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Account for the changing nature of Soviet foreign policy in the years between 1917 and 1941. Soviet foreign policy changed many times in the period between 1917 and 1941, partly for ideological reasons and partly for practical ones. Following their seizure of power, the Bolsheviks largely ignored foreign policy, believing that revolutions would soon sweep Europe. By the time it became clear that these would not eventuate, Russia’s new leaders were embroiled in civil war. It was only when the war had been won that they set about forging better relations with their neighbours, in the hope of maintaining the peace and fostering trade and investment. This was not easy, since Western governments were reluctant to recognise the USSR. To mollify international opinion, the Bolsheviks toned down their revolutionary rhetoric, then signed a series of international agreements – a policy known as the ‘United Front’. These agreements included the Treaty of Rapallo (1922) and the Treaty of Berlin (1926), both with Germany. By the late 1920s, relations between Russia and Germany were souring, and both looked elsewhere for allies. Russia had also failed to end its diplomatic isolation, so Stalin decided to renew his support for world revolution. This ideological shift mirrored the hardening of domestic policy at the time, as collectivization and central planning were introduced. Communist parties were now ordered to oppose all other leftist groups. The result was disastrous, since it helped the Nazis to come to power (by dividing the leftist vote). By 1933, the German Communist Party was banned. Stalin now realised his mistake, and began seeking better relations with the Western nations, in the hope of ending Russia’s diplomatic isolation. In consequence, the US recognised Russia (1933), and the USSR joined the League of Nations (1934). Stalin also signed treaties with France and Czechoslovakia (1935), and ordered all communist parties to form a ‘Popular Front’ with anti-fascist groups in Europe. Unfortunately, Stalin’s attempts to woo Britain and France failed. Both nations stood by while Germany reoccupied the Rhineland, then invaded Austria in 1938. When Hitler began making demands on Czechoslovakia, Stalin tried to get France to make a stand, however France was not willing to contemplate a war with Germany at that stage. At the Munich Conference in 1938, France and Britain gave Hitler what he wanted – control of the border regions of Czechoslovakia. Stalin now sought an accommodation with Germany, to buy him time to rebuild the Red Army. When Britain and France failed to make an acceptable counter offer, he concluded that they were not serious about an alliance. In August 1939, he signed a ten-year Non-Aggression Pact (the so-called ‘Nazi-Soviet Pact’) with Germany. It contained a secret protocol which divided Poland into Russian and German sectors and ceded Finland, Estonia and Bessarabia to Russia. In September, Germany invaded Poland. Two and a half weeks later, the Red Army invaded Poland from the east. Germany and Russia formally agreed to partition Poland and eliminate it as a state. Stalin spent the next two years preparing for the attack he knew Hitler would make. This time, though, he was without allies. And so by 1941, Russian foreign policy had changed many times – from the mild pragmatism of the ‘united front’, to the ideology-driven war against the socialist parties, to the desperate pragmatism of the ‘popular front’, to the cynicism of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. It was this inconsistency, more than anything, which isolated the USSR during the period, and which left it vulnerable to an attack by Nazi Germany.