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Transcript
Compare and contrast the Persian invasions of 490 and 480/79 BCE. What commonalities
appear, and what do they tell us about Greek society?
The Persian invasions of 490 and 480/79 played a major role in the Athenian rise to
power and the political climate of Greece, particularly during the interbellum period and the
second invasion. Spartan and Athenian unity was also influenced by the invasions. Beginning
in a period when fear of Persia was rife and the Greek city-states were constantly quarrelling,
the repulsion of the first ‘invasion’1, proved the Athenians’ own worth to themselves, and
gave prestige to their population. As a result of this new confidence, politics in the
interbellum period were quite different to the period before the war, which caused the second
war to be fought in a different way, and on a different scale. Instead of attempting a naval
invasion, Xerxes implemented a land-based attack, supplemented by the Persian Navy rather
than following his father’s general by using a fleet. Both the Persians and the Greeks utilised
larger armies. Athens gained naval supremacy as a direct result of the second invasion.
The prelude to the ‘invasion’ tells us something quite important about Greek society:
that they valued their freedom, even at the expense of human life. Darius “sent out heralds in
divers direction directions round about Greece, with orders to demand everywhere earth and
water for the king” (Herodotus, 6.48). Earth and water was a symbolic token of submission,
which meant accepting the role of subordinate ally (Lawless and Cameron, p104). Most states
complied with this demand out of fear of the Persian army, as Macedon did (Herodotus,
5.19). Neither Athens nor Sparta complied, however, and this tells us that they valued
freedom over life; they would rather have control over their own territory, but with half the
original population, than have a full population subjected to Persian hegemony. The Greeks’
view of the Persians, as barbaric in their practices, effeminate, and excessive2, meant that
Persian control over Greeks would have been offensive and demeaning. This situation tells us
that Greek society was by no means homogeneous, as most city-states submitted to the
Persians, but not Athens and Sparta. The other states had less to lose by having Persian
control than did Athens and Sparta. Persia’s policy in Ionia and in other parts of her own
Empire indicate that the city-states that submitted on the Greek peninsula would probably
have been ruled by either existing pro-Persian Greek tyrants, or by newly appointed tyrants3
(Martin, 6.16). Athens had, in the recent past, instituted the beginnings of a democratic
1
The first invasion was not technically an invasion, as all the sources agree that the intent was punitive, not
expansionist. The second invasion, however, was expansionist in aim, and was thus a true invasion.
2
Aeschylus, The Persians “Soft sons of luxury” (chorus), “in Greece the one, on the barbaric coast the other”
(Atossa).
3
Roebuck describes the period of c. 650-500BCE as ‘The Age of Tyrants’ (p191). The first Persian war being
only a decade after the approximate end of the epoch, and Athens being quite progressive at this point, it is
reasonable to assume that most states (other than Sparta) were either under tyrannies still, or very recently
freed from them. Lawless and Cameron agree that most city-states were ruled by tyrants at this time, meaning
that their political system would not be jeopardized to the same extent as the systems of Athens and Sparta.
system. Sparta had a functional system that worked very well for them. The Spartan system
of dual kingship had served Sparta well, allowing the Spartiates to become truly elite
warriors. Having a foreign ruler imposed by a foreign people would have damaged Spartan
society, and would have also significantly loosened the Spartan grip on the Peloponnese. The
main reason for Spartan and Athenian resistance was that both of their systems would be
destroyed if the Persians were allowed the chance to instate tyrants in the Persian fashion 4.
The first ‘invasion’ itself, particularly, the battle of Marathon, influenced Greece quite
significantly. It gave Athens a large confidence boost. The Athenians and Plataeans at
Marathon felt that the gods were on their side, and that they had thus won a moral victory, a
victory of good over evil (Herodotus, 6.109). It also demonstrated to the Greeks that Persia
could be defeated, and showed them the weaknesses in Persian armour and tactics. This is
one of the reasons that the Spartans, upon arriving late for the battle, “viewed the slain”
(Herodotus, 6.120). Many Athenians saw the victory at Marathon as a victory for democracy.
The skill of Miltiades and Callimachus (two strategoi, Callimachus was Polemarch) in
planning the battle (Herodotus, 6.110-111) reinforced the concept of meritocracy. As a result,
after 487BCE the strategoi were elected by popular vote (Bradley, pp128-9). One of the
outcomes of the enhanced confidence and optimism of the Greeks was that they gained
hubris; they became so confident of their abilities that they assumed the Persians were dealt
with for good, and continued with their internal quarrels (Plutarch, p80). This ended the first
invasion, and began the interbellum period.
Shortly before 480, envoys were again sent to the city-states demanding earth and
water, this time most complied, only thirty-one states did not, and they became the ‘Greeks’
at the ‘Congress at the Isthmus’ (Bradley, p137). Athens and Sparta were not approached by
envoys at all though, as the two states had killed the envoys ten years earlier (Herodotus,
7.133) which was a grievous offence. They would not be given the chance to redeem
themselves but would be ruthlessly punished. The confidence that the Spartans and Athenians
had gained from the first invasion was helpful to them. This can be seen from the resolve and
enthusiasm shown by the Spartans and allies at the battle of Thermopylae. The battles of
Thermopylae and Salamis were momentous victories, the latter being the beginning of
Athenian naval supremacy, and the moment that tipped the war in Greece’s favour, this is
substantiated by their move to offensive strategy, confronting Persia at Plataea and later
Mycale. As the Athenians furnished many of the ships used at Salamis, Athens gained the
credit for the victory and became a naval power. This gave the Athenians and their close
allies the upper hand, and inspired them to go on the offensive, attacking Mycale and Sestos,
and freeing the Ionian cities from Persian rule in 479 BCE.
