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The Emerging Economy Challenge: an Optimistic View Reforming the Bretton Woods Institutions Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen, Denmark September 2009 Aniket Bhushan Finance for Growth The North South Institute Outline • What went wrong this time? • How do we situate ‘Emerging Economies’ (EE)? Where do they stand in relation to advanced? • Their crisis experience: take-away(s), lessons? • Preconditions for policy change? • Three loci of change: monetary system (& IMF role); conditionality; broad policy mix What went wrong this time? Relationship between Imbalances 1400 (USD,billions) 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Change in EE Reserves US Current Account Deficit • Nothing • Chronicling continuation (long-trend: income polarization, middle class wage stagnation &debt dependence) • Economy on steroids (2000-07, cumulative household debt increase by $7tln, mortgage $5tln) What went wrong this time? Sharp growth in financial sector profitability – Curious in context of high competition – Profitability implies = “lads must be doing something right” – Dancing till the music plays Explosive growth in derivatives markets – Leverage, high opacity, breeding unknown unknowns, unforeseen correlations – Insurance v. gambling What went wrong this time: EE lens (not much new) • Urgency of reform, already made apparent by Asian (1997) • Inadequacy of BWI framework • Workaround strategies % increase in reserves (1997-2000 average vs. 2007) 3500 3314 3000 2500 2000 1500 907 1000 773 437 500 420 310 254 182 150 125 88 In do ne si a S au di A ra bi a A rg en tin a ex ic o M Tu rk ey l ra zi B ca ou th Af ri Ko re a S S ou th In di a na C hi R us si a 0 Situating Emerging Economies • Decoupling? (private consumption,$ billions) Size of the Wallet 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 0 US EU Japan China Brazil Russia India (real GDP growth,%) 7 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1980s avrg 1990s avrg Advanced 2000s avrg Emerging (broad) 2010-14 (projected) Difference Adv Emerg difference Structural Decoupling Situating Emerging Economies Catching Up: Share of World GDP (PPP) (% of world GDP) 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 19 80 19 82 19 84 19 86 19 88 19 90 19 92 19 94 19 96 19 98 20 00 20 02 20 04 20 06 20 08 20 10 20 12 20 14 0 EU United States China India • Over 35yrs, 20-26% gap down to 4-10% Situating Emerging Economies G20 Emerging Economies European Union United States • Emerging G20 catch-up and crisis experience • Still ways to go on DFD 2014 2012 2010 2008 2006 2004 2002 2000 1998 1996 1994 1992 1990 1988 1986 1984 1982 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1980 GDP (PPP), Share of World Emerging G20's Share of Global GDP Situating Emerging Economies: Sharp rise, hard fall BRIC Market Capitalization as % of World Market Capitalization 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 -100 -200 -300 617.49 (2007) 180.102 109.263 73.536 -6.46 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 -190.31 (2009) (percent) (US$, Billions) Net Private Capital Flows to Emerging and Developing Economies 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 16.9 (2007) 9.39 (2006) 4.26 (2004) 3.08 (2000) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Key EE take-away (s) • Workaround worked, but cannot count on steroids • Carpe diem: opportunity to play pro-active role • Managing “going out”: stake in external financial sys increasing rapidly Stock of Outward FDI ($,billions) 300 255.2 200 100 129.8 51.9 95.8 20.1 1.8 29.4 27.7 0 Brazil Russia 2000 India 2007 China Take-away, lessons? Well if EE were better prepared, are there any lessons • Calibrated liberalization, gradual • Strong ownership of process • Cap a/c lib not same as trade • Asian crisis, cause for pause • State as “absorber” v. “multiplier” of shock • Informal sub-grouping (BRIC Summit) BWI Implication • Bottom-line: – Addressing precautionary r. accumulation (insurance) – Longer-term diversification of global demand (drivers and composition) Household Consumption Expenditure 70.00 (%GDP) 60.00 50.00 40.00 30.00 20.00 10.00 0.00 YR2000 YR2001 YR2002 Brazil YR2003 China YR2004 India YR2005 YR2006 Russian Federation YR2007 Current IMF Vote-share relative to projected Population & Share of GDP(2014) (% of Total Votes, 2009) US (projected % share of global population, 2014) (projected % share global GDP,2014) 16.77 4.53 18.34 Japan 6.02 1.77 5.48 Germany 5.88 1.14 3.5 UK 4.85 0.92 2.88 France 4.58 0.9 2.73 Italy 3.19 0.86 2.14 Canada 2.88 0.48 1.74 44.17 10.6 36.81 Netherlands 2.34 0.23 0.85 Belgium 2.09 0.15 0.5 Australia 1.47 0.32 1.09 Spain 1.39 0.66 1.74 Sweden 1.09 0.13 0.47 52.55 12.09 41.46 China 3.66 20.2 15.52 Russia 2.69 1.95 3.44 India 1.89 18.13 5.74 Brazil 1.38 2.9 2.83 Total (BRIC) 9.62 43.18 27.53 Total (G7) Total (leading econ, 12) Conditions for policy change • Structural shifts (and amplifiers) – Economic, Geopolitical • Political capital – Will, momentum, anti-incumbency, palatable-ness • Perceived alternatives – i.e. doesn’t have to be “new”; but new mix of old/new • Windows of opportunities – i.e. vacuum can be window; or crisis can be too short Potential loci of Change • Monetary system and role of IMF • Conditionality • Broad policy-mix (countercyclical, industrial)