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Lesson 5
Air Force Heritage
READING FOCUS
Cognitive Lesson Objective: Know the major historical events, leaders, and milestones
that contributed to the development of the USAF.
Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
1. List the critical events of the Combined Bomber Offensive.
2. Identify the state of American airpower upon entering World War I.
3. Identify a key technological advancement of the Korean War.
4. Define the major air campaigns of the Vietnam conflict.
5. State the objective of the Mercury, Gemini and Apollo space programs.
6. State the goal of each of the four phases of the air campaign during DESERT
STORM.
Affective Lesson Objective: Respond to the importance of knowing Air Force heritage.
Affective Samples of Behavior:
1. Read the assigned information before attending lecture.
2. Voluntarily participate in classroom discussion.
The United States has a tremendous heritage as a fighting force, predating the Revolutionary War.
However, the heritage of American air and space power begins much later. The following provides a
brief historical account of how the United States Air Force has become “the world’s most respected air
and space force.”
Beginnings
On a cold December day in 1903, Orville and Wilbur Wright made man’s first controlled flights
of powered, heavier-than-air vehicles. Although the longest flight lasted only 59 seconds and traveled
just 852 feet, the air age had begun. After establishing the Aeronautics Section of the Signal Corps in
1907, the War Department solicited bids for an airplane that could carry two people, 40 miles per
hour, for 125 miles. The Wright Brothers were awarded the contract to produce this aircraft. On 2
August 1909, the Army officially accepted the Wright brothers’ aircraft after Orville Wright and Lt
Frank P. Lahm had remained aloft for over one hour and 12 minutes with an average speed of 42
miles per hour. From this inauspicious beginning, the USAF has made exponential leaps forward
through technology development and capability.
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1907-1917
During this period of time, the fledgling new air service fought the contempt and lack of understanding many military leaders held toward the airplane. Brigadier General James Allen, the chief signal officer of the United States Army, questioned the merit of the airplane. He was skeptical of the
airplane’s use as an offensive weapon, stating that “for the purpose of dropping explosives on the
enemy, a high speed aeroplane is hardly suitable...In passing over the enemy’s works a flying machine
should travel at least 4,000 feet above the earth...Traveling at the rate of 30 miles an hour at this altitude, even after considerable practice, it is not thought a projectile could be dropped nearer than half
a mile from the target.” General Allen was not alone in his narrow view of aviation’s utility. Assistant
Secretary of War Henry S. Breckenridge testified before the House Military Affairs Committee in
1913 that military aviation was simply an additional form of communication, observation, and reconnaissance. The shortsightedness of the military establishment toward American airpower resulted in
an Army Aviation Section woefully unprepared for war.
In April 1917, when the United States entered World War I, the Army Aviation Section had 131
officers, 1087 enlisted men, and no combat-capable aircraft. Almost 10 years had passed since the
Army had accepted its Wright Flyer, but American airpower was almost nonexistent.
World War I
Upon entering the Great War, the United States ranked 14th among airpowers of the world. Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell, an observer of the air war prior to the United States’ entry,
studied the concepts of Sir Hugh Trenchard (Father of the Royal Air Force) to formulate his own ideas
for the application of air power. Mitchell took Trenchard’s ideas of forward action and relentless
offensive to heart. In 1917, he wrote his first formal statement of Air Service doctrine in a paper entitled “General Principles Underlying the Use of Air Service in the Zone of Advance A.E.F.”
Applying these principles, Mitchell successfully devised and executed a plan that put 1,500 planes
over the battlefield in support of American ground attacks at St. Mihiel. Despite heavy losses, Mitchell’s command achieved air superiority over the battlefield and effectively attacked enemy ground
forces, airfields, and communications centers. By the war’s end, Mitchell had gained a reputation as a
flamboyant, outspoken, aerial tactician.
World War I was an age of men whose daring and courage brought them both fame and early
death. During his 4 months in action, Captain Eddie Rickenbacker amassed 26 confirmed kills, with
nearly the same number of unconfirmed kills, earning him the title of America’s “Ace of Aces.” Captain Rickenbacker was the first flyer to earn the Medal of Honor for conspicuous bravery during an
engagement in September 1918. Like Rickenbacker, all the aviators of the first war are remembered as
heroes.
When the Armistice took effect on 11 November 1918, the United States had 45 squadrons at the
front, 80 Americans had earned the title of “Ace,” and the Air Service had accounted for the destruction of 781 enemy aircraft and 73 balloons. Despite these accomplishments, many observers concluded that airpower had not proven itself in warfare. Still, air leaders viewed World War I as a
positive experience and upon his return from Europe, General Mitchell intended to make a case for
airpower as the first line of national defense.
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Between the Wars
The post-World War I period was a time of organizational growth for the air service. It was
marked by experimentation and innovation in aircraft design, by achievements of air pioneers, and
continued controversy as the young air service attempted to gain its independence. Led by the irrepressible Billy Mitchell, the struggle to develop the air arm involved two main issues: the establishment of an independent air force and the development of a fundamental airpower doctrine. Within 2
years of the conclusion of the war, Congress passed the Army Reorganization Act of 1920. This Act
made the Air Service a combatant arm of the Army, much to the dismay of General Mitchell. Mitchell, who had become the Assistant Chief of the Air Service, went on the offensive. He reasoned that
the Air Service would stand little chance of gaining independence unless it had a unique mission.
While Mitchell was an outspoken advocate of strategic bombing, he realized that since the United
States had entered a period of isolationism, he would be unable to convince the War Department or
Congress of the need for an independent Air Service to carry out this mission. Instead, he argued that
the airplane made the battleship obsolete; therefore, the Air Service could most effectively accomplish
the mission of coastal defense. To prove his point, Mitchell set up a demonstration in which his Martin MB-2 bombers would attack three captured German ships. Mitchell’s aircrews sunk all three ships,
including the “unsinkable” Ostfriesland. Mitchell was subsequently transferred to Texas due to his
incessant harassment of superior officers over the need to enlarge the Air Service and improve its
equipment. Mitchell continued to press the attack, however, and was ultimately court-martialed for
“conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.” Instead of suffering this disgrace, he
resigned and continued to voice his beliefs about airpower until his death in 1936.
Major General Mason W. Patrick, Chief of the Air Service, also believed that Army control over
the Air Service should be reduced but directed his efforts toward gaining a greater degree of autonomy
rather than complete independence. In 1925, General Patrick urged the creation of an Air Corps with
autonomy similar to that enjoyed by the Marine Corps within the Navy Department. His efforts were
rewarded when Congress passed the Army Air Corps Act of 1926, which replaced the Air Service with
a more independent Army Air Corps. Although the Act didn’t change the organizational structure of
the Air Service, it strengthened the concept that the air arm was offensive rather than just support and
ensured the Air Corps better representation in the War Department. It also authorized a plan to
develop and expand the Air Corps over the next 5 years, thus giving the fledgling service the opportunity to develop its strategic bombing doctrine.
Doctrine. In 1930, Mitchell published his book, Skyways, which described his theory of strategic
bombing:
The advent of airpower, which can go to the vital centers and entirely neutralize or destroy
them, has put a completely new complexion on the system of war. It is now realized that the
hostile main army in the field is a false objective and the real objectives are the vital centers.
The old theory that victory meant the destruction of the hostile main army is untenable.
Armies themselves can be disregarded by air power if a rapid strike is made against the
opposing centers...
As a result of his writings, Mitchell would have a profound effect on the development of air doctrine, especially among the instructors and students at the Air Corps Tactical School. The Air Corps
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Tactical School (ACTS), located first at Langley Field, Virginia, and then Maxwell Field, Alabama,
was the institution where Air Corps officers contemplated, developed, and taught airpower doctrine.
The instructors focused on the offensive nature of air warfare aimed at the vital centers (industrial
web) of an enemy’s industrial complex. They felt the destruction of this complex would wreck the
enemy nation’s capacity to sustain normal day-to-day activities, which, in turn, would destroy its will
and capability to wage war. Based on this concept, the Air War Plans Division, an air staff agency consisting of ACTS graduates developed the war plans (AWPD-1 and later AWPD-42) with which the
Army Air Corps entered and fought World War II.
Technology. Finally, the interwar period was punctuated by technological development. The Great
Depression slowed the 5 year expansion plan mandated by the Air Corps Act of 1926, but important
gains in the development and acquisition of new bomber aircraft occurred nonetheless. The first of
these were the Boeing B-9 and Martin B-10, both of which were twin-engined, all metal monoplanes
with retractable landing gear. Almost as fast as the best American pursuit planes of the period, the B-9
and B-10 raised the hopes of air power advocates. However, these aircraft were not capable of accomplishing the strategic bombing doctrine.
The Air Corps specified a multi-engined bomber capable of carrying a 2,000-pound bomb load
over a range of 1,200 miles at a speed of 200 miles per hour or better. Boeing developed the B-17, a
four-engine bomber with a wingspan of 103 feet and a service ceiling of 30,000, which was capable of
carrying a bomb load of 2,500 pounds over a distance of 2,260 miles at top speed of 250 miles per
hour. After flying nonstop 2,100 miles from Seattle to Dayton at an average speed of 232 miles per
hour in an August 1935 test flight, the B-17 became the symbol of strategic airpower for the Air
Corps. Although the B-29 and B-36 would be developed later, the Air Corps now had the machine to
implement its doctrine during World War II.
Innovation during the interwar period was not just focused on military aviation. Due to advances
in aircraft technology, altitude, speed, distance, and endurance records were set. The Question Mark,
an airplane flown by Major Carl Spaatz, Captain Ira Eaker, and Lieutenant Elwood Quesada, set an
endurance record by staying aloft for over 150 hours. The airplane was refueled 43 times, taking on
5,660 gallons of fuel. While significant, it didn’t compare to Charles A. Lindbergh’s solo flight across
the Atlantic. The trip took 33-1/2 hours!
World War II
While the interwar period was marked by technological developments in aircraft design and continued controversy as the Air Service made gains in its drive for independence from the Army, the
United States remained unprepared for World War II. Upon entry into World War II, the Air Corps
had only fourteen B-17s!
On 1 September 1939, the Second World War opened with the Nazi invasion of Poland. Using
the blitzkrieg (“lightning war”), the Germans overcame Polish resistance in 16 days. The Nazi war
machine continued its drive across Europe, and by July 1940, Norway, Holland, Denmark, Belgium,
and France had also fallen victim to Germany. While Britain stood alone against a Nazi dominated
continent, the United States would not officially enter the war for another year and a half, when the
Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.
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On 8 December 1941, President Roosevelt asked Congress to “declare that, since the unprovoked
and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, 7 December, a state of war existed between the United
States and the Japanese Empire.” On the morning of 11 December 1941, Germany and Italy declared
war against the United States and the President told Congress, “The long known and the long
expected have taken place. The forces endeavoring to enslave the entire world now are moving toward
this hemisphere.” Congress recognized the state of war with Germany and Italy that same day. Thus,
the United States found itself engaged in a two-front war.
