Download The heritage of german idealism in Kierkeggard`s Either/Or

The heritage of German idealism in Kierkegaard’s Either/Or
by Kresten Lundsgaard-Leth
I.
Preliminary remarks
Søren Kierkegaard’s authorship is often considered the critique par excellence of the German
idealism in general and its systematic-speculative version with Hegel’s philosophy in particular –
and this reputation is by no means entirely unfounded. Nonetheless, it remains an interpretive task
to investigate, how and why the Kierkegaardian alternative articulates itself. Is the Christian leap of
faith (qua »the highest paradox of thinking«) nothing but a theological (or existential) polemic
against idealism through idealism-external criteria? Or could it be that Kierkegaard’s thought (in a
very certain way) actualizes the dissolution of German idealism itself by means of idealism-internal
criteria?
This question is obviously a delicate matter. Still, through a careful reading of Kierkegaard’s
early magnum opus, Either-Or from 1841, I suggest the following thesis: The critique of idealism in
Kierkegaard’s authorship actually comes into being through a tense unity of diverse, idealistic
motives, which mutually exclude each other. Thus, the influence(s) of Kant, Fichte and Hegel are
all of them present in the investigations of Either/Or - as well as the apparent tension between their
philosophical key-concepts.
Negatively, the description (or diagnosis) of the aesthetical point of view in its various modes
draws on the Kantian notion of heteronomy as well as the Hegelian polemic against the irony of
romanticism. Positively (and probably more important) the ethical position of Wilhelm is presented
as a conspicuous mixture of idealistic thought-figures: Firstly, (i) Kant’s accentuation of the
importance of the motive (rather than the consequence) founds the normative intuition of the ethical
letters. Secondly, (ii) Fichte’s depiction of faith (as articulated in Die Bestimmung des Menschen
(1800)) inspires, how the ethical motive (i. e. the choice) must be understood. And finally, (iii) the
immanent-dynamical dialectics of Hegelian spirit determines – so to speak – the content (or the
what) of the ethical choice – as will be shown. And as already mentioned, this complexity of
transcendental, subjective and absolute idealism cannot be coherently conjoined within one single
position. There may have been biographical circumstances in the mix, but the idealistic tension of
Kierkegaardian ethics is, philosophically, the primary explanation for the necessary move towards
religion.
II.
The immediate aesthetical as Kantian heteronomy
Roughly, the aesthetical stage in Kierkegaardian thought must be divided in (at least) two versions
of aesthetical consciousness: Firstly (i), the immediate aesthetical consciousness lacking awareness
of itself as aesthetical and therefore without aesthetical self-consciousness. Secondly, (ii) the highly
self-conscious point of view of A (the supposed author of the first volume of Either/Or) could be
described as an aesthetic-subjectivist irony. It is fundamentally valid for both positions that – in
Wilhelm’s expression – »the aesthetical in a man is that by means of which he immediately is, what
he is«; but in a rather dissimilar fashion – as we shall have a closer look at.
To begin with, let us consider the first aesthetical stage: In Wilhelm’s formulation, every
aesthete believes that »one should enjoy life […] but he [i. e. the aesthete] always makes a
condition, which is either outside of the individual or in the individual in such a way that it is not
made by the individual himself«. It is easily comprehended, following some of Wilhelm’s
examples, in what sense phenomena such as wealth, fame or everlasting love are conditions of
enjoyment external to the individual him- or herself. But for what reason do not – in Wilhelm’s
opinion - talent and the ambition of personal beauty qualify as conditions made by the individual
him- or herself? Here, the etymological origin of aesthetics in the Greek expression for sensation (i.
