Download The United States foiled an Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi

The Meir Amit
Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center
The United States foiled an Iranian plot to assassinate
the Saudi ambassador in Washington using Quds Force,
a Revolutionary Guards elite unit, the main instrument
for subversion and terrorism outside of Iran. The plot
indicates a growing readiness by the Iranian regime to
take risks in its fight against the U.S.
Overview of the current state of affairs
1. On October 11, 2011, the U.S. Attorney General announced that a plot to murder Adel alJubeir, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, was foiled. Involved in the murder plot
were a dual U.S.-Iranian citizen and a commander in Iran’s Quds Force.1
2. According to documents filed to the New York federal court, the two suspects in planning the
murder are Manssor Arbabsiar and Gholam Shakuri, both natives of Iran. Manssor Arbabsiar,
a dual U.S.-Iranian citizen, was detained in New York’s JFK International Airport on September
29. Gholam Shakuri, a top Quds Force operative who was Arbabsiar’s handler, was apparently able
to flee to Iran. The two were charged with conspiracy to commit an act of terrorism and conspiracy
to murder a foreign official.
3. According to a hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives, the American administration has
proof that Al-Jubeir’s attempted murder was organized by high-ranking members of the
Revolutionary Guards. American administration officials said that these members were “directed
by elements of the Iranian government”, but did not reveal any additional information. One of
1
Quds Force is one of the five wings of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. It is an elite unit established to create a well-organized
environment for implementing the Iranian doctrine of “exporting the revolution” to the rest of the world. The Quds
Force is involved in a wide variety of covert activities outside of Iran’s borders, from the establishment of education systems
and indoctrination to spread the ideology of the Islamic revolution in Iran, to conducting subversive activities against
Iran’s opponents in the Middle East and elsewhere, “dealing” with the regime’s opponents, and directing
terrorist and guerilla infrastructures. For further details, see our April 2, 2007 Information Bulletin: “Using the Quds Force
of the Revolutionary Guards as the main tool to export the revolution beyond the borders of Iran”.
the members is Quds Force commander Qassem Suleimani, who was added to the list of
specially designated global terrorists on October 11, 2011, when the administration exposed the
affair. The reason given for his designation as a terrorist was that, as commander of the
Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force, Qassem Suleimani “oversees the IRGC-QF officers who were
involved in this plot”.2
Major General Qassem Suleimani, commander of the Quds Force since 1998, in uniform. Left: Qassem Suleimani
in a rare TV interview telling the story of a comrade who died in the Iran-Iraq War (Iran1 TV, March 18, 2007)
4. The indictment describes a plan to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United
States. After the plot was exposed, the media reported that the Iranians were subsequently
planning to hit the Israeli embassy in Washington and the embassies of Israel and Saudi Arabia
in Argentina. In response to the reports, Department of State spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said
that there were no other targets other than that specified in the report, i.e., the
assassination of the Saudi ambassador to the United States (Department of State website,
October 13, 2011).
5. Since the press conference, the American administration has provided a wealth of
details about the plot. U.S. President Barack Obama demanded answers from the
government of Iran, saying that the facts of the plan were not in dispute. He said that the
scheme involved the highest levels of the Iranian regime, ascribing it to a pattern of
“reckless and dangerous” behavior by the government of Iran. The U.S. president
promised effective American measures in response (AFP, October 13, 2011). The United
States did take a series of diplomatic and practical measures following the incident
(see below).
2
Joint Hearing; U.S House of Representatives; Committee on Homeland Security; Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and
Intelligence; Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management; “Iranian Terror Operations on American Soil”;
Testimony by Matthew Levitt, director, Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence; The Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, October 26, 2011 (hereinafter: hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives).
