Download THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Whitehead, C. (2000) ‘The anthropology of consciousness: Keeping body and soul together?’
Anthropology Today; 16 (4): 20-2
Dr. Irene M. Pepperberg with Alex, the talking parrot. Alex can count; name some 100 objects along with
their colour, texture, and shape; create grammatical sentences; and bully lab assistants to get what he wants.
THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS: KEEPING BODY AND SOUL
TOGETHER? Society for the Anthropology of Consciousness, Tucson,
5-9 April 2000
Twenty years ago the Society for the Anthropology of Consciousness (SAC) was born, partly in
response to the work of Carlos Castenada and the apparently traumatic blow this dealt to the collective
psyche of the American anthropological establishment. Castenada's writings, beginning with his 1968
PhD dissertation at UCLA, roused passionate debate, notably at meetings of the American
ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY Vol 16 No 4, August 2000
ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Anthropological Association in Mexico City in 1974. Castenada claimed that no one could study or
understand shamanism without becoming a shaman, and that shamans wield superhuman powers in a
world that transcends time, space, and the mundane limitations of western technology. The resulting
furore broke out between those who believed and disbelieved – with irreconcilable fervour – in the
truth of his claims (Schwartz1).
The SAC hosted its 20th Annual Meeting in Tucson in the week (5-9 April) before the
interdisciplinary conference ‘Toward a Science of Consciousness: Tucson 2000’. The convener,
Michael Winkelman, was involved in both, and there were discounted fees for those who attended both.
So why do we need two conferences?
‘Mainstream’ debates on consciousness are burdened by individualistic and disembodied
perspectives, lack any concept of the difference between communication and performance, and are
short on anthropological input. Thinking is intrinsically dualistic, being framed around David
Chalmers’ ‘hard problem’: how consciousness can ‘arise’ from ‘physical’ processes. The assumption of
‘physics’ as a non-conscious closed system effectively precludes any resolution, whilst the
individualistic perspective peripheralizes anthropology, and prevents recognition of the politicocultural origins of the impasse.
The SAC represents what is still a minority approach to consciousness, having its origins
‘not...in anthropology alone, but in the study of the anomalous experiences and phenomena that
brought many disciplines together in the seventies’ (Hriskos). Jo Long, reviewing the history of the
society, expressed her regret that more presenters were not researching anomalies associated with
shamanic practice, in line with core interests of founder members.
Even so, almost half of the fifty or so papers dealt with shamanic or related themes, and there
was a marked consensus between them. Leslie Conton’s paper on ‘contemporary shamanic practices’
probably typified the essential core of belief. She defended ‘neo-shamanism’ against criticisms voiced
by Native Americans and others, arguing that there is nothing ‘neo’ about western shamanism. Rather,
it is the inevitable resurgence or re-integration of something deeply rooted in human need and nature.
ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY Vol 16 No 4, August 2000
CHARLES WHITEHEAD
This naturalizing theme was echoed in Michael Winkelman’s presentation on ‘the shamanic
paradigm in evolution’. Cross-cultural studies, he pointed out, demonstrate the etic basis of shamanism,
and suggest that shamanic practices played a role in human cognitive evolution. Structural parallels
between ‘altered states of consciousness’, the spirit world, and community relations, suggest cognitive
universals. He contrasted the ‘presentational’ shamanic mode of consciousness with the
‘representational’ mode exemplified by language. In other words, he stressed the theatrical idiom
which, logically (and as argued by Durkheim, Grice, Austin, etc), must be prior to language.
Several speakers picked up this performative theme in the context of healing, with an implied
critique of western allopathic medicine. The notion that all healing practices depend, in part, on their
dramaturgical idiom, is not new to anthropology. A more holistic approach – in which the healer
suggests self-healing imagery (Overton), ‘becomes the medicine’ (Cassidy), restores ‘the memory of
Oneness’ (Allen), or makes herself ‘The Cure’ through dramatic performance and communitas
(Provost) – undoubtedly has points in its favour, and important lessons for western medicine.
