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The Paris Peace
Treaties 1919-1923
Mr. Todd’s group
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The Paris Peace Treaties 1919-1923
1. Introduction
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When World War One ended on 11th November 1918 over 13 million people had died and
millions more had been wounded and injured. Vast swathes of agricultural land had been
ruined as well as thousands of factories (23000 in France alone). Moreover the German,
Russian, Austrian and Turkish empires had collapsed and a new threat to the post war
world, communism, was now looming.
In the aftermath of such terrible and unprecedented bloodletting bitter feelings of hatred
and revenge became widespread. These deep emotions were to cast a long shadow over the
efforts of the politicians to create a long-lasting peace so that, it was hoped, such a costly
war should never (and could never) be repeated. In this atmosphere of visceral loathing, a
"Settlement" was eventually created that really settled very little at all and, arguably,
contributed to the outbreak of World War Two in 1939.
The British historian AJ.P Taylor called the years between 1919 and 1939 a "twenty year
cease-fire" while French Marshal Foch stated in 1919, "This (the Versailles Treaty) is not a
peace but an armistice for twenty years".
In April 1917 the United States joined the war and was to make a very contribution to the Allied
victory over the Central Powers. In January 1918, with both sides almost exhausted, President
Woodrow Wilson presented his idealistic Fourteen Points as a basis for a negotiated peace.
Wilson's 14 Points of January 1918
1. Abolition of secret diplomacy.
2. Free navigation at see for all nations in war and peace.
3. Removal of economic barriers between states.
4. All-round reduction of armaments.
5. Impartial adjustment of colonial claims in the interests of the concerned.
6. Evacuation of Russian territory.
7. Restoration of Belgium.
8. Liberation of France and restoration of Alsace and Lorraine.
9. Readjustment of Italian frontiers along the lines of nationality.
10. Self-government for the peoples of the Austrian Empire.
11. Romania and Serbia to be evacuated and Serbian" to be given access to the
12. Self-government for the non-Turkish peoples of the Turkish Empire.
13. An independent Poland with access to the sea and
14. A League of Nations to preserve the peace.
The German response to the 14 Points
However, Germany ignored Wilson's peace proposals because she felt that she still had a good chance
of winning the war (before US troops arrived in large numbers) now that her armies in the east were
freed (owing to the Russian Communist Revolution of October 1917) to fight in the west. A huge
attack was launched in the west in March (the "Hindenburg Offensive") that was only contained
with the greatest difficulty and cost another million allied casualties. Also in March Germany slammed
a defeated Russia with the punitive Treaty of Brest-Litovsk whereby;
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a) Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were given "independence" from Russia but were
then allied to Germany.
b) A crippling sum of reparations (in coal, iron ore and food) was to be paid by Russia to Germany.
In the autumn of 1918 retreating German armies destroyed industrial installations and railways in
France and Belgium. However, the German army was in reality defeated on the battlefield by the end of
August despite the fact that she had not been invaded. Nevertheless, many Germans came to believe
that the army had been "stabbed in the back" by communist revolutionaries in Germany who went
on strike in the Autumn apparently depriving the army of the supplies necessary to win the war.
In November the Kaiser was forced to abdicate and the new German government (faced with revolution
at home and the collapse of her Austrian. Bulgarian and Turkish allies) wrote to President Wilson
asking for an Armistice (i.e. a negotiated surrender) based on his 14 Points that Germany had earlier
rejected. Wilson and his allies agreed to the Armistice but, partly in view of Germany's behaviour since
January, also demanded that she would have to pay compensation for the cost of the war to the Allies.
At 11.00am on November 11th 1918 the First World War came to an end following the signing of the
Armistice by the German leaders.
2. The Mood (atmosphere) in 1919 and the difficulties of peacemaking
John Maynard Keynes was to write in his book The Economic Consequences of the Peace that nearly
all the major decisions of the treaties were wrong, but he underrated the immense difficulties facing the
statesmen of 1919. When these difficulties are borne in mind, the Versailles Settlement appears a more
reasonable achievement, despite several serious errors and its failure to establish a permanent order.
1. A lack of unity of purpose between the great powers. The self-righteous and idealistic
Wilson came to Europe almost in the guise of a prophet and expected his colleagues to make
sacrifices in the interests of a just peace. It was easy for him to do this; his country had not been
invaded nor had American losses been heavy. The French press turned upon him and objected
him to bitter ridicule which he found difficult to stomach, contrast Clemenceau was bound to
consider only one objective; French security. Twice in just over 40 years France had been
invaded the Germans. Germany must be permanently weakened so that ever in the future would
she be able to mount an invasion of France.
2. The American leader Wilson knew nothing about European affairs he had ideals which
could not be kept when faced with the reality of European affairs. He therefore had to change
his mind, became upset, American people upset as their leader looked silly. This was to have
terrible consequences later on.
3. The statesmen were under considerable pressure from their respective publics. In the
United States opinion was against further involvement in Europe. Lloyd George was no doubt
mistaken to promise in the election of 1918 to 'hang the Kaiser', to 'make Germany pay cost of
the war' and to 'squeeze the lemon until the pips '. When he tried to limit reparations during the
negotiations he received a telegram from 370 MPs holding him to promises. Even the narrow
view of Clemenceau seemed too moderate for the French. He to be refused the Presidency of
the Republic partly because compromises made during the peace settlement.