Based upon agreements with the British, it was decided that the United States would wage a
defensive campaign in the Pacific, while fighting offensively against the Germans who were considered the stronger, more dangerous enemy. The Army Air Forces (AAF) entered the fray with the
AWPD-1 plan to paralyze German war production and cripple her ability and will to wage war. They
attacked selected targets from electric, transportation, synthetic petroleum, and aviation industries.
When German fighters proved to be more effective than anticipated and the German submarine campaign took a heavier toll than expected on Allied shipping, President Roosevelt, in August 1942,
issued a call for “complete air ascendancy over the enemy.” The result was AWPD-42, a newly devised
plan updating the requirements and plans for the Army Air Forces to carry out its operations.
Eighth Air Force B-17 attacks began on 17 August 1942, with raids against the railroad marshaling yards at Rouen and Sotteville, France. Twelve B-17 squadrons and four RAF Spitfire squadrons
took part; losses were very light--two Spitfires and no B-17s. This experience, added to the subsequent missions flown, led the AAF leaders to gain a false sense of confidence in their doctrine of highaltitude, daylight, precision bombing. American air leaders were convinced that tight bomber formations and heavy defensive armament would protect the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress and Consolidated
B-24 Liberator during daylight operations. However, with deeper penetrations into the continent and
Germany, the aircrews would face formidable opposition and suffer tremendous losses.
In 1943, the Americans and British began joint strategic bombardment operations against Germany. This effort, known as the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO), combined around-the clock
operations--American bombing by day and British bombing by night--to keep the pressure on Germany. The initial American bomber assaults deep into Germany were met with disaster. On 14 October 1943, the AAF launched two groups of B-17s to attack the ball bearing plants of Schweinfurt,
Germany. There were 28 B-17s knocked out of the sky before the formation reached its target.
Another 32 fell victim to the Luftwaffe on the return back to their English bases. Additionally, 17 B17s sustained heavy damage and were eventually declared lost, while another 121 sustained less serious damage. Of the original 291 aircraft, 198 had been damaged or destroyed. This raid, combined
with the losses absorbed on three other raids during the same week, cost 148 bombers and their crews.
As a result, the AAF avoided targets deep in German territory for the rest of 1943.
Perseverance. AAF leaders, despite these tremendous losses, were not ready to discard the doctrine
of strategic bombardment. General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces, felt that a fighter
with sufficient range to escort the B-17s and B-24s into the heart of Germany was the answer to the
attrition problem. The Eighth Air Force attempted to increase the range of its available fighters, but it
wasn’t until the arrival of the P-51 Mustang, fitted with drop tanks, that the tide turned. The P-51
could escort the bombers to the farthest reaches of Germany.
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In late February 1944, The Eighth Air Force resumed its raids with attacks aimed at the German
aircraft industry. The attacks continued into the spring and by April the results were obvious: the
American fighters and bombers had gained control of the air. Air superiority was vital both for the
Allies’ success and for the relatively low casualties during the D-Day invasion. Due to air superiority,
the American and British bombers were able to attack virtually any target in Germany for the rest of
the war. By April 1945, the CBO had significantly hampered the German war machine.
The Pacific. Halfway around the world in the Pacific Theater, another air war was taking place. As
in Europe, the AAF wanted to conduct a strategic bombing campaign against the Japanese homeland.
Due to the vast territory involved, however, this campaign would have to wait until U.S. forces could
secure airfields close enough to Japan to permit B-24 operations. The strategy employed allowed General Douglas MacArthur to conduct an island-hopping campaign from Australia, while Admiral Nimitz drove the Navy straight through the middle of the Pacific to secure islands necessary in order to
permit bombing operations.
Prior to these operations taking place, the decision was made to launch a strike on Japan. On 18
April 1942, Lt Col James H. Doolittle led sixteen B-25 Mitchell bombers from the U.S.S Hornet on
a raid of the Japanese mainland. Although this raid caused insignificant material damage, it boosted
the sagging morale of the American people and caused the Japanese to devote more resources to home
defense. It also showcased the potential of the aircraft carrier, which became one of the premier weapons of World War II in the Pacific Theater. In June 1942, at the Battle of Midway, Navy pilots sunk
four Japanese carriers, crushing any hopes the Japanese had of winning the war. The Battle of Midway
is considered the turning point of the war in the Pacific. Finally, the strategic bombing campaign got
underway in late 1944, when the Marines captured the Marianas Islands. Major General Curtis
LeMay commanded the Marianas-based B-29s; it was through his direction that these Boeing Superfortresses exacted a terrible toll on the Japanese. LeMay’s 21st Bomber Command conducted firebombing raids on Tokyo and other cities. One such raid left sixteen square miles in the center of
Tokyo completely destroyed, but it was the atomic bombs of August 1945 that forced Emperor Hirohito to capitulate.
Atomic Bombs. On 6 August 1945, the world entered the atomic age when a B-29 named “Enola
Gay” dropped the first atomic bomb, “Little Boy,” on the city of Hiroshima. Three days later, “Bock’s
Car” dropped the second atomic bomb, “Fat Man,” on Nagasaki. On 14 August 1945, Japan surrendered ending World War II.
WASPs. The unsung heroes of the Army Air Forces during World War II were the Women’s Air
Force Service Pilots (WASPs). Much like “Rosie the Riveter” made it possible for the young, able-bodied men to fight for their country, these women freed male aviators for combat duty. The WASPs’
main mission was to ferry aircraft such as the B-17, B-26, P-51, P-47, and C-54 to Europe.
They also flew many other types of missions like target towing, smoke laying, radio control flying,
instrument instruction, and test flight. By the war’s end, these women had flown approximately 60
million miles in service to their country.
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Post World War II
In the aftermath of World War II, President Harry S. Truman faced a world situation that seemed
to threaten American national security at every turn and that demanded a posture of military preparedness that increasingly relied on strategic airpower as its backbone. Despite Truman’s concerns,
the United States emerged after the war as the most powerful country on earth. In terms of economic
strength, natural resources, industrial power, technological capability, and military might, the U.S.
stood clearly superior to its closest rival--the Soviet Union.
Immediately following World War II, the struggle for an independent air arm resumed as Congress began a reconsideration of the nations’ defense structure. Since the United States was the only
country in the world that had the expertise to construct and deliver atomic weapons, some leaders felt
all that was needed for defense was a strategic bomber force capable of delivering these weapons. In
1946, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was formed to provide this capability. General Curtis
LeMay assumed command in 1948 and began to build and organize the most destructive air fleet the
world had ever seen. However, the debate concerning an independent air force continued and on 26
July, after considerable prodding by President Truman, Congress passed the National Security Act of
1947. The Act established the Department of Defense and created the Air Force as one of three
coequal services. Executive Order 9877, signed the same date, outlined the main functions of the
three services. Specific Air Force functions assigned were: air operations, including joint operations;
gaining general air supremacy; establishing local air superiority; responsibility for the strategic air
force and strategic air reconnaissance; airlift and support for airborne operations; air support to land
and naval forces; air transport except for that furnished by the Navy; and supplying the means to
coordinate air defense among the services. Billy Mitchell’s Air Service had finally gained its independence when the United States Air Force stood up on 18 September 1947.
America had busied itself “organizing for defense” because the first chills of the Cold War were
being felt in Europe. By the end of World War II, the Soviet Union had occupied Eastern Europe,
including the zone of East Germany that included Berlin. In 1948, in a test of wills, the Soviets blockaded Berlin, cutting off all rail, barge, and road traffic leading to Berlin from Germany’s Westernoccupied zones. The only remaining avenue was air traffic. The Allies had been guaranteed three 20
mile-wide air corridors into the city, and the decision was made to resupply the city by air transport.
What came to be known as the Berlin Airlift began on 26 June 1948, when Air Force C-47s lifted
off from Wiesbaden Air Base with a cargo of milk, flour, and medicine bound for Berlin’s Templehof
Air Base. By 20 July 1948, 1,954 C-54s and 105 C-47s airlifted 1,500 tons of supplies a day into Berlin; in the final 3 months of the operation, 8,000 tons were moved daily. By December, planes flew
around the clock to bring supplies to Berlin. The airlift continued through a long, cold winter and a
dismal, rainy spring. “Operation VITTLES” airlifted over 200 million tons of supplies into Germany.
Finally, on 12 May 1949, the Soviets lifted the blockade. The West had won the first encounter of the
Cold War, and the Berlin Airlift had accomplished what few thought possible: it had supplied an
entire city with its basic necessities completely by air.
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The Korean War
On 25 June 1950, the Cold War turned hot when North Korean troops, supported and supplied
by the Soviets, crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea. President Truman immediately sent aid and
requested United Nations’ support to stop North Korean aggression. As the North Korean forces
threatened to push U.S. forces completely off the peninsula, the assets of the Far East Air Force were
committed to assist ground forces. By slowing the North Korean advance and flying in critically
needed men and supplies, the Air Force provided General MacArthur the opportunity to establish the
Pusan Perimeter on the southern tip of the Korean peninsula. General Ridgway, who replaced MacArthur on 11 April 1951, later wrote of this phase of the war: As for our Airmen, without them the
war would have been over in 60 days with all Korea in Communist hands...the fliers of the Air Force,
the Navy, and the Marine Corps...managed to eliminate the North Korean Air Force in the battle,
destroyed much of the NKPA armor, and transported critically needed men and supplies to spots of
greatest danger. The war continued to ebb and flow over a 3-year period with the Air Force flying
counterair, interdiction, close air support, strategic bombing, and transport missions in support of
ground forces. On 27 July 1953, the armistice signed at Panmunjom ended the war and established
an uneasy peace along the 38th parallel.
Technology. The Korean War saw the first full introduction of the jet fighter by both participants
(MIG-15, F-80, F-84, F-86). The MIG-15 was a technologically superior aircraft—it had a much
higher airspeed at altitudes above 30,000 feet, was much lighter, and had a higher climb rate and a
much smaller turn rate. The F-86 Sabrejet, on the other hand, more than held its own. The Sabre
enjoyed the superior training and aggressiveness of its pilots. Despite the MIG’s advantages, 792 of
them were destroyed in air-to-air combat, with only 78 F-86s lost, a tribute to the quality of the pilots
who flew the Sabrejets.
Armistice. Arguably, the driving force behind the armistice ending the hostilities was the threat of
expanding the war beyond the Korean peninsula. In May 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended direct air and naval operations against China and Manchuria, using aircraft and naval bombardment. One of the powerful multipliers in this process was the newly added threat of tactical
nuclear weapons. Artillery size nuclear bombs were successfully tested just 2 months earlier, and the
JCS recommended their use. President Eisenhower endorsed this recommendation and relayed his
intent to China through India. While it’s debatable whether or not President Eisenhower would have
actually used the weapons, the mere threat was enough to bring a rapid closure to the war. Nuclear
weapons success in ending the Korean War dramatically impacted the U.S. strategic perspective for
the next decade.
