Download After the cultural turn, a return to the moral economy[1]

BALIHAR SANGHERA
After the cultural turn, a return to the moral
economy1
The recent ‘cultural turn’ in the social sciences has led some writers to
rethink the relationship between culture and economy. 2 The term
‘cultural economy’ tries to outline the ways in which the economic is
inseparable from the cultural.3 The term refers to how cultural
meanings and identities are embedded in the economic life. We cannot
explain how economic practices are coordinated without
understanding the actors’ interpretations and the meanings behind
their actions.
This presentation of culture and economy is an improvement on
previous approaches that privileged the economy over culture, or
reduced cultural practices to economic structures, or treated the two as
separate and unconnected entities. But this recent depiction of culture
and economy has a fundamental limit: there is little interest in moralpolitical values. To be sure, the prioritisation of aesthetic values over
moral-political values in recent studies of the cultural economy
reflects the one-sidedness and a narrow conception of cultures.4 This
1
2
3
4
I am grateful to my students and colleagues at Novosibirsk State University and
Irkutsk State University in the Russian Federation, and the National University
of Mongolia, Ulaan-Baator, for their helpful comments on some of the issues
covered in this article.
See for example the collection of writings edited by Larry Ray and Andrew
Sayer, Culture and Economy after the Cultural Turn (London: Sage
Publications, 1999).
For an example of this approach see Paul Du Gay and Mike Pryke, eds.,
Cultural Economy: Cultural Analysis and Commercial Life, (London: Sage
Publications, 2002).
See Andrew Sayer, ‘Valuing Culture and Economy’ (posted on the Web at
comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/soc023as.html, 1999); see also, Andrew Sayer,
‘Equality
and
Moral
Economy’,
(posted
on
the
Web
at
comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/soc059as.html, 2000).
2
Balihar Sanghera
article aims to correct this imbalance, and will suggest the ways in
which the economy is embedded with moral values. Moral values
concern how society should be organised, how others should be
treated, our responsibilities to others, relationships with other species
and the environment, and so on.5
In the first section, I will discuss the cultural economy approach,
comparing it to more traditional approaches to culture and economy in
advanced industrialised societies. In the next section, I shall provide a
critique of this approach, highlighting its failure to deliver what it
promises. Finally, a critique implies an alternative standpoint: the
moral economy perspective will be shown to offer a more critical and
normative understanding and explanation of the contemporary issues.
The cultural economy approach
Increasingly contemporary writers argue that the economy has become
‘culturally stylised’, or aestheticised.6 By this, they mean two things.
First, this tendency refers to how more cultural goods (music,
literature, fashion, films, sport, etc.) are produced or mediated through
the market. In particular, many writers (for example Adorno and
Horkheimer or more recently Baudrillard and Featherstone) have
spelled out the implications of this process by examining mass culture,
mass consumption and fragmented identities.
A second meaning refers to how production systems have
become sensitive to the meanings people attach to work, and to the
efficacy of reconstructing meaning at work. In particular, the writers
on post-Fordism and corporate culture often claim that conflictual
5
6
As discussed by William Booth, ‘On the idea of the moral economy’, in
American Political Science Review, vol. 88, no. 3 (1994), pp. 653-667.
See for instance Paul Du Gay, ed, Production of Culture/Cultures of Production
(London: Sage Publications and Open University, 1997); Du Gay and Pryke,
eds., Cultural Economy; Scott Lash and John Urry, Economies of Signs and
Space (London: Sage Publications, 1993).
After the cultural
3
labour relations and arm’s length market relations have given way to a
high degree of trust and embedded, negotiated processes of
coordinating economic practices. It is also claimed that by
constructing either an enterprise culture or a total quality management
system in the organisation, economic relations and practices can
become more personally fulfilling and enriching for workers, and
productive and profitable for the company.
