WHEN IS EVIL? - San Diego State University
... makes us question our belief in a morally pluralistic world.5 We are confronted with the unjustifiable, with something that absolutely should not have happened and shows a gap between human actions and moral intuitions, or as Dews suggests “we are torn between a commitment to freedom and autonomy an ...
... makes us question our belief in a morally pluralistic world.5 We are confronted with the unjustifiable, with something that absolutely should not have happened and shows a gap between human actions and moral intuitions, or as Dews suggests “we are torn between a commitment to freedom and autonomy an ...
The Missing Formal Proof of Humanity`s Radical Evil in Kant`s
... held responsible only for things that we freely choose, and if we freely choose something, we must have been free not to choose it. So Kant seems to be claiming that we necessarily freely choose one way rather than another, whereas freedom and necessity surely exclude one another. Richard Bernstein ...
... held responsible only for things that we freely choose, and if we freely choose something, we must have been free not to choose it. So Kant seems to be claiming that we necessarily freely choose one way rather than another, whereas freedom and necessity surely exclude one another. Richard Bernstein ...
Keith Crome`s `Descartes` Evil Demon`
... Could it not also be the case that God ‘may have caused me to be mistaken… when I add two and three together, or think about the number of sides in a quadrilateral figure, or something even simpler if that can be imagined?'15 To such an argument it might be objected that God, whose attributes includ ...
... Could it not also be the case that God ‘may have caused me to be mistaken… when I add two and three together, or think about the number of sides in a quadrilateral figure, or something even simpler if that can be imagined?'15 To such an argument it might be objected that God, whose attributes includ ...
Evil and Human Nature.
... Evil to explain evil than do the other two theories. Once again, it may be true that some evil actions might be caused by Evil. According to dualism, however, evil is normally best explained by natural facts about human agents' propensities to pursue their own interests and desires at the expense of ...
... Evil to explain evil than do the other two theories. Once again, it may be true that some evil actions might be caused by Evil. According to dualism, however, evil is normally best explained by natural facts about human agents' propensities to pursue their own interests and desires at the expense of ...
A Post-Secular Faith? Connolly on Pluralism and Evil
... transgression of the moral order, whether conceived as a Divine command or the natural harmony of the Cosmos created by God. Rooted in the ‘original sin’ of Adam and Eve, evil is not itself a quality of the Divine will but is the force that subverts that will. It lies within the intrinsically divide ...
... transgression of the moral order, whether conceived as a Divine command or the natural harmony of the Cosmos created by God. Rooted in the ‘original sin’ of Adam and Eve, evil is not itself a quality of the Divine will but is the force that subverts that will. It lies within the intrinsically divide ...
Is Diabolical Action Possible? - Inter
... all that is required for our concept of ‘wanting’ is that a man should see what he wants under the aspect of some good.9 So understood, while Satan is surely acting wrongly when he takes on the Throne, by his own lights, there is something good about what he does, even if there is much to be said ag ...
... all that is required for our concept of ‘wanting’ is that a man should see what he wants under the aspect of some good.9 So understood, while Satan is surely acting wrongly when he takes on the Throne, by his own lights, there is something good about what he does, even if there is much to be said ag ...
Evil for freedom`s sake? David Lewis
... truth - God permits evil for the sake of some good or other - but something fairly substantive and detailed. One who claims to know God's mind so well (especially if he claims to know without benefit of revelation) will seem both foolhardy and impudent. 'Defence', on the other hand, means just any h ...
... truth - God permits evil for the sake of some good or other - but something fairly substantive and detailed. One who claims to know God's mind so well (especially if he claims to know without benefit of revelation) will seem both foolhardy and impudent. 'Defence', on the other hand, means just any h ...
Christian Apologetics, IV The Problem of Evil
... ensure, in any single case, that a human being freely refrain from sinning. • However, given that human beings are real creatures with a rational and fallible nature (and not merely puppets or robots), it would be deeply incongruous if they never sinned. • God wishes, in each case, that the creature ...
... ensure, in any single case, that a human being freely refrain from sinning. • However, given that human beings are real creatures with a rational and fallible nature (and not merely puppets or robots), it would be deeply incongruous if they never sinned. • God wishes, in each case, that the creature ...
The Logical Argument is not Bankrupt
... how a world with humans endowed with free-will is better than a world without any evil whatsoever. Why should it not be the case that an unfree world with no evil in it is better than a free world with some evil in it? The theist simply begs the question here. However, let’s suppose that the theist ...
... how a world with humans endowed with free-will is better than a world without any evil whatsoever. Why should it not be the case that an unfree world with no evil in it is better than a free world with some evil in it? The theist simply begs the question here. However, let’s suppose that the theist ...
Symposium III and Lysis
... • Problem 1: Parents and children • Problem 2: What if x doesn’t know that y loves x? ...
... • Problem 1: Parents and children • Problem 2: What if x doesn’t know that y loves x? ...
GUIDE AND REVIEW FOR FINAL EXAM IN PHILOSOPHY: As you
... there’s evil, there’s good. If there’s good there has to be a moral law. If there’s a moral law there has to be a transcendent moral lawgiver. But that’s what the skeptic is trying to disprove and not prove. Because if there is no moral law giver, there’s no moral law. If there’ no moral law there’s ...