4. It was a mistake to choose Paris as the venue for the Conference. Wire-netting was required
to guard the German delegates from the fury of the mob. This pressure of public opinion must
not discounted.
5. The sheer immensity of the task of reconstruction in Europe was appalling. The continent
was in chaos and the statesmen faced an impossible task in attempting to appraise a situation
which was deteriorating daily while the Conference deliberated.
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6. The fear of Communism did not make for calm deliberation at Paris. By 1919 the red flag
waved over the government buildings in Munich and Budapest. It was feared that the menace
would spread further - to Berlin or Vienna or even to Italy. Their existence added to the
pressure for a quick peace.
7. The terrible Flu epidemic was affecting Europe, killing millions. They had to make
decisions quickly under pressure and therefore had no time to really discuss or talk things
through
Considering the conditions, the statesmen did well. As Gilbert White, a member of the American
delegation put it, 'It is not surprising that they made a bad peace: what is surprising is that they
made peace at all.'
3. How the Versailles Settlement was negotiated: ‘The Big Three’
The peacemakers who met in Paris in early 1919 represented 28 "victorious nations". They met to
decide what should happen to the losers of the Great War; Germany. Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and
Turkey. The fate of Europe was to be discussed at various places around the French capital:
Versailles - Germany
St Germain - Austria
Trianon - Hungary
Neuilly - Bulgaria
Sevres (and in 1923 Lausanne) - Turkey
In reality, the peace settlement was to be dominated by three men: Georges Clemenceau. Prime
Minister of France; Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States and David Lloyd-George, Prime
Minister of Great Britain (Orlando, the Italian Prime Minister, played only a minor role as the others
tended to politely ignore his views).
All three had the common objectives of;
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organising a settlement in such a way that war should never recur
and that the Central Powers, notably Germany, should be punished.
However, the "Three" could not agree on how the vanquished should be punished.
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Georges Clemenceau
1. Clemenceau: nicknamed "The Tiger", was determined on one thing - revenge. He had
witnessed the destruction the German occupation had caused to his country and rebuilding
northern France would be expensive: he was determined that Germany should pay to repair the
extensive damage that it had caused.
2. Clemenceau was determined to obtain a peace that would never again allow Germany to invade
France. Speaking to his Parliament in 1918 he stated, "I wage war..always, everywhere I shall
wage war..and shall continue to do so even after the guns have stopped..."
3. As Germany was stronger than France this meant that Versailles would have to be a harsh treaty
that would permanently weaken Germany. He had no faith in Wilson's ideals. He knew exactly
what he wanted - to crush Germany while he had the chance.
4. He regarded Franco-German hostility as a fact of nature. His vindictive attitude weakened the
chances of a lasting peace. France demanded (amongst other things)...
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Very high reparations from Germany.
A continuous Rhine frontier and
a continuation of the wartime alliance with Britain and the USA to give France
security.
France's allies were to refuse the last two demands and this led Clemenceau to remark that Germany's
defeat was only a "Pyrrhic (empty) victory" for France. Both Lloyd-George and Wilson, it turned out,
had frequently to give way to Clemenceau. Neither Britain nor America had been invaded by the
Germans; it was difficult, therefore, to persuade the French to moderate their demands. Indeed, the lack
of cooperation between Lloyd George and Clemenceau nearly caused a breakdown of the treaty
negotiations at one point.
Lloyd George
1. Whereas commentators noted that the attitudes of Wilson and Clemenceau were, in their
different ways, fixed, Lloyd George was extremely flexible.
2. He personally favoured moderate terms, and gave only limited support to the French desire for
revenge.
3. Britain's principal goal at the peace conference was to remove the threat of German naval power
and to end Germany's overseas empire.
4. Once Lloyd George had achieved these two objectives, he pursued a moderate territorial
settlement out of concern that a harsh peace would prompt a defeated Germany to try to destroy
the new international order.
5. Lloyd-George had begun by arguing in favour of a less severe settlement (i.e. "a just
peace...without any spirit of greed", as he called it) so that Germany could resume her role as a
customer for British goods and also, through economic recovery, avoid falling into the grasp of
communism.
6. However, Lloyd-George had to be sensitive to a vengeful British electorate whose support he
had obtained with the slogan, "Hang the Kaiser" and talk of getting from Germany, "everything
that you can squeeze out of a lemon and a bit more".
7. However, his attitude towards Germany had moved toward the French position by June 1919.
8. Reparations were imposed upon Germany to make her pay for the war. Lloyd George wished to
scale them down, but he got little assistance from the Americans and met downright hostility
from the French.
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9. On Germany's western frontiers Lloyd George could make little headway against the
determination of the French. Once the principle of punishment had been accepted, it was
difficult to be to argue about its extent.
Wilson
1. Wilson, with his idealistic "14 Points", believed in a lenient peace and not one of revenge
which, he believed, would leave Europe more unstable than he had found it. However Wilson
had to deal with the harsh political realities of 1919 e.g.;
"National self-determination" for all peoples would have created a Germany that was stronger
in 1919 than she had been in 1914 if the Austrians and the Sudeten Germans had been allowed
to join Germany.
