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Romans. However, Gnaeus Scipio reinforced his fleet with picked legionnaires, caught the Carthaginian fleet by surprise, and crushed it at the Battle of the Ebro. In the fall of 217 BC, Publius Cornelius Scipio, now a pro-consul, finally arrived in his allotted province with 8,000 reinforcements. Historical Background At the onset of the Second Punic War in 218 BC, Rome dispatched one of its consular armies, under Publius Cornelius Scipio, to invade northern Spain. Arriving at Massilia (modern Marseille), the Romans were stunned to discover that Hannibal was already on the east bank of the Rhone, headed for Italy. In what was possibly the key strategic decision of the war, Publius opted to continue with the invasion of Spain. He sent his army on under the command of his older brother Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, while Publius himself returned to Italy to face Hannibal. This move resulted in a 13year duel for supremacy between Rome and Carthage for control of the Iberian Peninsula. Following the loss of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica to Rome during the First Punic War (264-241 BC) and its aftermath, Hamilcar Barca ((Hannibal's father) carved out an extensive Spanish province for Carthage between 238 and 229 BC. As the Second Punic War opened, Carthage held all of southern and eastern Spain, up to the Ebro River. When Hannibal departed for Italy, he left his brother, Hasdrubal Barca, with 12,650 infantry, 2,550 cavalry, 21 elephants, and a small fleet to hold the province. After a swift conquest of northeastern Spain, Hannibal left Hanno with another 11,000 troops to control the newly-won territory. Hannibal took with him all the veteran troops and experienced officers of Carthage's Iberian army. He had also bypassed the coastal Greek cities of northern Spain, allies of Rome. Gnaeus Scipio had 22,000 infantry, 2,200 cavalry and a small fleet with which to undertake the invasion of Spain. With these troops, and friendly bases at Emporiae and Tarraco, Gnaeus easily crushed Hanno's army and took control of northern Spain in the fall of 218 BC. The following spring, Hasdrubal, his forces augmented by Iberian levies, advanced north to challenge the Meanwhile, in Italy, Hannibal won three spectacular victories over the Romans at Trebbia, Trasimene, and Cannae by the summer of 216 BC. The Carthaginian government resolved that the time had come to reinforce Hannibal in Italy with an army from Spain and bring the war to a conclusion. Carthage sent Hasdrubal 4,000 foot and 500 horse as reinforcements, along with orders to march for Italy. A rebellion among the Tartesii tribe in southern Spain, however, delayed his invasion until the following year. In the meantime, the Scipio brothers consolidated their control north of the Ebro and prepared to meet Hasbrubal's onslaught. The Battle of Dertosa In the spring of 215 BC, Hasdrubal moved north with some 25,000 foot, 4,000 horse and 21 elephants. The Scipio brothers masses 30,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry to bar his path at the Ebro River. Hasdrubal's objective was to defeat the main Roman field army so that he could cross into Italy while still maintaining Carthaginian control of Spain. The Scipio brothers likewise aimed to defeat Hasdrubal in open battle to prevent his crossing into Italy and to break his grip on the Iberian Peninsula. Hasdrubal's army was comprised mainly of African and mercenary regulars augmented by Iberian levies. His infantry consisted of around 15,000 Libyan spearmen, 1,000 mercenaries (Ligurians and other unspecified soldiers of fortune), 8,000 Iberians, and 1,000 Balearic slingers. His mounted force included 2,300 Numidian light cavalry, 450 Liby-Phoenician heavy cavalry, 1,200 Spanish horse, and 21 elephants. Reportedly, his Spanish levies were none too anxious to make the trek to Italy that would follow a victory. The Scipio brothers' forces included two reinforced Roman legions, consisting of 10,000 foot and 600 horse, and allied Italian troops numbering nearly 18,000 infantry and 1,800 cavalry. Their auxiliary Iberian forces probably included about 2,000 foot and 400 horse. The Roman command was exercised jointly by the Scipio brothers. Although Publius had initially been the supreme commander, with Gnaeus as his deputy, the command by this point was