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Public power in Europe : studies in historical transformations / edited by James S.
Amelang, Siegfried Beer
(Thematic work group. States, legislation, institutions ; 1)
320.94 (21.)
1. Società e Stato - Europa 2. Europa - Storiografia I. Amelang, James S. II Beer,
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Volumes published (2006)
I. Thematic Work Groups
I. Public Power in Europe: Studies in Historical Transformations
II. Power and Culture: Hegemony, Interaction and Dissent
III. Religion, Ritual and Mythology. Aspects of Identity Formation in Europe
IV. Professions and Social Identity. New European Historical Research on Work, Gender and Society
V. Frontiers and Identities: Mapping the Research Field
VI. Europe and the World in European Historiography
II. Transversal Theme
I. Citizenship in Historical Perspective
III. Doctoral Dissertations
I. F. Peyrou, La Comunidad de Ciudadanos. El Discurso Democrático-Republicano en España, 1840-1868
Cover: Imaginary Architecture, fresco, Ist Century B.C., Villa di Poppea, Oplontis, Italy © 2003 Photo Scala, Florence
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Power Made Public: Athenian Displays of
Power and Aegean Diplomacy in the Fifth
and Fourth Century B.C.
Samuel Potts
University of Cardiff
This chapter will focus primarily on Athens’ political and diplomatic relations with the
states of her Aegean ‘empire’ in the 5th century, which were characterized by a mixture
of negotiation, mutual benefit and outright oppression. A brief overview of the historical
and historiographical background to the 5th century will be given; the chapter will then
introduce the various methods through which Athens engaged in diplomacy with the citystates of the Aegean, both directly and indirectly. The different duties and roles of officials
such as ambassadors, heralds and envoys will be briefly covered. Finally, the chapter will
explore the role played by the Athenian navy in the operation of diplomacy, a topic that has
received very little attention. At the most basic level, the ships of the navy were needed to
transport diplomats and ambassadors overseas. In addition, the use of these ships would in
itself have sent diplomatic messages about Athens and her power, messages which were also
made through a variety of means to foreign visitors to Athens.
This case study will examine several aspects of the relations between Athens and the
city-states of the Aegean during the 5th century B.C. The basis for these relations was
the alliance that was formed by many Hellenic cities in 480 B.C. to repel the invasion
of King Xerxes of Persia, and Athens’ subsequent leadership of these ‘allies’. The historical and historiographical background of this alliance will be briefly discussed, before
the chapter turns to the theme of display. By various means, the Athenians sought to
present their polis [city-state] as mighty, wealthy and invincible, and the audience for
these messages was not restricted to the Athenians themselves; Athens had a busy port
which thronged with traders and visitors coming to the city. The final part of this chapter will examine the ways in which the offices and practices of diplomacy conveyed this
message of power and invincibility from the city of Athens and disseminated throughout the Aegean.
Historical Background
Throughout most of the 5th century B.C., Athens collected financial tribute from over
100 other communities, money which at first was (ostensibly) to be used for punitive
campaigns against the Persians following their invasions of Greece in 490 B.C. and 480
Premodern Diplomatic Practices
144
Samuel Potts
B.C. This alliance was originally led by the Spartans, traditionally the most powerful
of the Greek city-states. Following the defeat of the Persian invasion at the battle of
Plataea in 479 B.C., the Spartans resigned the leadership and the Athenians, whose
role on the victory over the Persians had been crucial, took their place. Keen to avenge
the destruction of their city in 480 B.C., the Athenians established this alliance as a
more solid and permanent institution, inviting financial contributions and warships
from the members for the purpose of campaigning against the Persians. Alliance with
Athens, and the contributions it implied, was, at first, voluntary. The treasury for these
contributions was housed on the Aegean island of Delos, and hence this alliance is
often called in modern scholarship ‘The Delian League’1. This league of allies rapidly
became to all intents and purposes an Athenian Empire2, in which tribute payment was
enforced ruthlessly and rebellion punished harshly. The tribute was used in large part
to fund the Athenian-controlled navy, which was both the means of striking at Persia
and of oppressing the allies. It is the debate over when this transfer from a voluntary collection of autonomous cities in the Delian League to an Athenian-controlled empire
occurred, and indeed whether the search for a watershed moment is valid in the first
place, that has preoccupied scholars in this field.
The first historian to tackle the subject, the Athenian Thucydides in the second half
of the 5th century, suggested that the league was from the beginning controlled by
the Athenians for purposes other than those stated, that the oppression became more
severe with time, and that the allies had only themselves to blame for letting Athens
take over3. He has Athenian politicians in his narrative speak quite bluntly about their
city’s harsh rule4. Modern scholars writing in English are generally not quite so cynical5.
One reason for this is the status of the ‘Golden Age’ of Athens as the cradle philosophy,
drama and particularly democracy, and thus its privileged position in the development
of Western civilization; there is thus a tendency to downplay some of those aspects of
Athenian history that, to modern Western ideals, seem contradictory, oppressive and
brutal. Kuels complained as late as 1989 that historiography of 5th century Athens fails
to acknowledge sufficiently that “classical Athens was a militarily aggressive, expansionist state, which treated its slaves more harshly than many other societies, enslaved its
women and tyrannized its ‘allies’”6. Many works can indeed be seen, perhaps unfairly,
in this apologist light. McGregor, against whom Kuels directed many of her criticisms,
gives a fairly favourable verdict on Athens’ Empire, appealing to the early idealism of
the members, and their subjugation by Persia both before and after their alliance with
Athens. He argues that it was the damaging effects of the Peloponnesian war between
Athens and Sparta in the last 30 years of the 5th century “that put an end to what had
been in origin a noble concept”7.
Russell Meiggs, whose Athenian Empire is the seminal work in English on this topic, argues that modern judgements are fairly pointless in any case, and sought instead to find
ancient views on the Athenians and their rule. But he is in agreement with McGregor
at least in as much as that the league started off being enthusiastically supported by the
Aegean city-states, and Athenian encroachment upon them was gradual8. Both Meiggs
Power Made Public
145
and McGregor reject the notion that a single specific moment can be found in terms
of the change from Delian League to Athenian Empire, but rather point to a series of
moments crucial to the development of relations between Athens and the city-states of
the Aegean.