e. aisthesis) has a significant role to play: Exemplified, it may be the individual him- or herself who
is beautiful or have an inclination towards x (e. g. a cookie) but, as immediate facts of sensation,
both of these can immediately change – into ugliness (after a car-crash, for instance) and the
inclination towards not-x or y, respectively. In this sense, the sensually conditioned happens to us
»in such a way that is not made by the individual himself«. We cannot freely choose it – only take
note of its factuality as it comes over us. The determination of the sensually conditioned – and
sensual inclinations in particular – as not being a part of the individual’s genuine self clearly draws
on the Kantian distinction between heteronomy and autonomy as presented in The Foundation for
the Metaphysic of Morals (1785). As it would be well known, these Kantian terms are intimately
related to the concept of the will. The will determined through heteronomy is enthused through
sensual inclination (and eo ipso non-moral), whereas the autonomous as well as moral will
constitutes its own end. Negatively, Kantian morality must be considered as freedom from sensual
heteronomy and the conception of heteronomy as an alien (or self-external) determination of the
will arguably provides the framework for the aesthetical stage in Either/Or qua conditioned by
something »which is either outside of the individual or in the individual in such a way that it is not
made by the individual himself«. For both Kant and Wilhelm, the ethical and moral freedom,
respectively, implies a suspension of the necessity of natural causality. Positively, on the contrary,
the story is quite another. The moral will in Kantian morality is free to the practical selfdetermination of reason (acting upon the ends made by reason itself), which has very little to do
indeed with the passionate ethical choice suggested by Wilhelm. Both of them, still, are more
concerned with how we act as opposed to what we actually do when acting – which will be
addressed later on.
III.
Wilhelm’s critique of A’s aesthetics as Hegelian criticism of romanticism
So far, let us get back to the aesthetical stage, which is not exhausted with the immediate
aesthetical consciousness and which (therefore) cannot be contained within the framework of
Kant’s distinction between autonomy and heteronomy. Thus, the much more sophisticated and
reflective aesthetical point of view – as articulated by A in the first volume of Either/Or – cannot be
comprehended as an immediate consciousness following sensual inclination. More likely, it is a
mode of romantic irony, the critique of which draws on Hegel’s judgment towards this exact
movement (i. e. romantic irony) in contemporary intellectual history. Between the lines, this attack
on the ironical aesthete implies a critique of Kantian morality – as we shall see. Wilhelm depicts
(and addresses) A in the following manner: »There is not actual despair, but despair in thought.
Your thought has hastened ahead, you have seen through the vanity of everything but you have not
moved on […]. You are constantly beside yourself, namely, in despair«. Thus, A has seen through
the vanity and perishable nature of the aesthetical stage itself (in Danish these two words,
forfængelighed and forgængelighed, sound very much alike). As we already know, the conditions of
enjoying one’s life are sensually conditioned and not in the individual’s power – and to truly realize
this equals to despair – or with an utterly famous depiction: The aesthete is always already in
despair, whether he (or her) knows it or not. Having realized this, he does not participate in his own
existence – but has become a mere spectator (or voyeur) of it.
But what sense does it make (what regards A’s reflective despair) that – as was initially stated »the aesthetical in a man is that by means of which he immediately is, what he is«? In a way, it does
not make sense. A has once and for all invalidated the vanity of aesthetical existence and negated all
value founded on sensual conditions. In this self-reflective negativity, however, A remains
dependent on the very thing he negates (namely the perishable nature of everything immediate). In
what way? Well, because he has no positive alternative to put forth. He can see through the
untenable heteronomy of aesthetical value but is totally incapable of presenting a sound substitute,
wherefore radical negativity must be the inevitable outcome.
There are apparent common features between Wilhelm’s depiction of A’s aesthetical despair
and Hegel’s description of romantic irony. In Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1821), irony is presented
as nothing less than the highest form of evil. Irony, according to Hegel, actualizes the annihilation
of everything objectively normative, which it replaces with the artistic creation of subjective norms.