Table 1 highlights the key ways in which the cultural economy
approach differs from economic liberalism and Marxist political
economy. To be sure, the cultural economy framework has several
distinct advantages over them (see Table 2). There are many positive
effects of the cultural turn in the social sciences – both in taking
culture, meaning and subjectivity more seriously, and in escaping
from reductionist accounts of culture as a mere reflection of the
material situation. This cultural turn coincides with the decline of
socialism, and the diversification of the concerns of radical politics
beyond economic questions of distribution towards cultural questions
of recognition and identities.7 Research into the forms of domination
and division that go beyond those deriving from capital and class was
long overdue.
A critique of the cultural economy perspective
While acknowledging the importance of ‘culture’ within the economy,
and appreciating how cultural economy is an improvement on
economic liberalism and traditional political economy, there are
particular difficulties within the cultural economy perspective.
The first weakness is that the cultural economy model
uncritically accepts ‘the market’ as a central mechanism in the
economy. The cultural economy model treats the public as the market,
7
For a helpful discussion of the nature and the implications of the cultural turn,
see Larry Ray and Andrew Sayer, eds., Culture and Economy after the Cultural
Turn (London: Sage Publications, 1999).
4
Balihar Sanghera
and the people as consumers. Yet we are not offered a political and
moral critique of the market’s place in the economy – i.e., the effects
of economic markets on human values and social practices. As we
shall see later, the market mechanism, while appealing to individual
needs, actually poses a threat to the individuality of those who inhabit
the cultural economy terrain.
The second weakness is that the model seems to suggest that a
society that creates more cultural meanings and lifestyles is better than
one in which there are less. So we are invited to assess the effects of
globalisation by whether it adds to or subtracts from cultural diversity
and aesthetics. Again, when considering fashion, we are supposed to
ask whether it enables consumers to be active in creating their own
identities. Yet trying to maximise meanings, lifestyles and aesthetics
could be seen as morally suspect and unacceptable. For example,
women in pornographic magazines can be described in terms of their
beauty, youthfulness and attractiveness, but such images may be
interpreted as degrading and dehumanising to women. Similarly welldressed fascists preaching messages of ethnic intolerance and hatred
may well be seen as morally repugnant.
The third weakness concerns the methodology, which highlights
the importance of contexts, identities and contingency. This literature
also details how markets and organisations are socially constructed;
that is, particular identities are not essential or fixed, but changing.
While it contains within itself a much-needed corrective to traditional
political economy, this methodological stance deliberately fails to
identify any essential and necessary social relations and social
tendencies, and shies away from any detailed abstract analyses (i.e.,
one-sidedness). Inevitably, such an anti-essentialist and firmly
constructivist methodology produces studies that are more prone to
mistakenly attributing causality, confusing is with ought, and failing
to make critical interventions.8
Let us examine some of the weaknesses in more detail. Market
operations have implications for the individual’s identity, autonomy
8
For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Andrew Sayer, ‘System,
lifeworld and gender: associational versus counterfactual thinking’, in
Sociology, vol. 34, no. 3 (2000), pp. 707-725.
After the cultural
5
and desire for recognition. I will argue that cultural economy’s
dependence on market systems undermines its project of autonomy for
the individual, who desires recognition. We can identify three internal
weaknesses of the cultural economy approach.
Identity: according to the ‘cultural economy’ framework, identity
revolves around leisure and centres on looks, images and
consumption. It celebrates the market as it develops an autonomous
character: as consumers, we can choose our own taste, and as
entrepreneurs, we are responsible for our own success. The cultural
economy highlights the playfulness of choosing our own identities at
will from an array of market choices and opportunities.9
Yet the market can undermine identity and personal character,
because identity under market conditions tends to be unstable and
subject to change: market incentives to act in particular ways are
constantly changing. Individuals are no longer engaged in life
projects, or fail to make long-term commitments, and so abandon
deeper responsibilities (single issue protest movements for example).
Autonomy requires settled commitments, values, life projects and
responsibilities that define what it is to have a character. Under
changing market conditions and incentives, such long-term
commitments and deep responsibilities are discouraged.
