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God Must Be Evil A philosophical look into the problem of evil By: Sarah Cordoba PHIL-1000-009 Jeffrey Wood 7/28/2011 Cordoba |1 The problem of evil is one which has plagued philosophers since the fourth century BC. How can God and Evil both exist in the world? To be able to understand this question we must first gain knowledge of what evil is. Evil is often defined as something that is immoral or categorically bad, but can also be defined as suffering or pain. For the purpose of understanding the problem of evil it is best to think of evil in the latter context, or even more specifically as needless suffering. The second key to understanding the problem of evil is to understand the concept of God. The concept of God has three parts, God is omnipresent or all knowing, God is omnipotent or all powerful, and God is omnibenevolent or all good. Knowing these three things about God, combined with the definition of evil as suffering gives us the basis of the problem of evil. The problem of evil is assumed to be a logical one. Logically God cannot be all three of those things (tri-omni) and still allow needless suffering in the world. In the book 2000 Years of Disbelief: Famous People with the Courage to Doubt James Haught quotes the ancient Greek philosopher, Epicurus, as saying “Either God wants to abolish evil, and cannot; or he can, but does not want to. If he wants to, but cannot, he is impotent. If he can, but does not want to, he is wicked. If God can abolish evil, and God really wants to do it, why is there evil in the world?” This quote seems to best summarize the problem of evil, although it seems to leave out the possibility that God doesn’t know of the evil in the world, in which case he is not omnipresent. To better understand, we can look at this as an equation consisting of four statements: God is all knowing. God is all powerful. God is perfectly good. And evil exists. Logically if three of these statements are true, the fourth cannot be. For example, if God is all knowing, all powerful and evil exists then God mustn’t be perfectly good or he would not allow Cordoba |2 evil to exist. Our reasoning tells us that all four statements cannot be true at the same time; this is (in essence) the problem of evil. The seemingly simplest solution to the problem of evil involves expulsion of at least one of the contradicting parts of the problem. If we were to say God doesn’t exist, then we would have no problem of evil. Contrarily we could say evil doesn’t exist, and again our problem would go away. It is also possible to discard the problem by abandoning the thought that God is a tri-omni being. The problem with these solutions is that they aren’t solutions at all, they don’t do anything to solve the problem of evil, they simply take away an aspect of the problem thus eliminating the contradiction of the problem and thereby eradicating the problem itself. In looking for a solution to the problem we must hold that the problem itself exists. For the problem of evil to exist we must conclude that God not only exists, but exists as a tri-omni being, and that evil also exists. As we are looking for a solution to the problem of evil, and not merely trying to eradicate the problem, we will hold these conclusions as self evident truths. Alvin Plantinga came up with a solution to the problem of evil that does not involve denying the existence of any of its components. This is often referred to as Plantinga’s free will defense, as the basis for the argument rests in the human capacity of free will. “God’s creation of persons with morally significant free will is something of tremendous value. God could not eliminate much of the evil and suffering in this world without thereby eliminating the greater good of having created persons with free will with whom he could have relationships and who are able to love one another and do good deeds” (Beebe 2003, online). The free will Plantinga refers to is morally significant free will, which varies from the basic definition of free will- being Cordoba |3 one’s ability to make a choice. Plantinga’s center argument is that God chose to give us morally significant free will, rather than a world free of evil. Morally significant free will is the ability to act upon a choice that involves morality. We can think of this as a person being faced with three choices, two are morally good and the other morally bad. In morally significant free will the person has the ability choose any of the options, be it good or bad. If there were an all good world (free of evil) where the person did not have the ability to choose the morally bad option, then this would not be considered morally significant free will as the person is now choosing between 2 morally right choices. The person still has free will and the ability to choose, but it is no longer a morally significant choice. Plantinga believes that people are fully free and morally responsible for their actions and conditions. (Beebe 2003, online) Plantinga is not arguing that God allows evil to exist in our world, but instead that God allows free will to exist in our world. In fact he has said, “… we cannot see why our world, with all its ills, would be better than others we think we can imagine, or what, in any detail, is God's reason for permitting a given specific and appalling evil. Not only can we not see this, we can't think of any very good possibilities. And here I must say that most attempts to explain why God permits evil — theodicies, as we may call them — strike me as tepid, shallow and ultimately frivolous” (Tooley 2009, online). If God does not permit evil to exist, but permits free will to exist, by trying to abolish evil he would be taking away fully free will. This is to say that God knows of evil (omnipresent), could act upon it (omnipotent), but chooses not to because taking away morally significant free will would be worse. So God is still choosing the best (most good) option and is therefore still omnibenevolent. So we now have a solution in which God exists as a tri-omni being, evil still exists, and there is no logical contradiction. Cordoba |4 This solution, naturally, is not completely sound- otherwise it would be generally recognized as the only solution and the problem of evil would no longer exist. The biggest hole in Plantinga’s argument is he fails to address the problem of free will. The problem of free will being that if we are all made of natural substances (such as atoms), and all natural substances follow the laws of nature, then does free will exist at all? Or are we predetermined to choose the choices we make and we could never have made the opposite choice, because we are merely following the laws of nature? I suppose Plantinga would assume that free will does exist, but it seems to me that’s a very crucial piece of his argument that is missing. Another issue with Plantinga’s solution is that not all evil is a result of free will. He does not address at all any type of natural suffering. Cancer for instance, causes pain and suffering but is not the direct effect of someone’s freewill. It is a natural occurrence that I’m sure would be considered evil, however does not seem to relate at all to Plantinga’s free will defense. If God is allowing free will and that is why we have evil, then how do we explain suffering like cancer? Perhaps the most significant of the limitations to this proposed solution stems from the definition of good. If God chose to create a world with morally significant free will, rather than a world free from evil, how can we determine s/he made the right choice? Plantinga says free will carries tremendous value, and that having persons with free will is a greater good than eliminating evil (Beebe 2003, online), but can we be certain it is for the greater good? God is omnipresent so s/he should know what is for the greater good, but how is good defined? When Cordoba |5 there are two choices and both are good, where does one draw the line of more good vs. less good? Although solutions have been offered to the problem of evil, one solution that satisfies all has not been found and thus it remains a problem today. How can an all knowing, all powerful, perfectly good God allow evil to exist in the world? There may never exist one answer to that question, perhaps the question itself is completely subjective. For some, who don’t believe in God or in evil, the question does not even pose a problem and is completely inconsequential. For others the question may bring doubt to their former beliefs and faith. And for still others it may strengthen their resolve in their religion. Until the question has the same significance and meaning to all people any answer will not satisfy the masses and a solution will not be reached. Cordoba |6 Works Cited Beebe, James R. “Logical Problem of Evil.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 17 August 2003. Web. 04 August 2011. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/evil-log/#H4> Tooley, Michael. “The Problem of Evil.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2009. Web. 04 August 2011. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/#Arg>