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STORIES OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST Liu Jingzhu, Martin Kopeček, Jiří Ruml Original paper Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Maurice Obstfeld 2012 Institute of Economics Studies JEM 044 International Finance Outline of the Presentation Introduction Crisis Types and Emerging Market Vulnerabilities Some Empirics of Crises: Emerging and Advanced Economies, Then and Now Methodology What Happens Before, During, and After Crises? What Determines Crises? Related Empirical Research Conclusion Introduction After the mid-1970s were generally believed... Until the global crisis of 2007-2009 financial crises were mainly emerging market affairs crises in advanced economies less frequent and generally less devastating only EMEs would ever need to seek IMF support EMEs much more vulnerable to financial crisis because of mutually reinforcing weakness the mature advanced countries much more robust big net benefit from liberalized and open financial markets some EMEs suffered greatly, but others proved remarkably resilient (often experiencing smaller output declines and faster recoveries than those in the advanced countries) The goal of the paper… …to compare salient features of economic crises in advanced and developing economies, as well as differences between past crises (from 1973 to 2006) and the 2007-2009 crisis… Detrended Real Output Growth, by Regions (percent p.a.) Types of Financial Crises Three major types of crises (closely interrelated in practice): currency crises - in which a managed exchange rate falls to speculative pressure banking crises - focus on systemic banking crises, which endanger the entire economy and through channels of contagion also foreign economies government default crises - involving default, restructuring or market fears of default on internal or external public debt Links between them… Banking crises tend to begin ahead of currency crises when the two occur together Currency depreciation fears exacerbate (and may themselves cause) banking problems A systemic banking crisis, especially if worsen by currency depreciation, can jeopardize public finance as the government intervenes to guarantee bank liabilities or inject capital government default crises Types of Financial Crises – Crisis Incidence … in general, crises have been much more prevalent in EMEs in the past Emerging Market Vulnerabilities I Political and Economic Instability political instability => economic instability macro policies tend to be procyclical due to conflicts over profits in good times and disability to allocate losses in bad times inflation is a favoured method of resolving distributional disputes difficulty in collecting taxes worsens the fiscal position overall Undeveloped and Unstable Financial Markets government restrictions may discourage competition and innovation in financial markets. a lack of financial depth limits the economy's ability to absorb economic shocks. bureaucratic restrictions, corruption, lack of expertise an expectation that government will bail out failing financial institutions, confirmed by experience in Latin America or Asia, creates moral hazard Emerging Market Vulnerabilities II Dollarization, Original Sin, and Currency Mismatches tendency for financial contracts to be denominated in a stable foreign currency - the US dollar or euro the inability to borrow from foreigners in domestic currency is referred to as "original sin" at the national level, original sin implies that currency depreciation will raise the real value of external debt - sharp currency depreciations can lead to financial crises Fear of Floating emerging markets - less willing to tolerate sharp nominal exchange rate movements than advanced countries fear of sharp appreciation and its negative effect on exports fear of sharp currency depreciation – it can cause debt deflation (in the presence of currency mismatch) and a jump in inflation Emerging Market Vulnerabilities III Sudden Stops and Debt Intolerance EMEs have been vulnerable to sudden stops in foreign lending financial fragility and the government's weakness in generating resources for debt repayment contribute to volatility in capital flows Overregulation of Nonfinancial Markets. heavy regulation in product and labour markets reduces flexibility in resource reallocation administrative barriers to economic activity, such as licensing requirements, promote corruption as well as inefficiency Empirics: Introduction The questions to be answered: The analysis focuses on variables that: are likely to play causal role in determining probability of crisis are likely to be affected by crisis The estimates are computed separately for How have crises differed in their precursors and aftermaths? How does crisis of 2007-2009 differ from earlier crises? three types of crises – default, banking and currency – and current crisis advanced countries and emerging markets The outcomes of analysis are: estimates how an economic variables’ conditional expectation depends on temporal distance from crisis discussion on what extent are these estimates useful to predicting onset of crises Empirics: Methodology 1/2 For various economic variables’ conditional expectation as a function of temporal distance from crisis is estimated using the relation 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑𝑠 𝛿𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽𝑑𝑠 𝛿𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽𝑑𝑠 𝛿𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽𝑑𝑠 𝛿𝑑𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = economic variable of interest 𝛿𝑑𝑠,𝑏𝑠,𝑐𝑠,𝑔𝑠 = dummy variables for types of crisis (d = default, … ) 𝛽𝑑𝑠,𝑏𝑠,𝑐𝑠,𝑔𝑠 = coefficients for crisis type 𝛼𝑖 = fixed effect for country 𝜖𝑖𝑡 = remaining variation in 𝑦𝑖𝑡 𝑖 = numeric country ID 𝑡 = time period 𝑠 = number of periods from crisis 𝑠 ∈ −5,5 ∩ ℤ , where 𝑠 = 0 is the beginning of the crisis Empirics: Methodology 