largely shared. Gnaeus was the elder brother, and he had served a consulship with distinction against the Insubrian Gauls in 222 BC. Gnaeus has also served as the sole commander in Spain for over a year before Publius arrived. The Senate appears to have vested both brothers with pro-consular authority. Hasdrubal, on the other hand, was the unquestioned sole Carthaginian commander. This was mainly because he had no subordinate commanders of note. Himilco, his deputy, remained behind in southern Spain to maintain control of the vast Carthaginian province. Since both sides sought to fight a decisive battle, the maneuvering was limited and straightforward. In the early spring of 215 BC, the Romans crossed the Ebro and laid siege to the Carthaginian allied city of Ibera (the Battle of Dertosa is also known as the Battle of Ibera). Hasdrubal in turn laid siege to a small Roman allied city, also on the south bank of the Ebro, across from the city of Dertosa (modern Tortosa). The Romans then moved against Hasdrubal and he obliged by coming down onto a nearby plain to face them. The two camps were about five miles apart, and the two armies felt each other out during five days of skirmishing. The stage was set for the climactic showdown. The Scipio brothers deployed their army in standard fashion, with the two legions in the center and the allied infantry divided evenly between the wings. The Roman cavalry, reinforced with the Spanish horse, formed on the extreme right. On the far left were posted all the Italian cavalry. About 2,000 roman and Italian infantry and the Spanish auxiliary foot remained behind as a camp guard. Hasdrubal, who by now had received a full account of the action at Cannae, posted his sturdy African phalanxes on the wings of his infantry line. The right wing was purely African, while the left wing was reinforced by his mercenaries. The center was composed entirely of Iberian tribal levies. He stationed his Liby-Phoenician heavy cavalry and Iberian horsemen on his far left, opposite the Roman cavalry. Against the Italian horse he posted his superb Numidian light cavalry. Each cavalry wing was also reinforced with about ten African war elephants (the same disposition Hannibal had employed at the Battle of Trebbia). The Balearic slingers formed an extended skirmish line. The remaining infantry, 2,000 to 3,000 in number, guarded his camp. The Roman battle plan appears to have been typically straightforward—a frontal assault, weighted in the center. The Scipio brothers, like Hasdrubal, were well aware of what had occurred at Cannae. They apparently believed the appropriate counter to envelopment was to rupture the enemy center. For his part, Hasdrubal knew that the circumstances he faced were significantly different from those at Cannae. His infantry was much closer in numbers to his Roman opponent's than Hannibal's had been, but he lacked the decisive cavalry superiority his brother had exploited to such good effect. Hasdrubal could only hope that his elephant corps would provide the quick victory he needed from his cavalry on the flanks, and that his unenthusiastic Iberian infantry could hold in the center long enough for the envelopment to unfold. The action began in the center with the charge of the two Roman legions into Hasdrubal's Iberian infantry; the Spanish troops immediately gave ground. The African phalanxes and mercenaries on the wings now came into play and forced the allied Italian foot back. Meanwhile, on the extreme flanks, the elephant charges proved ineffectual, and neither side's mounted troops gained a quick advantage. At this critical juncture, the Carthaginian center broke in the face of the aggressive Roman assault. Although Hasdrubal had thus lost his chance for scoring a "Cannae," he could still win a "Trebbia" at this point. For just as in that earlier battle, the Carthaginian infantry wings were victorious even as their center faltered. In fact, the Italian infantry was hard pressed and effectively outflanked by the African phalanxes. But at the Trebbia, the Carthaginian cavalry had won a decisive victory—at Dertosa, they skirmished indecisively, then lost their nerve when they observed the rout of the center. The Punic cavalry joined in the flight, thereby dooming the heretofore victorious African and mercenary infantry on the wings. After putting up a stubborn fight and both inflicting and suffering