2. Wilson had to accept his allies' demands for reparations although he was able to limit these to
losses caused to civilians and their property instead of "the whole cost of the war". Moreover,
Wilson's main concern seemed to be setting up the League of Nations (point number 14). One
of his diplomats remarked. "The President's obsession to a League blinds him to everything
else. The whole world wants peace... the President wants his League."
3. Wilson was regarded among European intellectuals as a high-minded idealist who came to Paris
almost as a neutral. He had been first elected President of the USA in 1912, with an
unprecedented majority, but when he arrived in Europe the Democrats had already suffered
losses in the elections of 1918, and Wilson's support in the American Congress had been
undermined.
4. He was well placed, nevertheless, to stand aside from the revengeful passions which moved
Europeans. He genuinely sought a just Settlement and contributed many constructive ideas, and
the myth developed that Lloyd George was in some ways a go-between who tried to bridge the
gap between the ferocity of the French and the idealism of the Americans.
5. He also had a talent for making enemies, seeming self-righteous, obsessed with his own views
and intolerant of others. The essential soundness of Wilson's aims was sometimes obscured by
the manner in which he defended them, and he was not an easy man to work with. If Wilson and
Lloyd George had been able to work in closer harmony a more moderate as well as a more
coherent Settlement might have been produced.
Orlando
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He was another academic - a professor of law - who moved into politics. He was bent on
securing for Italy territories promised under the 1915 Pact of London, which he claimed
were rightfully Italian, but not yet achieved (Italia Irredenta).
He soon came into conflict with President Wilson, who thought that Italian claims were
exaggerated and contrary to his principle of self-determination. Orlando was also
handicapped by not being able to speak English.
His failure in Paris to sustain Italy's point of view, and his inability at home to remedy
Italy's growing unrest, led to his political eclipse. He withdrew from politics when
Mussolini came to power, and did not return to office until 1946.
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Conclusion
Not one of the Big Three survived long in office after the Peace Conference.
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Frenchmen thought that Clemenceau had not done enough, that Germany had been left
alarmingly strong. In retirement, before his death in 1929, the old man brooded on the
German problem and wrote his memoirs under the title The Grandeur and Misery of
Victory.
Lloyd George, after a troubled ministry from 1918 to 1922, lost the support of the electors
and never again held office, although he continued to produce new ideas which lesser
statesmen contrived to ignore.
Wilson returned to America to campaign for active American involvement in world affairs,
but by the end of 1919 he had collapsed and remained an invalid until his death in 1924.
4. What was the impact of the Treaty of Versailles of June 1919 upon Germany?
(The terms of the Treaty)
Loss of Territory in Europe
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Alsace-Lorraine to France
Eupen and Malmedy to Belgium
North Schleswig to Denmark (after a plebiscite)
West Prussia and Posen to Poland and Danzig to be a free city under the League of Nations
principally so that Poland could use it.
Upper Silesia to Poland (after a plebiscite)
The Saar to be run by the League for 15 years (than a plebiscite would be held to decide its
future status). In the meantime France would use its coalmines.
Union between Germany and Austria forbidden.
Restrictions on armaments
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Army restricted to 100,000 troops and conscription forbidden
Tanks, military aircraft and submarines prohibited
Rhineland to be permanently demilitarised and garrisoned with French troops for 15 years.
Only 6 battleships allowed
Germany's African colonies were taken away
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South West Africa, German East Africa. Cameroons and Togo were shared amongst Britain
and France as League mandates.
Germany was saddled with responsibility for the outbreak of the war
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The War Guilt clause fixed the blame for the outbreak of the war solely on Germany and
her allies: "231”
Germany was to pay reparations for the damage done to the Allies
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In 1921 the sum was fixed at £6,600 million in cash and kind to be paid over 66 years.
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A League of Nations was set up to effectively police the Treaty but Germany was not invited to join.
5. Why did the Germans object and how far were their objections justified?
(1) It was a dictated peace (Diktat)
The Germans were not allowed into the discussions at Versailles: they were simply presented with the
terms and told to sign otherwise Germany would be occupied (this was the "Diktat" that Hitler was
later to refer to). However, the Germans had done the same to the Russians at Brest-Litovsk in March
1918.
(2) Many provisions were not based on the 14 Points
The Germans claimed that they had been promised terms based on the 14 Points therefore they felt that
they had been swindled. However, the 14 Points had never been accepted as official by any of the states
involved while Germany herself had ignored them in January 1918 when she still seemed to have a
chance of winning the war. Also Wilson's attitude had hardened after the scorched earth policies of the
Germans during their retreat.
(3) The loss of territory was too much to bear
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Germany lost 13% of her territory and 7 million people. Moreover. Wilson's idea of
national self-determination was not applied in the following cases;
Alsace-Lorraine
West Prussia and the Polish Corridor (2 million Germans)
Danzig (90% German speaking)
Austria (5 million German speakers)
Sudeten Germans (3 million were put into Czechoslovakia)
(4) Disarmament was deeply resented
The Germans claimed that 100,000 troops were not enough to keep law and order at a time of political
unrest. Also hostile neighbours who did not respect the calls for disarmament threatened Germany.
However, Germany's powerful army and her militarism had helped to both cause and sustain the war.