One critical event occurred in 454 B.C., when the league’s treasury was moved from
Delos to Athens; another in 450 B.C., when financial tribute carried on being collected despite the cessation of hostilities with Persia9. But even before this time, as
Thucydides makes clear, allies trying to leave the league, such as Naxos in 470 B.C.,
were compelled by force to stay, and from the very beginning it was Athenian officials who had sole charge of spending of the league’s money10. Despite this series
of impediments and limitations placed upon the ‘allies’ throughout the 5th century,
Harold Mattingly has argued that “the severe, repressive period of Athenian imperialism began in the 420’s [B.C.]”11. Until recently his ideas have been dismissed by
the majority of scholars; however, developments in the field of epigraphy have lent
weight to some of his arguments12.
Epigraphy
and
Empire
Part of the practice of the Athenians’ style of democracy13 required the publication
of laws, decrees and treaties, often on stone pillars (stelai). A large number of these, in
various states of preservation, survive to this day, and the discovery of new inscriptional
evidence is relatively frequent, at least compared with the uncovering of new literary
sources. In addition, technological advances in recent years have been able to better
exploit the extant epigraphic material, and have serious implications for the historical
debate.
Inscriptions of measures passed in relation to the allies have contributed to our understanding of the Athenian Empire and its character. One of the clearest examples of
a legal imposition for which the decree is extant is the requirement of all the allies to
use Athenian coinage, weights and measures; this document is known as the Coinage
Decree or, in more recent work, the Standards Decree. This represents a high level of
Athenian interference in the freedoms and independence of her allies and is a significant development in the story of Athenian imperialism. However, there is no certainty
as to when this particular change occurred.
Dating is often the central problem with using inscriptions as historical evidence. Sometimes the names of officials and proposers on the decrees can be used to date the texts.
In particular, the name of the Archon (Chief Magistrate) for the year, which appears in
the preamble of almost all complete decrees of the Athenian democracy, is the most
reliable way of dating inscriptions14. In many cases, however, the inscriptions do not
survive in a complete state, and the name of the relevant Archon is lost. In the absence
of such guidance, methods of stylistic dating are used. This is the case for the Standards
Decree referred to above. One of the chief stylistic rules concerned the writing of the
Greek letter sigma. The argument ran that the letter written with three strokes repPremodern Diplomatic Practices
146
Samuel Potts
resented an older style of writing which fell out of use on official inscriptions by 445
B.C., to be replaced in all later documents by a four-bar sigma. Thus in the case of the
Standards Decree, a copy of which had the letter sigma written with three bars, placed
it to the period before 445 B.C. Feeling that this stylistic rule should not be considered
decisive, Mattingly argued in favour of a date in the 420’s B.C., as this later time seemed
to fit the historical context better15; for example, the satirical playwright Aristophanes
made a reference to such a policy in a play produced in 424 B.C.16. Mattingly found it
impossible to believe that Aristophanes, who generally targeted contemporary statesmen and topical issues, would bother to lampoon a measure passed around 20 years
earlier. Numismatic evidence also supported the view that many of the allies were continuing to mint their own coins for decades after this decree was supposedly passed.
Despite these difficulties, most scholars have dismissed Mattingly’s arguments, on the
strength of the stylistic rule concerning the three-bar sigma.
In 1986, sophisticated technology was used to analyse a treaty between Athens and
the city of Egesta in Sicily. It had part of an Archon name, but as it was erased but for
the last 2 letters there were several possibilities as to the year to which it could refer.
Using computer-enhanced photography of the stone, researchers from the University
of California were able to read more of the name, and determine with certainty that
the inscription dated from 418 B.C. The significance of this is that the inscription was
written using the three-bar sigma throughout, some thirty years after it supposedly disappeared from official use. The consequences of this discovery in terms of the dating of
other documents with the three-bar sigma, and the implications for our interpretations
of Athenian imperial policy in the 5th century, are yet to be fully realized. The dating
of many significant inscriptions is now filled with uncertainty, and exposed to fresh
interpretation and argument. But it seems more likely that the Standards Decree, and
the level of interference with the allies it implies, is a product of the 420’s B.C. and not
the 440’s B.C.
Clearly, legal measures such as the Standards Decree have a great deal to tell us about
the character and development of Athenian imperialism, but they were only a part of
a wider picture. One of the features this decree is the clause requiring the law to be set
up in stone not only in the agora (market-place) of Athens, but also those of the allied
cities too17; a practical measure to inform the allies of the new rules certainly, but also a
visible and lasting symbol of Athenian power and democratic ideology. The rest of this
chapter will explore further the subject of display of power, a crucial aspect of relations
between the Athens and the Aegean city-states. The Athenians were well aware of the
potency of propagandist displays of strength, and used a variety of media to deliver
their message, both in the city and beyond.
Athens
on
Display
If the city of the Spartans were deserted and the shrines and foundations of buildings preserved,
I think that after the passage of considerable time there would eventually be widespread doubt
Power Made Public
147
that their power measured up to their reputation (and yet they occupy two-fifths of the Peloponnese and preside over the whole of it as well as numerous allies beyond; nevertheless, since the
city is not unified nor furnished with elaborate shrines or public buildings but settled in villages
in the old Hellenic way, it would look inferior), but that if the Athenians were to suffer the same
fate their power would be estimated, from the city’s pure appearance, as twice what it was18.
Thucydides made this comparison between Sparta and Athens as part of his introduction to the two cities in his work on the Peloponnesian war. He should not be interpreted as suggesting Athenian power was illusionary; indeed, part of his stated reasons
for undertaking a study of the war between Athens and Sparta was that both protagonists were at the height of their strength.19 He merely suggests that Athens’ appearance
would make her look even more powerful than she was in reality.
There has been a great deal of study devoted to Athens’ “elaborate shrines and public
buildings”, particularly those standing on the Acropolis to this day. Under the auspices
of Pericles, the money for the construction of these buildings was taken from the tribute paid by Athens’ allies. Some scholars have seen this as a way for Pericles to curry
favour with the Athenian people and ensure his own political position. More recent
scholarship, however, has examined the buildings with a wider, international perspective. Recent English scholarship has concentrated on the importance of such buildings
as a means of displaying the power and democratic ideology of Athens, particularly
to foreign visitors and diplomatic envoys from other states. Those coming to Athens
were, through the various means described below, subjected to a great deal of Athenian
propaganda as a “demonstration before the city and its many international visitors of
the power of the polis of Athens, [and] its role as a force in the Greek world”20. What
has received less scholarly attention, and which will be the focus of the final parts of this
chapter, is how Athenians reinforced such messages outside of their city through their
diplomatic institutions.
