modelling Wholesale Change Gradually build consensus, make pacts When actors, interests, and power have shifted sufficiently, pass a threshold and. . . Wholesale Change If actors, interests and power do not shift enough, Within Institution Change Brazil 1990s Wholesale versus Within Institution Change Some reform processes altered interests, changed power to form a new consensus and pact (fiscal federalism) Others left old pacts intact (tax) Kinds of Reform Both are public finance reforms We look for threshold breaching, discontinuous, wholesale change in institutions • Macrosocial shift – Patrimonial democratic/Bureaucratic Authoritarian to Liberal democratic Politics in Brazil Feckless Democracy • Demos-constraining federalism • SNG power over tax, personnel, Banks • Weak parties, fragmented interest grps Institutional Restraint • Strong president veto, agenda, patronage • Party discipline in Congress Fiscal Responsibility Law Limits on public debt No bailouts across levels of government Control electoral-cycle Transparent accounts Personnel ceiling Fiscal crimes law with administrative, financial, political, criminal penalties 25 20 15 Tax Burden (% GDP) TAX - % of GDP 35 30 10 1999 1995 1991 1987 1983 1979 1975 1971 1967 1963 1959 1955 1951 1947 Year Causal Process of Wholesale Change Fiscal responsibility law • Machiavellian manoeuvres and capable bureaucracy • Actors and interests breach a threshold, new pact and consensus among democratic centre and state level elites • New rules of the game • Rational administration enforcing fixed fiscal rules Causal Process of Within Institution Change Tax reform • Machiavellian manoeuvres and capable bureaucracy • Still, no threshold, no new consensus or pact • Changes occur within old institutions • Increase tax but at cost of efficiency and regressivity Causal Process Observations Both involved subtle and incremental shifts Both involved high politics and capable bureaucracy Fiscal crisis had opposite impacts New consensus and new pact for federalism – wholesale change Within institution change of tax