(5) The War Guilt" clause (Article 231) was unfair
The Germans objected to being saddled with the entire blame for the outbreak of the war, which was a
complex affair in which several nations played important roles.
(6) Reparations were far too high
The figure of 6,600 million pounds (to be paid over 66 years) was far too high (given Germany's poor
economic condition - 500,000 Germans had starved to death in 1918). J.M.Keynes (an economic
advisor to the British government) who said that trying to repay this sum would further impoverish
Germany and prevent effective trade between nations supported this view. Moreover, it would punish
future generations of Germans who would be held responsible for what their grandparents were alleged
to have done. The exact amount of compensation to be paid was left to be worked out by an Allied
Reparation Commission. The Commission did not complete its calculations until April 1921.
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Meanwhile, the Allies had already taken steps to seize some of the more easily-removed German
properties, such as railway engines, and the Treaty of Versailles gave them authority to seize the
private property of Germans which lay outside Germany. The amount eventually fixed for Germany to
pay was 136, 000 million marks (£6, 600 million), plus interest. Much of the first instalment was paid
in coal. The intention was that the Allies would take a regular share of the wealth Germany produced
until the debt was paid. The Germans argued that this was a double punishment. The Treaty of
Versailles deprived them of lands and resources making wealth more difficult to produce; it then
required a share in that wealth for reparation.
(7) They were not allowed to join the League (victor’s club)
Because they were barred from joining the League they felt like an ‘outcast’ nation. It seemed there
was one rule for the winners and one for the losers. Britain and France did not have to cut down on
their weapons and they also kept their colonies.
How harsh was it?
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On one hand, Germany emerged from the peace conference as a potentially powerful
country because its industrial areas were left intact and it did not lose any vital territory.
However, the Germans clearly did have some grounds for complaint but given the intense
feelings of the time it is surprising that the treaty was not even more harsh.
Germany remained essentially intact (though temporarily weakened) and she remained the
strongest power in Europe economically as well as strategically because she no longer had
Russia threatening her on her eastern borders (France could now no longer threaten
Germany with a war on two fronts).
This potential for a future regeneration of German strength was the main reason why
France felt bitterly disappointed by the Treaty.
The U.S. Senate refused to approve the treaty in part because of internal U.S. politics, and
the United States concluded a separate peace treaty with Germany in 1921. Without U.S.
support, the economically weakened, war-weary countries of France and Britain were left
with the difficult task of enforcing the provisions of the Versailles peace.
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6. How did the victors feel about the settlement?
In the months after the Treaty of Versailles was signed, all nations took stock of this and of the other
treaties. You might expect Britain, France and the USA to have been pleased with it, but there had been
too many compromises made in too much haste for this.
France
Following the Treaty of Versailles, France felt more secure against German aggression, but there was
still a strong feeling that the treaty should have been harsher. France had wanted to take over part of the
German navy, to have had total control of the Saar, and for the Rhineland to have become independent.
Critics of the treaty said that if this had happened. Germany would have been too weak ever to have
tried to overturn the treaty. They believed that Germany was still strong enough to seek revenge. This
view was summed up by the French general. Marshal Foch, when he said, 'This is not peace, it is an
armistice for twenty years'.
Britain
There were two different reactions in Britain. Not surprisingly, after so many deaths, there was much
popular support for the harshness of the treaty. Yet some people felt that the treaty would create
problems in the future because it was too harsh. Some of the British delegates at Versailles had been
heavily influenced by German objections: they asked for last-minute changes, to allow Germany to join
the League of Nations and reparations to be reconsidered. Clemenceau and Wilson refused.
The treaty is in danger of reducing Germany to servitude for a generation, of degrading the lives of
millions of human beings and of depriving a whole nation of happiness.
These were the words of John Maynard Keynes, the chief British economist at Versailles. He resigned
in protest at the treaty, saying that it was impossible for Germany to pay reparations because of her
economic problems.
USA
President Wilson was delighted that the League of Nations had been set up. By 1919, however,
Wilson's views were less important. He was the leader of the Democrat Party, but elections in 1918
gave his opponents, the Republicans, control of the Senate. Wilson was still president, but the Senate
would not agree to his policies. The Republicans wanted the USA to stay out of European politics and.
as a result, the USA never did sign the Treaty.
Italy
Italy thought that it had made big sacrifices during the war, when over 600,000 soldiers had been lost,
but that its case for reward had never been considered. It had been given no colonies, and no share in
the mandates distributed. It had received few lands, and its claims to Italia Irredenta had been rejected.
Its finances were in ruins, but it was to receive only a derisory 15 per cent share of reparations. The
economy was breaking down, and industrial relations were threatened by massive strikes and lockouts.
The Italian poet d'Annunzio and a band of blackshirted nationalists seized the Adriatic port of Fiume
for Italy, but Giolitti's government sent Italian troops to turn them out and crush the movement. The
government's abject compliance with the Allies' wishes infuriated the Italian people.
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7. The Rest of the Paris Peace Settlement
The treaties mentioned below, including the Treaty of Versailles, were collectively known as The Paris
Peace Settlement.
The Treaty of St Germain (1919) dealing with Austria
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The former Austro-Hungarian Empire was broken up.