The building project instigated by Pericles in the mid 5th century B.C., which produced the Parthenon and the Propylaia amongst others, are the most obvious surviving
remains of Athenian self-presentation. The exact meaning of the messages that were
being presented has been the subject of much debate. To give one example, the 90 or
so horsemen depicted in marble on the Parthenon frieze have been thought variously
to represent the Athenian cavalry, Athenian mythical heroes, or the infantry soldiers
killed at Marathon, elevated to horsemen in this effigy. But despite the various interpretations of the buildings and their particular decorations, no-one has doubted the desire
to impress; whatever the statements were, they were made emphatically in capital letters. Powell’s recent interpretation of the Parthenon attempts to reconstruct the debate
in Athens surrounding its construction, and argues that Pericles’ opponents derided
the building as alazon, which means ‘pretentious’ or ‘falsely boastful’21. He argues that
the Parthenon, as well as its religious functions, was “intended to signal wealth and
military power”, but potential power only; Powell suggests that the Parthenon was also
something of a monument to a peace, which was in the event short-lived, between Athens and Sparta. By building a temple rather than an overtly military structure, Pericles’
Premodern Diplomatic Practices
148
Samuel Potts
Parthenon was “a deliberate signal of military strength combined with peaceful intentions”22. Powell asks himself who were the intended recipients of such a message, and
answers that “In part Athens’ subjects and allies, but also perhaps and pre-eminently
Sparta and her allies”23.
It was not only the Parthenon and other religious building projects that can be interpreted in the light of their suggestions of military power; in general “high and conspicuous expenditure on religious objects” was indicative of such strength. Another context of such expenditure was the full calendar of religious festivals that the Athenians
participated in. Such festivals provided a forum for competition amongst the wealthy
elite of the citizens, as they strove to put on the most lavish performances24. But as well
as these elite aristocrats and their shows, it was the city as a whole that was on display.
For one of these festivals in particular, the Great Dionysia, Athens was very consciously
on show to the wider world25. This was because it was at the time of this festival that
the allies of Athens were required to send delegations with their annual tribute. Not
only that, but the tribute was displayed publically, piece by piece, before the packed-out
theatre audience26. The Great Dionysia “was a public display of the success in military
and political terms of the city. It used the state festival to glorify the state”27. The festival
also involves the performance of dramatic works (the comic playwright Aristophanes
jokes that the reason all the foreigners come to the Dionysia is not because they have
to, but to see his latest work)28. Goldhill links the development of the Dionysia festival
with other rituals by which the Athenians publically displayed their power and demonstrated a democratic civic ideology. The public funeral of Athenian war-dead and the
setting up of stone tablets with the names of casualties inscribed upon them are also
indicators of this process29.
In the examples cited above, we have briefly explored the theme of Athens on display,
which has received a good deal of attention in recent scholarship. The focus here has
been on the projection of Athenian power and democratic ideology upon foreign visitors to the city. Powell even goes as far as to call the Parthenon an “essay in concrete diplomacy”30. No-one is suggesting that buildings like the Parthenon, or festivals like the
Great Dionysia, were created only for a foreign audience; it is simply that the intended
effects of these things on visitors is a particular concern of recent scholarship in English. There were indeed significant numbers of such people. Merchants and travellers
from many different states sailed in and out of Piraeus, the harbour district of Athens.
In the 5th century B.C., the Athenians took steps to ensure an even greater number
of visitors to the city. Athens’ allies were obliged to send certain legal cases to Athens
for judgement, which insured a constant flow of litigants from the allied cities31. It is
therefore understandable that large scale building projects and state festivals should be
considered in the context of a cosmopolitan Athens, bustling with people from many
different states.
Institutions
Power Made Public
of
149
Athenian Diplomacy
So far, we have examined various means by which the Athenians disseminated messages (or imposed propaganda) upon those visiting the city itself. The Athenians were
very conscious of their image, and sought to portray their city and their democracy as
powerful; more powerful perhaps than was the case in reality, according to Thucydides.
For the rest of this chapter, I wish to explore the ways in which the Athenians took this
message out from their city and into the wider Greek world. In particular, I am going to
examine the institutions of diplomacy, and the means by which such embassies could
be used for the display of power.
As Mosley and Adcock argue, “the conduct of diplomacy depended upon direct oral
exchange and contact between men and constitutional organs of the various states”32.
Men were sent to and fro all over the Greek world to facilitate such communication.
There were two principal types of diplomatic office despatched by the Athenians:
kerykes (heralds) and presbeis (envoys)33. In addition to these, I will examine the role
played by Athenian strategoi (‘generals’, but as will be discussed below, these men were
elected officials rather than military professional) and proxenoi (‘ambassadors’ is the
least unsatisfactory translation; again, see the discussion below) in terms of diplomacy.
When the Athenians and Spartans declared war in 431 B.C., Thucydides says that
from that moment, the only communication between the two states was through
heralds34. This shows the importance of such people in the field of relations between
cities; if a state of war was to be officially ended, it had to be done through heralds. In
battle as well as war, heralds had a crucial role in determining the parameters of the
conflict; the side which sent a herald to the other asking to recover the dead for burial
did, by that act, concede defeat in the battle. Heralds did not discuss policy or make
formal treaties, but often undertook an initial contact between states to allow such
negotiations to take place. Such communication through heralds could, for example,
allow warring parties to agree to hold more extensive diplomatic activity. Heralds
generally operated alone, though parties of envoys sometimes travelled with a herald
before them to try and ensure a safe and smooth reception. Because of their historical
association with the gods, heralds enjoyed a great deal of respect. In addition, heralds
enjoyed a divinely sanctioned protection, something akin to our modern concepts
of diplomatic immunity. Heralds were waylaid and murdered of course, but it caused
universal outrage when it happened, even to the heralds of non-Greek nations such
as Persia35. Unlike most public appointments in democratic Athens, being a herald
was something of an inherited title. A prominent family group in Athens, named
after and allegedly descended from Keryx the son of Hermes, “were for long into
historical times prominent in affairs of religion and diplomacy”, and “are evidence of
the herald as a family profession”36. The connection between Hermes and heralds was
a strong one; unlike other diplomats, heralds had a particular symbol of their office,
the snake-entwined kerykeion (heraldic staff ), descriptions of which are very similar
to those of the staff of Hermes.
