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Transcript
Economics for Managers
by
y Paul Farnham
Ch t 8
Chapter
Market Structure: Monopoly
and Monopolistic Competition
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.1
Market Power
ƒ Market power: ability of a firm to
influence the prices of its
products
d t and
d develop
d
l strategies
t t i
to earn profits over longer periods
of time
ƒ Monopoly: single firm producing
product with no close substitutes
ƒ Price-searchers: firms in
imperfect competition
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.2
Monopoly Model with
Positive Economic Profit
Figure 8.1a
8 1a
MC
PM
A
ATC
ATCM
B
MR
0
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
QM
D
Q
8.3
Monopoly Model with
Losses
Figure
g
8.1b
MC
B
ATC
ATCM
PM
A
MR
0
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
QM
D
Q
8.4
Monopoly Model
ƒ Monopolist maximizes profits by
producing where MR = MC and
earns positive
iti economic
i profit
fit
due to barriers to entry
ƒ The
Th monopolist
li t could
ld suffer
ff
losses if ATC is greater than price
at the profit
profit-maximizing
maximizing level of
output (see next slide)
ƒ The model has no supply curve
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.5
Comparing Monopoly
and
d Perfect
P f tC
Competition
titi
Figure 8.2
82
MC
ATC
P2
MC
P1
D=P=MR
0
QPC
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
ATC
0
QM
Q1
MR
Q
8.6
Comparing Monopoly
and
d Perfect
P f tC
Competition
titi
ƒ Monopolistic firm must seek out
optimal
p
price,
p
, which depends
p
on
demand and cost conditions
ƒ Firms with market power might
pursue other profit goals
ƒ Price is higher and output lower
under monopoly than under
perfect competition
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.7
Barriers to Entry
ƒ Economies of scale and mergers
ƒ Barriers created by government
ƒ Input barriers
ƒ Brand loyalties
ƒ Consumer lock-in and switching
costs
ƒ Network
N t
k externalities
t
liti
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.8
Economies of Scale
and
d Mergers
M
ƒ Exist when a firm’s LRAC slopes
downward or when lower
production
d ti costs
t are associated
i t d
with larger scale of operation
ƒ Can
C actt as a b
barrier
i to
t entry
t in
i
different industries
ƒ Mergers
M
are particularly
ti l l important
i
t t
in technology, media, and
telecommunications
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.9
Barriers Created
b G
by
Governmentt
ƒ Licenses
ƒ Patents and copyrights
• Public good
• Cost of exclusion
ƒ Regulation
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.10
Input Barriers
ƒ Control over raw materials
ƒ Barriers in financial capital
markets
• Larger firms can get lower interest
rates
• Smaller firms need more collateral
for loans
• Smaller firms are p
perceived as
riskier
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.11
Consumer Lock-In and
S it hi
Switching
Costs
C t
ƒ When consumers become locked
into certain types
yp or brands and
would incur substantial switching
costs if they changed
ƒ Although lock-in types are
dominant,, they
y represent
p
managerial strategies that can be
used elsewhere to gain market
power
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.12
Consumer Lock
Lock-In
In Costs
ƒ Contractual commitments
ƒ Durable purchases
ƒ Specialized suppliers
ƒ Search
S
h costs
t
ƒ Loyalty programs
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.13
Consumer
S it hi
Switching
Costs
C t
ƒ Replacement of equipment
ƒ Learning a new system
ƒ Converting data to a new format
ƒ Funding
F di
off new supplier
li
ƒ Combined buyer and seller search
costs
ƒ Lost benefits from current supplier
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.14
Managerial Rule of Thumb:
U i
Using
Lock-in
L k i as Strategy
St t
Managers can
• Use lock-in as a competitive
p
strategy
• Be prepared to offer customers
concessions
i
and
d attractive
tt ti terms
t
• Sell to influential buyers and
attract buyers
b ers with
ith high switching
s itching
costs
• Increase customer commitment
and entrenchment
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.15
Network Externalities
ƒ Act as a barrier to entry because
the value of a p
product depends
p
on
number of customers using the
product
ƒ Can be considered demand-side
economies of scale,, in contrast to
supply-side economies
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.16
Measures of
M k t Power
Market
P
ƒ Managers can use measures to
better understand the markets
• Lerner Index: measure of market
power that focuses on the
difference between a firm’s
product price and marginal cost of
production
d ti
L = (P – MC)
P
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.17
Cross Elasticity
off Demand
D
d
ƒ Percentage change in the quantity
demanded of g
good X relative to
the percentage change in the
price of good Y
ƒ The higher the cross elasticity,
the g
greater the potential
p
substitution between goods
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.18
Concentration Ratios
ƒ Measure market power by focusing on
share of the market held by the largest
firms
fi
ƒ Assume that the larger the share of the
market
k t held
h ld by
b few
f
firms,
fi
the
th more
market power those firms have
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.19
Herfindahl-Hirschman
I d
Index
ƒ Uses information about market shares
of firms in the industry
ƒ Is the sum of the squares of the market
share of each firm in the industry
ƒ The U.S. Justice Dept. uses it to
evaluate competitive efforts of
mergers
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.20
Antitrust Issues
ƒ Federal (country) or supranational
(EU) legislation that limits market
power of firms and regulates how
firms use their market power to
compete
p
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.21
Focus of the Horizontal
M
Merger
Guidelines
G id li
ƒ Definition
D fi iti off the
th relevant
l
t market
k t
ƒ Level of seller competition in that
market
ƒ Possibility that a merging firm might
affect price and output
ƒ Nature and extent of entry into the
market
ƒ Extent to which any cost savings and
efficiencies could offset increase in
market power
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.22
Managerial Rule of Thumb:
U d
Understanding
t di
Antitrust
A tit
t Laws
L
ƒ Managers must work within
antitrust constraints
ƒ Because of generalities and
ambiguities, managers may not
know whether their actions are
illegal
g unless the government
g
initiates litigation
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.23
Assumptions of
M
Monopolistic
li ti Competition
C
titi
ƒ Product differentiation exists
among
g firms
ƒ Large number of firms exist
ƒ No
N iinterdependence
t d
d
exists
i t among
these firms
ƒ Entry by new firms is relatively
easy
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.24
Monopolistic Competition,
L
Long
Run
R
and
d Short
Sh t run
Figure 8.4
84
MC
P1
MC
ATC
ATC
P2
MR
0
Q1
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
D
Q
MR D
0
Q2
Q
8.25
Managerial Rule of Thumb:
Market Power in
Monopolistic Competition
ƒ Managers must develop a variety
of strategies
g
to maintain market
power when faced with intense
competition
ƒ They can exploit geographic
advantages,
g , offer improved
p
customer service, become part of
a cooperative to lower cost, and
d
develop
l specialized
i li d niches
i h
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.26
Summary of Key Terms
ƒ Antitrust laws
ƒ Barriers to entry
ƒ Concentration ratios
ƒ Herfindahl-Hirschman
H fi d hl Hi
h
I d
Index
ƒ Lerner Index
ƒ Lock-in and switching costs
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.27
Summary of Key Terms
ƒ Market power
ƒ Monopolistic competition
ƒ Monopoly
ƒ Network
N t
k externalities
t
liti
ƒ Price-searcher
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.28
Do you have
any questions?
© 2005 Prentice Hall, Inc.
8.29