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James Tiburcio draft: Please do not quote Human Security in Angola: the role of religious non-state actors Human Security in Angola: the role of religious non-state actors1 James Tiburcio University of Brasília International Relations Institute [email protected] Religious non governmental actors in Angola are responsible for essential social services, including health care, primary education, and agricultural projects. Until the end of the Angolan civil war in 2002, most of them were primarily concerned with humanitarian relief. Since then, a relatively small but increasingly relevant share of the responsibility for minimum human security standards in the country lies within their realm of activity and influence. Such activity and influence is in its turn part of a greater virtuous cycle which may lead to national reconciliation and general well-being. Religious non-state actors, mostly local and international Christian churches, missionary agencies and missionaries, direct and indirectly engage in ‘human security perceptions exchanges, as beliefs and values on human security are transmitted and their presence spreads in urban and rural areas of Angola. How do religious nonstate actors influence the human security situation in Angola? Preliminary evidence suggests that though essential to human security in specific areas, (1) religious non-state actors inadvertently permit the perpetuation of chronic state deficiencies whenever they take upon themselves general human security responsibilities without partnership arrangements with local government agencies; thus, (2) allowing the government of Angola to indefinitely postpone investment in key areas; and predisposing (3) programs to fall short of their potential due to limited international resources and qualified local staff. As a result, (4) priorities and activities of international religious actors are conducive to improvements in human security, but, in the short and medium term, they tend to encourage harmful dependent behavior from state authorities. James Tiburcio In drafting this working paper, I am aware of some of its shortcomings. Due to a lack of literature and data dedicated specifically to the subject matter, a majority of references are at most circuitously about religious non-state actors in Angola or dealing with the importance of their role in human security issues. The very importance of religious non-state actors to human security in Angola is subject to dispute as their budgets and general presence is limited and poorly documented. Apart from actors’ identities and brief descriptions of their activities, little is readily available. “Systematic, theoretically driven, empirically based accounts” 2 of activities and impacts of non-state religious actors in Angola are practically non-existent. Information on their impact is scarce and specific indicators are yet to be developed in order to demonstrate the relevance of their presence in specific communities and how general socio-economic indicators respond to them. The literary review that follows is, nonetheless, an indispensable provisional guiding tool. The hypotheses presented are also tentative and will be further tested against new evidence collected during field research and survey. In spite of careful analysis and research, most data relating to Angola command a cautious stance as notorious difficulties in obtaining independently verified data remain a constant. Research Problem, Objectives and Methodology How do religious non-state actors influence human security in Angola? What is acceptable in government versus others in providing welfare services? How do Religion and Human Security fit into the national development visions? How can Religious Actors understand their own actual and potential role in the effort for higher standards of human security? The continued importance of nongovernmental actors in the relationship between the donor community and recipients, as well as their role in the elaboration and execution of policies that result in successful projects is generally accepted but little empirical evidence has been collected. Furthermore, recent studies reinforce the need to evaluate Human Security in Angola: the role of religious non-state actors social and material deficiencies in order to avoid the misplacement of decreasing donor resources. Hence, the present analysis endeavors to assess the influence of international religious organizations on human security in Angola. The targets of this study and its recommendations are policymakers and practitioners in Africa, governments, and religious non-state actors and their partners in the international donor community. This project is being carried out as an exploratory case study through an in-depth literature review and analysis, followed by field research focused on the participation of international religious actors, organizations and individuals in the provision of public services such as education, basic health care, development projects, agricultural projects and others which may have a direct or indirect impact on human security. At first, drawing from secondary sources such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Bank, the Human Rights Watch database, Global