Premodern Diplomatic Practices
150
Samuel Potts
Envoys from Athens were usually sent in groups, commonly of ten. Unlike most officials in Athens, envoys were appointed through direct election from the Assembly37.
Whereas heralds had important ceremonial and religious duties, envoys were purely political appointments. They were often sent to negotiate treaties, and to ratify them with
oaths after they had been negotiated. They did this on the instructions of the Assembly,
and were subject to scrutiny for their results and methods. Envoys did not enjoy any of
the sacred protections given to heralds, and the intercepting of a foreign power’s envoys
happened quite regularly. Heralds could, however, negotiate protection for envoys that
Athens wanted to send38. But this of course would only apply to the two states involved,
and not to any third party who wished to interfere. Unlike most public offices in Athens, the envoy was not elected for a fixed period (almost always a year), but for a specific
task. If a peace treaty was needed with Macedon, as it was in 346 B.C., the Athenians
would elect a party of envoys to make it. If more negotiations were needed with Macedon, another party of envoys would be elected, which may or may not involve some
of the same individuals. Like most public officials, envoys received payment for their
work. According to Mosley and Adcock, the amount given was calculated to provide
for expenses, but no more, to ensure that “public service was not undertaken for gain or
profit” but also to fit in “with the democratic ideal that a man should not be deterred by
poverty from playing a full role in public life”39. The stipend for envoys, while it could
vary from case to case, was generally only slightly higher than the daily wage of a semiskilled worker in Athens40; not enough to live the high life, but certainly enough to live
on, and even support a family if need be.
While envoys and heralds were essential parts of the diplomatic machinery of Athens,
in practice many of the negotiations with foreign powers were undertaken, at least provisionally, by the Athenian generals. Unlike their modern counterparts, generals were
not military professionals, but an annually elected office for which any Athenian could
stand. There were ten generals elected every year, to command both the army and the
navy on any campaigns. It therefore fell to the generals to arrange political and diplomatic matters following a campaign, such as “the negotiation and settlements with
defeated enemies, the use and distribution of the profits of war, and the disposition
of prisoners or war and the captive populations of conquered cities”41. They had wide
executive powers, though they did not have a mandate to conclude treaties of peace or
alliance, and operated under the broad framework of the Assembly’s instructions and
(perhaps more importantly) expectations. The generals were personally responsible for
their actions, and their necks were literally on the line when making settlements. The
wrath of the Assembly upon generals who made military or political decisions that in
retrospect it did not approve of could be very severe indeed. When the three Athenian
generals who captured Poteidaea in 430 B.C. imposed very lenient terms of surrender,
they were criticised, and possibly prosecuted, on their return for not consulting the
Assembly, who believed an unconditional surrender should have been imposed42. It is
therefore not surprising that generals, when not given explicit instructions as to what
to negotiate, exercised caution43.
Power Made Public
151
As we have seen, diplomatic missions were sent out on an ad hoc basis, when they were
thought to be needed. A more constant and persistent form of international contact
and diplomacy existed however, through the institution of proxenia. Indeed “the institution of proxenia was the closest the Greeks came to devising a form of permanent diplomatic representation”, and this characteristic of proxenoi leads to the inevitable, but
potentially misleading, translation of ‘ambassadors’44. These were individuals charged
with looking after the interests of a foreign power within their own city. For example,
Kimon, a prominent Athenian politician in the first half of the 5th century, was a proxenos of Sparta45. He seems to have been a good choice, as he consistently advocated a
return to the Athenian/Spartan alliance that had won the Persian wars. Athenian proxenoi were not necessarily prominent politicians in foreign states, but they were people
from whom Athens could expect useful services; often, merchants who imported grain
at reduced prices, or even gave it away, were granted the title proxenos. Proxenoi could
also be expected to offer practical help and hospitality to visiting Athenian dignitaries.
It was both a reward (as it offered an honorary crown and a state dinner) and an encouragement for more of the same sort of services. In return, the Athenians offered proxenoi
their protection; guaranteed safe passage in Athenian territory, a place of refuge if they
became exiled, and insurances of action should they be harmed46. The status of proxenos
was usually permanent and often hereditary, and was not cancelled if, for example, the
two states involved went to war. But of course a politician such as Kimon, an advocate
of alliance with Sparta, would find himself in the political wilderness if war broke out
with that state; indeed, when Kimon’s pro-Spartan policy led to Athenian humiliation
by Spartan hands, he was ostracized47.
The Athenian Navy
and the
Practice
of
Athenian
diplomacy
These various offices were the means by which the Athenians negotiated with other
states, both her enemies and her allies. By means of such “direct oral exchange”48, treaties were made and orders relayed. But such discourse was not the only important factor
of diplomacy in the Aegean.
Athenian diplomacy took place in the context of her being, for most of the period in
question, the strongest Aegean naval power. As detailed above, the Athenians could
claim dominance over many communities on the islands and coasts of the Aegean sea
for much of the 5th century, and even in the 4th, following their defeat in the Peloponnesian war, they retained much of this dominance. This context was extremely important in terms of Athenian diplomacy. One particular piece of ancient diplomatic
dialogue throws this into sharp relief. Thucydides reports (or more likely invents) a
conversation between an Athenian diplomat with a strong naval force behind him, and
the leaders of the Aegean island of Melos in 416 B.C.
Athenians: We will neither use noble phrases to furnish a lengthy and unconvincing speech
ourselves, about having the right to rule because we put down the Persians (at Marathon in
490 B.C., Salamis in in 480 B.C. and Plataea in 479 B.C.) or attacking now because we were
Premodern Diplomatic Practices
152
Samuel Potts
wronged… understanding as well as we do that in human considerations justice is what is decided only when equal forces are opposed; and in fact the strong do what they have the power
to, and the weak must acquiesce49.