Without denying the possibility that cultural practices may tap into some kind of ‘spiritual
reality’, one might question shamanism as an ideal type (are the egalitarian Temiars or !Kung strictly
‘shamanic’?), and the precise relationship to ‘cognitive universals’. The belief that all animals were
originally human, all eating is cannibalism, and, without shamanic intervention, the soul of the eaten
animal will eat you from the guts outwards, does not sound intuitive, spontaneous, or even politically
innocent to me, neither does it suggest spiritual or ecological insight. And as I pointed out in my own
paper at this conference, universal ontological intuitions, such as the distinction between appearance
and reality, are regularly inverted in animistic and venatic beliefs commonly associated with
shamanism. Reified representations (another inversion of a universal intuition) are almost definitive of
‘symbolic’ culture, and the reason would seem to be the super-biological demands of human social
orders. The maladaptive consequences of scrambling our own cognitive heritage must have been offset
by new forms of cooperation; but if archaic cultural practices furthered the expansion of human
cognition, why did human brains get smaller?
ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY Vol 16 No 4, August 2000
ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
At least six speakers were themselves shamanic practitioners, having studied shamanism in the
field and/or taken Michael Harner’s ‘core shamanism’ course. There were workshops on ‘Shamanic
journeying’ and ‘Shamanic extraction healing’ (the ‘extraction’ patient reported some dramatic
autonomic effects, and when I spoke to her the following week, was still feeling substantial benefit).
Besides two sessions on shamanism, there were related sessions on dreams, forms of altered
consciousness, hallucinogens, and language.
Several speakers focused on anomalous phenomena. Mark Schroll analyzed an 11-year
recurring dream, as ‘a means of re-inventing the mythos of Euro-American science’, and Fred Keogh
described a dream he had, following an increase rite of the Hoti (Venezuela), which correctly predicted
he would kill seven animals during the next day’s hunt. Jeff MacDonald and Edie Turner made crosscultural comparisons of near-death experiences (NDEs). MacDonald contrasted the purposeful nature
of ‘Orphic journeys’ with the more spontaneous character of western NDEs; Turner used Iñupiat
(Alaska) and Baha’i case material to explore their ontological implications. All these papers reflect the
failure of western science to accommodate, or a broader failure to provide social support and cultural
affirmation for, real human experiences. The theme continued into the hallucinogens session, where
Thomas Roberts reviewed anthropological research into entheogens (psychoactive substances used in a
spiritual context),2 and John Baker contrasted the sacred use of hallucinogens with the current
American ‘rhetoric of prohibition’.3
But the implicit theme unifying the conference was performance. The performative nature of
shamanic practices (not to mention everyday life) suggests that underlying ‘cognitive’ universals
include song, dance, extended childhood, make-believe, and role-play. There is plenty of evidence
linking pretend play to reflective consciousness, and we could hardly have social imagination at all
without a capacity for ‘as if’ thinking. Which means that imagination, dreams, and even hallucinogenic
experiences, are performative.
The elements of this argument were scattered across many presentations at the conference. We
had papers on Japanese pop-idols (Ayoagi), Yoga (Chandola), and the (mis)fortunes of an American
ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY Vol 16 No 4, August 2000
CHARLES WHITEHEAD
BDSM slave family (Chapman) - three highly contrasting examples of performative manipulations of
consciousness. Ted Hazelton gave us some basics of embodiment theory, which is beginning to
influence cognitive science. Derek Brereton reviewed the social brain hypothesis, and recent
suggestions that consciousness – the ability to read our own minds – is a ‘side effect’ of our evolved
ability to read other people’s minds. James Overton added a further ‘side effect’ of reflectivity. The
ability to manipulate an inner imaginal world allows the human organism to effect profound
psychological and physiological changes upon itself – the basis of dramaturgical healing.
Barbara Crowe gave an interesting presentation on music in the light of Norman Geschwind’s
model of symbolic cognition. Geschwind (1967) argued that the ‘impressive advance’ in human brain
organization is the remarkable expansion of the angular gyrus and adjacent parietal cortex. This area is
surrounded on all sides by visual, auditory, somatosensory, and motor cortices, and is strategically
placed for multimodal integration, crucial to our ability to generate ‘higher order associations’ and
multimodal ‘symbolic constructs’. Crowe pointed out that musical performance (she did not
specifically mention dance) involves the same cross-modal integrations required in Geschwind’s theory
– visual, auditory/vocal, and haptic (touch and movement). The evolution of song-and-dance
performance might, therefore, have contributed to the expansion of the angular gyral area.