Like J.-P. Sartre will accordingly suggest in the twentieth century, it is a self-deceiving illusion to
believe in the objectivity of normative validity. Thus, values are analogous to works of art rather
than to the categorical dictates of reason. Interestingly, Hegel argues that the romantic irony is
essentially the ultimate consequence of Kantian autonomy with its appeal to what the human subject
can will (qua reasonable) should become a universal law. The problem is – in Hegel’s opinion – the
following: When nothing is left other than subjectivity to appeal to, the apparent moral agent will
not only see through the perishable nature of sensation – but furthermore the abstract emptiness of
Kantian morality. Thus, purely subjective validity equals no validity whatsoever, as both Hegel and
A have apparently recognized. As an immanent critique of Kantian moral philosophy, Hegel’s
objection probably will not hold water. However, this consideration will be bracketed in the
following. What is of importance here is the concluding ironic-aesthetical nihilism of the romantic
irony as well as A. Both positions are ambivalently torn (or dispersed) between the excessive
creation of interesting states of affairs, on the one hand, and always already to have seen through
the emptiness of this design, on the other.
As we have witnessed, Wilhelm’s diagnosis of the aesthetical stage in toto is thoroughly
encouraged through motives of German idealism (namely Kant’s distinction between heteronomy
and autonomy and Hegel’s polemics towards romantic irony, respectively). Furthermore, and as a
result of this, there is already an inherent tension to be found within the mentioned diagnosis. That
is, the tension between the philosophies of Kant and Hegel. In the ethical alternative to aestheticism,
which we will now take into consideration, the same tension and incommensurability becomes all
the more obvious.
IV.
The Ethical choice as Hegelian dialectics
In order to vanquish his nihilistic despair, Wilhelm tells A to choose himself ethically. To choose
one self is intimately related to the concept of spirit. In the aesthetical stage (in both of its versions)
the spirit is hysterical. Wherefore? Well, for reasons inherited from German idealism: As we have
learned from The critique of pure reason as well as The Phenomenology of spirit, the spirit demands
the absolute (or the unconditional), which by no means can ever be satisfied through sensual (and
eo ipso finite) conditions. Just as the immediate aesthetical consciousness, A is negatively
dependent on the finality of sensation, wherefore he has not exceeded the boundaries of immediate
sensation (or finality) – but merely seen them through. Thus, the negative infinity of the ironical
nihilism (and its accompanying despair) must be replaced by a positive infinity of the spirit, which
has to go through to negative movement of despair in order to, positively, arrive at itself.
But how? Well, it (i. e. the spirit) must return to finality and manifest itself concretely and
positively herein. Furthermore, this movement is a twofold actualization: (i) It is an activity of the
spirit (i. e. a performance performed by the spirit) and (ii) it is the actual realization (in the
Aristotelian sense of actuality) of the spirit. The spirit must give up its immediate immediacy in an
infinite negation (such as A’s despair) and return to an infinitely re-qualified version of immediacy
(in the ethical choice). Only then is spirit really spirit – or in Wilhelm’s own formulation: »I posit
the absolute and I am the absolute, but as totally identical with this I must say: I choose the absolute
that chooses me and I posit the absolute that posits me […] It is the most abstract of all, which is
also in itself the most concrete of all«. With a trivial example: My identity is not exhausted in my
mere subjective possibilities as well as it not exhausted in any factual actuality (e. g. being a student
of philosophy). The immediate aesthetical consciousness has confused its identity with just its
sensual features (i. e. factual identity) whereas A has mistaken his negative reflection and
unqualified possibility with himself. However, none of these positions are adequate: My identity is
the dynamic-dialectical identity of the identity of identity and difference. But still, this is admittedly
a highly formal characterization in – in terms of Hegelian dialectics – of the double-movement of
the ethical choice.
V.