Strategic Force Development. Despite the fact that the majority of missions flown during the
Korean conflict were “classic” tactical missions, the U.S. focus was strategic nuclear force development. Typical of the thinking of the period, Thomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force, stated
that “the Korean War was a special case and air power can learn little from there about its future role
in U.S. foreign policy.” The tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union intensified in
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the wake of the Korean War. Many Americans believed the Soviets had a master plan to dominate the
world. This fear led to the expansion of the defense establishment and development of weapons of
such great power and range they would deter the Soviets from expanding and exporting their Communist ideology. Thus money was funneled to Strategic Air Command (SAC) for nuclear weapons
development, while the tactical needs of the Air Force were overlooked.
Strategic weapons developed to counter the Soviet Union included the B-52 Stratofortress, capable of delivering nuclear bombs on the Soviets and the KC-135 Stratotanker, which would provide the
air refueling support to the attacking B-52s. The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was also
developed during this time. With refinements made during the next 30 years, the ICBM changed the
nature of military technology, national strategy, and international relations forever. The ICBM also
opened the door for the exploration and use of space for civilian and military purposes. The Atlas,
Thor, Titan I, Titan II, Minuteman I, Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper missile systems were all developed and fielded throughout this 30-year period to complement SAC’s bomber
force, as well as the Navy’s missile launching submarines. This nuclear triad (bombers, submarines,
and missiles) still forms the backbone of the American deterrent force today.
SPACE: The New High Ground
Beginnings. There is a long historical relationship between the military and space exploration. The
road to manned and unmanned space systems from experimental novelties has been long and costly.
However, recent conflicts have highlighted the importance of space systems as a technological trump
for the United States against potential adversaries. Military support was key to advancing the exploration of space. Dr. Robert H. Goddard was responsible for developing the first liquid fueled rocket in
the 1920s. Yet, many have forgotten that he received his initial funding from the military. He also
developed a precursor to the bazooka, as well as Jet Assisted Take-Off rockets.
Dr. Werner von Braun got his start with the German military during World War II and developed
the V-2 rocket. When he immigrated to the United States after the war, he participated in our rocket
program, his work culminating with the Saturn V rocket that sent men to the moon.
History. Early in the space age, American supremacy was in grave jeopardy. The launch of Sputnik,
the first artificial earth orbiting satellite, by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 4 October
1957, threw the nation into a panic. The Russians soon followed with the first animal in space, and
then the first man in space, Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin. The political challenge these events presented
and the military capabilities they indicated spurred the United State into action.
The Air Force hastened development and deployment of our first operational inter-continental
ballistic missile (ICBM), the Atlas. The Atlas booster was followed by the larger Titan system.
ICBMs have formed the backbone of the U.S. nuclear deterrent since the early 1960s, and both the
Atlas and Titan boosters still serve as expendable launch vehicles for our satellites today.
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Military involvement was also critical to the U.S. manned space flight program, which also
received increased emphasis after Sputnik. In fact, all of the original Mercury astronauts came from
the military, including Lt Col John Glenn, USMC, the first American to orbit the earth. Other flights
of the Mercury program tested man’s ability to survive in space, a first step on our way to fulfilling
President John F. Kennedy’s challenge, “I believe that this Nation should commit itself to achieving
the goal, before the decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to earth.”
Project Gemini was a further stepping-stone on our way to the moon. This series of “two-man”
space flights tested our ability to work in space. In particular, this program tested techniques for rendezvous, docking, and extra-vehicular activity. Among the highlights of this program was the first
American space-walk, by astronaut Maj Edward H. White II, USAF.
Project Apollo represented the apex of our manned space flight program. The first three-man
Apollo missions tested the command and lunar modules in flight. However, Apollo II fulfilled President Kennedy’s challenge. Lt Col Michael Collins, USAF, orbited above in the command module
Columbia, while Neil Armstrong and Col Edwin “Buzz” Aldrin, USAF, landed on the moon in the
lunar module Eagle. On 20 July 1969, Armstrong became the first human to step on another celestial
body, saying, “That’s one small step for a man; one giant leap for mankind.” Six other Apollo crews
landed on the moon. Since the Apollo 17 mission in December 1972, man has not returned to the
moon.
The thoroughly tested Apollo vehicle continued to be used during the 1970s. It provided transport of crews to Skylab, the first American space station. Three separate crews studied the effect of
long duration space flight on the human body. Their record setting missions also conducted an ambitious scientific program, which included earth observation and solar astronomy. The Apollo vehicle’s
last mission was a political breakthrough, the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, in 1975.
The Vietnam War
The competition between the Soviet Union and the United States, while often intense during the
Cold War period, recognized certain limits. The fear of nuclear war loomed large in both nations;
thus, each side used restraint during conflict to limit the scale of war. The restraint each used during
the Korean War was again necessary in Vietnam.
The major air campaigns conducted during the Vietnam War were ROLLING THUNDER,
LINEBACKER I, and LINEBACKER II. ROLLING THUNDER, conducted from February 1965
to November 1968, was an interdiction campaign designed to stem the flow of men and supplies into
South Vietnam. By employing a “graduated” use of force against selective targets, the Johnson Administration hoped to drive the North Vietnamese to the bargaining table but instead allowed them to
build up their air defense network and continue fighting. President Johnson canceled ROLLING
THUNDER on 1 November 1968, when it became obvious it wasn’t having the desired effect.
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Peace talks did open in Paris in January 1969 and continued without effect until March 1972,
when North Vietnam launched a major offensive into South Vietnam. In April 1972, President
Nixon authorized the resumption of the air effort against the North. This bombing campaign, Operation LINEBACKER I, was more intense and more effective than the earlier ROLLING THUNDER
Operations. The main targets were North Vietnamese communications centers, road networks, railroads, bridges, military barracks, and harbors. It was intended to cut off the movement of supplies to
the North Vietnamese Army in the South, and to destroy or severely limit North Vietnam’s ability to
conduct war. The Vietnamese seemed willing to continue talks; however, by 20 November 1972,
President Nixon realized the Communists were stalling. Nixon decided to continue attacking the
North in December 1972; this offensive is known as LINEBACKER II.
Unlike the previous LINEBACKER campaign, LINEBACKER II used a large number of B-52s
to destroy the North’s will to resist and force Hanoi to negotiate in good faith. The “Christmas Offensive,” the true strategic bombing campaign directed against the North, quickly brought the North
Vietnamese back to reality. By January 1973, a cease-fire agreement was reached and prisoner-of-war
exchanges began in February. In retrospect, although the United States did not accomplish its political
objectives in the Vietnam War, the Air Force once again proved it was equal to the task, contributing
significantly to the war effort. In reaction to the war in Vietnam, the USAF developed new weapon
systems, methods of ordnance delivery, and training programs.
Post Vietnam Era
In the years following the Vietnam conflict, the Air Force learned many valuable lessons through
its new training programs and sporadic combat operations. During Operation URGENT FURY, the
United States intervened in Grenada to protect U.S. citizens from a Cuban-supported political party.
The U.S. did successfully protect the people on the island but not without cost. Six U.S. soldiers
were killed with 33 wounded and eight missing; three helicopters were shot down. One of the key
problems experienced during the operation dealt with communications equipment. Different military
services could not communicate with one another because of incompatible frequencies. These communications problems contributed to the death of three Army Special Forces personnel at the hands
of a Navy A-7 Corsair. Military planners began to take a hard look at joint operations.
Another dramatic raid during this time period was Operation EL DORADO CANYON. Intelligence sources linked several terrorist acts against U.S. citizens with Libya. Intelligence also confirmed
that Libya was producing large quantities of chemical munitions to be used by its military or terrorist
groups. The raid involved 13 F-111 Aardvarks from RAF Lakenheath and RAF Upper Heyford. After
flying 2,888 nautical miles to avoid flying through the airspace of any European nation, the F-111
began their raid. Receiving support from Navy A-7 Corsairs and EA-6 Prowlers, the F-111s executed
a precise military operation, suffering the loss of only one crew. “Smart” munitions proved their effectiveness by dramatically limiting collateral damage.
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As the U.S. prepared to close out the decade, the U.S. Air Force executed another major military
operation, Operation JUST CAUSE. Panamanian President Manuel Noriega was seeking to seriously
undermine the U.S. credibility and strength in the region through drug trafficking. Panamanian officials increasingly harassed U.S. military and civilian personnel in the country. Eventually President
Bush said, “He’s gone too far,” when Marine 1st Lt Robert Paz was executed near Noriega’s private residence. Just 4 days later, 25,000 U.S. military personnel were involved in Operation JUST CAUSE.
The operation was a major success despite being compromised to the Panamanian Defense Forces. It
was obvious. U.S. military planners had learned their lessons from Operation URGENT FURY.
Space Shuttle Challenger and Space Ops
After a long development period plagued by budget cuts and technical delays, Captain (USN)
John Young and Capt Robert Crippen, USN, piloted the first space shuttle, Columbia, into orbit on
12 April 1981. The shuttle was intended to provide low cost access to space because of its large payload capacity and its reusability. Unfortunately, the nearly monthly launching of space shuttle missions lulled NASA and the public into complacency. Manned spaceflight is still not only costly and
complex, but deadly. On 28 January 1986, we were reminded of the dangers of manned space flight
when the space shuttle Challenger exploded 117 seconds after launch, killing its crew of six astronauts
and one civilian. Since then, many payloads have shifted to expendable launch vehicles, while the
shuttle mainly carries payloads that require a “man-in-the-loop.”
Though less dramatic than the space shuttle, unmanned systems in space or sensors on the ground
provide the backbone of our Defense Department space effort. Most of these programs are managed
by the Air Force Space Command, which formed in 1982 as the primary DoD agent for space. Operation DESERT STORM illustrated the importance of Space Support missions, particularly Satellite
Operations. The NAVSTAR Global Positioning System provided three-dimensional navigation data
so that soldiers could travel in the featureless desert and aircraft could bomb within feet of their target.
The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program provided weather data that permitted our aircraft to
continue combat sorties despite the worst weather in years in Iraq. The Defense Satellite Communications System provided communications for commanders in the field and the National Command
Authorities in a part of the world that lacked telephone lines, while other systems provided warning of
SCUD missile launches that threatened our troops. Of course, Space Lift Systems, such as the Delta II
medium launch vehicle or the Titan IV heavy lift vehicle, were made available months or years earlier
to place these systems in orbit.
The Persian Gulf War
Background. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 stimulated a vigorous multinational
reaction. Led by the United States, the coalition response highlighted the capabilities of modern air
power. Operation DESERT SHIELD--from the President’s decision to commit U.S. forces on 5
August 1990 to the initiation of combat on 17 January 1991--and Operation DESERT STORM are
spectacular examples of the potential of air power.