2
Implications
6. Subversion and terrorism led by the Quds Force are important instruments
traditionally employed by Iran’s policy since the Islamic regime came to power. The Quds
Force is involved in a wide variety of covert activities outside the borders of Iran, including
subversion, intelligence collection, and terrorism. The hearing before the U.S. House of
Representatives offered examples of a number of terrorist activities and attacks carried out by
Iranian agents against various targets, particularly in the Middle East, Europe, and South
America.3 According to the hearing, as of the 1980s, Iranian agents have been engaged in
operations also in the United States. Such covert activities included assassinations of
opponents and intelligence collection, so that the present incident is not the first of
its kind.4
7. Past experience shows that the terrorist attacks perpetrated by the Quds Force across the globe
have been authorized by top officials in the Iranian regime. In this context, the most
revealing “case study” was the bombing of the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires (AMIA)
in 1994, orchestrated by the top echelon of the Iranian regime, including its former
president Ali Rafsanjani. Consequently, the Argentinean judge Rodolfo Canicoba issued
international arrest warrants for seven Iranian senior officials and senior Hezbollah operative
Imad Mughniyeh. These officials included the president of Iran, the ministers of
intelligence and defense, the foreign minister, the Revolutionary Guards chief, and
the commander of the Quds Force. Obviously, such a decision could not have been made
without the approval of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, but Argentina’s judicial system
preferred not to ask for an international arrest warrant for him.5
8. Saudi Arabia, the target of the current terrorist attack, has traditionally been a target
of subversion and terrorism from Iran. In the past, this was exemplified by Iranian
subversion in Saudi territory and in Saudi-oriented Persian Gulf states (such as Bahrain),
and even attempts to assassinate Saudi officials abroad. It appears that Saudi Arabia’s
major role in the entry of a Gulf Cooperation Council force into Bahrain, viewed by
Iran as its “backyard”, served as a catalyst for the launch of the recent terrorist
operations against Saudi Arabia. In this context, it should be mentioned that several months
before the attempted assassination of the Saudi ambassador in Washington, Iran eliminated a
Saudi diplomat in Pakistan (see below).
3
Hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives, “Past Plots”, pp. 2-8.
The hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives provides examples of Iranian intelligence and assassination operations
in the United States (“Past Plots”, pp. 2-8).
5
For details, see our November 14, 2006 Information Bulletin: “Argentina accuses Iran of responsibility for the Hezbollah
terrorist attack which destroyed Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, 1994. The Argentinean Attorney General’s office
announced it had found Iran responsible for the terrorist attack and an Argentinean judge issued arrest warrants for seven
senior Iranians and one senior Hezbollah member”.
4
3
9. Targeting a Saudi diplomat in United States territory while risking the possibility of killing innocent
Americans shows a great deal of daring on the part of the Quds Force and top officials
in the Iranian regime. In our assessment, it is a good indication that they are willing to take
substantial risks of complicating Iran’s relations with the United States, Saudi
Arabia, and the entire international community. The goal is to advance and expand
the campaign waged by Iran against the United States and its allies, including Israel
and Saudi Arabia, in which the Quds Force is the main executive instrument.
Chronology of events
10. The following is an examination of how the terrorist attack against the Saudi ambassador to the
United States developed until the plot was uncovered. The examination is based on American
media reports and a hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives, as it appeared on the
Washington Institute website.
a.
Preparations for the assassination developed quickly over about six
months. As early
as in the spring of 2011, Manssor Arbabsiar was recruited by his cousin Abdul
Reza Shahlai, a top Quds Force commander. Gholam Shakuri, who worked under
Shahlai, was appointed Manssor Arbabsiar’s direct handler immediately after the
latter’s recruitment.
b.
According to one theory, Arbabsiar was initially tasked with abducting the Saudi
ambassador, but at some point the abduction turned into an assassination.
Shahlai instructed Arbabsiar to try and contract a drug dealer for the abduction,
believing that people involved in drug trafficking would be willing to carry out such activities
for financial gain (www.stratfor.com, October 20, 2011). For that purpose, Manssor
Arbabsiar contacted a member of a Mexican drug cartel. That person, codenamed CS1, was a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent, who “agreed” to work for
Manssor Arbabsiar (www.stratfor.com, October 20).
c.