Authority and autonomy: autonomous people accept only that
which they are able to affirm according to their own reasoning or
experiences. Such a person appears most readily in the guise of the
sovereign consumer and the individual entrepreneur, particularly in
what has been called the ‘enterprise culture’.10 The cultural economy
appeals to autonomous people who can use their own powers of
judgement and decision to formulate projects and to make
commitments: the individual does not depend on the authority of
others. Authoritative standards in the product market (such as safety
and quality standards for consumer goods) and labour markets (such
9
10
For more on the enterprising self and the consuming self, see Paul Du Gay,
Consumption and Identity at Work (London: Sage Publications, 1996).
See Nikolas Rose, ‘Governing the enterprising self’, in The Values of the
Enterprise Culture, edited by Paul Heelas and Paul Morris (London: Routledge,
1992).
6
Balihar Sanghera
as workers’ rights) are seen as incompatible with autonomy and
freedom, and tend towards paternalism, elitism and a lack of
individual responsibility. Here the sovereign self merges with the
autonomous and responsible self.
However, as John O’Neill in his book The Market: Ethics,
Knowledge and Politics rightly argues, we can distinguish between
social authority (authority conferred on a person, such as political and
religious figures, on the basis of their institutional or social position),
and epistemological authority (authority and knowledge arrived at
through impersonal standards, dialogue and practical reasoning).
While we can be suspicious of the former, the latter is both necessary
and desirable in making reasonable judgements and decisions.
Without authority, we are prone to making mistakes (e.g. ignoring the
advice of our own doctor not to smoke and drink) that undermine our
desire for autonomy.
Recognition: recognition is required to confirm our self-worth as
beings with powers of rationality and the capacity to stand above and
shape particular desires. Yet recognition of worth and praise (or
compliments) counts only from those other individuals whom we
recognise to have worth. Recognition requires professional and trade
associations, academic and scientific communities and craft guilds,
whose recognition we respect as worth having. Recognition requires
other people located in non-market institutions, and because of this we
must reject an individualised market economy.
The cultural economy approach describes heavy consumption of
cultural goods as a desire for recognition, though it would be more
accurate to say a desire to be noticed. However, recognition takes
place entirely at the level of appearances – we buy goods that are
‘cool’ and aesthetically pleasing to the senses. Here, there is no
distance between recognition for looking good and for being good.11
Individuals do not seek recognition to confirm their independent
worth or gain praise for worthy acts, but for the recognition of their
appearance, in pursuit of love of praise. Appearance is fought over by
11
On this point see Alistar MacIntyre, After Virtue: A study in moral theory
(London: Duckworth, 1985). See also Russell Keat, Cultural Goods and the
Limits of the Market (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000).
After the cultural
7
producers and consumers usually in the form of better or worse
aesthetic tastes. Indeed, the idea of recognition of worth, dependent on
professional or trade association, is absent. In short, the market
rewards self-esteem rather than self-respect.
The moral economy approach
Without an adequate moral framework to evaluate the cultural and
economic, the cultural economy approach can be dismissed as simply
a version of neo-liberalism, naively celebrating the false gods of
market choices, individual autonomy, and value-neutrality.12 We shall
evaluate the cultural economy approach by examining the moral
economy approach (see Table 3), suggesting reasons why the latter is
preferable to the former.
A crucial feature of many of the goals or goods associated with
culture is that they are primarily internal, i.e., intrinsic. For example, a
certain kind of music might be valued, but this value is not accorded
merely in order to achieve some external goal, but because the kind of
music is valued in itself. By contrast, economic activities and
processes involve a primarily instrumental orientation; they are
ultimately a means to an end, satisfying external goals to do with
provisioning. The meaningful aspects of activities, artefacts and
relationships, whose value is primarily internal, are combined in
various ways with instrumental activities directed towards the external
goal of reproduction of social life. The internal association of the
cultural and the economic implies that it is wrong to think of the
relation between them as simply external. A question like ‘How has
the economy been influenced by culture?’ implies that there was first
a pristine economy which somehow later fell under the influence of
12
For a useful survey of the ethical and social limits of the market economy, see
John O’Neill, The Market: Ethics, Knowledge and Politics, (London:
Routledge, 1998).