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On 8 August 1990, 38 hours after receiving their deployment notification, the first F-15Cs, from
the First Tactical Fighter Wing at Langley AFB, Virginia, were ready for combat in Saudi Arabia, joining the Royal Saudi Air Force in air defense operations. These aircraft flew 8,000 miles nonstop in 15
flying hours. Five more fighter squadrons conducted similar deployments over the next 5 days. Aerial
refueling was crucial to the speedy movement of all the aircraft to the theater. Tanker support was also
essential for training activities during DESERT SHIELD and for combat operations during DESERT
STORM, especially due to the long distances involved. For example, fighter missions from the more
distant bases in the theater to targets in Iraq could last 8 to 9 hours and require refueling en route to
the target and during the return flight. During DESERT SHIELD, tankers flew almost 5,000 sorties
and refueled over 14,500 aircraft. In DESERT STORM, the tanker fleet logged 15,000 sorties and
refueled almost 46,000 aircraft.
The strategic airlifters--C-141 Starlifters and C-5 Galaxy transports--were crucial to the deployment of forces to the theater. In addition to deploying USAF units, airlift also rapidly moved light
ground units such as the 82d Airborne Division and Marines, who picked up prepositioned equipment in the theater. Throughout Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, airlift
moved the vast majority of personnel into the theater and ensured the timely delivery of high priority
resources. The USAF transport fleet was complemented for the first time by the extensive activation
of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, providing 158 civilian aircraft--95 passenger and 63 cargo--for the airlift effort. During the two operations, the airlift moved 482,000 passengers and over 515,000 tons of
cargo. This total was more than four times the ton-miles delivered during the 15 months of the Berlin
Airlift in 1948-1949.
The offensive campaign plan, developed under General Schwarzkopf ’s direction, was based on the
clear advantage that the coalition enjoyed in air power. The original plan, called “INSTANT THUNDER,” called for a quick, decisive campaign that would paralyze the Iraqi’s ability and will to fight.
The name itself is significant, because it signified the overwhelming offensive focus., rather than the
gradualist approach used in Vietnam’s “ROLLING THUNDER” 15 years earlier.
USAF planners developed a four-phase air campaign plan to guide the air operations. The initial
phase of the campaign was aimed at strategic targets in the heart of Iraq. These included key government offices; military headquarters; the command, control, communications and intelligence system;
nuclear, biological, and chemical production and storage facilities; offensive delivery systems such as
ballistic missiles; electric and petroleum production and distribution capabilities; and the Iraqi Air
Force.
The second planned phase was designed to suppress the Iraqi air defenses in the Kuwait Theater
of Operations (KTO). The third stage was the isolation and destruction of the Iraqi forces in the
KTO. This stage was designed to reduce the combat capability of the potent Iraqi ground forces
before the final coalition ground offensive. The last phase of the air plan was to provide support for
the ground campaign in the liberation of Kuwait.
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By mid-January, the coalition had over 2,600 aircraft in the area of operation, including over
1,900 from the United States. The USAF contribution was 700 combat and over 800 support aircraft. The coordination of this large force was important to its success, and this was done through a
centralized command and control system that was directed by USAF Lt Gen Charles A. Horner, the
Joint Force Air Component Commander. His headquarters produced a daily air tasking order that
provided assigned targets and missions of all of the aircraft flying in the theater.
Due to the large number of aircraft available by the start of offensive operations and some adjustment to the theater assessment, General Horner and his planners merged the first three phases and
conducted elements of each phase simultaneously. The strategic targets dominated the early operations, with the emphasis shifting towards targets in the KTO as the war neared the ground phase. Air
Force planners hoped the air campaign would reduce, or even eliminate, the Iraqi will and capability
to resist the ground offensive.
Operation DESERT STORM. The air campaign was kicked off in the early morning hours of 17
January 1991 (16 January in the U.S.). An Air Force-Army helicopter team that hit Iraqi early warning radar sites struck the initial blows. These attacks were quickly followed by F-117A and cruise missile--air and sea launched--strikes on additional air defense targets, key command and control
facilities, and other important strategic targets. Noteworthy in this first wave was the highly successful
first combat use of stealth aircraft and cruise missiles in a high-threat environment. Additionally, some
of the cruise missiles were fired from B-52s flying from the continental United States, an example of
the global capability of air power.
The initial attacks gained strategic and tactical surprise and were highly successful in disrupting
the Iraqi command and control capability and in significantly degrading the Iraqi air defense system.
This set the stage for a massive air assault staged by the rest of the coalition air assets. Fighter escorts,
Wild Weasel defense suppression aircraft, and electronic jammers protected the ground attack aircraft
in this second wave.
The intensity of the air attack--1,300 combat sorties and over 100 cruise missile attacks in the first
24 hours--stunned the Iraqi military. With minimal losses, the coalition air forces gained air superiority within days. The limited reaction by the Iraqi Air Force resulted in 36 air-to-air kills by coalition
fighters with no Iraqi victories. As the campaign progressed, the coalition destroyed over 225 Iraqi aircraft on the ground, including many in hardened aircraft shelters. In the face of this determined
offensive counterair effort, the Iraqi’s flew 130 aircraft to Iran in an attempt to preserve a portion of
their fleet.
The air campaign achieved almost all of its strategic objectives. The most significant effects were
the general disruption of the military command and control system, and the destruction of the production and delivery capabilities for weapons of mass destruction. The most difficult targets were the
mobile “SCUD” ballistic missile launchers. But even this relatively limited Iraqi capability was
degraded by the flexible use of a variety of aircraft. Air operations effectively isolated the KTO from
its supply base in central Iraq.
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Additionally, the air attacks accomplished their objectives of reducing the combat capability of the
ground forces and deflating the morale of the soldiers. At the start of the ground campaign, General
Schwarzkopf estimated that the overall combat effectiveness of the Iraqi ground forces had been
reduced by 50 percent. The air campaign destroyed an estimated 1,800 tanks, 1,000 armored vehicles, and 1,500 artillery pieces. Units that experienced air attacks suffered desertion rates of 20 to 40
percent before the coalition ground offensive began. Additionally, the low morale was reflected in the
willingness of many Iraqi soldiers to surrender without fighting. On 24 February 1991, the first day
of the coalition ground offensive, over 8,000 troops surrendered, with that number growing to
86,000 during the remaining 3 days of the war. The stunning ground victory, at the cost of less than
200 coalition lives, owed much to the foundation laid by the air campaign.
Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY
In Haiti, in December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a charismatic Roman Catholic priest, won
67 percent of the vote in a presidential election that international observers deemed largely free and
fair. Aristide took office in February 1991 but was overthrown by dissatisfied elements of the army
and forced to leave the country in September of the same year. From October 1991 to June 1992,
Joseph Nerette, as president, led an unconstitutional de facto regime and governed with a parliamentary majority and the armed forces. In June 1992, he resigned and Parliament approved Marc Bazin as
Prime Minister of a de facto government, with no replacement named for president. In June 1993,
Bazin resigned and the UN imposed an oil and arms embargo, bringing the Haitian military to the
negotiating table. President Aristide and General Raoul Cedras, head of the Haitian armed forces,
signed the UN-brokered Governors Island Agreement on 3 July 1993, establishing a 10-step process
for the restoration of constitutional government and the return of President Aristide by 30 October
1993. The military derailed the process and the UN reimposed economic sanctions. The political and
human rights climate continued to deteriorate as the military and the de facto government sanctioned
repression, assassination, torture, and rape in open defiance of the international community’s condemnation.
In May 1994, the military selected Supreme Court Justice Emile Jonassaint to be provisional president of its third de facto regime. The UN and the U.S. reacted to this extraconstitutional move by
tightening economic sanctions (UN Resolution 917). On 31 July 1994, the UN adopted Resolution
940, authorizing member states to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure of Haiti’s military
leadership and to restore constitutional rule and Aristide’s presidency. In the weeks that followed, the
United States took the lead in forming a multinational force (MNF) to carry out the UN’s mandate
by means of a military intervention. In Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, U.S. objectives were
fostering democratic institutions and reducing the flow of illegal immigrants into the United States.
Despite the pledges of a military-backed regime in Haiti to return power to the democratically elected
government it had ousted, the regime did not relinquish authority but became increasingly repressive
and presided over a plummeting economy. As the result of deteriorating conditions, tens of thousands
of impoverished Haitians fled the country, many attempting to enter the United States.
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The United States responded with Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the movement of
forces to Haiti to support the return of Haitian democracy. The U.S.-led Multinational Force for
Haiti (MNF) began on 19 September 1994 with the approval of the Security Council, which at the
same time approved the follow-on UN operation. In preparation for this contingency, DoD simultaneously planned for an invasion and for the peaceful entry of forces into Haiti, and executed portions
of both scenarios. For the invasion, an airdrop was planned involving 3,900 paratroopers. Most of this
force was airborne when Haitian officials agreed to a peaceful transition of government and permissive entry of American forces. With U.S. troops prepared to enter Haiti in a matter of hours, President
Clinton dispatched a negotiating team led by former President Jimmy Carter to discuss with the de
facto Haitian leadership the terms of their departure. As a result, the MNF deployed peacefully,
Cedras and other top military leaders left Haiti, and restoration of the legitimate government began,
leading to Aristide’s return on 15 October.
The credible threat of overwhelming force--combined with skillful, eleventh-hour diplomacy-enabled U.S. forces to land unopposed and avoid the negative consequences that combat would have
brought. The MNF initially employed over 20,000 U.S. military personnel, plus some 2,000 personnel from a dozen other countries. The mission was to restore democracy by removing the de facto military regime, return the previously elected Aristide regime to power, ensure security, assist with the
rehabilitation of civil administration, train a police force and judiciary, help prepare for elections, and
finally, turn over responsibility to the UN. A prior but unfulfilled political agreement between the
parties on Governor’s Island (New York) in 1991 served as a template to shape objectives.
UPHOLD DEMOCRACY succeeded both in restoring the democratically elected government of
Haiti and in stemming emigration, thanks to well-executed political, military, diplomatic, and
humanitarian activities. On March 31, 1995, the United States transferred the peacekeeping responsibilities to United Nations functions. Advanced planning and coordination for the transition were well
managed by the U.S. and the UN, as was the selection and training of senior leaders to sustain continued cooperative international action. In contrast to the Somalia transition, the UN deployed an
advance headquarters element to Haiti 6 months prior to the change of command. On 31 March
1995, a smaller UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti (UNMIH) succeeded the powerful MNF, with a
March 1996 deadline for completion after a newly elected President was scheduled to take office.
Operation ALLIED FORCE
The Kosovo crisis began in early 1998 when large-scale fighting broke out, resulting in the displacement of some 300,000 people. A cease fire was agreed to in October 1998, which enabled refugees to find shelter, averting an impending humanitarian crisis over the winter. A Verification Mission
was deployed under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE). However, violence continued and the situation worsened significantly in January 1999. A
peace conference held in Paris broke up on 19 March with the refusal of the Yugoslav delegation to
accept a peaceful settlement.
