Download Into the Aegean, 394–392 To Egypt: Preparations and Campaign

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Into the Aegean, 394–392
Stephen Ruzicka
in Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BC
Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press
2012
DOI: 10.1093/
ISBN: 9780199766628 eISBN: 9780199932719 acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0007
Item type: chapter
Conon's capture of an Egyptian grain fleet headed to Rhodes revealed
Egyptian-Spartan collusion, which raised the specter of Egyptiansponsored Spartan enterprise in the eastern Mediterranean aimed at
disrupting Persian campaign preparations against Egypt. This prompted
reinforcement of Conon's guard fleet and anti-Spartan Persian diplomatic
initiative in Greece. Conon persuaded Artaxerxes to undertake more
aggressive action in 394, which led first to encounter with and defeat
of the Spartan fleet near Cnidus and then to Persian recovery of Asian
Greek and Aegean cities and to Persian operations in the Peloponnesus,
installation of a Persian guard force on Cythera off the Peloponnesian
coast, subsidies of Athens and Corinth's opposition to Spartan, and
restoration of Athens’ fleet. Spartan efforts at a negotiated settlement
failed in 392.
To Egypt: Preparations and Campaign, 391–387
Stephen Ruzicka
in Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BC
Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press
2012
DOI: 10.1093/
ISBN: 9780199766628 eISBN: 9780199932719 acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0008
Item type: chapter
The first fourth-century Persian attack on Egypt most likely took place
in 390/89–388/7. Security arrangements, in place by 391/0, involved
use of Athens’ new fleet to deter any Spartan initiative in the west and
installation on Cyprus of a force under Hecatomnus, the native satrap
of Caria, to secure Cyprus and safeguard staging areas in Phoenicia.
Despite lengthy preparations and the presence of experienced Persian
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generals, there is no evidence of any significant Persian-Egyptian
battles in Egypt. This is best explained by noting that the Egyptian king,
Acoris, faced with a usurper who had gained control of Upper Egypt
and Memphis, dared not lose troops in battle and avoided engagement.
The Persians, in turn, aware of the debilitating political situation, simply
waited in the expectation that internal Egyptian discord would allow
them to regain control of Egypt without fighting.
The Egyptian War and the King's Peace, 387–386
Stephen Ruzicka
in Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BC
Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press
2012
DOI: 10.1093/
ISBN: 9780199766628 eISBN: 9780199932719 acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0009
Item type: chapter
From the Persian perspective, the situation in Egypt and in the Aegean
deteriorated during 388 as Acoris regained sole power and thus freedom
of movement and as both Athens and Sparta were engaged in territorial
aggrandizement and, in need of additional resources, might be drawn
into cooperation with Egypt in return for subsidies. Such concerns explain
Artaxerxes’ adoption of a pro-Spartan stance, his peace with Sparta,
and his determination to impose a common peace on the Greek world.
To gain leverage, the Athenians operated aggressively, sending a force
to campaign with Evagoras on Cyprus. Though Persian-Spartan control
of the Hellespont and the Black Sea–Aegean grain route compelled
Athenian assent to peace terms, the ensuing King's Peace granted the
Athenians exemptions from the prohibition against impinging on the
autonomy of Greek states, which allowed them to hold on to important
islands near the mouth of the Hellespont. The King's Peace represented
a new Persian strategy to ensure there would be no mainland Greek
support for Egypt.
Egypt Strikes Back: The Cypriot War and the Struggle for the
Eastern Mediterranean, 386–379
Stephen Ruzicka
in Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BC
Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press
2012
DOI: 10.1093/
ISBN: 9780199766628 eISBN: 9780199932719 acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0010
Item type: chapter
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In the immediate aftermath of Persian withdrawal from Egypt, the
Egyptian king Acoris supported Evagoras as proxy commander in the
eastern Mediterranean and mounted a wide-ranging, mainly diplomatic
offensive which succeeded in detaching the entire Levant and southern
Anatolia up to Caria from Persian control. Out of necessity, the Persian
response involved deploying a largely Greek force (ships from Asian
Greek cities and mercenaries from the Greek mainland). The ensuing
“Cypriot War” waged by the Persians was really a war to recover the
eastern Mediterranean. This involved successful operations throughout
Cilicia, Syria, Phoenicia, and Philistia, but little fighting on Cyprus.
Evagoras sought to destroy the effective Persian fleet, but lost the naval
battle off Salamis and with this lost Egyptian support. But a breakdown
of the Persian command crippled Persian efforts and led to defection
and revolt by Glos, who established a base at Leucae and solicited
Spartan and Egyptian aid, threatening now to undo Persian recovery
achievement. Assassination finally removed him.
Preparing the Second Campaign: Engaging Greeks, 380–373
Stephen Ruzicka
in Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BC
Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press
2012
DOI: 10.1093/
ISBN: 9780199766628 eISBN: 9780199932719 acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0011
Item type: chapter
Since the Persian expeditionary army's withdrawal from Egypt in 388/7,
Egyptian kings—Acoris and then Nectanebo—had been attending to
Egyptian defenses, constructing fortified camps on the eastern and
western frontiers, fortifying entries to the various Nile branches, and
even adding fortification walls to many temples. They also hired Greek
mercenaries in great numbers. Persians secured the middle territory
with a Greek force under Athenian condottiere Iphicrates as early as
379, and subsequently Iphicrates directed Persian preparations, doing
so thoroughly with simulated attacks and battles. A second Persian
campaign, ready to launch by 373, seemed certain to succeed.