Fichte’s faith as how of the ethical choice contra Hegelian mediation
Although there is an apparent structural analogy between the ethical choice and Hegelian dialectics,
the specific how of Wilhelm’s choice is clearly inspired by Fichte’s concept of faith (as a matter of
fact, we do know that Kierkegaard has been reading Die Bestimmung des Menschen). With Fichte,
the »inner voice of conscience« articulates the demands of moral freedom as opposed to the natural
mechanics of inclination. This delineation still seems rather Kantian - but there is an imperative and
vital difference. In the Foundation for the Metaphysic of Morals a moral action is described as (i)
subjectively motivated by respect for the moral law and (ii) objectively determined by the moral law
itself. Practical reason – in Kantian morality - has to postulate a pure feeling – namely the respect –
which can be motivated exclusively intelligibly. Otherwise, the normative ought of morality cannot
be acted upon, in which case morality in toto would be absurd. Thus, respect is a practical conditio
sine qua non for practical imperatives. This argument, however, arguably is either (i) begging the
question (that what ought to be done actually can be done) or (ii) a terribly formal argument (and
here, we cannot get into details). Fichte, on his side, apparently senses this difficulty when he
proclaims how »I cannot think anything outside of my thought«. Ethical motivation must
necessarily manifest itself in a factual reality outside the realm of pure thinking (or knowledge),
wherefore it seems utterly insufficient for practical reason merely to postulate its own conditions of
possibility (such as the moral agents capability of acting out of respect for the moral law). Morality
is not simply a matter of coherent reasoning but must be actualized in the factual world. Otherwise,
moral philosophy is no less abstract than romantic irony and we will have no reliable way of telling
the difference between the creations of ironic reflection and the postulations of pure practical
reasoning. The answer to this challenge, as Fichte puts it, is »not knowledge, but a decision of the
will […]. All of my conviction is just faith and it originates from the character (or the disposition) –
not from the understanding«. Thus, the freedom of the moral (or ethical) act is a matter of decision not the necessary self-legislation (i. e. autonomy) of reason.
Admittedly, a thorough reading of Fichte’s relation to Kant would have to be way more
nuanced. For now, however, we just wish to point out a genuine idealistic inspiration for Wilhelm’s
concept of choice. Wilhelm’s formulations on the subject are in each case close to Fichte’s: Thus,
the ethical realization of the spirit is not an activity of thought or contemplation, but a choice of the
will. Although the Kantian notion of freedom means (as we just mentioned) a necessary selflegislation of practical reason, it is not necessary (in the eyes of Kant) - but only possible - that
moral actions will actually be carried out. Human beings are namely very likely to act from
heteronomous motives and inclinations, wherefore we (in this sense) can choose not to obey the
necessary imperatives laid upon by practical reason. Following this line of argument, Wilhelm’s
choice does not primarily oppose the Kantian conception of autonomy. Instead, it attacks the
Hegelian notion of »Sittlichkeit«, the metaphysical radicalism of which by far outbids that of
Kantian morality. For Hegel, not only the imperative demands of morality must imply necessity.
The realization of freedom and morality is itself a necessary dialectical movement of the
»Weltgeist« (i. e. the absolute spirit). »That which is reasonable is actual; and that which is actual is
reasonable« - as Hegel puts it in his Philosophy of Right. As the core metaphysical principle of
reality, the Hegelian spirit assures that the factual reality will actualize the abstract reason; thereby –
by means of this institutional concretization - realizing reason itself (very much like the dialectical
structure of the ethical choice). Thus, true reality (and freedom) is a dynamical synthesis (or
mediation) of »the concept and its realization«. In practical philosophy, the state is such a
reasonable unity of concept and reality through which Hegel can dismiss the inherent dualism of
Kant’s morality. Wilhelm furiously and consistently opposes this Hegelian framework – for
instance in this concise passage: »If mediation is admitted, there is no absolute choice […]. [The]
difficulty […] lies therein that one confuses two spheres with each other, that of thought and that of
freedom […] in the logical, in nature [!] […] necessity rules, wherefore the mediation has its
validity […] With history, on the other hand, there is a difficulty, because, as you say, here freedom
rules«. Wilhelm – as well as Hegel – understands both movements dialectically. Nonetheless, he
distinguishes rigidly between (i) the epistemological doubt as impetus in the necessary dialectics of
logic on the one hand and the existential despair as the catalyst in the free dialectics of the ethical
choice. Hegel, indeed, does not distinguish between the two – as a reading of the opening chapter of
the Phenomenology of Spirit would reveal. In Wilhelm’s articulation: »Doubt is the despair of
thought, despair is the doubt of personality«. Despair is existentially involved (something is at
stake) – whereas doubt is an indifferent epistemological mode of thought. And it is only what
concerns the existential despair that the either/or of the book title finds it application. Either A will
choose himself in his despair (taking over his factual existence in freedom) – or he will not. Tertium
non datur. No mediation is possible here.