The ear, she told us, has three times more neuronal connections than the eye. A related point
that she missed here is that human primary cortices (visual, motor, etc.) are no larger than those of an
ape, with the single exception of auditory cortex which is about three times bigger. This is not
necessarily an adaptation to speech, because we can learn to read both text and deaf-dumb signing
perfectly well with our other (ape-sized) primary cortices. The differential expansion of auditory cortex
(and the early appearance of a prominent Broca’s ‘speech’ area in Homo habilis) is more likely to
reflect the development of preverbal song.
It seems likely that song-and-dance display paved the way for the emergence of dramatic ability
in humans (much as ritual paved the way for language in Durkheimian theory). Music exemplifies
‘primary intersubjectivity’ – that is, it refers to nothing outside itself – and song-and-dance-like
ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY Vol 16 No 4, August 2000
ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
behaviour is the first performative mode apparent during infancy. If song and dance collectivize
internal states, this would seem to be a logical precursor to role-play – the ability to put yourself into
another’s experiential shoes.
My own paper suggested that we should forget the whole idea of ‘symbolic behaviour’, and
study human social mirrors (modes of play and performance) and their relationship to collective
representations. A pilot brain-mapping study of role-play, by R. Turner and myself, suggests that
‘theatre of mind’ may be virtually continuous throughout the day in humans, whilst cognitive effort is
needed to ignore or dissociate social imagination during non-social tasks.
But the most interesting presentation of the conference, in my view, was Irene Pepperberg’s
post-banquet talk on African grey parrots. Alex, the most famous of these birds, challenged
primatologists with his command of spoken English. He uses around 86 nouns and over 100 words,
gives meaningful replies to questions, makes refusals and requests, and expresses pleasure, affection,
and jealousy (Pepperberg 1999). This has to have performative implications, because autistic children,
who have impaired pretend-play abilities, also have problems with language. Do grey parrots engage in
pretend play? Apparently they do. They love cardboard boxes, and will, for example, peck out a
rectangular doorway and square windows to create a parrot-sized Wendy house. They also use firstperson pronouns, which human children do not acquire much before the age of two. This marks an
important watershed in human development: the start of the ‘terrible twos’ and a new concept of the
self-as-value. There is nothing like this during ape development, whereas the behaviour of grey parrots
is very reminiscent of human two-year-olds. They demand full time social interaction, and Pepperberg
is currently developing an interactive computer programme to keep them amused when she is away
from the laboratory.
So, overall, the explicit take-home message was (excuse the parody of William James):
1.
There is something wrong about science as it naturally stands
2.
We are saved from the wrongness by making proper connection with indigenous world-views
ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY Vol 16 No 4, August 2000
CHARLES WHITEHEAD
But underlying this overt theme was an implicit emphasis on performance – a major blind spot in
current consciousness research.
There is a possibility that the two themes may unite. Fantasy-prone people, credulous ‘New
Agers’, and those in dissociational states such as hypnosis, consistently score above average in tests of
psychic ability. So make-believe and other performative behaviours may favour psychic effects. Bill
Plank, speaking on ‘quantum non-locality’, challenged Cartesian dualism and the notion of independent
objects perceived and measured by ‘objective’ observers. Quantum experiments reveal a non-local
world, in which observer, observed, and measuring device, exist in a causally entangled ‘quantum
configuration’. The implicate order underlying our course-grained perceptions of reality may be, as
Jung suggested, essentially psychoid, with no distinction between ‘mind’ and ‘matter’. So what might
happen, at the quantum level, when ‘mind’ becomes capable of creating imaginary worlds?
Footnotes
1.
Undated author citations refer to conference abstracts, available at http://www.sacaaa.org
2.
An entheogen chrestomathy (bibliography with excerpts) is available at
http://www.csp.org/chrestomathy
3.
For hallucinogens not yet prohibited in the USA see http://www.maps.org
References
Geschwind, N. (1967) `Neurological foundations of language' in H.R. Myklebust, ed., Progress in
Learning Disabilities (Grune & Stratton: New York) pp 182-98
Pepperberg, I. (1999) The Alex Studies (Harvard University Press)
Charles Whitehead
University College London
ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY Vol 16 No 4, August 2000