In the event, the Melians were not swayed by arguments of this sort, choosing to resist the Athenians rather than submit, and were destroyed. This sort of thinking was
present in Athenian diplomatic activity from a much earlier time. In 479 B.C., the wily
Athenian commander Themistocles, architect of the great naval victory at Salamis over
the Persians the year before, laid siege to the island of Andros. The blockade was instigated because Themistocles’ extortionate demands for money were not acquiesced to
by the Andrians. While this blockade was in progress, he sent envoys in ships to nearby
islands, threatening them with the same treatment if they did not pay up; unsurprisingly, many of them did50. This is our best and most blatant example of what in a later
age was called ‘gunboat diplomacy’, and no doubt this type of one-sided negotiation,
based solely on disproportionate power, was at least as important as “direct oral communication” and negotiation.
As well as providing this broad context for negotiation with the Aegean city-states,
I wish to examine the role played more directly by the Athenian navy in diplomatic
terms; firstly in facilitating the movement of diplomats, and secondly in participating
indirectly in the negotiations themselves. This will give a broader picture of how the
Athenians conducted diplomacy, and the kinds of messages they sought to express.
The participation of the Athenian navy in diplomatic activities at first glance looks unworthy of serious consideration; Athens needed to send diplomats to cities overseas,
and the navy had ships to take them there. The practical realities of international negotiations demanded the employment of the navy. The case is not so simply explained,
however. Diplomats could be conveyed across the sea far more cheaply than by using
navy vessels if a functional and seaworthy vessel was all that was required; many merchant ships and fishing vessels plied their trade in and out of the Piraeus harbour, and
thus boats would have been easily available for envoys to use. The decision to send them
in naval vessels was just that; a conscious decision on the part of the Athenian Assembly,
as a decree relating to the despatch of envoys makes clear51. It is impossible to say what
percentage of diplomatic missions involved triremes, as often such details are not given
in the sources. However, in nearly all the examples of diplomatic activity for which the
type of vessel is specified, that ship was a trireme52.
Triremes were the most important war vessel of the 5th and 4th century. They were
long, thin galleys with three superimposed rows of oarsmen on each side. They required
a crew of 200 men. The costs and logistical problems involved in using such ships were
considerable. Principally, all the men on board had to be paid and fed. The cost of this
was probably a drachma a day per man; a living wage, as we have seen above. To put
this amount of money in context of the city’s expenditure, keeping a trireme at sea for a
month would cost the Athenian treasury 6,000 drachmae, or 1 talent. The total annual
income of the city of Athens, including the tribute from the ‘allies’, was estimated in the
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153
420’s B.C. as 2,000 talents53. This is a lot of money by the standards of the time, and
no other Greek state could boast such financial resources. But no other contemporary
Greek state had similar expenditures. At a rate of one talent per ship per month, the
navy was one of the largest drains on this supply of money. The fleet had a potential
strength of over 300 triremes, but never would all of these be at sea simultaneously.
There were regularly around 100 in commission for periods of up to 6 months. Rarely
would there be less than 50 in commission at any given time in the fifth century. Just
these 50 ships in commission all year round would cost, in wages and food for the crewmen, 600 talents; a significant proportion of the 2,000 talents posited for the total of
Athens’ wealth. As well as the expenses for the navy, the Athenians paid those who took
part in its democratic institutions in order to ensure that the poorer Athenians could
afford to participate without losing out financially; we have seen this with regard to
some of the diplomatic appointments. For the 500-man Council almost permanently
in session, as well as the many boards of magistrates numbering hundreds of individuals
each year, the bill would have been huge. Rich as Athens no doubt was, there was little
question of money being spent without good reason.
It therefore requires an explanation as to why the Athenians paid for triremes to convey diplomats on negotiations which could stretch out for many expensive weeks and
even months, especially as it was possible for diplomats to use alternative, and cheaper,
transportation. Even if we concede, as Westermann has assumed, that “the dignity of
sovereign states naturally demanded that the presbeis travel in a manner which would
command the respect of the states visited”54, there were perhaps features unique to
triremes that persuaded the Athenians to maintain their dignity with this particular
type of ship.
In looking for justifications for the use of triremes in diplomatic missions, therefore, we
must look more generally at what advantages the ships offered. Firstly, triremes were
extremely fast. In both tactical and strategic terms, the speed of a trireme was remarkable by the standards of the time. Additionally, and unlike sail driven merchant vessels,
its voyaging speed was not wholly dependant on the wind55. If a diplomatic mission was
especially urgent and a speedy resolution was required, despatching the ambassadors
aboard triremes made some sense. A 4th-century ship captain boasts how, because his
ship was the fastest, it was chosen to carry envoys back to Athens56.
One occasion where the speed of a trireme was essential to the success of the mission
occurred in 427 B.C. After quashing the rebellious state of Mytilene (a city on the island of Lesbos), the Athenians debated how to deal with the defeated populace. At first
they resolved to slaughter the whole male population and enslave the women; to wipe
Mytilene off the map, in other words. The resolution was passed and a trireme duly
despatched to relay these orders to the Athenian forces at Mytilene. However, the very
next day, perhaps following pleading from the Mytilenean ambassadors present in Athens at the time, the Athenians relented, and after another assembly meeting, decided to
kill only the ringleaders of the rebellion, and to impose less drastic penalties on the rest
of the city. Thucydides describes the voyage vividly.
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Samuel Potts
They immediately sent off another trireme in great haste, lest they find the city destroyed because the first had already arrived; it was about a day and a night ahead. With the Mytilenean
envoys providing wine and barley for the ship and making great promises of rewards if they arrived in time, the degree of zeal was so high during the voyage that they ate barley kneaded with
wine and oil as they rowed, and while some rowed others slept in turns, and since by luck there
was no opposing wind… the ship following landed and prevented the killings57.
Clearly, time was of the essence in this situation, and the second trireme was able to
stop the massacre of Mytilene being carried out. The first trireme, despatched with the
order to massacre the population of Mytilene, no doubt came from Mytilene in the first
place, from the general there asking for instructions, and possibly carrying along with it
the Mytilenean diplomats. The Athenians’ decision to send the second message on such
a ship was because there existed no faster way of getting the message across.
If speed was the cardinal virtue of the trireme, it was not only the rapid movement of
important messages that made it so. Triremes were incredible machines, awe inspiring
and impressive. The visual impact of a trireme and its speed was remarked upon in the
ancient sources.