Between May and July 2011, Manssor Arbabsiar traveled several times to Mexico. He
intended to pay the cartel member a sum of $1.5 million for carrying out the task. By
August, he wired two payments totaling $100,000 to the drug dealer. The money was
transferred
into
an
FBI-controlled
bank
account in
the
United
States
(www.stratfor.com, October 20). He was promised he would receive the remaining sum
after completing the mission.
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d.
As the plot developed, the mission was changed from abduction to assassination. In
a conversation with the drug cartel member he had contracted, Arbabsiar told him he
did not care how the ambassador would die or how many innocent people would
be killed in the process. He mentioned bombing the Saudi ambassador’s favorite
Washington restaurant as a possible means of assassination (www.investigativeproject.org,
October 11, 2011).
e.
Quds Force operative Gholam Shakuri insisted that the plot should go forward as
soon as possible.6 It is our assessment that rushing the preparations had to do with
Iran’s strategic considerations, particularly the pressure exerted on Iran by the
United States and the international community. We believe it is possible that the plot
was set into motion as a result of the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council military
intervention in Bahrain (March 14, 2011), which marked Saudi Arabia as leader of the
struggle against Iran in the Persian Gulf.
f.
On September 29, 2011, Manssor Arbabsiar was arrested at New York’s JFK
International Airport. Gholam Shakuri, the top Quds Force operative, is still at large.
According to Manssor Arbabsiar, the top Iranian official who recruited him sanctioned the
use of the drug cartel member (the DEA agent) for planning the assassination,
approved the way the Saudi ambassador was going to be assassinated, and
confirmed the payment for his services (www.investigativeproject.org, October 11,
2011).
11.
Top U.S. administration officials have stressed that they have solid evidence of Iran’s
involvement in the attempt to assassinate the Saudi ambassador, rejecting Iran’s attempts to
spread misinformation to abdicate its share of the responsibility for the plot (for instance, by
spreading reports that the assassination was planned by an exiled Iranian group). According
to these officials, there is enough proof to link the assassination plot to top Quds
Force operatives. Such proof includes telephone surveillance, money transactions,
and other evidence (The New York Times, October 19, 2011).
Profile of the two Iranians who took part in the plot
12. The two suspects in planning the assassination are Manssor Arbabsiar and Gholam
Shakuri, both natives of Iran.
6
Hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives.
5
13. Manssor Arbabsiar, 56, resident of Texas, is an American citizen of Iranian descent who has
lived in the United States for several decades. He has an undergraduate degree in mechanical
engineering and owns an apparently unsuccessful car business. He used to travel to Iran once a
year (www.investigativeproject.org, October 11, 2011).
Manssor Arbabsiar (ghatreh.com)
14. Manssor Arbabsiar was not randomly chosen for the mission. According to some reports, he was
recruited by his cousin Abdul Reza Shahlai, a senior Quds Force commander, in the spring
of 2011. After being recruited, he was handled by Gholam Shakuri, Shahlai’s deputy. He was
apparently considering leaving the United States and returning permanently to Iran; however, as a
United States citizen he was seen as more beneficial to the Quds Force for his ability to
freely travel across the country (www.stratfor.com, October 20, 2011).
15. After his arrest, Arbabsiar confessed to his part in the plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador.
He told investigators he was chosen for the mission because of his business interests and
contacts in the United States and Mexico and his acquaintance with individuals involved in the
narcotics trade (www.stratfor.com, October 20, 2011).
16.The other person involved in the plot is Gholam Shakuri, a senior Quds Force operative,
who was Manssor Arbabsiar’s handler. He is wanted by the American authorities and believed
to be in Iran (Reuters, October 24, 2011).
17. According to a Saudi official, Gholam Shakuri is an important Quds Force case officer who
helped organize militant Shi’ite protesters in Bahrain. “Shakuri was among the Iranians who
met Hasan Mushaima, a radical Bahraini Shiite cleric, during a stopover in Beirut last February, when
Mushaima was on his way back home to lead protests in Bahrain”, the official said.7
7
Hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives, citing David Ignatius, “Intelligence Links Iran to Saudi Diplomat’s
Murder”, PostPartisan blog, Washington Post, October 13, 2011 (www.wasingtonpost.com).