8
Balihar Sanghera
culture, when of course economic activities have always been
culturally embedded.
In the moral economy approach, cultures include values among
their signifying practices. These may involve judgements and
sentiments regarding utility, aesthetics and moral-political matters.
Contemporary writers of the cultural economy approach are overly
preoccupied with aesthetic values, as evident in their focus on style
and taste; indeed the definition of their object of study refers to the
‘stylisation of life’.13 Yet there is less interest in moral-political
values.
For Sen, Habermas, Polanyi and other writers on the moral
economy, central to the question of the relationship between culture
and economy is that of the nature and role of moral-political values
and the potential moralising and identity-neutral effects of the
market.14 The tendency of neo-liberal theorists and cultural economy
writers to reduce culture to the stylisation of life and private
preferences is complicit in the de-moralisation of culture and derationalisation of moral-political values. There is a tendency to ignore
moral influences on social life, usually by interpreting them either as
merely subjective and emotive, or in instrumental, power-based terms,
‘strategies of distinction’, to use Bourdieu’s term.15 In order to counter
these tendencies, a new version of the concept of moral economy is
required that highlights the ways in which all economic activities –
13
14
15
See for example Scott Lash and John Urry, Economies of Signs and Space
(London: Sage Publications, 1993); Stuart Hall, ed., Representation: Cultural
Representations and Signifying Practices (London: Sage Publications and Open
University, 1997); Paul Du Gay, ed., Production of Culture/Cultures of
Production.
See Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliation (New York:
Free Press, 1955); Albert Hirschman, ‘Rival Interpretations of the Market
Society: Civilising, Destructive, or Feeble?’, in Journal of Economic Literature,
vol. 20, no. 4 (1982), pp. 1463–1484; Andrew Sayer, Radical Political
Economy: A Critique (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995); Sayer, ‘Equality and Moral
Economy’.
Pierre Bourdieu, ‘La production de la croyance: contribution à une économie
des biens symboliques’ [The production of belief: contribution to an economy
of symbolic goods], in Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, no. 13,
February (1977), pp. 4–43.
After the cultural
9
both formal and informal, or domestic – are influenced by norms and
conventions, including ethical principles. The moral economy
embodies norms, conventions, tacit understanding, and ‘constitutive
rules’ regarding the responsibilities and rights of individuals and
institutions with respect to others and regarding the nature and
qualities of goods, services and environment. These norms,
conventions and constitutive rules shape both the formal and informal,
including household economies. It is worth noting that while these
norms, conventions and constitutive rules may be considered as part
of a moral order, they are invariably influenced by networks of power
and considerations of costs.16
The emergence of the market society has de-moralised society in
another way. As Habermas and Sen point out, the development of
economic systems (institutions characterised by formal rationality
such as markets and bureaucracy) has turned questions of validity into
questions of behaviour, and turned ethical and political questions into
engineering and technical ones. The questions of purpose and ethics
have become secondary to questions of fitness for purpose and
techniques.17 Indeed, liberals and contemporary social theorists have
usually depicted actors and institutions as merely instruments,
generating wealth and producing a social order.18 In other words, the
sphere characterised by formal rationality and impersonality
dominates the sphere characterised by deliberation and negotiation. As
Sayer argues, as people lost control over their economic lives (i.e.,
‘vagaries of the market’), became alienated at work and from others,
and came to have close economic relations with distant unknown
others (i.e., advanced division of labour), the competitive laws of
global economy tended to reduce the normative standpoints on moral
economy, correspondingly making philosophical discourse on ethics
appear irrelevant.19 However, we need to return to the questions of
16
17
18
19
See Robert Salais and Michael Storper, ‘The four “worlds” of contemporary
industry’, in Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 16, no. 2 (1992), pp. 169–
193.
See Russell Keat, Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market.
For a useful survey of modern social theories of the market society, see Don
Slater and Fran Tonkiss, Market Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001).
Andrew Sayer, ‘Valuing Culture and Economy’.
