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Summary
By: Andrew N. Windrem
Thesis:
-The use of strategic bombing in World War Two by the Allied powers was justified due to the success in limiting the shipments that
reinforced German positions, as well as crippling production capabilities in Germany and destroying the morale of the German people.
Counter Argument 1:
-The Russian “scorched earth policy” caused problems for the Germans in the western front.
-The destruction caused more then a major annoyance as the usage of location specific cargo made the resupply of German positions
tedious and expensive since the trains did not have the ability or luxury to transfer cargo in large marshaling yards.
-This consequentially made the Germans more resilient by allowing for more streamlined transfers and clandestine methods of
transport.
-More importantly, this was the chief reason that the Germans were able to establish the major counter offensives of Operation
Luttich, Operation Wacht am Rhein, and Nordwind.1
-Dr. Pape stated that the destruction of the rail system only caused momentary lapses as the Nazis quickly rebuilt what was destroyed
during the onslaughts.
-Dr. Rummel continues this thought with his assessment that the usage of aerial bombing could be effectively removed as the allied
powers were effective enough in their numerical superiority to achieve a series of decisive victories that mirrored the so called benefits
of aerial bombardment.
Argument 1: The success in limiting the shipments that reinforced German positions
-The German army was only able to amass three major counter offensives in response.2
-The German railway network carried the vast majority of military vehicles and other heavy equipment. 3
-The Allies focused on the idea to create “roadblocks” and “bottlenecks” by bombing the principal marshalling yards, which acted as
transportation hubs for munitions, soldiers, and supplies, rather than cutting individual railway lines. 4
-The goal was to make it impossible for the Germans to move significant reinforcements into France and other fronts of the war.5
-The Allies targeted eighty critical transportation targets in France.6
-By late May, French railroad traffic was half what it had been in January and by mid-June, it had ceased to operate.7
From December on, all sectors of the German economy were in rapid decline.8
-As well in December, the strategic effectiveness of German rail traffic was down 50% due to destruction of infrastructure.9
-The attack on transportation was the decisive blow that completely disorganized the German economy. It reduced war
production in all categories and made it difficult to move what was produced to the front. The attack also limited the tactical
mobility of the German Army. . . . Germany was reaching a state of helplessness. . . . Her armament production was failing
and total disruption and disintegration were well under way. . . . Even if the final allied land victories had not occurred the
German Armies without ammunition and the impending collapse of the supporting economy would have had to cease fighting
within a few months. 10
-It directly allowed the Allied powers to strike deep into occupied territories and Germany itself with the great range of the planes
conducting the raids. With the collective efforts of both the American Bomber effort and the British Bomber Command there were
enough disruptive and effective attacks that the Luftwaffe was forced to keep the bulk of its strength in Germany for defense purposes.
This limited German airpower on the Russian front and weakened the German army’s effectiveness by reducing the usage of
Blitzkrieg.11
-The British estimated that the loss of more than 50 percent of Axis output would quickly reduce German tactical and strategic
mobility as well as frontline delivery of supplies. The expected destruction of fifty-four oil installations would force Germany to cut
military consumption by 25 percent, even if it retained possession of the Rumanian oil fields.12
-By disrupting the combat effectiveness of the military machine and more importantly its ability to resupply itself resulted in
debilitating problems for the Nazis. By choking off the ability of an army to supply itself, the German military could not hold their
position to the level of effectiveness that they were accustomed to in the majority of the earlier parts of the war. This should be noted
with the rapid retreat of the German army into Germany to protect its homeland and the great number of Allied victories between June
6th 1944 and May 8th 1945. The lack of supplies forced reduced numbers of German counter attacks.13
Counter Argument 2:
-The usage of this campaign did not wholly destroy the German production machine: it often only temporarily removed the essential
workers from their posts.
1
Worldwar-2.net. World War 2 Timelines 1939-1945 - Western Europe 1945 - Worldwar-2.net. 2006. 20 Mar. 2008
<http://www.worldwar-2.net/timelines/war-in-europe/western-europe/western-europe-index-1945.htm>.
2
Worldwar-2.net. World War 2 Timelines 1939-1945 - Western Europe 1945 - Worldwar-2.net. 2006. 20 Mar. 2008
<http://www.worldwar-2.net/timelines/war-in-europe/western-europe/western-europe-index-1945.htm>.
3
Williamson Murray and Allan Millet, A War to be Won, p. 326.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid. 341
6
Murray and Millett, A War to be Won, p. 327.
7
Ibid.
8
Hansell, The Strategic Air War, p. 122.
9
Pape, Bombing to Win, p. 277.
10
Hansell, The Strategic Air War, p. 126.
11
Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, p. 181.
12
Pape, Bombing to Win, p. 277.
13
Worldwar-2.net. World War 2 Timelines 1939-1945 - Western Europe 1945 - Worldwar-2.net. 2006. 20 Mar. 2008
<http://www.worldwar-2.net/timelines/war-in-europe/western-europe/western-europe-index-1945.htm>.
-The economy was also very versatile and resilliant by moving essential industries to caves and sewers so that production could go on
unharmed and in a clandestine manner.
-The Germans most notably moved aircraft production into caves as a result of the crackdown on their city based production.
