Download Question: To what extent does Islamic State propaganda and

Question: To what extent does Islamic State propaganda and Western ‘antipropaganda,’ communicated on social media, perpetuate the fifth filter of the
Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model?
A critical understanding of mass media suggests there is a strong presence of
propaganda in the current media landscape. The emergence of social media as a new
platform of the public sphere gives rise to the ability of extremist groups to
communicate their ideologies to worldwide audiences through propaganda. Currently,
the Islamic State (ISIS) publishes mass content aimed to promote the notion of a
global caliphate. As a response, Western nations have similarly begun to utilise social
media as means of fundamentally opposing and retaliating the messages of ISIS
through ‘anti-propaganda.’ The content of Western ‘anti-propaganda’ underpins the
Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model, which presents five filters utilised by
governing forces and elites in order to shape media content for their own benefit. The
fifth filter of the model identifies the use of the media to promote a particular
ideology and foster fear against ‘the enemy.’ This essay will outline the propaganda
of ISIS and the ‘anti-propaganda’ of Western governments, arguing there are
significant similarities in the presentation and circulation of their messages to specific
audiences. Both underpin the fifth ideological filter of the Herman-Chomsky
Propaganda Model, where the idea of ‘the enemy’ is circulated to promote either an
authoritarian or pluralist ideology.
Taylor (1942) defines propaganda as “a systematic scheme created by a group in an
effort to persuade people on insufficient grounds to believe what it wants them to
believe or to act to its advantage.” (p. 562) In contrast, ‘anti-propaganda’ is any action
or message combating propaganda, (Human Rights First, 2013, p. 9) however remains
a relatively recent concept with little scholarly concurrence in definition. For the
purpose of this essay, ‘anti-propaganda’ is used to describe official communication
opposing identified propaganda. Governments, political and religious groups are all
capable of producing and circulating both propaganda and ‘anti-propaganda’ to
influence audiences. A new public sphere, or a space where “information, ideas and
debate can circulate in society” to form political opinion (Habermas, 1989; cited in
Bainbridge, Goc & Tynan, 2001, p. 404) has emerged on social media. It is this
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platform where ISIS propaganda and ‘anti-propaganda’ are circulated, enjoying the
worldwide audiences and involvement associated with networked media.
However, the public sphere in pluralist societies is not immune to propaganda. In
1988, the Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model was introduced as a framework for
analysing mainstream media. It identified, “the media operates on the basis of a set of
ideological premises, depending heavily and uncritically on elite information sources
and participates in propaganda campaigns helpful to elite interests.” (Herman, 2000,
p. 101) One component of the Propaganda Model identifies five filters in which news
production processes shape content: ownership, advertising, agents, flak and ideology.
The fifth ideological filter ascertains the use of the media to promote capitalist ideals
and activate the public against an enemy. (Herman and Chomsky, 1988; cited in
Klaehn, 2009, p. 45) Similarly, the fifth filter can be recognised in news media as the
“customary western identification of 'the enemy' or an 'evil dictator.'” (Cromwell,
2002) The Propaganda Model corresponds with a Critical-Marxist reading of mass
media, which Mullen and Klaehn (2010) state political systems reflect the governing
class’ domination of media sources to perpetuate and maintain a class-based society.
(p. 216) Therefore, ‘anti-propaganda’ communicated by Western governments can
critically be seen to deter groups and individuals away from ISIS in order to maintain
government and elite superiority in Western nations.