10
Balihar Sanghera
validity, ethics and purpose, otherwise we collude with the dominance
of economic systems over the cultural sphere, condemning ourselves
to the senseless truck, trade and barter mentality and to market
fatalism.
Sayer raises some issues of moral economy, validity, ethics and
purpose that fundamentally question the nature of advanced
industrialised societies.20 What are our responsibilities towards
children, the elderly, the disabled and infirm, to distant others and
future generations, and to the environment? How should we discharge
our responsibilities to others? By paying taxes to fund transfer
payments? Through direct unpaid labour? By paying others to do the
work? How should these responsibilities be allocated between men
and women, or between people of different incomes and wealth? To
what extent should people be reliant on wages for their income? How
far should income be subject to the anarchy of the market, or to the
self-adjusting market? What things should not be commodified?
Of course, our answers and practices to these and other questions
require an informed and practice-based dialogue and engagement, in
which the participants have equal opportunity to discuss, act and
decide. In any one generation, practices and decisions will inevitably
vary according to the historical, political and cultural circumstances.
However, this does not mean that we should accept moral relativism,
which is usually a disguised form of power. Rather, all practices and
decisions require an identification with and a recognition of
fundamental and transnational values such as equality, freedom from
oppression and poverty, autonomy, respect for cultural difference, and
so on.
Concluding remarks: three dimensions of the moral
economy
20
See Sayer, ‘Valuing Culture and Economy’; ‘Equality and Moral Economy’.
After the cultural
11
To strengthen the explanatory and critical claims of the moral
economy approach, I will conclude by suggesting the different
dimensions along which the economy is morally embedded: they are
institutional, explanatory and normative.
Institutional: the market society cannot be characterised as
socially disembedded since markets require the construction of
property rights, of contracts and their enforcement, and so on that
enable them to operate. To depict the economy as a self-regulating
market is to misconstrue the emergence and the development of the
market society.21 To be sure, the moral reconstruction of the economy
suggests that the provisioning of human beings is embedded in
relations of justice. For example, members of families give gifts to
one another based on their norms of deference and of reciprocal
obligations between parents and children, and their religious beliefs.
Members of a political community will adapt relations of distribution
and of production to the norms and values of the community. For
instance, a community that recognises the inequalities among its
members will restructure economic relations differently to one in
which freedom and liberty are highly valued.
Explanatory: as Booth notes, economics as the science of wealth
must be guided by the question of wealth’s purpose: wealth is an
instrumental good, and it has a purpose external to itself, and in light
of which its worth is judged.22 This claim, then, makes economics an
ethical inquiry about the nature of the good life and about the place of
the economy in relation to it. Consequently, economic science is
incomplete if it fails to embed its studies of the economy in a wider
cultural context. Economics must be centrally informed by the
question of the good to which the economy serves. Significantly, this
shifts us away from the liberal inquiry of rights, neutrality and selfownership, towards a normative study grounded in questions like ‘To
what purpose?’ and ‘What good is served?’
In addition, according to Adam Smith and the Scottish
Enlightenment thinkers, markets have a ‘civilising effect’: reducing
21
22
See Slater and Tonkiss, Market Society.
Booth, ‘On the idea of the moral economy’, in American Political Science
Review, pp. 653-667.
12
Balihar Sanghera
the power of the sovereign, and encouraging individuals and nations
to be industrious and attentive to one another’s needs and to cultivate
a reputation for fair dealing so as not to damage their creditworthiness and market position.23 Similarly, Simmel argues that
commerce is a powerful socialising and moralising agent that brings
many non-material improvements to society, even though a bit of
double-dealing may have to be accepted into the bargain.24
Normative: the historical transition from non-economic and
feudal relations to market (and visibly economic) relations yields a
new form of moral embeddedness, in which labour and land are freed
from their status-determined, non-consensual location in the social
hierarchy. Indeed, as Walzer notes, the market sphere is one sphere of
justice, in which equality and autonomy are accorded primacy,
operating in a pluralistic field of different spheres with other
principles of justice.25 Given the plurality of spheres of justice, society
must limit the effects of the market by regulating it in various ways
according to other values and norms.