70
Excerpts from “USAF Posture Statement 2000:”
The Air Force played a dominant role in NATO’s air war against Serbia. Operation ALLIED
FORCE was the equivalent of a major theater war for the Air Force. We had over 500 aircraft and
44,000 people from our active and reserve components committed to this significant combat operation. Some of our Airmen fought from home bases in the U.S. or overseas, but many deployed into 1
of the 21 expeditionary operating locations we created during the crisis. For example, the international airport at Tirana, Albania was turned from a remote airfield into both a major humanitarian
relief center and a combat location for Task Force Hawk in less than 12 days. Five C-130s arrived
from Ramstein AB, Germany on March 30th, and by April 4th, the first C-17 was offloading outsized
cargo for the Army’s Apache helicopter unit. From the time our expeditionary Airmen landed at the
airport to the time combat helicopters landed in Tirana only 9 days. By mid-April the airfield was
fully operational, flying approximately 25 airlift sorties per day. Throughout this short time period,
Air Force civil engineer units steadily improved airfield operations and living conditions by setting up
water, sewer, electricity, roads, and critical runway repairs and upgrades. By the end of operations,
1,240 sorties would fly into Tirana.
More than 90 percent of the combat sorties delivered precision-guided munitions. B-1 and B-52
aircraft dropped 10,000 nonprecision munitions to close airfields and strike concentrations of opposing forces. These strike sorties were highly effective and successful because of our well-trained people
and our unquestioned ability to control the air above the fight. It wasn’t just precision munitions,
however, that made the outcome of Operation ALLIED FORCE so successful. The integration of
manned and unmanned air and space weapon systems were truly merged in one air and space domain
where intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) from air or space platforms were step-forstep synchronized with our combat operations at all levels of warfare—from the strategic level to the
tactical level.
The success of Operation ALLIED FORCE stemmed from our long-term investment in aircraft
modernization and stealth, as well as a range of precision, near-precision and stand-off weapons; realtime communications; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); space systems; and ISR aircraft. We gleaned
many insights from this conflict, and they will be reflected in current and future budgets. Some of the
lessons we learned were:
•
Expeditionary operations worked. With seeming ease, our Airmen deployed to more than 20
expeditionary bases, bringing with them the force protection, logistics, sustainment, and communications systems that supported expeditionary combat operations.
•
Reachback worked. Satellite communications enabled warfighters to reach back to the United
States for real-time information and analysis, while avoiding the need to deploy such systems.
By reaching back to CONUS for real-time support, theater forces were both leaner and better
supported than if we had deployed CONUS forces and their equipment to Europe.
71
•
Logistics worked. Depots (parts suppliers) surged and provided some 500,000 additional
hours of work. With Air Mobility Command’s worldwide express package delivery system, 93
percent of replacement parts got to forward expeditionary bases in Europe in an average of
just 3.7 days. The engaged force averaged a 92 percent mission capable rate, much better than
the peacetime average, because it had adequate parts and a full complement of experienced
maintenance personnel.
•
Technology worked. The many areas where technology gave U.S. great advantages are the
same areas that offer U.S. the chance to modernize and improve our forces, gaining greater
capability and saving dollars.
During the 78 days of combat, 14 NATO nations flew 38,000 sorties and dropped 27,000 munitions against a wide range of Serbian targets in a small battlespace. Our Air Force provided nearly 50
percent of the coalition aircraft, dropped 70 percent of the munitions, and provided a large portion of
the support aircraft. These support aircraft flew critical intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and
mobility missions, which were key ingredients to the operation’s success. During combat missions,
hundreds of aircraft from many countries flew in close proximity over the Balkans; at some times, as
many as five aerial refueling tracks were operational over the Adriatic at one time, competing for airspace with the tracks for ISR and command and control aircraft. For the Air Force, Operation
ALLIED FORCE was equivalent to a major theater war. We proved expeditionary air and space
power was decisive. From the operational perspective, Airmen damaged over 85 percent of critical
infrastructure targets and attacked more than 850 Yugoslav army ground mobile targets (such as
tanks, artillery pieces and trucks). From the strategic perspective, air and space power demonstrated
NATO’s might and resolve to Serbian leaders; and in the end, Serbia complied with NATO demands.
The synergy that resulted from combining air, space, and information operations allowed NATO to
attack strategic, operational, and tactical targets, day and night, and often in adverse weather conditions within hours of being identified. Having said all that, the greatest advantage we have is our outstanding people.
The War Against Terrorism
In response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. launched Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, on 7 October 2001. The objective of the operation was to destroy the Al Qaeda
training camps and safe zones inside Afghanistan and to remove the ruling Taliban forces from power.
The USAF played a major role in defeating the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces. By utilizing the most
technologically advanced weapons in history, Air Force fighters and bombers flying over the region
were able to attack specific targets in real time. The use of unmanned aerial vehicles and Air Force
combat controllers allowed continual observation of the entire region, which significantly aided the
targeting and engagement process. For more on the Air Force in Afghanistan refer to the reading by
Dr. Don Chipman at the end of this chapter.
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After the end of major combat operations in Afghanistan, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was
initiated. The objective was to disarm Saddam Hussein’s regime and to preempt future terrorist
attacks on the United States and its allies. The Operation began with a “decapitation attack” on 20
Mar 03 and Baghdad fell on 9 Apr 03. Major battle operations were ended on 1 May 03, although
operations continue to this day. Unmanned aerial vehicles and precision munitions were once again
stellar. However, the greatest success of IRAQI FREEDOM is Joint Operations. The advancements in
joint operations ultimately lead to fast paced offensive operations in open, complex, and urban terrain.
Air Force Heritage
USAF Today...and Tomorrow
Dramatic events have reshaped the world in recent years and the Air Force has kept pace with
them. Tremendous cuts in defense spending--a result of these events--have forced the Air Force to
streamline, reorganize, and restructure to accomplish its mission. As the Air Force continues to
shrink, it must rely on high technology and superb people. Aircraft such as the F-22, B-2, and C-17
will lead the United States through the 21st century. Excellent officers from your class and those that
follow will be called upon to fly, fight, and win our nation’s conflicts. You are tomorrow’s leaders!
73
AIRPOWER AND THE BATTLE FOR MAZAR-E SHARIF
By Don D. Chipman, PhD
In a similar way, the battle for Mazar was a transforming battle. Coalition forces took
existing military capabilities-from the most advanced (such as laser-guided weapons) to the
antique (40 year-old-B-52s updated with modern electronics) to the most rudimentary (a
man on a horse with a weapon)-and used them together in unprecedented ways, with devastating effect on enemy positions, enemy morale....
Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
I. THE VERTICAL FLANK
Phase One of America's war on terrorism was fought during the fall of 2001 against
Afghanistan's Taliban and Al Queda forces. The air offensive began on 7 October and by late
December Taliban forces were fleeing from their fortifications. The key to these victories was the
capture of Mazar-e Sharif by the Northern Alliance on 9 November. Shortly afterward, the Taliban
retreated from Herat, Kabul, Jalalabad, and eventually from Kandahar in early December. These
cities fell like dominos as Taliban and Al Queda forces headed into the mountains where they
continued their fight using guerrilla warfare tactics.
The Northern Alliance, a patchwork of militias, was commanded by General Muhammed Fahim.
His triumph over the Taliban defending Mazar-e Sharif was primarily due to the effectiveness of airpower. American Special Forces working with the Northern Alliance used laptops and ground-laser
target designators to pin point enemy forces. Then, they signaled this information to loitering B-52s
and other aircraft which attacked with precision guided munitions. The Taliban were confronted
from the right flank, the left flank, and the vertical flank as air power rained bombs down upon them.
According to the Jane's Intelligence Review, it was in these vertical flank attacks, especially in the conquest of Mazar-e Sharif, that victory hinged.[1] The sequence of events leading to the capture of
Mazar-e Sharif began immediately after September 11th.
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II. THE PRESIDENT'S WAR PLANS
A government's first duty is to deal with those who would kill its citizens. That is why they pay their taxes and obey laws.
Norman Friedman
Immediately after the terrorist attacks on the New York World Trade Center and Pentagon,
President George W. Bush and his administration began searching for those responsible and evaluating possible responses. Claiming that Osama bin Laden had master minded the attacks, CIA Director
George J. Tenant was the first to call for a military operation against the Taliban and Al Queda forces
in Afghanistan.[2] Four days later the President and his staff headed for Camp David where they continued their discussions of various options. Again CIA Director Tenant presented his robust strategy
which involved a military campaign to overthrow the Taliban and conduct a covert anti-terror war
against Al Queda in sixty or more nations.[3]
Tenet wanted to send CIA agents and Special Forces into Afghanistan and provide the Northern Alliance with military support in their war against the Taliban. Once in place, Special Forces
would provide targeting information to American aircraft which would then attack key Taliban positions.
The war would be fought by the Northern Alliance, with America providing financial aid, logistical
support, arms, and precision air attacks. "It would take discipline and patience," stated Tenet, "but it
would work."[4]
At this point, the Pentagon offered the President other alternatives, included an immediate cruise
missile attack on various Al Queda training camps. A second option involved a combined cruise missile and manned bomber attacks against the terrorist training camps and key Taliban centers. A proposal for an all-out land invasion was offered but it was quickly dismissed. The last Pentagon
recommendation focused on implementing a coordinated air campaign using Special Forces as forward air controllers.[5]
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The Pentagon was skeptical of providing direct support to the Northern Alliance.[6] This amalgam
of forces controlled only a small portion of Afghanistan's northeast corner and was judged to be little
more than a patchwork of about 30,000 poorly armed militia-men. It may be too risky, explained one
Pentagon official. The Americans should not "put its faith-and its people-in the hands of an opposition force that had shown little skill in fighting the Taliban in the past."[7] The assassination of the
Northern Alliance's talented commander, Ahmed Massoud on September 9th created even more
unsettling doubt of the Tenet proposals.[8]
After reviewing various options and dismissing a suggestion to attack Saddam Hussein, President
Bush retired to consider America's course of action. Two days later, on 17 September, he reconvened
his cabinet officers and notified them of his decision. America, he began, will fight the terrorists and
will confront anyone who aids and harbors them. Phase One of this military campaign would basically follow the plans proposed by George Tenet.[9] In Afghanistan, stated the President, "I want the
CIA to be first on the ground," and work with the Northern Alliance.[10] Then, he turned to Defense
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and told them to ensure that the air strikes were coordinated with guidance from Special Forces.
"We'll attack," emphasized the President, "with missiles, bombers and boots on the ground." [11]
A pivotal factor in these decisions was the status of various countries surrounding Afghanistan.
