Download Objective and Subjective Ends in Kant`s Realm of Ends

Second Annual Dutch Conference on Practical Philosophy
University of Groningen, October 8 and 9, 2010
Stijn Van Impe, Ghent University
Objective and Subjective Ends in Kant’s Realm of Ends
In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant assesses his idea of a moral world as
a ‘realm of ends’ (‘Reich der Zwecke’) defining it as ‘a whole of all ends in systematic
connection (a whole both of rational beings as ends in themselves and the ends of his own
that each may set himself)’ (IV:433). The importance of this topic for Kant’s moral
philosophy can hardly be overestimated for Kant strikingly holds that ‘Morality consists,
then, in the reference of all action to the lawgiving by which alone a realm of ends is possible’
(IV:434). Yet, in the literature, rather little attention has been devoted to Kant’s realm of
ends. First, I shall briefly examine what it is that makes a being a rational being and what
Kant exactly means by calling rational beings ‘ends in themselves’ or ‘objective ends’. In
contrast to these ‘objective ends’, I shall use the notion of ‘subjective ends’ for referring to the
ends that a rational being sets. Secondly, I shall show that Kant’s paradoxical claims (i) that
the realm of ends contains the subjective ends that each may set for himself and (ii) that its
realisation at the same time requires abstraction from the content of these subjective ends
(IV:433), are not incompatible if we distinguish two stages that Kant probably has in mind.
First, we have to abstract from the content of the ends in determining which maxims of
action are to be universalised and in universally legislating for a moral community, for if this
were not to be the case, we would act for the sake of our own ends and we would not legislate
universally. Secondly, once we have decided – in abstraction from the content of ends – to act
on universalisable maxims, legislating within a realm of ends according to such maxims
will yield the pursuit of particular as well as common ends that can be recognised as morally
legitimate and that sketch a vivid image of what our moral conduct leads to. Finally, I shall
argue that the subjective, morally legitimate ends in the realm of ends can be understood as
(i) morally permissible ends, i.e., ends that a subject wishes to pursue and that may be valueneutral or amoral but that do not violate or conflict with the moral law, and (ii)
morally obligatory ends, i.e., ‘ends as duties’ as developed in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals.
Moreover, I suggest to combine this distinction with a second division into (i) individual ends
and (ii) shared or social ends. Hence, a four field taxonomy is generated: (i) individual,
morally permissible ends (e.g. listening to a piece of music), (ii) social, morally permissible
ends (e.g. sharing a dinner), (iii) individual, morally obligatory ends (one’s own perfection)
and (iv) social, morally obligatory ends (promoting others’ happiness). My interpretation
thus also suggests to interpret Kant’s realm of ends as a meaningful connection of ethical
liberalism and ethical socialism.