6
Saudi Arabia as a target of Iranian terrorism
18. Saudi Arabia, Iran’s major opponent in the Arab and Muslim world, has traditionally
been a target of subversion and terrorism from Iran. Such subversion takes place in Saudi
Arabia itself, in the Middle East, and in other countries across the globe. It includes attempts to
assassinate Saudi diplomats, both directly and by proxies, key among which is the Lebanese
Hezbollah.
19. The terrorist attacks against Saudi Arabia occurred in a number of waves, closely linked to the
Iran-Saudi Arabia and Iran-U.S. relations. In the 1980s and 1990s, Iranian subversive activity took
place during pilgrimages (hajj) to the holy sites of Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia. Instructed to
do so in advance, Iranian pilgrims incited large-scale riots in which hundreds of people were killed.
For instance, 16 Kuwaiti citizens who were brought to trial in Saudi Arabia admitted to a series of
attacks during the pilgrimage season of 1989, assisted by the Iranian embassy in Saudi Arabia.
Following their execution, a series of revenge attacks was carried out in which six Saudi
Arabian diplomats were killed in various places around the world (Lebanon, Turkey, and
Thailand).8
20. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia was the site of devastating terrorist attacks against
American targets. For example, two car bombs exploded in Saudi Arabia: one in Riyadh in 1995,
in which seven people were killed, among whom were five U.S. citizens; the second in Al-Khobar
in 1996, near an American military base, in which 19 people were killed and over 500 wounded. In
both cases, the attacks were carried out by Saudi elements supported by Iran.9
21. Examples of past Iranian terrorist attacks against Saudi Arabia were also brought up at the
hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives (p. 4, ITIC emphasis):
“Iran also has a history of targeting Saudi diplomats. During Iran’s worldwide assassination
campaign targeting political dissidents, Hezbollah in Saudi Arabia embarked on a campaign against
Saudi diplomats and officials. Attacks against Saudi officials abroad occurred in Turkey, Pakistan,
and Thailand. Indeed, commenting on one of these assassinations, a CIA analysis issued in
December 1988 noted that “Riyadh is concerned that the assassination of a Saudi diplomat in
Ankara on 25 October may be the opening round in a Shi’a terrorist campaign targeting Saudi
officials and facilities. According to U.S intelligence, Iranian attacks targeting the Saudis continued
even under the presidency of the “moderate” President Rafsanjani. A CIA analysis published in
August 1990 assessed that Iran had been responsible for “sponsoring numerous attacks against
Saudi interests” over the past year. Moreover, the CIA assessed that Iranian terrorist attacks
8
9
For details, see our April 2003 paper: “Iran as a State Sponsoring and Operating Terror”.
Ibid.
7
carried out over the past year (1989-1990) “were probably approved in advance” by the President
and other senior Iranian leaders”.10
22. We believe that the current attempts to assassinate Saudi diplomats are part of a broader
Iranian campaign against Saudi Arabia, which uses diplomacy, propaganda, and
terrorism. It is our assessment that the specific motive behind this campaign is the military
intervention of the Gulf Cooperation Council in Bahrain (March 14, 2011), which marked Saudi Arabia
as leader of the fight against Iran in the Persian Gulf.
Gulf Cooperation Council forces enter Bahrain (presstv.ir)
23. Prior to the assassination attempt in the United States, a Saudi diplomat was assassinated
in Pakistan. On May 16, 2011, Hassan al-Qahtani, a security officer who worked in
the Saudi consulate in Karachi, the capital of Pakistan, was shot dead while driving
his car. The assailants were two men who followed him on a motorcycle. Four days prior to
that, two grenades were thrown at the front gate of the Saudi consulate in the
Pakistani capital (The Guardian, May 16, 2011). Officials in Saudi Arabia and the United States
agreed that Iran’s Quds Force was involved in the killing, since the killer was a member of
a local Shi’ite dissident group known for its close connections with the Quds Force
(Washington Post, October 13, 2011).
