Download but it was no match for his own genius. All the more true in the case

T h e D E A T H of C A E S A R
but it was no match for his own genius. All the more true in the case of the
gossip and rumor that was the stuff of domestic political intelligence. Cae102
sar's problem was probably not too little information but too much. One
imagines a steady stream of rumors and tips of alleged threats. The difficulty
was separating fact from fiction.
Caesar heard accusations that Brutus, Mark Antony, and Dolabella were
each plotting revolution. He suspected Brutus and Cassius. He made a
memorable quip about the supposed plotters: "I am not much in fear of
these fat, long-haired fellows"—Antony and Dolabella—"but rather of
those pale, thin ones," meaning Brutus and Cassius. He meant that Antony
and Dolabella were slow, lusty, and affected, while Brutus and Cassius were
intellectuals, and so they were dangerous.
Yet Caesar refused to take the risk seriously. He had too much faith
in Brutus's character, and without Brutus, Cassius could do little. Caesar
complained to his friends about Cassius but did nothing. He brushed off
Brutus's accusers with a joke.
Why then did Caesar dismiss his bodyguard? Wasn't he inviting an attack? Ancient authors asked the same questions. One school of thought says
that the dictator was arrogant. He knew about the danger but he convinced
himself that it couldn't happen to him. He reasoned that the senators had
all sworn oaths to guard him with their own lives. He put too much trust in
the oath, some said, while others said that his enemies concocted the oath
precisely in order to lure Caesar into giving up his bodyguard. As men-
a
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85
mus was the eyes and the ears. He was an insider. Of all the conspirators,
only Decimus could be described as "a close friend of Caesar." If anyone in
the conspiracy might have agonized about betraying a friend, it was Decimus. But there's not a scrap of remorse in any of the dozen surviving letters
that Decimus wrote after the assassination.
Readers of Shakespeare might wonder why they have never heard of
Decimus. He is misnamed in Julius Caesar as "Decius." Except for a scene
in Caesar's house on the morning of the Ides of March, "Decius" plays
very little role in the drama. That is not surprising when we consider that
Shakespeare based his account on English translations of Plutarch and Appian. Decimus has some importance in Appian but Plutarch scorns him as
insignificant. The ancient author who emphasizes Decimus's role in the plot
against Caesar is Nicolaus of Damascus, and Shakespeare did not read him.
Nor did he read Cassius Dio or Cicero's letters, other sources of Decimus's
importance.
It was Decimus whom Caesar chose to accompany him to dinner on
March 14. He was the conspirators' ace. Decimus was the best source of
information about the dictator's thoughts and plans and the best hope of
moving Caesar in whatever direction was needed. Who better to confirm
that Caesar suspected nothing?
Decimus is widely recognized in the ancient sources as a major player
in the conspiracy. Both Nicolaus of Damascus and Suetonius place him on
an equal footing with Brutus and Cassius among the conspiracy's leaders.
Nicolaus actually names Decimus first. Appian makes him next after Brutus
and Cassius. Velleius Paterculus, a Roman soldier-statesman who wrote a
history around 30 A.D., speaks of Decimus leading the conspirators along
with Brutus and Cassius. Other sources name Decimus as one of the four
most important conspirators. Plutarch is not very impressed with Decimus,
whom he unfairly calls "neither active nor daring," but he recognizes Decimus's importance to the plot.
At only thirty-seven, Decimus had a brilliant record. A noble of impeccable pedigree and one of Caesar's confidants, Decimus stood near the
pinnacle of power. Having excelled as a commander in Gaul both in the
Ali
Gallic War and the Civil War, Decimus governed the province for Caesar
in 48-45 B.C. and added another military victory to his record, over the
fierce Bellovaci. He was probably praetor in Rome in 45 B.C., certainly
governor-designate of Italian Gaul for 44 B.C., and consul-designate for
42 B.C. Whether Decimus knew it or not, Caesar named him in his will as
heir in the second degree, in the (unlikely) event that one of the three heirs
in the first degree—Octavian and his cousins Quintus Pedius and Lucius
Pinarius—was unavailable. He also named Decimus as one of the guardians
of his adopted son, Octavian. Caesar unwittingly named other conspirators
as guardians as well, although their names are not known to us.
Decimus brought two essential things to the conspiracy. He had Caesar's
confidence and he had a band of gladiators. Without his trust in Decimus,
Caesar would never have gone to the Senate on the Ides. Without the gladiators, the conspirators might not have survived the day themselves. Looking
ahead, there was a third point. Decimus was about to start a term, given to
him by Caesar, as governor of Italian Gaul. It was a strategic position, close
to Rome and with two legions. Such a man could be enormously useful
after the Ides.
Decimus owed even more to Caesar than Brutus did. Caesar had made
Decimus's career and, until the Ides, Decimus seemingly repaid him with
faithful support. In later years, no one earned more scorn for ingratitude
from Caesar's loyalists than Decimus. The sources don't reveal his motives,
so we can only engage in informed speculation.
Like Brutus and Cassius, Decimus might have felt that his first loyalty
was to the Republic. When writing to Decimus in 43 B.C., Cicero portrayed
him as part of a cause. For all his support of Caesar, for all his mother's
flirtation with revolution, Decimus came from a family of Best Men and
claimed descent from the founder of the Republic. Both Decimus's father
and his grandfather had slaughtered Populists in the city of Rome in what
they considered the defense of the Republic. Now it was Decimus's turn.