Of these Pakistan's loyalty was especially critical. From 1979 to 1989, during the USSR's occupation
of Afghanistan, Pakistan supported the most radical factions of the Mujahideen guerrillas in their
fight against the Soviets. Then, from l994 through 2001, Pakistan was one of only three countries
which provided the Taliban with major support in their continuing civil war against Ahmed Massoud's North Alliance forces.[12]
The question of Pakistan's support, therefore, was crucial. To fight the Taliban and Al Queda, the
U.S. would need military bases and permission to over-fly Pakistan. Secretary of State Colin Powell
informed the President that radical Muslims were constantly threatening Pakistan's government and
76
therefore he believed President General Pervez Musharraf would support the American cause. I
believe, explained Secretary Powell, that Musharraf does not want the radicals to turn Pakistan "into a
rogue state," and therefore he will be open to U.S. assistance.[13]
Later, in a Washington meeting with one of Musharraf's representatives, the Bush Administration
forcefully encouraged Pakistan's full cooperation.
Under Secretary of State Richard Armitage
requested that Pakistan "seal the borders, provide over flights and basing rights, sever diplomatic relations with the Taliban and cut off the flow of oil and gas to Kabul." If Pakistan would agree to these
terms, explained Armitage, the U.S. would lift all economic sanctions, and "shower Musharraf with
more financial aid than he would know how to spend." Essentially, noted Secretary Powell, "we gave
him an offer and he decided to he could not refuse it."[14]
While work continued on the diplomatic front, the Bush Administration began sending military
supplies to the Northern Alliance. Just days after the American attacks, an arms agreement was made
with Russia in which the U.S. began financing the transfer of weapons from Russia to the Northern
Alliance.[15]
Interestingly, several months prior to the September 11th attacks, Northern Alliance
spokesmen were in Washington trying to get military aid. However, because the U.S. wanted to
remain loyal to Pakistan, an old time cold war ally, these pleas for assistance were overlooked.[16]
From September 17th through October 6th, the deployment phase of the "Operation Enduring
Freedom" moved forward. Ships, planes, CIA operatives, Special Forces, and logistical support began
moving into striking positions. On 21 September, USAF Lieutenant General Charles F. Wald, the
commander of American Air Forces assigned to the Middle East, headed for the Combined Air Operations Center [CAOC] located in Saudi Arabia. From his post, General Wald would help direct the
air campaign against Taliban and Al Queda forces. While the U.S. and British navies were sending
ships into the Persian Gulf and off Pakistan's coast, B-52s and B-1B bombers were heading for the
Indian Ocean to the British island of Diego Garcia.[17] The air war over Afghanistan was about to
begin.
77
III. THE AFGHAN AIR WAR AND THE CAPTURE OF MAZAR-E SHARIF
The air campaign began on October 7th when about 50 cruise missiles were launched from
American and British ships. These attacks were followed by F-14, F-18, B-2, B-1 and B-52 strikes
against Taliban headquarters, training camps, airfields, air defense nodes, and other key targets. In
Kandahar and Kabul the electrical systems were quickly destroyed, plunging the cities into darkness.
Other missiles struck and destroyed Taliban leader Mulla Omar's guest house.[18]
At the time of these attacks, there were an estimated 45,000 Taliban soldiers, equipped with
approximately 450 T-55 and T-62 tanks. Their air force consisted of about 30 MIG-21s and SU-22s.
Taliban air defenses were fortified with a few SA-3s, some 300 or so antiaircraft guns, and about 100
shoulder-fired stinger missiles left over from the Soviet/Mujahideen war of the l980s.
In terms of conventional arms, Taliban fortification were not overly formidable.[19]
While U.S. air strikes continued through the first week, a radio station configured C-130 aircraft
headed into the battle arena and began broadcasting messages to the Afghanistan people. Called
"Commando Solo", this aircraft informed Afghan listeners of America's intentions of aiding them in
their struggle against the Taliban.[20] In addition, USAF C-17 transports dropped over 75,000 packets of food and medical supplies. These planes flew out of Ramstein Air Base and parachuted most of
their cargo into Afghanistan refugee camps. Each food packet possessed the written statement: "This
is a food gift from the people of the United States of America."[21] Commenting on this unique
"dual" air strategy, U.S. Congressman Ike Skelton said "it's the first time I've ever heard of trying to
feed the people while you're trying to destroy their government. I don't think it's ever been done
before, but I think it's an excellent strategy."[22]
By day three the Americans had gained air supremacy.[23] During the initial strikes, the Taliban
had launched several stingers and they continued to fire their antiaircraft guns. However, because the
Americans flew above 15,000 feet the Stingers were ineffective.[24] From the state of Missouri, B-2
stealth bombers flew forty-one hours across half the world into the war zone where they attacked Tal78
iban air defenses. Bagram air base was hit and Shindand air field located near Herat was pocketed
with craters.[25] After these attacks the B-2s flew to the island of Diego Garcia where a new crew took
the controls and flew them back to the U.S. Although B-2s would be used later in the war, by 11
October, with most of the Taliban air defenses destroyed, they were no longer scheduled to fly regular
sorties.[26] For the most part, explained General Wald, Taliban integrated air defenses and their command-and-control systems were demolished "within the first 15 minutes or so."[27]
After the first week, various American planes began flying around the clock striking key Taliban
targets. There were, however, accusations that an errant bomb had struck the Kabul offices of a land
mine removal team, killing four civilians.[28] Commenting on this, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld,
who twice a day relayed political guidance to U.S. Army General Tommy R. Franks, Commander of
U.S. Central Command, stated that as always, "coalition forces will continue to make every reasonable effort to select targets with the least possible unintended damage."[29] Shortly afterward, U.S.
Navy pilots flying off the U.S. carrier Carl Vinson were told to "fly over and visually identify targets
before dropping their bombs."[30] As in the 1999 Kosovo air war, political considerations concerning
collateral damage played a significant role in the planning and execution of the air campaign.
After 2 weeks into the war, C-130 gunships and F-15E Eagles made their first appearance.[31]
Initially, C-130 gunships flew primarily in the south, attacking Taliban posts in the Kandahar region.
Because of their extended loitering ability, they could remain over enemy territory for long periods of
time, thus providing a continuous threat. While the aerial attacks from passing bombers were relatively short in duration, noted one Air Force officer, the AC-130 gunships can strike with their
Gatling guns providing continuous fire and that "experience can be even more frightening."[32]
By week three, the air war shifted away from striking airfields, air defenses, communication nodes,
and other fixed targets to attacking tanks and Taliban troop placements. Engagement zones were
established as patrolling forward air controllers looked for targets and authorized attacks.[33] On or
79
about the 19th of October, in support of the Northern Alliance, USAF C-130 cargo planes began ferrying U.S. and British Special Forces into Afghanistan's back country.[34] Both C-17s and C-130s
continued dropping ammunition, warm clothes, boots, and miscellaneous equipment to these commandos.[35]
Despite the intense air assault, by late October, Taliban forces were still occupying all the major
Afghan cities and they appeared to be more resilient than ever. In addition, the Northern Alliance
had not made any significant advances against the enemy and while air attacks continued against key
Taliban targets, there were few signs of progress. At this point, because of political constraints, aircrews were required to withhold strikes against the Taliban defending Kabul. About 35 miles northeast of the capital, the enemy had constructed a series of bunkers and were fully entrenched in these
defensive perimeters. A Northern Alliance force was maneuvering southward through the Panjshir
valley toward Kabul and requested more air strikes. The U.S., however, responded with only token
air attacks.[36] According to Janes Defense Weekly, the number of air strikes in this area were "sporadic and limited in intensity" with fighter-bombers "dropping usually
no more than eight
bombs."[37]
When one Northern Alliance commander was asked about the importance of air power, he
claimed that it was of little help to his troops but it was certainly aiding the enemy. "After a few
attacks, their morale was better." In comparison, he submitted, "our artillery is better."[38] Most
Northern Alliance commanders did not understand why air power was being held back. The "concerns of American generals and politicians--to exhaust diplomatic avenues, to minimize civilian
deaths, to avoid alienating the Muslim world, to stop short of being dragged into the quagmire of
Afghanistan's politics--have little resonance among these men," explained the New York Times. [39]
This incremental use of air power was a calculated attempt by the U.S. government to ensure that
the military campaign was not leaping ahead of a diplomatic effort to restore a pro-Western Afghan
government. Pakistan wanted assurances that a new Kabul government would represent all of Afghan80
istan's tribes. Between 1992 and 1996, a Mujahideen government, dominated by Tajiks and Uzbeks
and void of Pashtuns which comprised over forty percent of the population was unable to bring stability to Afghanistan. Then, in 1996, the Pashtun dominated Taliban captured Kabul and with Pakistan aid forced the Northern Alliance into an extensive military retreat. The configuration of a post
Taliban government, therefore was a serious political issue. It was even more sensitive to Pakistan
since its arch rival, India, had fully supported the Northern Alliance.[40]
Washington wanted to slow down the advance on Kabul to convey a message to the Pashtuns that
in the future they would play a vital political role. In addition, there was a belief that a sudden Taliban retreat from Kabul would throw all of Afghanistan into total anarchy.[41] "In effect," concluded
the New York Times, American military planners were "finding themselves obliged to calibrate the
bombing to achieve a desired political result---establishing a stable, broadly representative government
in Kabul--that has eluded Afghanistan for decades."[42]
With little progress to report, there suddenly appeared a swelling chorus of complaints concerning
the America's slow military progress. A few U.S. congressmen claimed that the American strategy was
just too timid and sluggish. They wanted to send in more U.S. ground troops and sever American
dependence on the Northern Alliance.[43] This viewpoint was reinforced on October 20th, when a
Northern Alliance advancement against Mazar-e Sharif collapsed after suffering from significant casualties.[44] At this point, even Northern Alliance commanders were complaining that the "American
bombing campaign appeared increasingly misguided and ineffectual."[45]
For many skeptics, American's new war appeared to be slipping into a morass of inconclusiveness.