... there’s evil, there’s good. If there’s good there has to be a moral law. If there’s a moral law there has to be a transcendent moral lawgiver. But that’s what the skeptic is trying to disprove and not prove. Because if there is no moral law giver, there’s no moral law. If there’ no moral law there’s ...
The Argument from Design & Darwinism
... itself God and is imperfect, finite, and limited. In this way, it allows the existence of evil as incomplete goodness. ...
... itself God and is imperfect, finite, and limited. In this way, it allows the existence of evil as incomplete goodness. ...
hui216_14_v5
... had recognized and that he valued the influence of classical philosophy on the Scriptures • This discovery must have shown him the way to reconcile values and ideas of the Greeks and the Romans with the new Christian ideology, which was originally, by virtue of its roots, essentially different from ...
... had recognized and that he valued the influence of classical philosophy on the Scriptures • This discovery must have shown him the way to reconcile values and ideas of the Greeks and the Romans with the new Christian ideology, which was originally, by virtue of its roots, essentially different from ...
Unit 13
... had recognized and that he valued the influence of classical philosophy on the Scriptures • This discovery must have shown him the way to reconcile values and ideas of the Greeks and the Romans with the new Christian ideology, which was originally, by virtue of its roots, essentially different from ...
... had recognized and that he valued the influence of classical philosophy on the Scriptures • This discovery must have shown him the way to reconcile values and ideas of the Greeks and the Romans with the new Christian ideology, which was originally, by virtue of its roots, essentially different from ...
arguments - UCSD Philosophy
... Anything…even the logically impossible Anything logically possible Anything physically possible ...
... Anything…even the logically impossible Anything logically possible Anything physically possible ...
The argument from evil
... God allows evil for the sake of our free will. It is impossible for us to have free will and always act rightly; so it is impossible for God to create a world in which we have free will and there is no evil. So, God creates a world with evil because it is the only way to make a world which contains ...
... God allows evil for the sake of our free will. It is impossible for us to have free will and always act rightly; so it is impossible for God to create a world in which we have free will and there is no evil. So, God creates a world with evil because it is the only way to make a world which contains ...
Mackie and Rowe
... rational support, but that they are positively irrational, that the several of the essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with one another, the theologian can maintain his position as a whole only by a much extreme rejection of reason than in the former case. He must now be prep31red to bel ...
... rational support, but that they are positively irrational, that the several of the essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with one another, the theologian can maintain his position as a whole only by a much extreme rejection of reason than in the former case. He must now be prep31red to bel ...
God Must Be Evil - Sarah`s ePortfolio
... one’s ability to make a choice. Plantinga’s center argument is that God chose to give us morally significant free will, rather than a world free of evil. Morally significant free will is the ability to act upon a choice that involves morality. We can think of this as a person being faced with three ...
... one’s ability to make a choice. Plantinga’s center argument is that God chose to give us morally significant free will, rather than a world free of evil. Morally significant free will is the ability to act upon a choice that involves morality. We can think of this as a person being faced with three ...
Augustinian theodicy
The Augustinian theodicy, named for the 4th- and 5th-century theologian, philosopher and (according to some Christian denominations) Saint Augustine of Hippo, is a type of Christian theodicy designed in response to the evidential problem of evil. As such, it attempts to explain the probability of an omnipotent (all-powerful) and omnibenevolent (perfectly loving) God amid evidence of evil in the world. A number of variations of this kind of theodicy have been proposed throughout history; their similarities were first described by the 20th-century philosopher John Hick, who classified them as ""Augustinian"". They typically assert that God is perfectly (ideally) good; that he created the world out of nothing; and that evil is the result of humanity's original sin. The entry of evil into the world is generally explained as punishment for sin and its continued presence due to humans' misuse of free will. God's goodness and benevolence, according to the Augustinian theodicy, remain perfect and without responsibility for evil or suffering.Augustine of Hippo was the first to develop the theodicy. He rejected the idea that evil exists in itself, instead regarding it as a corruption of goodness, caused by humanity's abuse of free will. Augustine believed in the existence of a physical Hell as a punishment for sin, but argued that those who choose to accept the salvation of Jesus Christ will go to Heaven. In the 13th century, Thomas Aquinas – influenced by Augustine – proposed a similar theodicy based on the view that God is goodness and that there can be no evil in him. He believed that the existence of goodness allows evil to exist, through the fault of humans. Augustine also influenced John Calvin, who supported Augustine's view that evil is the result of free will and argued that sin corrupts humans, requiring God's grace to give moral guidance.The theodicy was criticised by Augustine's contemporary Fortunatus, a Manichaean who contended that God must still be somehow implicated in evil, and 18th-century theologian Francesco Antonio Zaccaria criticised Augustine's concept of evil for not dealing with individual human suffering. Hick regards evil as necessary for the moral and spiritual development of humans, and process theologians have argued that God is not omnipotent and so cannot be responsible for any evil. The logic of Augustine's approach has been adapted by Alvin Plantinga, among others. Plantinga's adapted Augustinian theodicy, the free will defence – which he proposed in the 1980s – attempts to answer only the logical problem of evil. Such a defence (not a ""theodicy"" proper) does not demonstrate the existence of God, or the probable existence of God, but proves that the existence of God and the presence of evil (or privatio boni) in the world are not logically contradictory. Some criticisms have also been derived from science, as aspects of the Augustinian theodicy (specifically, the fall of an originally good creation) run contrary to scientific consensus regarding the beginning of the world and the development of life.