And why is a trireme which is crammed with men a frightening spectacle for enemies and a
pleasant sight to allies? Is it not because it sails quickly?...Is it not because the crew sit on the
benches in order, moving their bodies forward and backward in order?58
Many trireme captains indeed dipped into their own pockets in order to insure not only
that their ship was well-crewed, but also that it looked the part. A 4th-century trireme
captain, who conveyed many diplomatic missions during his term of service, describes
his own efforts in this area:
I was the first (after the call to arms in 362 B.C.) to man my ship, hiring the best sailors possible
and giving to each man large bonuses and advance payments. More than that, I furnished the
ship with equipment all my own, taking nothing from the public stores, and I made everything
as beautiful and magnificent as possible, outdoing all the other captains59.
The visual effect of a trireme, and the ambivalent feelings of hope and fear it could instil
in those with whom Athens wished to negotiate, could have been a reason for their
regular employment to convey diplomatic missions.
The sight of an Athenian trireme would have several interlocking effects on the viewer,
alongside the impressiveness described by Xenophon. Most importantly, they were a
very direct and visible symbol, almost an embodiment, of Athenian power. An Athenian character in a comic play could identify himself as coming from “the land of the
fine triremes”60, so close was the association between Athens and these vessels. In 428
B.C. when the inhabitants of Chios, an island friendly to Athens, saw a fleet of triremes
near their island, they automatically assumed that they must be Athenian.
For when this Spartan fleet was sighted the people (of Chios) made no effort to flee; instead
they came to meet the ships, under the impression that they must be Athenian, since they
never imagined that, with Athens in control of the sea, a Peloponnesian fleet could come
across to Ionia61.
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The fact that they were wrong in this instance is not so important as the fact that they
made the assumption in the first place. Clearly the inhabitants of Chios believed it
would not be possible for any other state to have warships such as triremes in the Eastern Aegean. Their idea of Athenian sea power was such that they believed it impossible
for anyone but the Athenians to sail. This idea was (as events in this instance proved)
divorced from reality to a very great degree.
From our modern perspective, it is easy to see the limitations of sea power in the age of
the oared galley; it was literally impossible for the Athenians, or any other ancient state
for that matter, to have such dominance over the sea as to prevent any others from sailing it62. There are many reasons why the dominance of the sea, such as that claimed by
the British Royal Navy in the 18th and early 19th centuries, could not be foreshadowed
in the classical period. The reasons are largely logistical. Triremes had to be brought
up to land regularly to dry out, and the crews had to be landed nightly for sleep. A
trireme could not carry more than a couple of days’ worth of the food and water its 200
man crew needed63, and thus fleets and individual ships were required to keep close
to friendly bases for replenishment of supplies. As well as this, as we have seen, the
resources required to keep a large naval force in permanent station were huge; it was
beyond even the wealth of Athens to maintain permanent local superiority of ships in
every region of the Aegean. In any case, oared galleys could not impose total blockades
of harbours and force other navies into port; the Athenians did in fact, on several occasions, attempt the close blockade of a city or port; on such occasions, ships were nevertheless able to slip out of the cordon. If there ever was an age where total dominance of
the sea was possible, it certainly was not in this one.
Yet the Chians seem to have believed the Athenians capable of complete and total
dominance of the sea. Nor were they alone in their delusion; a writer known as the Old
Oligarch, a fierce critic of democracy, explains to his readers how the Athenians could
and did rule the Aegean through sea power;
The large states can be ruled by fear and the smaller ones by sheer necessity. For no city can
do without imports, but it will not be permitted to trade unless it submits to the rulers of the
sea64.
How was it that these distorted perceptions came about? Part of the answer brings us
back to our discussion of Athenian diplomatic missions, and the presentation of power.
The Chians could believe that only Athens could sail warships in the Aegean because
they regularly saw Athenian warships in the Aegean. Bringing ambassadors to their negotiations in such vessels created the impression that where this one ship could sail 100
more could come, and persuading everyone of Athens’ inevitable rule of the waves. The
Athenians were probably more aware than others of both the power and the logistical
limitations of their navy, and thus were no doubt keen to present an image of greater
power and control than in fact they possessed.
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Samuel Potts
Conclusion
The policy of the Athenians, to try and look more powerful than they actually were,
was not restricted to the field of international diplomacy. As we saw at the start of this
chapter, there were other ways in which the Athenians presented their power and made
it look “twice what it is”. Despite the ravages of time, war and more recently pollution, it
is hard to look upon the Parthenon and not think that Thucydides was probably right.
The temple building projects undertaken under the auspices of Pericles, the other grand
public buildings in the Piraeus and the city, and the performances and processions of
the Great Dionysia all conspired to produce a public image of an invincible Athens.
Athenian imperial policy depended heavily on display; the increasingly severe political
and economic restrictions which were passed in Athens, such as the Standards Decree,
were then displayed prominently in stone throughout the Empire. Perhaps there was
something similar going on with the Athenian navy; by using her triremes to convey
diplomats, Athenians sought to demonstrate the extent of their power, power that they
did not in fact possess. The expense of triremes as vessels would only reinforce this message. Even a single such ship was beyond the capabilities of many Aegean communities
to support for any length of time, but the Athenians, from their extensive permanent
fleet, could man one merely to send diplomats to negotiations. Until the late 4th century, triremes were the cutting edge of technology and a statement of power and prestige
in themselves. In the context of persuading her allies and enemies that her power was
greater than it was, therefore, the expense in using such vessel for the job of conveying
ambassadors could well have seemed a good investment.
Notes
I would like to express my gratitude to the members of Thematic Work Group 1, James Amelang in particular, for their constructive criticism and suggestions for improvement. In addition, I would like to thank
Nick Fisher, Louis Rawlings and Sterenn Girard-Suard, all of whom read several early drafts of this chapter
and saved me from many errors in the process. Any that remain are entirely my own.
1
The Athenians themselves tended to refer to this alliance as “the Athenians and their allies”, and occasionally (and perhaps more accurately) “the Athenians and their subjects”.
2
Another modern phrase, but one with more support in the ancient material; the Greek word for empire, arche, was used in relation to Athens’ allies.
3
Thucydides, 1.96; 1.99.
4
Thucydides, 1.97-6; In speeches made in the course of Thucydides’ narrative, both Pericles and Kleon,
prominent Athenian statesman at the time of the Peloponnesian war, liken Athens’ rule over her ‘allies’
as a tyranny.
5
This chapter will include discussion and examples of English historiography only.