Social media has allowed ISIS propaganda to infiltrate its values into the public
sphere in order to influence the public to support the aim of a global caliphate. The
“hyper-religious, highly authoritarian state” (Fitzpatrick, 2014, p. 30) of ISIS asserts
its religious supremacy over the rest of the world through propaganda, portraying the
prominent propaganda myth of race superiority. (O’Shaughnessey, 2004, p. 96) ISIS
typically uses social media accounts to share images and messages to promote its
jihadist army, often in English to target worldwide audiences. For example, one image
shared multiple times on Twitter portrays two militants holding heavy artillery with
faces replaced with shining lights. Over the image reads: “This is our Call of Duty,
and we respawn in Jannah,” promising a re-birth in the Islamic eternal paradise after
the fulfilment of terrorist activities. The propaganda refers to the popular videogame
‘Call of Duty,’ targeting western young men interested in the game and its violent
values. DeAngelis (2015) states ISIS propaganda is intended for Western citizens who
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already feel disenfranchised from their country, or feel they do not belong in their
pluralist society. Unfortunately, social media has bridged the two opposing ideologies
to directly expose these citizens to ISIS. Additionally, another image shared on social
media portrays a gun covered in blood, its caption reading: “YODO: You Only Die
Once, why not make it martyrdom?” The image implies dying for ISIS is considered a
respectful act, yet does not mention the acts of terrorism associated with the ISIS
martyrdom. Accordingly, the images perpetuate the ideals of propaganda, “making
one conclusion authoritative and final by disregarding not only all other possible
conclusions but also many related facts.” (Taylor, 1942, p. 562) The use of
propaganda is a crucial tactic to not only recruit, but also justify the actions of the
group. Scholzel (2014) recognises the strong relationship between physical or military
violence and symbolic communication, where propaganda is used to validate acts of
violence. (p. 194) Therefore, ISIS uses propaganda to seek Western attention in order
to achieve a global caliphate.
The ‘anti-propaganda’ of Western nations opposing ISIS can critically be identified as
perpetuating the fifth filter of the Propaganda Model, where the content encompasses
the ideologies of pluralist societies. Government participation on social media to
influence the online public sphere enables governments to persuade online audiences.
Specifically, as part of the fight against ISIS, the media content of Western
governments presents a strong ideological agenda combatting terrorist propaganda.
Lewis states, “ISIS is operating in both military and political spheres to achieve its
objective to form an Islamic Caliphate. A counterstrategy to defeat ISIS has to be just
as sophisticated.” (2014, p. 25) Concurrently, Neumann asserts Western efforts needs
to be focussed on online communications in order to deter the growth of ISIS jihad.
Therefore, to counteract the influx of ISIS propaganda on social media, Western
governments have chosen to pursue a similar course of action through ‘antipropaganda.’ Similar to the propaganda of ISIS, ‘anti-propaganda’ is conceived
through the creation of social media accounts circulating images portraying the
Western ideology. Additionally, images are often posted on Facebook or Twitter
accounts multiple times to infiltrate individuals’ accounts. One example of ‘antipropaganda’ is the image of a boot kicking an ass (or donkey) armed with bombs
posted by a US State Department government account. The text alongside was posted
in Arabic, targeting middle-eastern recruits and high-risk citizens, translated to read
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“Al-Baghdadi (the boot). An ISIS suicide bomber (the ass).” The image implies those
who agree to suicide bombing are being taken advantage of ISIS, or are simply the
‘asses’ of ISIS leader Al-Baghdadi, in order to humiliate ISIS. Yet, Taylor (1942)
acknowledges not all methods in order to gain public support for an opinion or a
course of action considered propaganda, as long as a wide range of sources had
factually proved the content. (p. 561-562) News coverage and communications
regarding the actions of ISIS, such as warfare, executions and the destruction of
historical sites are not propaganda. However, the distribution of images, particularly
on social media platforms, highlighting the hypocrisy of ‘the enemy’ may be looked
at in a different light. In her policy recommendations to defeat ISIS, Lewis (2014)
states one area to target ISIS is by, “deflating its strategic messaging by proving its
propaganda false and the organization vulnerable.” (p. 24) Yet, proving such content
false gives rise to the implied message of the superiority of Western nations. For
example, an image shared by a US Government Twitter account, portrayed ISIS
leader Al-Baghdadi wearing a Rolex watch worth around US$3,000. The image was
altered to place Al-Baghdadi under a Rolex sign, with an Arabic headline accusing
him of spending ISIS funds on expensive accessories. The image clearly took aim at
the character of Al-Baghdadi, presenting him as hypocritical and consumerist, where
the Islamic State heavily opposes capitalism. As a result, by highlighting the
hypocrisy associated with Al-Baghdadi’s character, the anti-propaganda takes aim not
only at the ISIS authoritarian ideology, but encourages its alternate. Seaton (1988)
associated a critical-determinist approach of the media, where governing classes
control the media in order to influence public opinion. (p. 221) Such reading can
identify the Western ‘anti-propaganda’ serves to influence audiences to reject the
ideals of ISIS, implying the ideologies of Western nations are superior. However,
Mullen and Klehn highlight the lack of empirical evidence can be proved as a result
of the Propaganda Model, where scholars “focus upon media behaviour rather than
media effects.” (2010, p. 217) Therefore, this essay can only link the nature of antipropaganda to the ideological filter of the Propaganda Model, rather than proving the
effect it may have on the public sphere.