Reactions from the United States
24. After the plot was exposed, the American administration launched extensive efforts to
condemn Iran and deepen its isolation on the international scene. In this context,
United States officials gave the media a wealth of details about the plot, describing it as a gross
10
Hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives, based on “Iranian Support for Terrorism: Rafsanjani’s Report Card”,
Terrorism Review, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, August 9, 1990, approved for release June
1999 (www.foia.cia.gov).
8
violation of international law and escalation of Iran’s support for terrorism (see details
below).
25. In addition to the strong remarks against Iran, the American administration took several
diplomatic and practical measures:
a. United States officials informed Iran, directly and indirectly, that they are viewing
the issue with grave concern. They did so at a direct meeting with an Iranian delegation11
and during a brief visit by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Oman. According to a senior
Department of State official, the visit to Oman was aimed to take advantage of Oman’s
relations with Iran to send a message to the Iranians regarding the United States’ concern
about the plot and its consequences for Iran (U.S. Department of State website, October 15;
AFP, October 19).
b. The United States Department of Treasury reported it was freezing the assets of five
individuals directly linked to the plot. It also announced sanctions on Mahan Air,
Iran’s national airline, due to the fact that it transports Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah
operatives, including those involved in the plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the
United States. All of Mahan Air’s assets in the United States are now frozen, and United States
citizens have been forbidden to do business with the company (AFP, October 12, 2011).
c. The Treasury undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence said he met British officials
to discuss potential new sanctions on Iran. He added that the United States is
going to continue to look at those financial institutions that are involved with Iran’s
activity and continue to try to isolate them from the international financial sector (Reuters,
October 25, 2011).
d. A spokesman for the White House reported that the President of the United States and
the King of Saudi Arabia agreed that the plot was a gross violation of international
law, stressing their commitment to act for a united and strong international response. They
also reaffirmed the “strong partnership” between the two countries (White House Spokesman’s
Office, October 13, 2011).
Statements by top United States officials
26. Top United States administration officials made strong remarks concerning the plot:
11
The spokeswoman for the U.S. Department of State who reported the meeting refused to provide details about its
participants and location.
9
a.
On October 13, 2011, President Barack Obama said that the plot is proof of a dangerous
pattern of activity by the Iranian regime, stressing that the plot was directed and
sponsored by elements in the Iranian government. Obama promised to impose the
most severe sanctions on Iran and mobilize the international community to further
isolate the country and make it pay for its conduct.
b.
U.S. Vice President Joe Biden strongly condemned the plot: “It is an outrageous act,
where the Iranians will have to be held accountable”. He said that the United States
is currently in the process of mobilizing world public opinion against Iran and continuing
efforts to isolate it and condemn its conduct (ABC News, October 12, 2011).
c.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in an interview that the exposure of the plot is an
achievement for the law enforcement and intelligence community of the United
States. According to Clinton, the perpetrators were obviously directed by elements
within the Iranian regime. The plot casts light on Iran’s intentions and raises
questions not only about Iran’s doings in the United States and Mexico but
everywhere else in the world (AP, October 13, 2011). In another interview, Hillary
Clinton said that the plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States is proof
of a dangerous escalation in financing terrorism by the government of Iran, and
in Iran’s use of “political violence” (AFP, October 12, 2011).
d.
Dianne Feinstein, Chairwoman of the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee, argued
that Iran’s attempt to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington was an
escalation by Iran. She repeated that she would support imposing sanctions on
Iran’s Central Bank. However, she claimed she was not aware of any American plan to
contend with the Quds Force, saying that such an action could evolve into a war with Iran
in which the United States has no interest at the present time (FOX, October 17, 2011).
Iran’s reaction
27. Iran categorically denied Washington’s accusations of being involved in the plot to
assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington. According to the Iranians, the
allegations were aimed to divert attention from the United States’ domestic and
foreign failures. Iranian spokesmen warned that Iran would react strongly to any
American action against it.