The new state of Czechoslovakia was recognised
Austria and Hungary became separate states
The new state of Yugoslavia was created, partly from lands formerly in the
Austro-Hungarian Empire
Poland got Galicia and Italy obtained the South Tyrol
Union between Austria and Germany was forbidden
Austria accepted certain responsibilities for war damage
Although the Austrian republic agreed in theory to make some reparation, no money was
paid. Payments in kind were on a small scale because the new was obviously not wealthy.
Austrians complained that, although self-determination was used to justify the Breaking up
of the Habsburg Empire, the principle was ignored when Germans in the South Tyrol
became subjects of Italy and those in the Sudetenland became subjects of Czechoslovakia.
Almost all Austrians spoke German and many felt that it would be difficult for a tiny
Austria to survive alone; so a union with Germany would be helpful. They therefore doubly
resented the loss of their own German subjects and their enforced isolation from the new
republican Germany.
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The Treaty of Trianon (1920) dealing with Hungary
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Hungary accepted the break up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
Hungary was reduced in size as Czechoslovakia was given Slovakia and Ruthenia,
Yugoslavia got Croatia and Slovenia while Romania obtained Transylvania.
Hungary accepted certain responsibilities for war damage
In vain, they protested that plebiscites should be held in areas now declared to be parts of
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania.
Over three million Magyars (Hungarians) now found themselves the subjects of foreign
governments. Over half of them were in Rumania which had been persuaded in 1916 to
assist the Allies in the war; Rumania therefore expected a reward. The population of
Hungary was now less than half of what it had been before the war.
(It is important to note that the Austro-Hungarian Empire had already disintegrated before the
Armistice (owing to the demands of the disaffected nationalities who were compelled to fight
in an unpopular war) and that the peacemakers at Versailles merely recognised what had
already, in effect, taken place).
The Treaty of Sevres (1920) dealing with Turkey
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Turkey was to lose Eastern Thrace, many Aegean islands and Smyrna to Greece; Rhodes to
Italy and Cyprus to Britain.
Turkey's former Arab lands were made League of Nations mandates and distributed as
follows; Syria and Lebanon (France), Jordan, Iraq and Palestine (Britain) although Saudi
Arabia became independent. There was no hope that the Turkish Empire, long-renowned
for inefficiency and corruption, could escape the fate of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
The effect of this Treaty was to reduce Turkey to the barren and mountain Anatolia (Asia
Minor). She had been almost completely expelled from Europe; her capital city was
separated from the rest of the country by Straits under international control and, even in
Anatolia, the Greeks held the city of Smyrna and the Italians held Adalia. The Treaty dealt
the Sultan his death blow.
The Treaty of Neuilly (1919) with Bulgaria
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Bulgaria had joined the war on the side of the Central Powers in 1915. Under the provisions
of the Treaty of Neuilly, Bulgaria was now to share in the setbacks of the defeated. Like
them, she suffered limitations on her armed forces and losses of territory and a figure was
eventually worked out for reparation. The penalties imposed were by no means severe,
however, and Bulgaria even gained a small area of land, from Turkey. The loss of access to
the Aegean Sea, and thus to the Mediterranean, was the most serious of the injuries done to
Bulgaria.
Bulgaria lost territory to Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania Anxious to improve her position
as one of the minor Balkan states,
Lausanne 1923
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At Lausanne, Mustapha Kemal achieved most of his immediate ambitions.
The Treaty returned East Thrace to Turkey and left to the Turks the control of the Straits.
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Anatolia remained free from foreign troops and the Turks were required neither to limit
their armed forces nor to make reparation.
The parts of the Treaty of Sevres which dealt with the Arab states were confirmed and only
minor changes were made concerning the ownership of islands.
Greeks and Turks exchanged some populations to lessen the risks of Greek retaliation
against Turks and vice versa, but old hatreds between them remained.
These hatreds would find a stage on which to contend, in the second half of the twentieth
century, in Cyprus
8. The Weaknesses of the Settlement in Eastern Europe
(1) Despite attempts to create new states, whose borders were to be established according to the
national identity of the inhabitants (i.e. self-determination), substantial minorities were left stranded
inside states to which they held no allegiance.
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One million Bulgars were put under foreign rule
Three million Magyars (Hungarians) in Transylvania were given to Romania
Three million Germans were given to Czechoslovakia and two million Germans given to
Poland. Millions of Slovenes, Croats and Albanians resented their inferior status vis a vis
the Serbs in the new state of Yugoslavia.
The main reason for these departures from the 14 Points was that strategic and economic considerations
sometimes took priority over self-determination. For example. West Prussia (2 million Germans) and
the Sudetenland’s (3 million Germans) were given to Poland and Czechoslovakia respectively for the
aforementioned reasons. Moreover, several states challenged the Settlement in the Twenties;
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Italian nationalists seized Fiume in 1920 and in 1923. Italy invaded the Greek island of
Corfu.
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Poland was unhappy with the limitations placed on her eastern border and in 1919 she
seized the Ukraine from Russia. By the Treaty of Riga in 1921 Poland relinquished the
Ukraine but obtained western Byelorussia (including 4 million Russians). Furthermore.
Poland seized Vilna from Lithuania.