4
This was, in fact, one of the reasons that the Ionian revolt occurred in the first place. The Ionian Greek cities
were beginning to develop more representative forms of government, and the Persian system of state
sponsored tyranny oppressed the freedom of the Ionian cities.
In the first invasion, the Athenians sent to Sparta for help, but were told that they must
wait until the end of the festival that the Spartans were celebrating, as it would be
sacrilegious to leave it early (Herodotus, 6.106). Regardless of the veracity of the excuse, it
demonstrates the fact that the Spartans were reluctant to act unless they could really see the
value of their action5. In the case of the first invasion, the threat was in Attica, the territory of
their rival city-state, and it was of little significance to them if their rival was defeated. In the
second invasion, the Spartans, although still reluctant to act, could see that the Persians were
a real threat to them; they had been convinced by the Persian subjugation of central Greece
(Oxford Classical Dictionary, p 802). The Spartans were reluctant to act, preferring to protect
the Peloponnese alone (Burn, 352)6 . To the Spartans, as in the first invasion, threat to their
rival was not important to them, and a festival was given as an excuse (Burn, p362).
However, the congress decided that Sparta would go and fight. The repeated Spartan
reluctance to fight with and for the other city-states reinforces the fact that Greece was not
homogenous, and shows that some of the city-states operated in their own interests.
Throughout the course of the Persian invasions of 490 and 480/79 the Athenians rose
to great power. They began by becoming aware of their own strength at the battle of
Marathon. This strengthened them and made them capable of defeating the Persians again a
decade later, after which they became the supreme naval power of the region. The Persian
wars also increased the freedom of Greek peoples as a whole, the victory in 479 deterred the
Persians from any further attempts at conquest of the peninsula, and the Athenian navy freed
the Ionian Greeks from Persian rule. However, Spartan compliance with the wishes of Greece
was reluctant, and Greek society was diverse and heterogeneous.
5
It would seem unlikely that the Spartans would refuse to fight due to a religious celebration if the Persian
army were actually in Sparta, but as the threat was distant, they were more than happy to honour the gods
correctly.
6
Their plan consisted of blockading the Isthmus of Corinth; this was intended to stop the Persians gaining
entrance to the Peloponnese. However, even if they had done this, if Athens did not have naval supremacy,
the Persians would have been able to gain access to the Peloponnese via the sea.
Bibliography:
Potter, Robert [trans], Aeschylus, The Persians,
http://classics.mit.edu/Aeschylus/persians.html , accessed 6/9/2009.
A play from 472 BCE, approximately seven years after the end of the second
invasion, this play outlines a popular opinion of Persian custom following the wars. It
is a pro-Athenian take on the Persian side of the hostilities. It is a tragedy, and thus
deals with wrath of gods, and Xerxes’ hubris. It is also designed as entertainment, and
therefore cannot be taken as gospel, however, as a source for opinions regarding
Persians at the time, it is reasonably accurate.
Herodotus, The Histories vol.2, Everyman’s Library, London, 1964.
Commenced in the 450s BCE, The Histories is Herodotus’ research on Greek history
up until the time of writing. As a source for the Persian wars, it must be noted that it was
commenced approximately thirty years after the event, although Herodotus would have been
able to converse with people with firsthand experience of many of the events. Having been
born in Ionian Greece (Halicarnassus) in the 480s, Herodotus had some knowledge of Persian
rule and customs, although given his age at the time, probably only through other people i.e.
parents, friends etc.
Plutarch, The Rise and Fall of Athens, Penguin, 1960.
Writing over five hundred years after the events of the Persian wars, Plutarch’s
accounts may not be entirely veracious, however, he seems to analyse other sources, and
therefore is not entirely unreliable.
Bradley, Pamela, Ancient Greece: Using Evidence, Edward Arnold, Victoria, 1988.
High school text book outlines agreed upon events and interpretations. Uses simple
language and comprehensive selection of sources. Does not dwell on the myths of the Persian
wars, like Marathon and Thermopylae.
Burn, Andrew Robert, Persia and the Greeks: The Defence of the West, c. 546-478 B.C.,
Edward Arnold, London, 1962.
A scholarly and thorough examination of Ionian Greece from the Persian conquest to
the liberation of Ionia. Comprehensive selection of sources, and considered
interpretation of information. Language slightly dry, although not overly difficult.
Slight pro-Greek bias, but not overt.
Hammond, N.G.L, Scullard, H.H [eds], The Oxford Classical Dictionary 2ed, OUP, Oxford,
1970.
A dictionary of the classical world, deals with names, dates and documented facts.
Little to no interpretation is presented, and no bias is evident.
Lawless, Jennifer, Cameron, Kate, Studies in Ancient Persia, Nelson, Sth Melbourne, 1994.
Excerpt from textbook on ancient Persia, it is thus from the Persian perspective, but
details effects of the wars on Greece as well. Could not ascertain the selection of
sources.
Martin, Thomas R., An Overview of Classical Greek History from Mycenae to Alexander,
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgibin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0009;query=subsection%3D%2333;layout=;loc
=9.4.3.1 accessed 9/8/2009
A long and in depth history of Greece, contains lots of detail and uses fairly extensive
sources. Does not display any overt bias, but that which can be detected is pro-Greek.
Roebuck, Carl, The World of Ancient Times, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1966.
1960s high school and college text book is quite readable. The bias displayed differs
throughout the book, as different civilisations are covered, but nowhere is there any
strong bias (in the sections relevant to this topic, at least)
Sealey, Raphael, A History of the Greek City States ca. 700 – 338B.C. UCP, Carolina, 1976.
A Greco-centric textbook focusing the development of city-states, the factors that
influenced this development, and their relations. Pro-Greek, but not to the extent that
it warps facts, it is easy to ignore the bias and focus on the merits of Sealey’s
arguments or interpretations.