Noting that the signs of progress were sparse, the New York Times wondered if America was facing
another Vietnam and thus becoming involved in "another stalemate on the other side of the
world.[46] While the Taliban were "oozing bravado", announced Time magazine, critics from the
Middle East to Congress were claiming that America was "hurtling toward either humiliating defeat
or inescapable quagmire...." [47]
81
In November, Foreign Affairs featured the essay "Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires." In their
preview the editors noted that for 10 years (1979-1989), the Soviet Union was unsuccessful in trying
to conquer Afghanistan. Accordingly, noted the editors, the U.S. needed to "proceed with caution-or end up on the ash heap of Afghan history."[48] This period of pessimism concerning America's war
effort was exacerbated by the portent of a harsh early Afghanistan winter with its sub-zero freezing
temperatures and winds of over 100 miles an hour. And finally, there was confusion as how the U.S.
would react to the advent of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan which was scheduled to begin on
November 17th.[49]
In early November, the America's war momentum increased. On 30 October, General Tommy
R. Franks, Commander of U.S. Operations in Afghanistan, flew to Tajikistan and met with General
Mohammed Fahim, Commander of the Northern Alliance. The conference, according to General
Franks, was very formal and productive.[50] Upon conclusion, there were wide spread forecasts that
the intensity of fighting around Mazar-e Sharif would increase. Subsequently, the Pentagon stated
that more troops and forward air controllers were on their way into Afghanistan to join the 100 or so
commandos already in country.[51]
Once in place and among the Northern Alliance fighters, many of these American Special
Forces commandos grew beards and wore tribal clothing and rode on horses to the front lines over
treacherous high mountain trails atop wooden saddles. In addition, pack mules were used to carry in
heavy equipment.[52]
The commandos brought with them targeting equipment which included
high-powered telescopes, global positioning receivers, hand-held laser range finders, and radios that
allowed them to send maps and close-up photographs to command centers via satellites and to loitering aircraft.[53]
Once these messages arrived in the Saudi Arabian Combined Air Operations
Center, [CAOC] they were linked with data gathered from JSTARs, U-2s, satellites, RC-135 Rivet
Joints, flying Predator UAVs and other sources.[54] Then, as the New York Times explained, "in
Saudi Arabia, American commanders could watch all these moving parts on a big screen, directing
82
aircraft like pieces on a chess board."[55]
According to Secretary Rumsfeld, the commandos not only helped plan the offensive against the
Taliban defending Mazar-e Sharif, they were an integral part of the advancing Northern Alliance
forces.[56] At one point, Northern Alliance Commander Rashid Dostum cornered a young Air Force
Special Operations lieutenant and told him he desperately needed air support. Dostum, one of
Afghan's most feared warlords, was astounded when only 20 minutes later bombs rocketed out of the
sky, striking Taliban positions, sending fireballs everywhere, destroying artillery, and killing over 250
enemy soldiers. Since Dostum did not expect air support for at least another day, he was shocked
with the rapidity, accuracy and power of the strike.[57]
These quick and precise strikes were indications that net centric war had arrive in Northern Afghanistan. They were the culmination of new advancements in surveillance and the most obvious signs of
America's transformation in warfare. Using laser guided target designators, U.S. Special Forces forwarded
messages to waiting B-52 and B-1 bombers who quickly unleashed their precision guided weapons.
Twenty first century technology was now linked to the nineteenth century fighting skills of the Northern
Alliance. Indeed, noted Secretary Rumsfeld, "the battle for Mazar, was a transformational battle."[58]
The Northern Alliance's offensive against Mazar-e Sharif began on 4 November when Dostum's
forces captured Keshendeh, a town 50 miles southwest of the key objective. This village, explained Janes
Intelligence Review, was taken only after Dostum's cavalry charged into the Taliban's defensive lines.[59]
According to Secretary Rumsfeld, U.S. commandos participated in the attack. Initially, there were several
key air strikes in which:
the explosions were deafening and the timing so
precise that, as the soldiers describe it, hundred of
Afghan horsemen emerged, literally, out of the smoke,
riding down on the enemy through clouds of dust and flying
shrapnel. A few carried RPGs, some had less than ten
rounds of ammunition in their guns-but they rode boldly-Americans and Afghans--into tank, mortar, artillery and
sniper fire. It was the first U.S. cavalry attack of the
21st Century. [60]
83
While Dostum was maneuvering against Keshendeh, another Northern Alliance force under the
command of General Atta Mohammed was preparing for an attack against Ag Kupruk, a town 40
miles south of Mazar-e Sharif. An American U.S. Army commando team of twelve, plus one USAF
forward air controller were fighting with this force of about 2,000 troops. Earlier, to equip these soldiers, the commandos had called in air drops of supplies which included shoes, blankets, food, and
ammunition. Now, as they approached Ag Kupruk, six commandos advanced with Atta's forces while
the other seven circled northward through the mountains and maneuvered behind the enemy's lines.
From their advantage points these two commando teams designated targets with their lasers, called in
air strikes, and helped guide bombs to their mark:
The bloody accuracy of the attacks instantly
lifted the spirits of Atta and his troops.
During one bombing raid, Stan, the A-team's warrant
officer, was showing Atta how the lasers worked.
Just as Atta put his eye up to the view finder,
an American bomb obliterated a distant target. [61]
On November 6th, after more air strikes, followed by a Northern Alliance ground attack, Ag
Kupruk capitulated. With Keshendeh and Ag Kopruk in Northern Alliance hands, Generals Atta
Muhammed and Dostum joined forces and advanced northward through Shulgarah Gorge toward
Mazar-e Sharif where more battles were fought. In support of these operations, U.S. aircraft continued their attacks from the vertical flank, as sorties increased to approximately 120 per day.[62]
Once outside of Mazar-e Sharif, a third element of the Northern Alliance, a Hazara military unit,
joined in for the final advancement. Then, on the evening of November 9th, more than 5,000 Taliban soldiers fled from the city, leaving behind most of their armor and heavy weapons. For the first
time since l997, Mazar-e Sharif was in Northern Alliance hands. Within the next few days, the cities
of Taloqan, Herat, Jalalabad and Kabul capitulated, as Northern Alliance forces consolidated their
grip on most of Afghanistan. The uncontrolled stampede of retreating Taliban from Mazar-e Sharif,
explained Jane's Intelligence Review "began a rapid domino like collapse first across the north and
84
then across Afghanistan as a whole." Northern Alliance commanders agreed that one of the primary
keys to this victory, was "the intensity and accuracy of relentless U.S. bombing...."[63]
After the capture of Kabul, the battle for Afghanistan shifted to the Kandahar region where the Taliban held out until early December. Except for continuous mopping up military operations primarily
in the mountains of Paktia province, Phase One of the war against terrorism ended with the capture
of Kandahar on 7 December. Commenting on the importance of Mazar-e Sharif, Jane's Intelligence
Review stated that "within a single week in early-mid November, the USA's coalition had all but won
the war."[64]
IV. TRANSFORMATION: NET CENTRIC AIR WAR
We witness transformation when we see Airmen
traveling by horseback with the tools of their
trade (GPS and laser range finders) hanging from a
saddle. With secure satellite and radio links, they
pass target coordinates to bombers, or fighters from
the Air Force, Navy, or Marines flying miles overhead.
We see the venerable 40 year old B-52 precisely
place a JDAM just 800 meters from our friendly
positions. No single piece of this equation is
transformational but together it yields a transformational asymmetrical advantage over any enemy.
General John P Jumper
Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
In the 2001 air war over Afghanistan the use of new surveillance technology and techniques coupled with precision guided weapons aided the campaign's effectiveness. It was what Norman Friedman called a "net-centric" campaign in which the time between acquiring enemy positions and
striking targets from the air substantially decreased.[65] When the warlord Dostum asked for air
strikes, he was not aware that a B-52 was flying unseen above the clouds and that an Air Force forward
air controller had just scanned the enemy's position with a laser range finder. This target information
was quickly relayed via satellite to the theater command center and returned to the loitering bomber.
In some cases, if the Northern Alliance was under direct attack, the data was sent directly to loitering
85
planes who had authorization to attack. The emphasis was not on weapon platforms as much as on
the ability to remotely sensor the target and quickly coordinate the signals into an effective air strike.
Moreover, stated General Franks, a critical factor was not so much of having boots on the ground as
having "eyes on the ground." [66]
Yet the concept of eyes on the ground was only part of success story. The Air Force also used new
techniques to integrate aerial surveillance aircraft throughout the war theater. When an orbiting satellite or Rivet Joint aircraft received suspected communication from Taliban or Al Queda forces in the
Mazar-e Sharif area, this intelligence was quickly forwarded to the CAOC, where it was analyzed.
From there, officers directed other surveillance aircraft, such as Joint-STARS, AWACS, or P-3s with
wide-area sensors to further investigate these signals and narrow their place of origin. Once the confined area was identified, Predator UAVs were sent in to pin point the target and call in waiting AC130 gunships or strike aircraft for an attack.
There is no doubt, noted Aviation Week & Space Technology, that the air war over Afghanistan was
a milestone in the transformation of air strategy and surveillance operations. Moreover, analysts and
senior military officers:
are hailing it as the first conflict in which
intelligence was the primary U.S. weapon. Key
factors in their assessment were persistence
(the ability to maintain around-the-clock
surveillance), integration at the tactical and
operational levels of intelligence from many
sources, and the ability to control data
collection. [67]
John T. Correll, editor of Air Force Magazine, noted that some of these net-centric target acquisitions and subsequent air strikes required less than 20 minutes. In contrast, he noted, "for various reasons--some technical, some procedural, some political--most targeting of air power takes much longer
than 19 minutes."[68] During Kosovo air campaign, for instance, a war which involved nineteen
NATO nations, the targeting cycle sometimes required more than 2 weeks.[69]
86
The Afghanistan net-centric air war was achieved by gathering intelligence using commandos, spy
satellites, unmanned drones and aircraft equipped with downward looking radar. All of these sources
helped improve the accuracy of acquiring targets. Because of the rapid communication of messages
through digital links from surveillance units to commanders and then to weapon platforms, the
effects of fog and friction caused by excessive distances were decreased. In contract, the "Special
Operations Forces dramatically increased the effectiveness of the air campaign and on the ground,"
explained U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense. Overall, "they turned the Northern Alliance into a
conquering army."[70]
Emblematic of this war was the depiction of a U.S. commando leaning over his laptop, sending digital targeting data to a circling B-52 bomber and an UAV forwarding video photos to a waiting AC130 gunship.[71] These were the obvious signs of a transformation in warfare. Moreover stated General Jumper, "we are witness to the true potential of transformation. It can be seen in the stories from
current operations." [72]
As of this writing, the war in Afghanistan continues as allied forces attempt to root out the
remaining Al Queda and Taliban resistance. The first phase of America's war on terrorism was primarily fought against Taliban forces who used conventional tactics of massing their troops in defense of
their cities. In Maoist terms, the Taliban were using conventional tactics in the strategic offensive
phase of the protracted war strategy. This was a phase of guerrilla warfare in which Americans, with
their advanced technology, had a superior edge. But now the Taliban and Al Queda forces are in the
mountains and using Mao's guerrilla tactics. There is little doubt that fighting this type of war will be
a test of America's know how and ingenuity.
--------------------------------------------------------------
87
NOTES
1. Anthony Davis, "How the Afghan War Was Won," Jane's Intelligence Review [February, 2002]
6-13. "Vertical Flank" is concept found in Robert P Givens "Turning the Vertical Flank," School
Of Advance Airpower Studies paper, June 2001.
2. Dan Balz, Bob Woodward and Jeff Himmelman, "Afghan Campaign's Blueprint Emerges," Washington Post,(January 29, 2002) p. 1.
3. Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Washington Post, "At Camp David, Advise and Dissent," (January
31, 2002) p. 1.
4. James Carney and John F. Dickerson, "Inside the War Room," Time (December 31, 2001) 113119.
5. Woodward and Balz, "At Camp David," p.1.
6. Carney and Dickerson, "Inside the War Room," 113-119.
7. Ibid.
8. Joseph Fitchett, "Did Bin Laden Kill Afghan Rebel?" International Herald Tribune, (September
17, 2001) p.1.