-The usage of area bombing in the cities of Berlin, Munich, Hamburg, Cologne, Leipzig, Essen, and Dresden was used to combat this
problem as they provided the greatest range of effect with the technology at the time.
Argument 2: Crippling production capabilities in Germany
-The Eaker plan consisted of two heavy bombardment groups which Washington
had earmarked for spring delivery to the
United Kingdom, and for other units which were to follow.…The actual establishment of the Eighth in England followed the pattern
of the Eaker plan.14
-The usage of The Eaker Plan, which became part of Combined Bomber Offensive strategy called for all-out attacks, by the combined
day and night effort of U.S. and British bomber forces, it mainly targeted precision targets but allowed for nighttime area-bombing of
the cities associated with those targets.15
-This campaign was so effective that it created great demands upon the civilian power system, and gas system.16
-This was arguably due to the fact that 85% of American bombs fell on Germany after D-Day.
-It brought about a change in German production requirements that required a shift to an increased emphasis on fighters and the
attempt to develop new technologies in the form of the V-2 “buzz” bombs and jet aircraft to combat the assault.
-It forced the diversion of a large segment of Germany’s work force to the unending task of reconstruction of bombed factories and
public utilities, engaging a million and a half workers. 17
Counter Argument 3:
-Considering the sheer blast yield dropped upon the city production centers in Germany and their effect resulted in a level of resiliency
that the German people portrayed. This resiliency mirrored that of the British during The Blitz.
-German industries realized that repairing their factories and other production centers a multitude of times was an ineffective means of
keeping production at a consistent and dependable level as demanded throughout the state of total war. Some included the use of
sewer and cave production to shield from bombing or aerial recognizance.
-The ravaging destruction of displacing 7.5 million German civilians has made some conclude that these actions border upon war
crimes. This level of displacement was immoral, and bordered upon war crimes as the Allies specifically targeted civilians en masse
with the amount of bombing in German production centers of Berlin, Cologne, Hamburg, Essen, Munich, Leipzig, and Dresden.
-The German people were also effected as they had to not only relocate their employment in factories that were moved but were often
forced to relocate their residences as a result of the bombing and mass fires that were especially present in Hamburg, Munich, and
Dresden.
Argument 3: Destroying the morale of the German people
-The Americans accomplished this through the usage of strategic interdiction which focused on sectors of industry directly linked to
the combat power of the German army. 18
-The Americans vigorously focused upon the destruction of certain identifiable components early in the military production cycle.
Ideal targets included primary and semi-finished products with special military use, such as ball bearings, machine tools, rubber,
aluminum, magnesium, nickel, steel, and nitrates.19
-The stimulation for attacking these targets was initially to slow down the might of the German war machine, but it proved more
effective as the German citizens were often out of the production work cycle and were required to retool, repair, or rebuild their places
of employment. This monotonous and tiring work resulted in the slowing of production.20
-The Combined Bomber Offensive air plan called for the destruction of the German air force as an intermediate objective and then the
destruction of support systems, including the German aircraft industry, ball bearing plants, petroleum production and supplies.
-This plan had some quantifiable, results including the visible destruction of German factories, airfields, and forcing the Germans to
move aircraft production into hidden locations.
-American bombers dropped bombs on fourteen airframe plants, which caused a drop in fighter production between July and
December 1943.21
-June 1943, British bombers had burned an average of fourteen square miles per city; by March 1944, the level of destruction reached
thirty-six square miles and continued to rise. British bombers attacked sixty-one major cities and thirty-one towns and razed 128
square miles, amounting to 50 percent of the urban area. Area bombing rendered 7.5 million people, or 11 percent of the German
population homeless, killed 305,000 civilians, and wounded 780,000. The catastrophic losses inflicted on such cities as Cologne,
Hamburg, and Dresden shocked the entire German people. 22 To provide a cross section of the tonnage dropped upon these cities by
allied forces it shows that Berlin faced 67,607.3 tonnes, Cologne 44,923.2 tonnes, Hamburg 39,687.6 tonnes, Essen 37,938.0 tonnes,
Munich 21,110.9 tonnes, Leipzig 11,616.4 tonnes, and Dresden 7,100.5 tonnes.23
-This further lead to the allied advances where the German people were willing to allow allied occupation without major uprisings or
civil unrest thus proclaiming that the German people were morally defeated as a result of allied bombing campaigns and their
widespread effects.
14
Craven, W. F., and J. L. Cate. HyperWar: The Army Airforces in WWII: Vol I--Plans & Early Opperations [Chapter 17]. 2003. 20
Mar. 2008 <http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/I/AAF-I-17.html>.
15
Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, II, 13-16.
16
Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, IV, 392.
17
Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, p. 181.
18
Strategic interdiction was to reduce the enemy’s capacity to field forces by destroying the production facilities that manufactured
weapon systems.
19
Pape, Bombing to Win, p. 263.
20
Ibid.
21
USSBS, p. 17.
22
Ibid. 18-24
23
Angell, Joseph W. "Historical Analysis of the 14-15 February 1945 Bombings of Dresden", USAF Historical Division Research
Studies Institute Air University, 1953, retrieved January 7, 2008.