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However, the most successful challenge to the Settlement came from Turkey that was
outraged by the loss of so much territory to Greece. The loss of Smyrna (see map) on the
Turkish mainland infuriated Turkish national feeling (self-determination being ignored in
this case). Led by Mustapha Kemal (with the cry," We are Turks and we will never be the
subjects of a people who were yesterday our slaves."), Turkey rejected the Treaty of Sevres
and chased the Greeks out of Smyrna after a bloody struggle.
In 1923 the erstwhile warring parties plus Britain and France agreed to the Treaty of Lausanne whereby
Turkey got back Eastern Thrace and Smyrna (one million Greeks living in Turkey were forced to leave
their homes and 400,000 Turks left Greece).
Therefore, by 1923 the Peace Settlement had been successfully challenged by aggression on more
than one occasion.
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2) Some areas of Europe suffered economically as a result of the Settlement.
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The natural economic unity of the Danube basin was destroyed as new states introduced
tariff barriers.
Austria ceded her industrial areas to Poland and Czechoslovakia while Hungary lost her
best agricultural land to Romania. Both countries suffered serious economic and political
problems as a consequence.
(3) The Settlement divided Europe into those states that wanted to maintain it and those states that
wanted to destroy it.
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Although Britain was a founder of the Settlement, she increasingly felt that it had been too
harsh on Germany (and Turkey)
France desperately sought to uphold the letter of the treaties but believed that her security
had been compromised by a Settlement that had been too lenient towards the aggressors.
Italy felt cheated, as she did not get the territories that the secret Treaty of London (1915)
had promised her (e.g. land in Africa and along the Adriatic).
Russia and Germany (both temporarily weakened) had been excluded from the negotiations
and did not feel bound by the Settlement's provisions. Germany loathed Versailles and
Russia felt unhappy with a hostile Poland and Finland on her borders (as well as with the
loss of land to Romania).
(4) The European power balance was destroyed by the Settlement.
The "Successor States" that were recognised at Versailles (ie. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria,
Hungary, Yugoslavia, Finland and the Baltic States) created a power vacuum in Eastern Europe and
were far too weak politically, economically, militarily and strategically to resist a revived and
expansionist Germany and Russia in the Thirties and Forties.
9. The effects on Germany to 1923
Introduction
There could therefore be no doubt that Germany, in accepting the armistice on the basis of the Fourteen
Points and of the Allied note about them, had undertaken to pay some form of indemnity. The Allied
note of 5 November 1918 had specified that 'compensation will be made by Germany for all damage
done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property'. This condition was accordingly
included as Article 232 of the Treaty of Versailles which the German representatives signed in June,
1919.
This enforced acceptance of a very general 'responsibility' was bitterly resented in Germany because it
meant admitting under pressure that all Germans who had died in the war had died for an unjust cause.
Secondly, since no sum could be agreed upon by the Allies before the Treaty was signed, a Reparation
Commission was set up to determine the amount that Germany should be required to pay and to
supervise its collection on behalf of the Allied governments. This meant requiring Germany in 1919 to
sign a blank cheque, and projected the wrangles about reparations far into the postwar years.
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The payment of Reparations by Germany
The sum eventually agreed by the Allies in April 1921 for the Germans to pay - £6,600 million - was a
problem. Although heavy, it was not outside the range of economic possibility. Perhaps the German
working day would have had to be lengthened, and the economy kept working at peak efficiency under
watchful management, but many were sure it could be done.
German unwillingness to pay
The real problem was not the ability of the Germans to pay, but the practicability of the Allies insisting
on it. Naturally the Germans complained at the burden so as to get it reduced, but the resolve of the
Allies gradually weakened. At first they took a tough line saying: 'Justice is the only possible basis for
the settlement of the account of this terrible war . . . Reparations for wrongs inflicted is of the essence
of justice. Somebody must suffer for the consequences of the war. Is it to be Germany, or the countries
she has wronged?’ When the final figure was announced; the German government protested, and it was
only an ultimatum from France to occupy the Ruhr and a loan from London bankers that compelled
them to agree to the Allies' decision in May.
In 1922, they once again protested, and once again the Allies insisted. Part of the money for the first
payment came from the delivery of coal and timber. The non-delivery of consignments of timber in
December 1922 gave the French their excuse to turn the screw, and in January 1923, in spite of British
protests, French and Belgian troops were sent to occupy the Ruhr. There were strikes in the coal and
steel industries, and the factories came to a stand still. Right-wing agitators in Germany were delighted
to see public opinion, at least in Germany, swinging in their favour. The French reacted harshly and
over 100 strikers were killed and over 100,000 were expelled from the region.
The great German inflation
The most important result was that Germany had no goods to trade and no money to but things with!
The paralysis of Ruhr industry, together with the German government's determination to maintain
strike pay and other social benefits, led to rapid inflation. The further the German mark depreciated, the
faster it was printed; and the faster it was printed, the further depreciated. Soon barrow-loads of it were
necessary to make even the simplest of purchases. The price of goods could change from the back to
the front of the queue. Of course, it did not help Germany's reparation predicament, since the country’s
obligations were calculated in terms of gold.
The effect of such a massive inflation was to destroy the value of money, thus wiping out the savings,
investments and pensions of millions of ordinary Germans. The public debt was also wiped out, and so
funds invested in it, e.g. by insurance companies. Eventually a new German government under Gustav
Stresemann, with Dr Hjalmar Schacht as financial adviser, was able to stabilize the currency in 1924,
making 1 new Reichsmark equivalent to 1,000,000,000,000 'old' marks.
