* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
Download How to reduce procyclicality in the Eurozone?
Debt collection wikipedia , lookup
Debt settlement wikipedia , lookup
Financialization wikipedia , lookup
Debtors Anonymous wikipedia , lookup
Systemic risk wikipedia , lookup
Debt bondage wikipedia , lookup
Interbank lending market wikipedia , lookup
Quantitative easing wikipedia , lookup
Moral hazard wikipedia , lookup
European debt crisis wikipedia , lookup
How to Moderate the Procyclical Nature of the EMU? Juraj Kotian, Head of Macro/Fixed Income Research CEE Erste Group Bank Procyclical policy cocktail will always lead us to boom and bust periods • Pro-cyclical fiscal policy • Pro-cyclical and adverse common monetary policy • Nexus between governments and banks - bailouts & moral hazard vs. debt resolution Governments Nominal criteria were procyclical and inefficient Slovakia Change in structural balance Change in structural balance Greece real GDP growth real GDP growth Source: AMECO, Erste Group Research, period 2004-2013 (years 2009-2010 excluded) Some advanced economies managed to do the anticyclical fiscal policy Correlation between real GDP growth and change in structural balance (2004-2013)* Source: AMECO, Erste Group Research *years 2009-2010 were excluded The lesson learnt from past mistakes: • Macro-prudential policy: tight fiscal policy during the boom years and more expansionary during the downturn • Nominal criteria have been already replaced by structural criteria (six-pack) • Nominal criteria have formally remained in place in SGP, but have become less important • Surveillance process and the sanction mechanism have been strengthened Will better governance be enough for limiting the procyclicality? • No. We desperately need reliable debt resolution scheme for sovereign debt • Correct pricing of default risk during ‘good times' should prevent countries from running a high debt or primary deficits • Reduced moral hazard - creditors should bear losses Fiscal union with a common budget • For what do we need a transfer union? Cohesion or countercyclical fiscal action? • Pooling of cyclically sensitive tax revenues vs. robust tax revenues (excise taxes, VAT) • Covering of cyclically sensitive expenditures (automatic stabilizers or public investments?) • Paying the interest payments on commonly issued bonds (i.e. Eurobonds) Austerity vs. Stupidity Lorenzo Bini Smaghi (a former member of the ECB’s Executive Board) ‘Austerity has certainly caused low growth but may itself be the result of the poor and unbalanced growth performance before the crisis, which was due to the lack of reform. The postponement of reforms to improve growth potential has left countries with only one solution, austerity. Austerity is thus the result of policy makers’ past inability to take timely decisions, in other words it’s the result of their short sightedness – and stupidity.’ Monetary policy One size does not fit all • Members would need a different level of real interest rates and real exchange rates • Larger cyclical swings among member states makes the common monetary policy even more adverse • Nexus between banks and governments bring procyclical problem to even higher level and makes monetary transmission mechanism inefficient Tailor rule interest rate should range between 15% to 4% Source: Zsolt Darvas, Silvia Merler (Bruegel 2013) Nexus between sovereign and banks makes the transmission mechanism of common monetary policy even more challenging Correlation between sovereign and banking CDSs Source: VOX (Wolff, Angeloni 2012), weekly averages over the period January 2011- February 2012 Resulting in tight monetary conditions in countries where the optimal monetary policy would need to be accommodative SMEs Interest Rate spreads to Germany (loans up to EUR 1m with maturity of up to 1 year) Source: EC Economic Forecasts (Autumn 2013) Nexus between banks and sovereigns Moral hazard in pricing of government debt • Markets had been betting on implicit bailout of sovereigns and absence of redomination risk • Zero risk weight on sovereign – home bias • IMF breached its own rules and provided financial assistance to insolvent country (Greece,...?) • Key arguments: No debt resolution scheme for sovereign debt- disorderly restructuring would cause contagion and meltdown of financial sector in the EA LTRO helped to the financial fragmentation, moral hazard and regulatory arbitrage Viral Acharya, Sascha Steffen (2013): The banking crisis as a giant carry trade ‘Under-capitalised banks had incentives to shift further into risky sovereign debt as the failure of this trade is precisely when they are also insolvent and they benefit if sovereign bond prices improve, as described in Diamond and Rajan (2011) (i.e. ‘risk shifting’). Basel II regulation that requires banks to meet a capital ratio based on regulatory equity and risk-weighted assets provides banks incentives to shift into assets with lowest risk weights, i.e. sovereign debt. As sovereign debt had zero capital requirements for all banks, banks had incentives to shift into these risky assets (‘regulatory capital arbitrage’).’ Investments into domestic government bonds have increased the nexus Share of domestic government bonds as % of total assets Source: Silvia Merler (Bruegel, 2013) How to fix it? • Debt resolution scheme for sovereign • Introduction of non-zero risk weights for sovereign • Reduction of home-bias for investments into sovereign portfolio through concentration risk Banking Union • Common resolution fund, minimum amount of bail-in eligible liabilities • 100% deposit guarantee should be reconsidered in order to tackle the adverse selection • Non-zero risk weights for domestic sovereign bonds • Eurobonds with senior status over the local (national) debt would be the most efficient tool for breaking the nexus between banks and sovereigns Eurobonds as an option for debt exchange programme • Eurobonds with senior status should replace part of the national debt (but not 1:1) • In auctions of Eurobonds, national bonds could be used for settlement the highest bids would be accepted until the country quota (i.e. up to 60% of GDP) is consumed • It would correspond to voluntary private sector involvement • Remaining part of debt (i.e. above 60 percent of GDP) would remain ‘national’ (subordinate) and could be subject of occasional default • 'Disorderly' default would not be an option, occasionally orderly sovereign debt restructuring would be possible Summary • Following structural rather than nominal criteria • Enforce the fiscal discipline via better pricing of risk of default • Make the sovereign default possible • Introduction of non-zero risk weight for domestic sovereign bonds • Bank resolution scheme • Introduction of commonly issued bonds (i.e. Eurobonds) which would help to break the nexus between banks and sovereigns