2/2 Estimated variables by the postulated equations are output, domestic credit, current account balance, external leverage, real interest rate, real exchange rate, international reserves and fiscal variables The sample of data used comprises of all advanced and emerging markets countries for which data are available in either of: J. P. Morgan’s EMBIG index FTSE’s Group of Advanced or Secondary Emerging markets MSCI-Barra classification of emerging or Frontier Economies Dow Jones list of Emerging Markets Economies Together 57 emerging market countries and 22 advanced economies were examined Empirics: Real Activity Output above trend for banking and default crises in EM and ADV Output below trend for EM and slightly below trend for ADV Lower output for all crises compared to tranquil times banking crises are often preceded by unsustainable levels of economic activity relatively less output fall in ADV and recovers faster in currency crisis Output of EM recovers in 5 years for banking crisis, while remaining lower for ADV Output gap (log deviation from trend in percent p.a.) as a deviation from log trend by HP filter set to 100 Empirics: Inflation Rate Inflation rate of EM increases after crisis constraints disappear inflating away nominal claims 10-15% above normal one year after currency or banking crisis For ADV rate remains subdued In 2008 crisis inflation rate of EM remained below tranquil-average Inflation Rate (percent p.a.) Empirics: Public Finances Most of the estimates insignificant The debt/GDP increases after crisis for both ADV and EM, however most dramatically for ADV, Banking government bailouts of insolvent domestic financial sectors slowdown of economy (lower GDP ⇒ higher debt/GDP ratio) growing public deficits In 2008 crisis ADV had high debt/GDP which increased after crisis EM had decreasing ratio to around-zero levels before crisis allowing them to apply countercyclical fiscal stimuli Gross Public Debt (percent of GDP) Empirics: Leverage 1/2 Significant build-up of credit/GDP at peak 25 percent for ADV and 8.6 for EM dramatic build-up for ADV in the five years before 2008 crisis build-up also for EMs, but only in Central and Easter Europe Domestic Credit (percent of GDP) as total claims of depository corporations, minus net claims on central government Empirics: Leverage 2/2 Increasing level of external leverage in ADV before 2008 crisis 32 percentage points more that in the tranquil times External Leverage as ratio of country’s total assets to its gross equity liabilities Empirics: Current Account Improvements after default and currency, especially for EM Largest current account deficits for ADV prior to banking crises Current Account (percent of GDP) Empirics: Real Exchange Rate Significant real depreciation after default and currency crises and appreciations before those crises especially for EM, but also for ADV Real Exchange Rate (log deviation from trend in percent) Empirics: Foreign Reserves Low reserves prior to currency crises and rebuild afterwards Fall prior to default, but remain to continue down Large build-up prior to 2008 crisis for EM Foreign Exchange Reserves (percent of GDP) What Determines Crises? Discrete choice models: commonly used in the “earlywarning” literature on crisis predication: j---crisis type t---time period 1≤k≤3 Notes Each table reports the overall probability of crisis occurrence p(y=1) evaluated at the pre-crisis sample mean For each explanatory variable xi in the vector x, its standard deviation sd(xi) over the price-crisis sample And the marginal effect along with White-robust standard errors, evaluated at the pre-crisis sample mean ∆p reports the change in probability resulting from a one-standard deviation increase in x, evaluated at the pre-crisis sample mean ,with the corresponding standard error evaluated by the delta method, also at the pre-crisis sample mean Findings The results are consistent with event-study analysis and indicate that several of the macro indicators that appear elevated before crises, notably domestic credit and real currency strength, also contain significant predictive power for the occurrence of crises Related Empirical Research I Face the difficulty of accurately controlling for a variety of relevant differences across diverse groups of economies Predictors of crisis intensity: prior financial liberalization prior current account deficits short-term external debt levels prior domestic credit growth Related Empirical Research II Rose and Spiegel (2011): a useful compendium and critique of the econometric literature and findings a set of univariate regressions no econometric evidence that exchange rate pegs played a role but anecdotal evidence still suggests that exchange rate flexibility was an advantage the statistical significance of the preceding factors is much lower when subsets of them are entered jointly in various regressions measuring crisis intensity supportive that where EMEs’ showed resilience in the recent crisis this was due in part to their avoidance of excessive foreign and domestic leverage Conclusion Emerging and advanced economies’ crises are qualitatively similar Two most robust predicators of crises: domestic credit growth and real currency appreciation A third robust determinant of EMEs’ crisis probabilities: an emerging country’s level of foreign exchange reserves is a significant factor determining the probability of future crisis To the extent that emerging economies escaped the worst of the global crisis of 2007-2009, they did so in part through economic and institutional reforms. Some of these reforms resulted in greater economic openness, although relatively low levels of financial development and financial globalization may have been advantages in withstanding the forces that generated the 2007-2009 crisis It remains to be seen if emerging economies can preserve their financial and economic stability without reducing current levels of economic openness Discussion Questions or Remarks?