Yet, unlike Brutus or Cassius, Decimus was no philosopher, nor do his
republican sentiments run very deep. In his eleven surviving single-authored
letters—all from 44 or 43 B.C., ten of them to Cicero—Decimus refers
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85
only once to "liberating the Republic"; he is much more interested in military and political affairs. Although he was admirably brief as a writer, and
although he was running a military campaign, his silence about why he
fought is striking. By contrast, thirteen letters by Cicero to Decimus survive
from the same period and five of them refer to liberty, tyranny, the assassination of Caesar, or the Republic.
When it comes to killing Caesar, self-interest suggests itself as Decimus's
motive. Decimus was ambitious, competitive, proud, and violent. He cared
very much about his dignitas, a subject that comes up frequently in his correspondence with Cicero. If Cicero was a good judge of character—and he
often was—then Decimus wanted fame and greatness. Caesar being
Caesar, it is easy to imagine him telling Decimus that there was no limit to
his ambitions. Yet Caesar was too shrewd to believe it. He could see Decimus's
limitations.
Decimus was the right man to conquer or govern Gaul but not to rule
Rome. Decimus was a tactician, not a strategist. He took things personally,
which made it difficult for him to postpone revenge, as a good leader needs
to be able to do. Decimus was shrewd and capable of deceit but, like the
Gauls whom he spent so much time with, he was passionate. For all his
youth, Octavian's acumen and judgment made him much better suited to
succeed Caesar. Decimus was a soldier while Octavian was a politician to
the core.
Decimus was not the sort of person to shrug off the rise of a rival. He
rose to the top by serving Caesar in the field in Gaul and the Civil War.
Now others would have the chance to do the same in Parthia while Decimus stayed behind. In particular, the new man who would serve in Parthia
was Octavian. After a long ride with him from Gaul to Italy in 45 B.C.,
Decimus had at least an inkling of Octavian's ruthless determination. If
Decimus ever dreamed of being Caesar's heir, he had to worry about Octavian. The more Decimus valued the signs of affection bestowed on him
by Caesar—the place in his second chariot, the companionship of the
dining couch at Lepidus's—the more he might have resented the rise of
Octavian.
Being governor of Italian Gaul and then consul was well and good, but
Decimus knew where the real power lay in Caesar's world—with the army.
And the army was closest to Decimus's heart. The army could win him the
cherished goals of being hailed imperator, celebrating a triumph, and becoming one of the first men in Rome. By the end of 45 B.c. Octavian had
joined the force that would fight Parthia while Decimus was still in Rome.
Decimus might have reckoned that, once Caesar, Octavian, and a troupe of
new heroes rode back home in triumph, he would be swept aside. Better to
get rid of Caesar now and seize power while he still could.
Style perhaps played a role as well—Decimus was a very brave man and
a hard man, and he might have bristled at the courtly affectations that were
accruing to Caesar. Snobbery may have played a role. Like Antony, Decimus could sneer at Octavian as the heir of a freedman and a moneychanger.
As a member of the old Roman elite, Decimus might not like rubbing
shoulders with Caesar's new senators, men he thought were beneath him.
With perhaps a few exceptions, they were not barbarians or ex-legionaries
but, rather, wealthy citizens of northern Italy and southern Gaul, descendants of Roman immigrant families in Spain, and centurions from the
urban elite of all Italy and not just Rome. Yet that might have been enough
to disgust senators who traced their ancestry back to early Rome. We know
the name of only one centurion whom Caesar elevated to the Senate but it
is worth noting—Gaius Fuficius Fango. His was no doubt a proud name in
his hometown of Acerrae, a small city near Naples, but to a Roman elitist it
sounded like it came from the gutter.
Then there is Paula Valeria, Decimus's wife. She was a member of the
Roman elite and was in touch with Cicero. Her brother is plausibly identified as Valerius Triarius, a man who fought with Pompey at Pharsalus and
died either in that battle or before the end of the Civil War; Cicero became
his children's guardian. Perhaps Paula, like Porcia, felt that she had family blood to avenge and so encouraged her husband to break with Caesar.
Paula, remember, had divorced her first husband on the very day of his
return to Rome from military service so she could marry Decimus. Such a
woman would not hesitate to advise a change of allegiance.
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The DEATH ofCAESAR
The sources offer no trace of any personal grudge against Caesar but
they give abundant evidence of other personal grudges on Decimus's part.
Decimus's cold-blooded betrayal of his chief becomes easier to understand
if emotions like fear, loathing, and resentment came into play. And so he
turned on Caesar.
6
W A N T E D :
A S S A S S I N S
BRUTUS, CASSIUS, AND DECIMUS NOW MOBILIZED FOLLOWERS.
They had to decide how to kill Caesar and where and when, but first they
needed to assemble a team. They had to move quickly but cautiously.
Although Caesar had appointed many if not most of the 800-900 senators, quite a few senators had lost faith in the man who seemed to want to
be king. Still, few were willing to commit murder, even on behalf of the
Republic, and few were willing to risk their own lives. Fewer still could be
trusted. Secrets did not last long in Rome. Besides, Caesar was planning
to leave for the Parthian War on March 18. That left a window of about a
month.
The leaders of the conspiracy wanted just the right number of followers.
They needed enough men to surround Caesar and fight off his supporters
but not so many men as to risk being discovered. They preferred trusted
friends to new acquaintances. They wanted neither rash youths nor infirm
elders. They sought men in the prime of life, like themselves. In the end,
they focused on men around the age of forty, as were Brutus, Cassius, and
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