The whole operation went so smoothly that some foreign observers even suggested that the whole
inflation had been planned by a few powerful Germans whose own wealth was securely locked up in
land and other real property.
The solution of the reparations problem
In 1924, after a change of government in France, a committee of experts, under US Vice-President
Charles Dawes, produced the Dawes Plan for more gradual reparations payments, with early
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instalments at £50 million per year, and later ones at £125 million. A gold loan of 800 million
Reichsmarks was made to Germany, and over the next six years Germany received around 21,000
million marks. Foreign credit was enough to keep the exchange value of the mark stable. In effect,
money was being borrowed with which to pay reparations: the Germans contributed very little. The
heaviest burden imposed by the Dawes Plan never exceeded 3 per cent of the German national income.
Meanwhile, the Germans used the money to rebuild their railways and manufacturing plant. Some
German towns even spent the money to reshape their public buildings. In 1929, however, the flow of
money into Germany faltered, when the New York stock exchange offered the prospect of bigger
pickings. That year, another committee under the US financier Owen Young modified the Dawes Plan,
cutting Germany's total liability to £2,000 million, spread over a period of 59 years.
But the Young Plan in reality mattered little, for before the end of 1929 the Great Depression burst
upon the world. German imports and exports fell sharply, and soon there were over 6 million
unemployed. US President Herbert Hoover in June 1931 announced a one-year moratorium
(postponement) on payments; and before this expired Germany announced its unwillingness to make
further payments. A conference at Lausanne in 1932 cancelled all outstanding obligations in return for
a final payment by Germany of £150 million, which the European governments insisted on receiving in
order to be able to continue their own payments to the United States. In the end, the German
government evaded even the last modest demand.
Political effects
In 1919 Ebert's government was very fragile. When he agreed to the Treaty it tipped Germany into
chaos. Ebert's right-wing opponents could not bear the Treaty and they attempted revolution against
him. The right-wing opponents were largely people who had grown up in the successful days of the
Kaiser's Germany. They had liked the Kaiser's dictatorial style of government. They liked Germany
having a strong army. They wanted Germany to expand its territory, and to have an empire. They had
been proud of Germany's powerful industry.
In March 1920 Dr Wolfgang Kapp led 5000 Freikorps into Berlin in a rebellion known as the Kapp
Putsch (Putsch means simply rebellion). The army refused to fire on the Freikorps and it looked as if
Ebert's government was doomed. However, it was saved by the German workers. They declared a
general strike which brought the capital to a halt with no transport, power or water. After a few days
Kapp realised he could not succeed and left the country. He was hunted down and imprisoned. The rest
of the rebels went unpunished.
Ebert himself had been very reluctant to sign the Treaty but he had no choice. Germany could not fight
on. However, in the minds of many Germans Ebert and his Weimar Republic were forever to blame for
the Treaty. To their right-wing opponents, the Socialist politicians who signed it became known as the
November Criminals. The injustice of the Treaty- became a rallying point for all Ebert's opponents.
They believed that the German army had been 'stabbed in the back' by the socialist and liberal
politicians who agreed an armistice in November 1918. They did not believe that Germany had been
beaten on the battlefield but betrayed by its civilians who didn't dare continue the war.
Ebert's government struggled to deal with the political violence in Germany. Political assassinations
were frequent. In the summer of 1922 Ebert's foreign minister Walther Rathenau was murdered by
extremists. Then in November 1923 Adolf Hitler led an attempted rebellion in Munich, known as the
Munich Putsch. Both Hitler and Rathenau's murderers received short prison sentences.
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10. Verdict on the Peace Settlement: How fair was the Treaty?
The Treaty of Versailles
1. We must call the peace treaty a “Compromise Peace”. Very few leaders and diplomats were
completely happy with it. Clemenceau and the French people felt it was not harsh enough and in 1920
he was voted out of office in the general election. People in Britain liked the Treaty but David LloydGeorge felt it was too harsh and later he called the treaty a “great pity”. He felt war would be more
likely rather than less likely to break out again because of it. Wilson was very disappointed with the
treaty. He felt he had been tricked into treating Germany more harshly than he had wanted and when he
got home the American Government refused to pass the Treaty, the American public were now against
him. The Italians felt they should have got more territory from Germany as well, as the allies had
promised it to them in 1915.
2. Apart from being harsh, one of the main criticisms was that Germany, (or any other of the defeated
powers) were not allowed to take part in the Conference-it was not a negotiated peace. When the
terms were announced they were naturally shocked and people felt sympathy towards them as they not
be allowed to see the terms before-hand.
3. Germany was so angry and humiliated that they began to look for revenge within 20 years, precisely
what they had wanted to avoid with the Treaty. They could not accept the “War Guilt Clause” (Article
231) that they had started the war and the reduction in their armed forces.
4. The English economist J.M Keynes predicted that the reparations would be disastrous for Germany
and he was right, the reparation payments had terrible consequences for Germany in the early 1920s
therefore leading to resentment in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
5. The Treaty caused so much resentment in Germany that it prepared the way for a new terrible force
in German politics-the Nazi party under Hitler and eventually World War Two.