23
24
25
This is pointed out by in Albert Hirschman, ‘Rival Interpretations of the Market
Society: Civilising, Destructive, or Feeble?’, in Journal of Economic Literature,
pp. 1463-1484.
Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliation.
Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York, Basic Books, 1983).
13
After the cultural
Economic liberalism
Basic focus
Marxist Political economy
Cultural economy
Private economic interests
and market freedom
Main figures/movements
Power
relations
economic life
Culture and identity
Adam Smith
Neo-classical economics
Public choice theory
Hayek
Key concepts
Marx
Labour process theory
Class theory
Gramsci
Weber, Foucault
Politics of recognition
Social constructionism
Baudrillard
Individual sovereignty
Self-interest
Rationality
Self-regulating market
Spontaneous order
Private property rights
Private morality
Small governments
Methodology
Mode of production
Social
relations
of
production and exchange
Property rights
Capitalism
Commodification
and
decommodification
Exploitation
Modes of representation
Discursive strategies of
resistance and struggle
Consumption
and
identity
Interpretations
Cultural symbolism
Norms and conventions
Individualism, atomism
empiricism and idealism
Essentialism, dialectics,
abstractions, materialism
and critical realism
Social constructionism,
contingency, discourse
analysis and narratives
in
Table 1 Comparison of the main approaches to economy and culture26
26
Adapted from Robert Holton, Economy and Society (London: Routledge, 1992).
14
Balihar Sanghera
Weaknesses
of
economic
liberalism and Marxist political
economy
Improvised interest-based view of
economic
action
and
the
motivation
of
economic
participants
Strengths of cultural economy
Inability to explain the normative
basis of economic and social
cohesion; indeed reduces this to
interest and/or power
Provides an analysis of the interpretative and
symbolic basis of economic and social order,
including tacit rules as well as explicit modes
of political regulation
Inability to demonstrate that
economic interest is sufficient to
generate changes in cultural
practices as well as in economic
and social life
Emphasises the order-transforming elements
of culture at the personal, organisational,
national and global levels
Provides a deep understanding of the issues
of meaning and motivation (i.e., the
connections between meaning and economic
action)
Table 2 Strengths of the cultural economy approach over traditional approaches27
27
Adapted from Holton, Economy and Society.
After the cultural
15
Cultural Economy
Deals with recognition and signifying
practices
Basic Focus
Moral Economy
Deals with recognition and signifying
practices
Stylisation of life; aesthetic values; status,
prestigious and positional goods, e.g.
fashions, advertising, mass consumption,
corporate culture, and identity at work
Moral implications, choice and
regulation; rights and responsibilities;
virtues and social relations, e.g.
public service broadcasting, antipornography, business ethics, and
moral obligations
Questions of validity, asking what
economic activities are for, e.g.
citizenship,
public
sphere
as
democratic forum, civil society, and
Nordic democratic welfare states
Life projects, long term commitments
and deep responsibilities
Distinction between social and
epistemological authority
Love of praiseworthy acts, desire to
be worthy of recognition
Questions of behaviour, adapting to
economic systems, e.g. enterprising self,
consumer, public as market place, and
neo-liberal US and UK neo-liberal
workforce states
Playfulness of identities
Sceptical of any authority
Love of display, praise and promotion,
desire to be noticed
Table 3 Comparison between moral economy and cultural economy approaches
16
Balihar Sanghera
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Political Science Review, vol. 88, no. 3 (1994), pp. 653-667.
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économie des biens symboliques’ [The production of belief:
contribution to an economy of symbolic goods], in Actes de la
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Civilising, Destructive, or Feeble?’, in Journal of Economic
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After the cultural
17
Salais, Robert and Michael Storper, ‘The four “worlds” of
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vol. 16, no. 2 (1992), pp. 169-193.
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the Department of Sociology, Lancaster University at:
http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/soc023as.html
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the Department of Sociology, Lancaster University at:
http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/soc059as.html
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counterfactual thinking’, in Sociology, vol. 34, no. 3, (2000b),
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York: Free Press, 1955).
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