6
E. Kuels, Archaeology and the Classics, in P. Culham - L. Edmunds (eds.), Classics: a discipline and profession in crisis?, Lanham 1989, p. 226
7
M. McGregor, The Athenians and Their Empire, Vancouver 1987, p. 176.
8
R. Meiggs, The Athenian Empire, Oxford 1972, pp. 42-9; pp. 152 ff.
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157
Whether or not this cessation of hostilities was confirmed by an official treaty is one of the many insoluble debates of this period. The so-called Peace of Callias of c. 451 B.C. and its terms are well attested
in the 4th century sources, but doubted on two principal grounds; firstly that a 4th century writer
dismisses the treaty as a forgery, and secondly that Thucydides, our best narrative source for the 5th
century, fails to mention it.
10
Thucydides (1.89-117) gives a brief and selective narrative of the 50 or so years between the invasion of
Greece by Persia and the outbreak of war between Athens and Sparta.
11
Chambers’ Foreword in H. Mattingly, The Athenian Empire Restored, Michegan 1996.
12
Developments in the field of epigraphy, which will be discussed in the next section, have strengthened
many of Mattingly’s arguments, but most scholars are still reluctant to accept this central thesis.
13
At least from 462 B.C. onwards, when the reforms of Ephialtes stripped the last of the aristocratic
Council of the Areopagus’ powers and bestowed them on the Assembly.
14
The Athenians employed the name of the Archon to name the year; for example, Thucydides (2.2) dates
the start of the Peloponnesian war to “the last two months of Pythodorus’ archonship at Athens”. Decrees often recorded the Archon in office when they were passed, as well as the names of other officials
and secretaries, and also the name of the man who made the proposals.
15
This argument was made in H. Mattingly, The Athenian Coinage Decree, “Historia”, 10, 1961.
16
Aristophanes, Clouds, ll. 247-9.
17
This was not an uncommon feature of Athenian decrees, and often it was the allied cities themselves
who had to meet the expenses the inscription. The text of the Standards Decree itself is restored from
partially complete inscriptions from several different places in the Aegean.
18
Thucydides, 1.10.
19
Thucydides, 1.1.
20
S. Goldhill, The Great Dionysia and Civic Ideology, “Journal of Hellenic Studies”, 107, 1987, p. 61. Goldhill
is here talking only of the annual Great Dionysia festival, but these comments could equally be applied to
the Periclean building project and the other public works that will be discussed in first half of this chapter.
21
A. Powell, Athens’ pretty face: anti-feminine rhetoric and fifth-century controversy over the Parthenon, in
A. Powell (ed.), The Greek World, 1995, pp. 250-1. The word alazon comes from Plutarch’s biography
of Pericles, probably written in the late first century AD.
22
Powell, Athens’ pretty face cit., p. 257.
23
Powell, Athens’ pretty face cit., p. 254.
24
At a lower level, the citizens who participated in the choruses also competed with one another.
25
The comic playwright Aristophanes (Acharnians 496 ff.) alludes to his comparative freedom of speech
in another great festival, the Lenaian, as the audience there contains no foreign visitors.
26
The orator Isocrates (Peace, 82) describes this process in detail.
27
Goldhill, The Great Dionysia and civic ideology cit., p. 61.
28
Aristophanes, Acharnians, ll. 641 ff.
29
Goldhill, The Great Dionysia and civic ideology cit., p. 66.
30
Powell, Athens’ pretty face cit., p. 257. Albeit a futile one, given his view that it was constructed in part
to celebrate a peace with Sparta that was short-lived; he goes on to suggest that, because of this, Pericles
was rather embarrassed by the project, and it is for this reason that his eulogizing speech praising Athens and the Athenians on the eve of war in 431 B.C. makes no mention of it.
31
[Xenophon], 1.16 ff.
32
F. Adcock - D. Mosley, Diplomacy in Ancient Greece, Thames and Hudson, 1975, p. 152. We will explore
some means of non-oral communication in a subsequent section.
9
Premodern Diplomatic Practices
158
Samuel Potts
A third and more general term, angelos (messenger) was also common. It could denote anyone bringing
a message regardless of status. In diplomatic terms it is used, rather disparagingly, to describe envoys
from non-Greek states; official Greek envoys are universally called presbeis.
34
Thucydides, 2.1
35
Herodotus (7.133-4) records that the Spartans received a herald from Persia demanding they submit
to the Great King Darius and symbolize this by giving water and soil. In response, the Spartans threw
the herald down a well to his death. Herodotus then details the divine retribution inflicted upon Sparta
over the following years due to this impious act.
36
Mosely, Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece, “Historia Einzelschriften”, 1973, p. 88
37
Most officials were appointed by lot; a random selection from all who volunteered. The lot was considered by the ancient Greeks to be democratic, and popular elections oligarchic; the reason being that an
election favoured the better, richer, nobler or more outstanding people, to the exclusion of the rest.
38
Adcock - Mosley, Diplomacy in Ancient Greece cit., pp. 153-4
39
Adcock - Mosley, Diplomacy in Ancient Greece cit., p. 156
40
Quarry men and builders working on a temple at the end of the 5th century, for example, received
exactly this level of remuneration.
41
D. Hamel, Athenian Generals: Military authority in the classical period, “Mnemosyne” 1998, p. 40.
42
Thucydides, 2.70. Hamel, Athenian Generals cit., p.43
43
An example of this will be discussed below, in the reference to the capture of Mytilene in 427 B.C.
44
Mosley and Adcock, Diplomacy in Ancient Greece, p. 160
45
Plutarch, Kimon, 14.
46
This is not to say that all proxenoi has the same privileges and honours; different packages of honours
were given to different individuals based on their status and the services given and expected.
47
In the technical sense; he was expelled from Athens for 10 years.
48
Adcock - Mosley, Diplomacy in Ancient Greece cit., p. 152.
49
Thucydides, 5.89
50
Herodotus, 8.111-2
51
IG i3 1453. In this decree, the Assembly orders the generals to ensure that the envoys to the allies are
despatched aboard a trireme. The fact that it is specifically spelt out as part of the decree (as opposed to
there being a ‘standard procedure’ for the despatch of envoys) is interesting. It shows firstly that triremes
were not inevitably used in such cases and alternatives could perhaps be conceived, and yet on this occasion and on many others, the trireme option was chosen.
52
Mosley (Envoys and Diplomacy cit. pp. 75-6) lists some examples of such ships being assigned specifically for diplomatic duties.