Witness reports, as well as mission archives, and when available, Government of Angola (GOA) documents, this study uses the analytical tools of human security literature to examine the effect of religion and religious activism in addressing low levels of human security in Angola. A second phase, pending on the availability of funds, will the constituted of interviews and field research to be conducted in Angola and in the United States with selected decision-makers and field workers over a 3 week period in December of 2008. Despite being an exploratory single case study, it is not completely limited as a basis for explanations and meaningful generalizations in what concerns the role of religious non-state actors in human security issues specifically in sub Saharan Africa.3 Human security as an approach to address today’s causes of insecurity to the individual are to be found in the institution of the International Council of the Red Cross, the Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions, as they assume the human being as their reference center4. The human security model as developed by Leaning and Arie (2000)5 is deemed appropriate as a structural framework for this case study. The model “seeks to shift the focus of international assistance to the individual, household, and community [;] [it] posits that human security at the local level is essential to create a base of stability and resilience capable of sustaining human and 3 James Tiburcio economic development over the long term.”6 Therefore, food, water, shelter and safety, “must be supplemented by the psychosocial inputs of identity, recognition, participation, and autonomy.”7 Religious actors possess the indispensable moral and ideological independence to play an increasingly relevant role in realizing basic needs as well as supplementary needs.8 Background and Context Since Angola’s pre colonial period, religious organizations have been involved in addressing general needs, not only spiritual, but also material and social. The Portuguese colonial government had little interest in improving the living conditions of the local population, and as a result, when independence was granted in the end of 1975, the settler population was a world apart in relation to the local population in terms of basic social services. In the last 33 years following independence, the national government has done the barely minimum to address these needs, mostly blaming the long civil war that ensued Portugal’s withdrawal 1975 and only came to an end in 2002.9 The Luena Memorandum of Understanding, signed on April 4th 2002, sealed the end of a 27 year civil war, with the military victory of the Government of Angola over the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), a once liberation movement turned terrorist organization.10 By the time confrontations halted, there were 3.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), 350 thousand landmine victims, over a million dead and unaccounted for damage to the country’s infrastructure and land11 and the result is a country featured near the bottom of most global socio-economic measures.12 The United States is Angola’s most important investor and producer in the country’s main economic sector, the oil industry, as Angola is the sixth largest crude oil exporter to the United States, only behind Canada, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Nigeria and Venezuela.13 Apart from being Angola’s main trading partner, the United States is also the largest bilateral donor through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)14 which in Angola works mostly through international humanitarian agencies such as Care and Catholic Relief Services.15 Angola’s present situation provides social Human Security in Angola: the role of religious non-state actors researchers a once in a generation opportunity to evaluate how international religious actors’ funding and resources are being employed to influence human security levels in the least developed countries. Angola has been going through four transition processes since 1989 concurrently: “(1) from war to peace and reconciliation; (2) from humanitarian emergency to rehabilitation, recovery and development; (3) from an authoritarian, one-party system of governance to pluralist democracy; and (4) from a command economy to an economy based on the laws of the market.” 16 None of these processes have proceeded smoothly, at times they were aborted, but there has been progress in all areas. Religious non-state actors are part of the dynamics of these processes, especially in the transition from humanitarian emergency to rehabilitation, recovery and development. In the last 6 years, since the Luena Memorandum, Angola’s economy has been characterized by record growth rates, fueled by record-breaking oil prices, leading Angola to the top 5 of the fastest growing economies in Africa. Inflation has been controlled and fiscal and external accounts surpluses have become the order of the day.17 The GOA has complete control of the country’s territory since 2002. Landmines are being cleared, roads and bridges rebuilt, thus allowing free movement of people and goods. The most important result has been the return of almost 3.7 million people to their ancestors’ homes. Previously important activities, such as subsistence agriculture and herd grazing are being revived, despite drought conditions in some provinces (cultivated land has increased only by 8%, not an irrelevant number in the case of a landmine filled country).18 In the macroeconomic sphere, the Angolan GDP grew 18.6% (in real terms) in 2006 and the World Bank estimates a staggering 23.4% for 2007 (as of March 2008) while the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects 26.8% for 2008.19 Apart from the already accounted for record oil prices, these results are also due to increased production in new deepwater oilfields, and rising diamond production. Infrastructural rehabilitation has rekindled the construction and manufacturing sectors which grew double digits in the last decade. Inflation fell to under 12% in 2007 and real interest rates remain negative. On the political side, preparations for legislative elections are underway. They will take place on September 5 and 6 2008, as announced by President José Eduardo dos Santos on 27 December 2007.20 5 James Tiburcio Table 1. Angola: Key Indicators Land area, thousands of km2: 1 247* Population, thousands (2005): 15 941* GDP per capita, $ PPP valuation (2005): 3 363* GNI per capita US$ 1,030** Life expectancy (2000-2005): 40.7* Literacy (pop. Age 15+): 33% (2006)** Arable land: 2.41%** Agricultural production (% GDP): 8%** HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate: 2.8% (2006)** Human Development Index 161 out of 177 (2006)** Population living below national poverty line 70%** Sources: (*) AfDB/OECD African Economic Outlook. 2006. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/35/36734978.pdf. Data tables available in excel format at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/344387777260 . (**) World Food Program: http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/indexcountry.asp?country=024 Despite all progress registered in the last 6 years, the country still is a poor resource-rich country - an “oil state”21 - as more than 90% of exports are from the oil industry. Oil is the key element in the Angolan government’s ability to gain access to international political, diplomatic and economic networks and channels. The GOA is completely dependent on oil and it confers an extravagant life-style to its inner circle, albeit most Angolans living conditions have deteriorated significantly in the last 10 years. According to some analysts, Angola’s situation is symptomatic for “resource curse, whereby oil and other extractive industries have actively harmed many developing countries.”22 Dependency on oil revenues does not only originate from exports, sales and royalties, but especially for the reason that Angolan oil production is committed as collateral in credit lines, which allows bankrolling general government expenditures, import financing, and until 2002, finance an over sized military budget. Human Security in Angola: the role of religious non-state actors Oil revenues allow the presidency to elude the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s recurrent recommendations for renegotiations of its external debt. In this manner, the GOA is able to postpone any structural adjustment programs with its required transparency requirements. So far, all pressures for the government to open its books to an external audit of oil revenues, debt and debt repayment have fallen short of any real results. Such opening would shed some light on the complex, and oftentimes suspicious, arrangements among the government, Sonangol (the state owned oil company) and international stakeholders.23 The Angolan regime oftentimes neglects a number of social services that are normally entrusted to the state in order to benefit a small elite and foreign companies and governments that are more interested in the safety of their investments in the country.24 Backed by oil and diamonds, the Angolan government has enough leverage to withstand demands for change from donors such as the United States and the European Union and at the same time receive a great amount of support from non-liberal rising superpowers as China and Russia, and historical allies such as Brazil.25 Table 2. Real GDP Growth and Per Capita ($ PPP at current prices) Angola - Real GDP growth (%): blue line; Africa - Per capita GDP ($ PPP): light blue bar; Angola Per capita GDP ($ PPP): green bar; Source: AfDB/OECD African Economic Outlook. 2006. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/35/36734978.pdf. Data tables available in excel format at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/344387777260 7 James Tiburcio Human Security in Africa International and national universal normative bases of human security are loosely established in the laws which provide for human rights protection and humanitarian and refugee laws.26 The concept of human security has been adapted to contemporary Africa, at least in theory, in an all-inclusive approach by the members of the African Union Organization (AU), as found in the, “Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defense and Security Policy”, which states: “The causes of intra-state conflict necessitate a new emphasis on human security, based not only on political values but on social and