Pharnabazus and Iphicrates’ Egyptian Campaign, 373
Stephen Ruzicka
in Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BC
Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press
2012
DOI: 10.1093/
ISBN: 9780199766628 eISBN: 9780199932719 acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0012
Item type: chapter
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We have enough information to reconstruct the second fourth-century
Persian attack on Egypt. As planned, Pharnabazus and Iphicrates ferried
mercenary troops beyond the Pelusiac branch to the mouth of the
Mendesian branch and after amphibious landings seized the Egyptian
fortress there. Wishing to secure this base and transport the whole of the
Persian force to it before advancing, Pharnabazus rejected Iphicrates’
insistent demands that he be allowed to make a quick attack upriver
on Memphis. Continuing landings by Persian forces met stiff Egyptian
opposition, but it was the Etesian winds in combination with rising
floodwaters which made further landings impossible and compelled
Pharnabazus and Iphicrates to withdraw back to the initial camp east
of Pelusium. Continuing friction between Pharnabazus and Iphicrates
prompted Iphicrates to abandon the campaign and flee to Athens.
Lacking an effective commander for the all-important Greek mercenaries,
Pharnabazus had no choice but to terminate the whole campaign—just a
few months after it began.
Court Politics and the Collapse of the Third Campaign, 372–365
Stephen Ruzicka
in Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BC
Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press
2012
DOI: 10.1093/
ISBN: 9780199766628 eISBN: 9780199932719 acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0013
Item type: chapter
Persian preparations for a renewed campaign began immediately with
the hiring of the Athenian Timotheus to fill Iphicrates’ role. Datames,
satrap of Cappadocia, soon replaced Pharnabazus as commander of the
expeditionary force and oversaw preparations prolonged evidently by
the effort to recruit great numbers of additional Greek mercenaries. The
beginning of a succession struggle created great political uncertainty,
which ultimately prompted Datames’ return to Cappadocia, where he
sought to secure himself and await some resolution of the political
situation. However, Artaxerxes, persuaded by false charges by Datames’
own son, treated him as a rebel official. Datames himself made a
hasty anabasis in hopes of gaining confirmation of his status, but
withdrew when Artaxerxes advanced to meet him. Artaxerxes then
sent Autophradates against Datames with an army made up largely of
contingents from the expeditionary force. Autophradates failed against
Datames and then moved back west in Anatolia to deal with other
“rebel” officials, Ariobarzanes and Orontes. Autophradates failed here
too, and ultimately seems to have discharged most of the force he
commanded, marking the end of the post-373 effort to renew the attack
on Egypt.
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Egyptian Strategy Shifts: The Genesis of Tachos’ Great
Offensive, 364–361
Stephen Ruzicka
in Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BC
Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press
2012
DOI: 10.1093/
ISBN: 9780199766628 eISBN: 9780199932719 acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0014
Item type: chapter
From the beginning of Tachos’ coregency with his father Nectanebo
in 365/4 on through the beginning of Tachos’ sole kingship by 362/1,
we can trace the formation of plans for an Egyptian counteroffensive
aimed at exploiting Persian problems in the west growing out of the
ongoing succession struggle. Tachos seems originally to have planned
a campaign into the Levant by Greek mercenaries led by the Spartan
king Agesilaus, but the further deterioration of Artaxerxes’ power in the
west, marked by continuing defections by Persian officials, willingness on
the part of various peoples to break from Persian control and side with
Egypt, and the likelihood that Artaxerxes could not mount an effective
response to Egyptian enterprise, prompted Tachos to move toward a
grander scheme in which he himself would lead a great Egyptian force
augmented by Greek mercenaries on a campaign aimed at seizing
control once and for all of the middle territory and detaching all of the
eastern Mediterranean/Anatolian world from Persian control. On this
interpretation, the so-called Great Satraps’ Revolt was really just a
coalition of individual satraps encouraged and supported in rebellion by
Tachos.
Tachos: Campaign and Collapse, 360–359
Stephen Ruzicka
in Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BC
Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press
2012
DOI: 10.1093/
ISBN: 9780199766628 eISBN: 9780199932719 acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0015
Item type: chapter
In 360/59, the Egyptian king Tachos led in person an enormous offensive
(unaffected by the resumption of loyalty on the part of rebel satraps in
Anatolia) aimed at laying claim to the whole of Syria-Palestine. Tachos’
nephew Nectanebo commanded the native machimoi, the Spartan king
Agesilaus commanded the mercenary force, and the Athenian Chabrias
commanded the fleet. There was no Persian opposition to the advancing
force, and Nectanebo's force penetrated into Syria, probably heading
for the Euphrates. This all collapsed, however, as a result of dynastic
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challenge back in Egypt by the Mendesian line of Acoris. Tachos’ own
brother and regent in Egypt repudiated him and persuaded Nectanebo
to lay claim to kingship. Tachos fled, making his way to Artaxerxes (and
hoping to regain the kingship with Persian backing). Nectanebo gained
the support of Agesilaus and, abandoning the offensive, turned back to
Egypt to contend with the Mendesian claimant.
Persian Counterattack, 359?
Stephen Ruzicka
in Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BC
Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press
2012
DOI: 10.1093/
ISBN: 9780199766628 eISBN: 9780199932719 acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0016
Item type: chapter
The later report that Artaxerxes III Ochus waged three campaigns against
Egypt, one of them while his father Artaxerxes II was still alive, points to
360/59 as the likely time for this. Thus it must have been connected with
Persian response to the Egyptian counteroffensive. The most plausible
reconstruction treats this as a hasty campaign waged without much prior
planning after the Egyptian offensive collapsed and Egypt was beset by
potentially debilitating conflict between rival dynasties. There was no
Persian victory, and the best conjectural explanation is that while Ochus
entered or approached Egypt, Artaxerxes II's death compelled Ochus to
abandon the campaign and return home to claim the kingship.
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