VI.
Kant versus Hegel: The motive or the what of the ethical choice?
As we have seen, Fichte’s concept of faith has inspired the how of the ethical choice thereby
trumping Kantian autonomy and Hegelian mediation. Nonetheless, the basic understanding of
normativity on the whole draws on Kant’s deontological focus on the motive rather than
consequences. With Wilhelm: It is not as much about »choosing what is right, as it is about the
energy, the earnestness and pathos, with which one chooses«. This mixture of Kant and Fichte
within the ethical stage of Either/Or has already been confused by the involvement of Hegelian
dialectics in the existential sphere. And the eclecticism of Wilhelm goes even further: Thus, the
content of the dialectical double-movement of the choice is a concretization and identification of
abstract self-consciousness in its factual circumstances. In practice, the individual must realize the
universal – as both Wilhelm and Hegel put it – and be able to re-identify itself with its actual
profession (as carpenter or student of philosophy) without (as the immediate aesthetical
consciousness) losing hold of itself (i. e. its self) in its factuality. Still, Wilhelm accuses Hegel of
having confused the spheres of existential freedom and logical necessity. No mediation of absolute
spirit can bring about the ethical choice, which will always have to be a concrete choice of a
concrete individual (or in Danish: hin enkelte).
VII.
Rounding: The dissolution of the ethical position
»If there must be mediation, then one could say that it is repentence, but repentence is not
mediation […] and if I cannot repent the past then freedom is but a dream«. But what does this say.
Well, in order to choose oneself freely one must repent oneself. To repent oneself is to be able to reidentify with an aesthetical facticity, which is more than oneself, indeed, which is ultimately the
entire stock (or generation). Every individual is always already something actual (formed by its
history and its predecessors), which must be taken over in a free choice. But does the idea of
repentence as some sort of existential necessary condition for the ethical choice seem somewhat
preposterous? Can anybody choose so much? The problem is – in my reading - that Wilhelm copies
Hegel’s idea of a concrete realization of the moral will without accepting the metaphysical concept
of the spirit, which would assure a necessary mediation between the reflective self and the positive
reality. Thus, Wilhelm demands an objectification of morality solely by means of a decision of the
subjective individual and this presents an exceedingly tense juxtaposition of Kantian autonomy,
Fichtean faith and Hegelian »Sittlichkeit«. In Either/Or Wilhelm still presupposes that the ethical
individual is up for the task; that he or her can »reconcile man with life«. Nonetheless, the
following questions (just to mention a few) are already present between the lines: (i) how can
subjective repentence contain the objective guilt of the stock? (ii) How can the individual ever
choose something right here right now, if it must continually repent the past? How can I know,
whether or not I have repented adequately or in the right way? Is this consideration not anxietyprovoking (to point to a later work of Kierkegaard)? Must we not presuppose a metaphysical »order
of things« as a precondition for the meaningfulness of the ethical choice?
As we know, Kierkegaard will ask those questions with full-blown radicalism in his later
writings. He moves on to religion – in other words – but only (or philosophically) because of the
dissolution of the ethical stage from idealism-internal motives. Religion, shortly explained, will
bring about a complex atonement through the absurdity of faith – or in the words of Vigilius
Haufniensis (i. e. the watchful Copenhagener): »The only thing that is truly capable of disarming
the sophism of repentence is faith, the courage to faith […] This only faith can do, for only in faith
is the synthesis perpetual and in each moment possible.« But this – I am afraid – I quite another
story. It starts nonetheless, with the dissolution of the ethical stage qua a manifestation of problems
inherent to German idealism and some of its most prominent representatives.