53
Admittedly, the source of this figure is a comic play (Aristophanes, Wasps, ll. 655-718), but it is probably a reasonable approximation. In any case, if there was satirical exaggeration in this passage, the joke
would be served best by inflating Athens’ actual revenue. If Athens had less than 2,000 talents to spend,
it would only reinforce the points being made here.
54
W. Westermann, Notes upon the Ephodia of Greek ambassadors, “Classical Philology”, 5, 1910, p. 204.
55
Triremes themselves had masts and sails, and so could harness the elements if they were favourable; if
not, the oars could be employed.
56
[Demosthenes], 50.12. This speech, though universally acknowledged as the work of Apollodorus, is
usually referred to under the rubric [Demosthenes] 50, as it owes its survival in manuscripts to its inclusion in the Demosthenic corpus.
57
Thucydides, 3.49
33
Power Made Public
58
159
Xenophon, Economics, 8.8
[Demosthenes] 50.7. There is evidence that trireme captains in the 5th century also sought to beautify
their vessels, for example in Thucydides’ description of the preparations for the invasion of Sicily in 415
B.C.
59
60
Aristophanes, Birds, l. 108.
Thucydides, 3.32.
61
This thesis is put forward by C. Starr in The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History, Oxford 1989.
62
It is worth noting, for comparative purposes, that the number of crew required in a trireme was almost
identical to that required by a British Royal Navy frigate of the early 19th century. Such frigates were far
larger vessels, and could stand out at sea for extended periods of time without retiring to port. Indeed,
they had the logistical and technical capability of sailing round the globe, and could carry food supplies
adequate for such a journey on board. No ancient ship had such capability.
63
[Xenophon], 2.3. My emphasis.
64
Bibliography
Adcock F. - Mosley D., Diplomacy in Ancient Greece, London 1975.
Amit M., Athens and the sea: a study in Athenian sea-power, Bruxelles 1965.
Badian E., From Plataea to Potidaea: studies in the history and historiography of the Pentecontaetia, London
1993.
Beard M., Parthenon, London 2002.
Casson L., Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World, Princeton 1971.
Gabrielsen V., Financing the Athenian fleet: public taxation and social relations, London 1994.
Goldhill S., The Great Dionysia and Civic Ideology, “Journal of Hellenic Studies”, 107, 1987, pp. 58-76.
Hamel D., Athenian Generals: Military authority in the classical period, “Mnemosyne” 1998.
Hornblower S., The Greek World, 479-323 B.C., third edition, London 2002; org. ed. 1983.
Hurwit J., The Acropolis in the Age of Pericles, Cambridge 2004.
Jordon B., The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period: a study of Athenian naval administration and military
organization in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., Berekley 1975.
Kuels E., Archaeology and the Classics, in Culham P. - Edmunds L. (eds.), Classics: a discipline and profession in
crisis?, Lanham 1989.
Mattingly H., The Athenian Empire Restored, Michigan 1996.
McGregor M., The Athenians and Their Empire, Vancouver 1987.
Meritt B. - Mcgregor M. - Wade-Gery H., The Athenian Tribute Lists (4 vols), Princeton 1939-53.
Meiggs R., The Athenian Empire, Oxford 1972.
Morrison J.S - Coates J.F - Rankov B., The Athenian Trireme: the history and reconstruction of an ancient Greek
warship, second edition, Cambridge 2000, orig. ed. 1986.
Mosley D., Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece, “Historia Einzelschriften” 1973.
Powell A., Athens’ pretty face: anti-feminine rhetoric and fifth-century controversy over the Parthenon in Powell A
(ed.), The Greek World, London 1995, pp. 245-270.
Pritchett W.K., Thucydides’ Pentekontaetia and other essays, Amsterdam 1995.
Rhodes R., Architecture and meaning on the Athenian Acropolis, Cambridge 1995.
Starr C., The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History, Oxford 1989.
Premodern Diplomatic Practices
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Samuel Potts
Wallinga H., Ships and sea-power before the great Persian War: the ancestry of the ancient trireme, New York
1993.
Westermann W., Notes upon the Ephodia of Greek ambassadors, “Classical Philology”, 5, 1910, pp. 203-216.
For a good narrative account of the period covered in this chapter, Hornblower’s Greek World (now in its third
edition) which covers both the fourth and fifth centuries. The standard work on the Athenian’s alliance structures in the fifth century Aegean remains Meiggs’ Athenian Empire, but see also the collected articles of Harold
Mattingly, The Athenian Empire Restored, which presents many challenges to accepted views. Studies of imperial
epigraphy should begin with the seminal four-volume Athenian Tribute Lists by Merrit, Wade-Gery, McGregor.
The third volume provides a continuous narrative of the fifth century based on the epigraphic and literary sources discussed in the previous volumes, most notably the records of tribute payments made by the allies to Athens.
On the many debates surrounding the events and chronology between the Persian and the Peloponnesian wars
(the ‘Pentekontaetia’), and the Peace of Callias in particular, see Badian’s Plataea to Potidaea, whose discussions
often reach controversial and unorthodox conclusions, but give good bibliography and full references. The fullest refutation of Badian’s conclusions is given by Pritchett in Thucydides’ Pentekontaetia and other essays. Beard’s
Parthenon is a recent and accessible discussion of this building, its context and its effect on the viewer. For recent
interpretive discussion of the Periclean building projects generally, see Rhodes’ Architecture and meaning on the
Athenian Acropolis and Hurwit’s The Acropolis in the Age of Pericles. On the question of ‘thalassocracy’ in the ancient world see Starr’s Influence of Seapower and Wallinga’s Ships and Seapower. The second edition of Morrision,
Coates and Rankov’s The Athenian Trireme offers a good account of the reconstructed trireme Olympias, the sea
trials of which in the 1980’s and 1990’s solved the so-called Trireme Question. On ancient seafaring generally,
Casson’s Ships and Seamanship offers concise discussion, many pictures and references the full range of ancient
evidence. Also note Morrison and Williams’ Greek Oared Ships. On aspects of the Athenian navy in particular,
works to be recommended include Gabrielsen’s Financing of the Athenian fleet, Amit’s Athens and the Sea (though it is somewhat dated, it provides a useful introduction), and (more cautiously) Jordon’s Administration of the
Athenian Navy.