Difficulties
It is easy to criticise the Treaty but.......................
1. Europe was in political and economic chaos, the Peacemakers did not have much time to make
decisions.
2. They had to act quickly as there was a flu epidemic sweeping through Europe and they had to get
things sorted out.
3. The public feeling in the Peacemaker’s home countries was very powerful, they had to do what the
people wanted.
4. There were many, many different groups who wanted their freedom, Wilson could not believe how
many nationalities he had to deal with.
If all this is taken into consideration they had a very difficult job, and they did not have the benefit of
time, or knowing what would happen to Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. It was so difficult to make a
decision it is a wonder that they were able to make peace at all!
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The Other Peace treaties of 1919-1920
The peace treaties made with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey were not without criticism either.
1. Like Versailles, no representatives from the defeated countries were allowed at the negotiations and
they had to disarm and pay reparations.
2. The new state of Poland had weak borders, the Polish Corridor always presented problems and the
new country contained 30% non-Poles. It was clear that the new state would not have a smooth start.
3. The treaties ignored some minority groups and set up small countries which were weak and
vulnerable, i.e. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. This made Europe less not more stable.
4. Turkey was upset that some of their lands went to Britain and France as Mandates, and not to
“independence” as they had been told.
5. Self-Determination applied to some groups but only if you were on a winning country! It did not
apply to Germans. Many found themselves within the borders of the new countries. (e.g. 3 million
within the new Czechoslovakia). This would create trouble for the new countries.
6. The old Austro-Hungarian Empire had also been a single economic unit. Now it had been broken up,
road and rail links were closed and it became difficult to trade. This contributed to the economic
weaknesses of the new countries.
Difficulties
1. All the same difficulties that the peacemakers faced at Versailles were true of the other Treaties-(flu
epidemic, feelings inside their countries, and political and economic chaos).
2. Self-determination was a good idea but there were so many different nationalities in Eastern Europe
who wanted their freedom, that this made the job of sorting out the old empires very difficult. Wilson's
later regret at his pronouncements about self-determination are worth recalling. 'When I gave utterance
to these words', he said,
'I said them without the knowledge that nationalities existed which are coming to us day after day.'
Therefore a new patchwork of national minorities replaced the old one.
Czechoslovakia, for example, had a total population of 14 million, of whom 4.5 million were Poles,
Ruthenes, Magyars and Germans. Poland's population of 32 million included nearly 1 million Germans,
6 million White Russians and 3 million Jews. Rumania now included 1.5 million Magyars. The result
was highly unsettling for postwar Europe because it divided the continent into some states which
wished to uphold the Versailles Settlement and some which were determined to revise it.
Once again, under the difficult circumstances it was amazing that they were able to reach any decisions
at all and make peace.
Inevitably the settlement pleased nobody;

The French (without their Rhine frontier nor their hoped-for peacetime alliance) believed
that they had been betrayed by their allies (and that 1.3 million French soldiers had died in
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vain).
The Americans became isolationist and did not ratify the Versailles Settlement (nor did
they join the League). So the settlement did not have the backing of the world's strongest
power.
Britain joined the League (along with France) but refused to support
France when she invaded the Ruhr area of Germany in 1923 in order to force Germany to
pay reparations.
Germany, not surprisingly, loathed the Treaty of Versailles (see later) which, it argued, was
grossly unfair and a travesty of Wilson's 14 Points.
Germany would work to destroy the Treaty which she achieved under Hitler's leadership in
the Thirties.
HOWEVER
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If organizations such as the League of Nations did not work as successfully as the peacemakers hoped they would, the fault lay less with the peacemakers than with the next
generation of statesmen. Hitler's aggressive disregard of the Treaty of Versailles stemmed
more from Hitler's aggressiveness than from the alleged faults in the Treaty.
It was remarkable for its moderation, Germans insisted on extracting from Article 231 the
maximum humiliation. The Allies were guilty of slipshod wording. It was absurd to suggest
that Germany alone had brought about the First World War. It was equally absurd of the
Germans to take the 'War Guilt Clause' in isolation and pretend that on this alone the
Settlement of Europe was based. Nevertheless, what Germany lost and what Germany was
made to pay came to be regarded as the foundations on which the whole Peace Settlement
was built.
Germany's territorial losses were much less harsh than those imposed on its allies AustriaHungary and the Ottoman Empire. In addition, some scholars have argued that Germany
could have paid the reparations, if the country’s standard of living had been reduced. The
reparation settlement failed not simply because Germany was not able to pay but because
many German people did not accept that Germany was more responsible for the war than
any other country.
When Nazi leader Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933, he was able to destroy much of the
Versailles treaty by exploiting two pervasive sentiments of the 1930s. The first was the lingering
suspicion, particularly widespread in Britain, that Germany had been treated unfairly at the peace
conference and that its demands for territorial changes should be considered. The second was the
universal belief that any political compromise with Nazi Germany was preferable to another European
war. The diplomacy of appeasement, which enabled Hitler to remilitarize Germany and take over
territory during the 1930s, was therefore a direct outgrowth of the memories that millions of survivors
retained of the traumatic experience of the World War I. They were intent on not repeating the
experience at all costs.
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