28. The following are some noteworthy reactions by top Iranian officials:
10
a.
In a speech given during a visit to Kermanshah Province, Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei said that the allegations are meaningless. He predicted failure for what
he termed the recurring attempts by Western leaders to spread fear against Iran and
portray it as a state sponsor of terrorism. He warned that any action by the
United States against Iran will be met with a strong reaction.
b.
Iran’s Foreign Minister Ali-Akbar Salehi said that this was a new American
scenario against Iran designed to divert American public opinion from the
internal problems of the United States. He noted that Iran and Saudi Arabia
enjoy good relations, and that the differences of opinion between them have to do
with international, rather than bilateral issues. He warned that even though Iran has
no interest in a confrontation with the United States, it can react strongly in case
one does occur (IRNA, October 12).
c.
Intelligence Minister Heydar Moslehi rejected the allegations made by the
United States, saying that Iran has intelligence information which shows that even
the American administration has no confidence in the allegations. He stressed that
the allegations have no real intelligence support and that they rely on questionable
information (Press TV, October 20, 2011).
d.
Revolutionary Guards deputy chief Hossein Salami also rejected the claims
made by the United States, saying they were “ridiculous and completely unfounded”.
He added that it is the failure of the American foreign policy that prompted the
United States to try and divert international public opinion from the ongoing demise
of the capitalist establishment and the domestic protest in the United States by
bringing up ridiculous charges aimed to sow discord among Muslims (IRNA, October
13, 2011).
29. Iran’s official and reformist media both rejected the American administration’s claims, portraying
them as an imaginary, nonsensical scenario designed to serve the interests of the
United States in its fight against Iran, divert domestic and global public opinion from the
severe problems facing it, and prepare domestic and global public opinion for additional
measures against Iran. The Iranian media reported that the allegations were met with
considerable skepticism even by experts and commentators in the United States.
30. At the same time, the Iranian media continue their attack on Saudi Arabia. Iran’s
media once again accused Saudi Arabia of cooperating with the United States
against the nations of the region and suppressing its Shi’ite citizens. For instance:
11
a.
The daily Keyhan accused Saudi Arabia of collaborating with the United States and
Israel in the assassinations of senior figures in the “Islamic resistance” and in Iran.
Keyhan said that the assassinations of Islamic movement leaders in Lebanon,
Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan, as well as of Iranian nuclear scientists, were
planned by the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Israel, and Saudi Arabia to
get the Western world and the crumbling Saudi regime out of the crises they’re
undergoing (Keyhan, October 16).
b.
Mehr News Agency strongly criticized Saudi Arabia’s policy towards the Shi’ite
citizens of the kingdom, arguing that even Western media compare the policy of
suppression and discrimination pursued by the Saudis with regard to the Shi’ites in
eastern Saudi Arabia to the apartheid policy in South Africa (Mehr, October 14).
Saudi Arabia’s reaction
31.
Saudi Arabia strongly condemned the plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to
the United States. The Saudi embassy in Washington released an announcement
saying that the assassination plot was a shocking violation of international norms and
thanked the United States administration for preventing the crime. A “senior Saudi official”
said that the exposure of the plot would take the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran to
an “unprecedented low”. He said it was not the first time Iran made an attempt to
attack Saudi diplomats (Haaretz, October 12, 2011).
32.
Saudi Arabia’s permanent mission to the U.N. reported that it had officially asked the U.N.
Secretary General to bring up the issue before the Security Council, saying that
those responsible should be brought to justice (AFP, October 15, 2011).
Other reactions
33.
Britain, EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, and other elements in Europe congratulated
the United States authorities for the operation, saying that if it turns out that Iran is involved in
the assassination attempt, it will face severe repercussions on the international scene.
34.
The EU announced it was freezing the European assets of five individuals involved
in the plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador, saying that the asset freeze would
become effective on October 22, 2011 (EU Council official website, October 21, 2011).
12