economic imperatives as well. This newer, multidimensional notion of security thus embraces such issues as human rights; the right to participate fully in the process of governance; the right to equal development as well as the right to have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; the right to protection against poverty; the right to conducive education and health conditions; the right to protection against marginalization on the basis of gender; protection against natural disasters, as well as ecological and environmental degradation. At the national level, the aim would be to safeguard the security of individuals, families, communities, and the state/national life, in the economic, political and social dimensions. This applies at the various regional levels also; and at the continental level, the principle would be underscored that the “security of each African country is inseparably linked to that of other African countries and the African continent as a whole.” 27 Manifestly, African leaders and governments are aware that “human security - protecting and empowering people, at the individual and community levels – is essential to national and international security.”28 But, in spite of a handful of commendable initiatives,29 their track record since independence has generally been poor. As a result, African civil society and non-governmental international organizations must take upon themselves an ever more crucial responsibility in order to bring about higher living standards, democratization, development and general welfare. Such involvement is directed to the following main concerns: (i) “[S]trengthening mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution; (ii) [P]romoting and protecting democracy and human rights; (iii) [E]xtending education and healthcare; (iv) [P]romoting the role of women in social and economic development; Human Security in Angola: the role of religious non-state actors (v) [B]uilding state capacity to maintain law and order; and infrastructure and agricultural programs.”30 Findings Catholic, protestant and evangelical missionary agencies, especially from the United States, Canada, Switzerland, Portugal, Italy and Brazil (among a number of other nationalities) are presently working in Angola, some of them for over a hundred years, focusing in medical care, agricultural development, and relief work.31 As the Portuguese colonial government before, the present government in power since 1975 has regarded religious organizations as service providers to the state.32 Table 3. Health Service Indicators Indicator Measure Doctors in the public sector Doctors per 100,000 inhabitants Access to drugs % of the population with access to essential drug Source MOH WHOSIS WHO Angola Year 2000a 1997 Data 5 7.7 2001 1996 2001b 20 24 2001b Vaccination coverage for % of children 12-23 months vaccinated DPT (3rd dosage) MICS Vaccination coverage for % of children 12-23 months vaccinated polio MICS 1996 2001b Deliveries in health facilities % of deliveries attended by trained health personnel MICS Pre-natal consultations % of pregnant women who attend one or more pre-natal consultations MICS Contraceptive use % of women of reproductiv age who use any method of contraception MICS MSH Sub-Saharan Africa Source Year Data HDR 1991 32 WHOSIS 1995-2003 16 SOWCc 1999 46 28 63 SOWCc 1999 48 1996 2001b 1996 2001b 22 45 64 66 SOWCc 1995 - 2000 39 SOWCc 1995 - 2000 64 1996 2001b 2002 8 6 17 SOWCc 1995 - 2000 22 Notes: WHOSIS = World Health Organization Statistical Information System, HDR = Human Development Report (U.N. Development Program), MICS = Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, SOWC = State of the World’s Children (UNICEF), MSH = Management Sciences for Health a) Estimate based only on doctors in the National Health Service, as published in Anuário Estatístico do MINSA (MOH 2000). b) MICS 2001 (MOP 2003) only covered areas accessible during the war. c) UNICEF (2002). d) Survey (MSH and Consaúde, 2002) covered only three municipalities in Luanda province. 9 James Tiburcio Source: adapted from Vinyals, 2002 in Connor, Catherine, Yogesh Rajkotia, Ya-Shin Lin, and Paula Figueiredo. October 2005. Angola Health System Assessment. Bethesda, MD: The Partners for Health Reformplus Project, Abt Associates Inc, p. 19. The role of non governmental religious actors in Angola to the GOA is not restricted by their relative small size and territorial reach. Donors through grassroots organizations offer an option to circumvent the corrupt and inept state machine.33 In that way, most religious NGOs avoid partnerships with the ministries of the Angolan government, although there are reports attesting to some NGOs willingness to partner with the Ministry of Health with disproportionate expectations about the Ministry’s capacity to do its part.34 Religious non-state actors have mentioned the inefficiency and corruption of local government agencies in order to run completely independent projects in Angola, avoiding any partnership with government agencies and authorities.35 Indeed, due to a lack of commitment by local authorities, much aid sent out does not reach their intended beneficiaries. Along the way, a part ends up in the informal local markets (praças), while another goes to officials’ storerooms, and still another never leaves their port of entrance, deteriorating in containers due to bureaucracy, inefficiency and transport problems.36 Bypassing government has made service and aid delivery faster and more reliable. The downside is that by the demoralization of local authorities, the whole public organism, be it in health or education services, suffers. One symptom is the brain drain to the private and third sector.37 External funding of the health sector in Angola, 8%, is below subSaharan Africa (SSA)’s average of 20%, nonetheless, it still is relevant.38 International civil society organizations are, as long as they accept the central government’s rules, an element in the presidential office’s plan to deliver basic services to the poorest sections of the Angolan population.39 While a considerable part of the Angolan civil society has been co-opted by the state, becoming part of the patrimonial system, “in which the patron-client logic so prevalent in Africa and elsewhere is given enormous extra power and reach by the state’s possession of natural resources”,40 most religious actors remain the only autonomous entities that have not been contaminated. Human Security in Angola: the role of religious non-state actors Churches are a reliable link between NGOs and the poorest communities in the provision of basic social services such as aid distribution, health care and education41 despite the fact that the budgets of religious non-state agencies and donors are minute compared to revenues amassed yearly by the country’s innumerous oil barrels and diamond gems in a myriad of official and unofficial transactions. Churches of most denominations enjoy substantial goodwill from parts of the government and from communities in general. Most see in them an opportunity for greater transparency and more poor-oriented development policies. But, the GOA still perceives non-state actors as service providers, and not as partners in policy-making. As such, religious and non-religious NGOs continue to work as essential subcontractors, and in some areas, they almost completely replace state services in the health and education sectors.42 Several other deficiencies have been identified in state practices and structure, among them, a shortage of human and institutional capabilities and management skills, and inadequate financing of basic public health inputs for service delivery, such as supplies, drugs, equipment, electricity and potable water.43 The governmental policy towards land reform has also been a source of decline in living conditions in rural areas, chronic dependence on cereal imports and fresh vegetables supply shortages in urban centers. There is still a long way to go for Angola to reach a secure, minimum food supply production or even achieve its pre-independence levels of production, although, presently, agricultural production is steadily rising; however considering that 70% of the population remains under the poverty line, exceedingly vulnerable to malnutrition and unable to break free from a cycle of poverty, the government surely could do more to alleviate the worst off communities’ lot.44 Aggravating the situation, commercial farms that once belonged to Portuguese settlers and had been nationalized following independence (led by the then Marxist-oriented MPLA - Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, in power since 1975), beginning in the late 1980s, as part of the economic transition, those same farms were privatized. In practice, former state farms were handed to the ruling elite, further limiting the means of existence to a large number of impoverished small peasants and pastoralists, “who had been occupying and tilling much of the land of the former state farms on an ad hoc 11 James Tiburcio basis, without land titles, since the mid-1980s”.45 There are no signs of change in land reform policy, increasing social pressure on Angola’s agricultural sector, already dependent on external food imports. Most religious (and non-religious) grassroots organizations are dependent on external funding and some are funded by the same donor agencies, and often end up competing with each other to obtain the same grants.46 Due to intra-NGO competition for funding and projects47 as well as a need to obtain or maintain public exposure in order to attract donations and sponsors, most NGOs, including religious ones, offer their services to the Angolan government without pre-conditions, or an analysis of how the corresponding ministry would be able to cooperate and how the nongovernmental sector would complement the government’s efforts instead of substituting it.48 In this manner, religious non-state actors tend to perpetuate chronic state deficiencies when they take upon themselves general human security responsibilities without any partnership arrangements with the local government agencies. Increasingly, key donors and organizations feel that the Angolan Government should invest more of its own revenues in its own people, especially in social services. Such situation has led to continued restrictions on international resources available to organizations such as the World Food Program.49 Such circumstances have allowed the Angolan state not to satisfactorily fulfill its role as the main