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Oxford Scholarship Online You are looking at 51-60 of 411 items for: keywords : stasis clawor classics Into the Aegean, 394–392 Stephen Ruzicka in Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BC Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press 2012 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199766628 eISBN: 9780199932719 acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0007 Item type: chapter Conon's capture of an Egyptian grain fleet headed to Rhodes revealed Egyptian-Spartan collusion, which raised the specter of Egyptiansponsored Spartan enterprise in the eastern Mediterranean aimed at disrupting Persian campaign preparations against Egypt. This prompted reinforcement of Conon's guard fleet and anti-Spartan Persian diplomatic initiative in Greece. Conon persuaded Artaxerxes to undertake more aggressive action in 394, which led first to encounter with and defeat of the Spartan fleet near Cnidus and then to Persian recovery of Asian Greek and Aegean cities and to Persian operations in the Peloponnesus, installation of a Persian guard force on Cythera off the Peloponnesian coast, subsidies of Athens and Corinth's opposition to Spartan, and restoration of Athens’ fleet. Spartan efforts at a negotiated settlement failed in 392. To Egypt: Preparations and Campaign, 391–387 Stephen Ruzicka in Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BC Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press 2012 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199766628 eISBN: 9780199932719 acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0008 Item type: chapter The first fourth-century Persian attack on Egypt most likely took place in 390/89–388/7. Security arrangements, in place by 391/0, involved use of Athens’ new fleet to deter any Spartan initiative in the west and installation on Cyprus of a force under Hecatomnus, the native satrap of Caria, to secure Cyprus and safeguard staging areas in Phoenicia. Despite lengthy preparations and the presence of experienced Persian Page 1 of 6 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 10 May 2017 generals, there is no evidence of any significant Persian-Egyptian battles in Egypt. This is best explained by noting that the Egyptian king, Acoris, faced with a usurper who had gained control of Upper Egypt and Memphis, dared not lose troops in battle and avoided engagement. The Persians, in turn, aware of the debilitating political situation, simply waited in the expectation that internal Egyptian discord would allow them to regain control of Egypt without fighting. The Egyptian War and the King's Peace, 387–386 Stephen Ruzicka in Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BC Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press 2012 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199766628 eISBN: 9780199932719 acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0009 Item type: chapter From the Persian perspective, the situation in Egypt and in the Aegean deteriorated during 388 as Acoris regained sole power and thus freedom of movement and as both Athens and Sparta were engaged in territorial aggrandizement and, in need of additional resources, might be drawn into cooperation with Egypt in return for subsidies. Such concerns explain Artaxerxes’ adoption of a pro-Spartan stance, his peace with Sparta, and his determination to impose a common peace on the Greek world. To gain leverage, the Athenians operated aggressively, sending a force to campaign with Evagoras on Cyprus. Though Persian-Spartan control of the Hellespont and the Black Sea–Aegean grain route compelled Athenian assent to peace terms, the ensuing King's Peace granted the Athenians exemptions from the prohibition against impinging on the autonomy of Greek states, which allowed them to hold on to important islands near the mouth of the Hellespont. The King's Peace represented a new Persian strategy to ensure there would be no mainland Greek support for Egypt. Egypt Strikes Back: The Cypriot War and the Struggle for the Eastern Mediterranean, 386–379 Stephen Ruzicka in Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BC Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press 2012 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199766628 eISBN: 9780199932719 acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0010 Item type: chapter Page 2 of 6 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 10 May 2017 In the immediate aftermath of Persian withdrawal from Egypt, the Egyptian king Acoris supported Evagoras as proxy commander in the eastern Mediterranean and mounted a wide-ranging, mainly diplomatic offensive which succeeded in detaching the entire Levant and southern Anatolia up to Caria from Persian control. Out of necessity, the Persian response involved deploying a largely Greek force (ships from Asian Greek cities and mercenaries from the Greek mainland). The ensuing “Cypriot War” waged by the Persians was really a war to recover the eastern Mediterranean. This involved successful operations throughout Cilicia, Syria, Phoenicia, and Philistia, but little fighting on Cyprus. Evagoras sought to destroy the effective Persian fleet, but lost the naval battle off Salamis and with this lost Egyptian support. But a breakdown of the Persian command crippled Persian efforts and led to defection and revolt by Glos, who established a base at Leucae and solicited Spartan and Egyptian aid, threatening now to undo Persian recovery achievement. Assassination finally removed him. Preparing the Second Campaign: Engaging Greeks, 380–373 Stephen Ruzicka in Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BC Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press 2012 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199766628 eISBN: 9780199932719 acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0011 Item type: chapter Since the Persian expeditionary army's withdrawal from Egypt in 388/7, Egyptian kings—Acoris and then Nectanebo—had been attending to Egyptian defenses, constructing fortified camps on the eastern and western frontiers, fortifying entries to the various Nile branches, and even adding fortification walls to many temples. They also hired Greek mercenaries in great numbers. Persians secured the middle territory with a Greek force under Athenian condottiere Iphicrates as early as 379, and subsequently Iphicrates directed Persian preparations, doing so thoroughly with simulated attacks and battles. A second Persian campaign, ready to launch by 373, seemed certain to succeed. Pharnabazus and Iphicrates’ Egyptian Campaign, 373 Stephen Ruzicka in Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BC Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press 2012 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199766628 eISBN: 9780199932719 acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0012 Item type: chapter Page 3 of 6 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 10 May 2017 We have enough information to reconstruct the second fourth-century Persian attack on Egypt. As planned, Pharnabazus and Iphicrates ferried mercenary troops beyond the Pelusiac branch to the mouth of the Mendesian branch and after amphibious landings seized the Egyptian fortress there. Wishing to secure this base and transport the whole of the Persian force to it before advancing, Pharnabazus rejected Iphicrates’ insistent demands that he be allowed to make a quick attack upriver on Memphis. Continuing landings by Persian forces met stiff Egyptian opposition, but it was the Etesian winds in combination with rising floodwaters which made further landings impossible and compelled Pharnabazus and Iphicrates to withdraw back to the initial camp east of Pelusium. Continuing friction between Pharnabazus and Iphicrates prompted Iphicrates to abandon the campaign and flee to Athens. Lacking an effective commander for the all-important Greek mercenaries, Pharnabazus had no choice but to terminate the whole campaign—just a few months after it began. Court Politics and the Collapse of the Third Campaign, 372–365 Stephen Ruzicka in Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BC Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press 2012 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199766628 eISBN: 9780199932719 acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0013 Item type: chapter Persian preparations for a renewed campaign began immediately with the hiring of the Athenian Timotheus to fill Iphicrates’ role. Datames, satrap of Cappadocia, soon replaced Pharnabazus as commander of the expeditionary force and oversaw preparations prolonged evidently by the effort to recruit great numbers of additional Greek mercenaries. The beginning of a succession struggle created great political uncertainty, which ultimately prompted Datames’ return to Cappadocia, where he sought to secure himself and await some resolution of the political situation. However, Artaxerxes, persuaded by false charges by Datames’ own son, treated him as a rebel official. Datames himself made a hasty anabasis in hopes of gaining confirmation of his status, but withdrew when Artaxerxes advanced to meet him. Artaxerxes then sent Autophradates against Datames with an army made up largely of contingents from the expeditionary force. Autophradates failed against Datames and then moved back west in Anatolia to deal with other “rebel” officials, Ariobarzanes and Orontes. Autophradates failed here too, and ultimately seems to have discharged most of the force he commanded, marking the end of the post-373 effort to renew the attack on Egypt. Page 4 of 6 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 10 May 2017 Egyptian Strategy Shifts: The Genesis of Tachos’ Great Offensive, 364–361 Stephen Ruzicka in Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BC Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press 2012 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199766628 eISBN: 9780199932719 acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0014 Item type: chapter From the beginning of Tachos’ coregency with his father Nectanebo in 365/4 on through the beginning of Tachos’ sole kingship by 362/1, we can trace the formation of plans for an Egyptian counteroffensive aimed at exploiting Persian problems in the west growing out of the ongoing succession struggle. Tachos seems originally to have planned a campaign into the Levant by Greek mercenaries led by the Spartan king Agesilaus, but the further deterioration of Artaxerxes’ power in the west, marked by continuing defections by Persian officials, willingness on the part of various peoples to break from Persian control and side with Egypt, and the likelihood that Artaxerxes could not mount an effective response to Egyptian enterprise, prompted Tachos to move toward a grander scheme in which he himself would lead a great Egyptian force augmented by Greek mercenaries on a campaign aimed at seizing control once and for all of the middle territory and detaching all of the eastern Mediterranean/Anatolian world from Persian control. On this interpretation, the so-called Great Satraps’ Revolt was really just a coalition of individual satraps encouraged and supported in rebellion by Tachos. Tachos: Campaign and Collapse, 360–359 Stephen Ruzicka in Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BC Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press 2012 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199766628 eISBN: 9780199932719 acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0015 Item type: chapter In 360/59, the Egyptian king Tachos led in person an enormous offensive (unaffected by the resumption of loyalty on the part of rebel satraps in Anatolia) aimed at laying claim to the whole of Syria-Palestine. Tachos’ nephew Nectanebo commanded the native machimoi, the Spartan king Agesilaus commanded the mercenary force, and the Athenian Chabrias commanded the fleet. There was no Persian opposition to the advancing force, and Nectanebo's force penetrated into Syria, probably heading for the Euphrates. This all collapsed, however, as a result of dynastic Page 5 of 6 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 10 May 2017 challenge back in Egypt by the Mendesian line of Acoris. Tachos’ own brother and regent in Egypt repudiated him and persuaded Nectanebo to lay claim to kingship. Tachos fled, making his way to Artaxerxes (and hoping to regain the kingship with Persian backing). Nectanebo gained the support of Agesilaus and, abandoning the offensive, turned back to Egypt to contend with the Mendesian claimant. Persian Counterattack, 359? Stephen Ruzicka in Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BC Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press 2012 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199766628 eISBN: 9780199932719 acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0016 Item type: chapter The later report that Artaxerxes III Ochus waged three campaigns against Egypt, one of them while his father Artaxerxes II was still alive, points to 360/59 as the likely time for this. Thus it must have been connected with Persian response to the Egyptian counteroffensive. The most plausible reconstruction treats this as a hasty campaign waged without much prior planning after the Egyptian offensive collapsed and Egypt was beset by potentially debilitating conflict between rival dynasties. There was no Persian victory, and the best conjectural explanation is that while Ochus entered or approached Egypt, Artaxerxes II's death compelled Ochus to abandon the campaign and return home to claim the kingship. Page 6 of 6 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 10 May 2017