heavy losses, Hasdrubal's wings joined in the rout. Cannae had been avenged. The Aftermath The immediate result of this battle was to prevent Hasdrubal from crossing into Italy with a second Carthaginian army. He would not accomplish this for another eight years (208-207 BC). Although the failed invasion attempt of 215 BC has been historically eclipsed by the Metaurus campaign of 207 BC, Hasdrubal's earlier effort actually posed a far greater threat to Rome's survival. In 215 BC, Rome, still reeling from Cannae, would most likely have been overwhelmed by the combined forces of the two eldest sons of Hamilcar Barca. By 207 BC, Rome was far better prepared to handle a second invasion, as the resulting Battle of Metaurus demonstrated. The Roman victory at Dertosa also brought the Scipio brothers new Iberian allies and the opportunity to carry the war into Punic Spain. In fact, the Scipio brothers carried on the war in Spain with great success for the next four years. However, in 211 BC, Hasdrubal Barca, along with his brother Mago and Hasdrubal Gisgo, defeated and slew them both in the twin Battles of Castulo and Ilorca. Of course, Hasdrubal was also destined to die in a losing battle, at the Metaurus. It was left to Publius Scipio's son, the great Africanus, to avenge the deaths of his father and his uncle by decisively crushing the Carthaginian Spanish armies at Ilipa in 206 BC. This battle would spell the end of Carthaginian domination and the beginning of Roman control of the Iberian Peninsula. The Final Analysis Why did Hasdrubal fail at Dertosa while his brother Hannibal had succeeded at Cannae against a far larger Roman army? Many have assumed that Hasdrubal was simply inferior to his older brother in command ability. While this charge may have some merit, Hasdrubal undeniably suffered from a number of serious disadvantages. First of all, he lacked the cavalry superiority (10,000 to 6,000) that proved decisive at Cannae. He lacked the disciplined troops that Hannibal commanded, veterans of 20 years of continuous warfare in Spain. Even more important, he lacked the cadre of highly trained, professional staff officers that accompanied Hannibal into Italy. This was particularly evident in the failure of the Carthaginian cavalry to press home its attacks on the extreme flanks. In addition, Hasdrubal faced two very competent Roman commanders in the Scipio brothers, whereas Hannibal had been matched against the inept Gaius Terentius Varro. But most important, a double envelopment is probably the riskiest of battle plans, promising total, annihilating victory or overwhelming defeat. Chance, or fate, had its role as well. Hasdrubal tossed the dice, and lost. Hasdrubal is killed, there is no substitute OC. Tychaeus may only command Numidian cavalry. Roman Leadership Publius and Gnaeus Scipio are both Roman OCs, but only over the following units: •Gnaeus Scipio is OC for the III Double Legion, VII Ala Sociorum Legion, and all AS Cavalry. •Publius Scipio is OC for the V Double Legion, XIV Ala Sociorum Legion, and the Roman and Iberian cavalry. Both Scipio brothers can command any Roman unit which is outside its normal command chain by using individual orders. If either brother is killed, the other becomes OC for the entire Roman army. Retreat Edges The Carthaginians use the Southwest edge as their Retreat Edge. The Romans use the Northeast edge as their Retreat Edge. Optional Rules The following rules from Consul for Rome are recommended, if you have the module: • Triarii Tactical Doctrine • Roman Line Replacement From SPQR's Zama scenario, you may use the Special Rule: "Blow, Scipio, Blow." Either Africanus' father or uncle may issue the command for the sonic anti-elephant blast in this scenario. (Surus is not affected.) Victory The army which routs loses the scenarios. If both armies rout simultaneously, the Carthaginians win. Army Rout Rome: Army routs when units with TQ totaling 188 have been eliminated. Carthage: Army routs when units with TQ totaling 110 have been eliminated. Sources The sources for Dertosa are generally the same as those listed for SPQR. However, the primary source is Livy, rather than Polybius, as the latter's account of this battle has not survived. Additional sources: Head, Duncan, Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars, Wargamers Research Group, Sussex, 1982 Lazenby, J. F., Hannibal's War, Warminster, 1978