Thus, the communications battle between ISIS and Western nations displays the
distinct similarities between propaganda and ‘anti-propaganda,’ both of which fulfil
the fifth filter of the Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model. The propaganda of ISIS
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aims to indoctrinate individuals to conform to the Islamic religious supremacy and
terrorist activities, clearly condemned by all pluralist societies. On the other hand,
‘anti-propaganda’ claims Western and capitalist superiority on the basis of being
ideologically opposed to ISIS. In this way, we can view ‘anti-propaganda’ simply as
another form of propaganda for the opposing side, perpetuating the ideological filter
of the Propaganda Model. However, there is limited research and evidence as to
whether ‘anti-propaganda’ is successful in deterring audiences away from ISIS in
favour of Western nations, which may be an interesting study for scholars to
undertake as the war on ISIS continues.
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List of References
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ABC News. (2015). Anti-radicalisation Tweets - Rolex Watch and Suicide
Bomber Donkey. [images] Retrieved from http://www.abc.net.au/news/201503-12/state-department-counter-radicalisation-twitter/6290436
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Bainbridge, J., Goc, N., & Tynan, L. (2011). Media & journalism (2nd ed.).
Melbourne: Oxford.
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Cromwell, D. (2002). The Propaganda Model: An Overview. Chomsky.info.
Retrieved from http://www.chomsky.info/onchomsky/2002----.htm
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DeAngelis, T. (2015). Understanding Terrorism. Monitor On
Psychology, 40(10), 60. Retrieved from
http://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/11/terrorism.aspx
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Fitzpatrick, M. (2014). ISIS, Al Qaeda and The Wretched of the Earth.
Flinders Journal Of History And Politics, 30. 21-34.
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Herman, E. (2000). The Propaganda Model: a retrospective. Journalism
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Human Rights First,. (2013). The Anti-“Propaganda” Law & the Threat to
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http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/uploads/pdfs/HRF-russias-anti-gay-banSG.pdf
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Kingsley, P. (2015). Who is behind Isis's terrifying online propaganda
operation? Call of Duty photo and Gun photo. The Guardian. [images]
Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/23/who-behindisis-propaganda-operation-iraq
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Lewis, J. D. (2014). Counter-Strategy for a Counter-State. Middle East
Security Report 21. Retrieved from
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/LewisCenter%20of%20gravity.pdf
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Mullen, A., & Klaehn, J. (2010). The Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model:
A Critical Approach to Analysing Mass Media Behaviour. Sociology
Compass, 4(4), 215-229. doi:10.1111/j.1751-9020.2010.00275.x (in-class)
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Neumann, P. (2014). How to curb the threat of homecoming jihadist fighters.
New Scientist, 2976(7). Retrieved from
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O'Shaughnessey, N. (2004). Persuasion, Myth and Propaganda. Journal Of
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Seaton, J. (1988) “The Sociology of the Mass Media”, in J. Curran & J.
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Taylor, W. (1942). What is propaganda? College English, 3(6) pp. 555-562
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