9. Carney and Dickerson, "Inside the War Room," 113-119.
10. Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, "Combating Terrorism: "It Starts Today!" Washington Post, (February 1, 2002) p.1.
11. Ibid.
12. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (London: Yale
University Press, 2001) pp. 183-195. "In 1997/8 Pakistan provided the Taliban with an estimated
US $30 million in aid."
13. Woodward and Dan Balz, "At Camp David," p.1.
14. Carney and Dickerson, "Inside the War Room," p.113-119.
15. Editors, "Turning the Tide in Afghanistan," Boston Globe, (December 31, 2001) p.1.
16. Ibid.
17. Lieutenant General Charles F. Wald, Commander, 9th Air Force and U.S. Central command Air
Forces, interviewed by author, 30 May 2002;, and Eric Schmitt and Michael R. Gordon, "U.S.
dispatches Ground Troops and Top Officer," New York Times, (September 21, 2001) p.1.
88
18. Peter Baker, "Kabul and Kandahar Hit in Attacks Through Night," Washington Post, (October 8,
2001) p.1.
19. Thomas E. Ricks and Vernon Loeb, "Initial Aim Is Hitting Taliban Defenses," Washington Post,
(October 8,2001) p.1. and Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, "Dusty City May Be Pivotal To
U.S. Effort," New York Times, (October 9, 2001) p. 1.
20. Karen DeYoung and Alan Sipress, "Dual Strategy Of Assualt and Reward," Washington Post,
(October 8, 2001) p. 1.
21. Anne Hull, "U.S. to Drop Food Over Afghanistan," Washington Post (October 8, 2001) p. 14.
22. Ricks and Loeb, "Initial Aim," p. 1.
23. Bradley Graham and Dan Balz, "U.S. Controls Skies, Hunts New Targets And Encourages AntiTaliban Forces," Washington Post, (October 10, 2001) p. 1.
24. Bill Gertz, "Afghanistan Hits Will Continue Till Taliban Is Ousted," Washington Times, (October 9, 2001) p. 1.
25. Graham and Balz, "U.S. Controls Skies..." p.1.
26. Michael R. Gordon and Steven Lee Myers, "Taliban's Troops Hit As Allies Plan For Commando
Raids," New York Times, (October 11, 2001) p. 1.
27. Lt. Gen. C. Wald, interviewed by author, 30 May 2002; & John A. Tirpak, "Enduring Freedom"
Air Force Magazine (February 2002) 32-39.
28. Graham and Balz, "U.S. Controls Skies..." p. 1.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Rowan Scarborough, "Runsfeld Ponders Ground Troops," Washington Times, (October 19,
2001) p. 1.
32. Vernon Loeb and Thomas E. Ricks, "Pentagon: Taliban Forces 'Eviscerated'," Washington Post,
(October 17, 2001) p.1.
33. Rowan Scarborough, "U.S. Splits Aftghanistan into Engagement Zones" (Washington Post)
(October 18, 2001) p.1.
34. General Charles R. Holland, Commander in Chief, Headquarters U.S. Special Operations Command, Interviewed by author, March 8, 2002. and Thom Shanker, "Conduct of War Is Redefined By Success of Special Forces," New York Times (January 21, 2002) p.1.
89
35. Tirpak, "Enduring Freedom," 32-39.
36. Zahid Hussain, "Alliance Poised for New Attacks Around Kabul," London Times (September 26,
2001) p. 1. and Thomas E. Ricks and Alan Sipress, "Attacks Restrained by Poltical Goals," Washington Post, (October 23, 2001) p.1.
37. Anthony Davis, "Poor logistics and slow air war Stall UF move on Kabul," Jane's Defense Weekly,
(October, 31, 2001) p.4.
38. David Rohde, "Anti-Taliban Forces Say Light U.S. Strikes Lift Foes' Morale," New York Times,
(October 26, 2001) p. B-3.
39. Ibid.
40. Rashid, Taliban, Militant Islam, p. 45.
41. Thomas E. Ricks and Alan Sipress, "Attacks Restrained By Political Goals," Washington Post,
(October 23, 2001) p.1. and Michael R. Gordon, "Military Campaign Out-Stripping American
Diplomatic Maneuvers," New York Times (October 15, 2001) p. 1.
42. John F. Burns, "U.S. Military Goals Entagled In Afghan Politics," New York Times, (October 12,
2001) p.1.
43. Romesh Ratnesar, "The War: Bombs Away" Time (November 12, 2001) 47-52. and Michael
Sirak & Kim Burger, "Pressure Pushes US bomb Raids Into Overdrive," Jane's Defense Weekly,
(November 7, 2001 7.
44. Davis, "How The Afghan War Was Won," 6-13.
45. Dexter Filkins, "Taliban's Foes Say Bombing Is Poorly Aimed and Futile," New York Times,
(November 2, 2001) p.1.
46. R.W. Apple Jr, "Quagmire Remembered: Afghanistan As Vietnam," New York Times, (October
31, 2001) p. B-1 & 3.
47. Ratnesar, "The War: Bombs Away," 47-52.
48. Milton Bearden, "Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires" (November/December 2001) 17-30 [Editorial comments are on page I].
49. Michael R. Gordon, "Soldiers Of The Northern Alliance Prepare For A Ground Battle," New
York Times, (October 22, 2001) p.1.
50. General Tommy R. Franks, Commander U.S. Central Command Interviewed by Author, 8 April
2002. (General Franks discussed his meeting with Northern Alliance Command Mohammed
Fahim) and Tatnesar, "The War: Bombs Away," 47-52.
90
51. Ibid
52. Donald Runsfeld, "21st Century Transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces," Transcript of
Speech Defense Link, (January 31, 2002) pp. 1-11
53. Kirk Spitzer, "Green Berets Outfought, Outthought The Taliban" USA Today, (January 7, 2002)
p.1. Before transmitting any message to awaiting aircraft, each commando had to follow two ironclad rules: [1] a team member had to actually see the target and [2] the coordinates had to doublechecked.
54. Eric Schmitt and James Dao, "Use of Pinpoint Air Power Comes of Age In New War," New York
Times, (December 24, 2001) p.1. and USAF Captain Richard Cao, personal interview by Author,
27 March,2002.
55. IBID.
56. Rumsfeld, "21st Century Transformation," pp. 1-11.
57. John Hendren, "Afghanistan Yields Lessons For Pentagon's Next Targets," Lost Angeles Time,
(January 21, 2002) p.1.
58. Rumsfeld, "21st Century Transformation," pp. 1-11.
59. Davis, "How the Afghan War Was Won," 6-13.
60. Runsfeld, "21st Century Transformation," pp. 1-11.
61. Donatella Lorch, "The Green Berets Up Close," Newsweek (January 14, 2002) 20-25.
62. Roland Watson and Michael Evans, "America Turns Up The Heat," London Times, (November
7, 2001) p.1.
63. Davis, "How the Afghan War Was Won," 6-13.
64. Ibid.
65. Norman Friedman, "The Revolution Arrives," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, (January, 2002)
4-6.
66. Ibid and General Tommy R. Franks, USAF Air Command and Staff College Presentation, Air
University, Montgomery, Al. (8 April 200).
67. David A Fulghum, "Intel Emerging As Key Weapon in Afghanistan," Aviation Week & Space
Technology (March 11, 2002) 24-25.
68. John T. Correll, "From Sensor to Shooter," Air Force Magazine (February 2002) 2. and USAF
Captain Steve Purdum, B-52 Aircraft Commander, personal interview by author, 27 March 2002.
91
69. Ibid.
70. Michael R. Gordon, "New U.S. War: Commandos, Airstrikes And Allies on the Ground," New
York Times (December 29, 2001) p.1.
71. Joseph Fitchett, "High-Tech Weapons Change The Dynamics And The Scope of Battle," International Herald Tribune (December 28, 2001) p.1.
72. General John P. Jumper, "Q&A: Air Force Transformation" Military Air and Space Technology
Online, (Vol 1: Issue 2: May 2002) http://www.mat.kmi.com/index.cfm.
92
F-117A Nighthawk
Mission
The F-117A Nighthawk is the world's first operational
aircraft designed to exploit low-observable stealth technology.
This precision-strike aircraft penetrates high-threat airspace
and uses laser-guided weapons against critical targets.
Features
The unique design of the single-seat F-117A provides exceptional combat capabilities. About the size of an F-15 Eagle,
the twin-engine aircraft is powered by two General Electric
F404 turbofan engines and has quadruple redundant fly-bywire flight controls. Air refuelable, it supports worldwide
commitments and adds to the deterrent strength of U.S. military forces.
The F-117A can employ a variety of weapons and is equipped with sophisticated navigation and attack systems
integrated into a digital avionics suite that increases mission effectiveness and reduces pilot workload. Detailed
planning for missions into highly defended target areas is accomplished by an automated mission planning system
developed, specifically, to take advantage of the unique capabilities of the F-117A.
Background
The F-117A production decision was made in 1978 with a contract awarded to Lockheed Advanced Development
Projects, the "Skunk Works," in Burbank, Calif. The first flight over the Nevada test ranges was on June 18, 1981, only
31 months after the full-scale development decision.
Streamlined management by Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, combined breakthrough stealth technology with concurrent development and production to rapidly field the aircraft.
The first F-117A was delivered in 1982, and the last delivery was in the summer of 1990. Air Combat Command's
only F-117A unit, the 4450th Tactical Group, (now the 49th Fighter Wing, Holloman Air Force Base, N.M.),
achieved operational capability in October 1983.
During Operation Desert Storm in 1991, F-117A's flew approximately 1,300 sorties and scored direct hits on 1,600
high-value targets in Iraq. It was the only U.S. or coalition aircraft to strike targets in downtown Baghdad. Since
moving to Holloman AFB in 1992, the F-117A and the men and women of the 49th Fighter Wing have deployed to
Southwest Asia more than once. On their first trip, the F-117s flew non-stop from Holloman to Kuwait, a flight of
approximately 18.5 hours -- a record for single-seat fighters that stands today.
In 1999, 24 F-117A's deployed to Aviano Air Base, Italy, and Spangdahlem AB, Germany, to support NATO's
Operation Allied Force. The aircraft led the first Allied air strike against Yugoslavia on March 24, 1999.
Returning to the skies over Baghdad, F-117A's launched Operation Iraqi Freedom with a decapitation strike on March
20, 2003. Striking key targets in the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime, 12 deployed F-117s flew more than 100
combat sorties in support of the global war on terrorism.
The F-117A program demonstrates that stealth aircraft can be designed for reliability and maintainability. It created a
revolution in military warfare by incorporating low-observable technology into operational aircraft. The aircraft
receives support through a Lockheed-Martin contract known as Total System Performance Responsibility.
93
94