provider of basic social services, “due to a de-linkage of the state from the Angolan society”.50 Taking advantage of the altruism of religious and non-religious initiatives, government agencies indefinitely postpone investment in key areas. During the civil war (1975 – 2002), the GOA lacked complete control of the national territory and exhibited three inter-related and interdependent features with direct bearing on human security: I. “A de-linkage of the Angolan political elite (itself fragmented) from Angolan society; II. “An erosion of the Angolan state’s performance in delivering services to the people, including providing security for the people, and in consequence”; III. A loss of political legitimacy of the government.”51 Human Security in Angola: the role of religious non-state actors Such loss of legitimacy has been accompanied by an increasing privatization of the Angolan state, and although some analysts see the “public−private partnerships in health“, as a strength,52 the privatization process initiated in the last decade of the 20th century has in many stances been detrimental to public health as a whole. The deregulation and privatization 53 of state health responsibilities has transferred considerable capabilities to private clinics, which are inaccessible to the bulk of the Angolan population.54 Recommendations and Conclusions Perceptions of what should be the main priorities and activities of religious organizations in order to achieve minimum human security standards in Angola differ considerably between donors and local NGOs. According to a 2005 USAID survey of focus groups of international donor and NGO participants, and focus groups of Angolan counterparts, Angolans were more concerned with end results and service delivery, while the international community represented by religious and non-religious NGOs, concentrated on strategic objectives and how to accomplish them. Angolans’ top priorities were “Income redistribution and poverty alleviation”. On the other hand, international NGOs were more concerned with combating corruption and increasing transparency.55 Religious civil society in Angola needs to mature from a compliant service delivery tool to an actual pivotal basis for social change. On the other hand, a parallel basic services infra-structure may cause further atrophy of an already thinly spread government administration. Therefore, engagement with the government as a partner is highly advisable although practical difficulties remain pervasive. Religious NGOs should consider the enduring consequences of their decisions despite their short term needs on the ground. Unless the government openly opposes such partnerships, genuine attempts need to be evaluated before any decisions to avoid them all together are made. 56 13 James Tiburcio There is an underlying conflict of interest in the ‘human security perceptions exchange’ dynamics in Angola. Donors and grassroots organizations tend to paradoxically regard the strengthening of government ministries and agencies as unconstructive, since greater government control and political will may represent less political freedom, free market initiatives and general and organized civil society participation. However, different approaches are demanded, considering that state frailty can be traced as the main independent variable in some of Angola’s worst social disasters since independence.57 1 This is a draft working paper, comments are welcome. 2 Bratton, Michael, and Nicolas van de Walle. Democratic Experiments in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. xiv. 3 Yin, Robert K. Estudo de Caso: Planejamento e Métodos. Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2005, p. 22. 4 Bruderlein, Claude. The Role of Non-State Actors in Building Human Security: The Case of Armed Groups in Intra-States Wars. Geneva: Human Security Network, 2000. 5 Leaning, Jennifer, and Sam Arie. Human Security: A Framework for Assessment in Conflict and Transition. Washington: CERTI/USAID, 2000. 6 Stites, Elisabeth and Jennifer Leaning. Human Security in Angola: A retrospective study. A Report for CERTI/USAID, Washington: Harvard School of Public Health, 2002. 7 Ibid., p. 3. 8 Vines, Alex, Nicholas Shaxson, Lisa Rimli, e Chris Heymans. Angola: Drivers of Change: Economic Change and Reform. Position paper 1, London: Chatham House, 2005, p. 10. 9 van der Borght, Erwin. The Humanitarian Situation in Angola. Briefing, Geneva: Medicins sans Frontieres, 2002. 10 “SADC Leaders Declare Unita Terrorist Group”. TOMRIC News Agency January 16, 2002. Clover, Jenny. “Land reform in Angola: Establishing the ground rules.” In: Land rights, conflict and peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, por Chris Huggins e Jenny Clover. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies & African Center for Technology Studies, 2005, 347 – 381. 11 12 UNDP. Human Development Report 2007/2008. Fighting climate change: Human solidarity in a divided world. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 13 Administration, Energy Information. Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government. 28 de March de 2008. http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/company_level_imports/current/import.html (acesso em 31 de March de 2008). 14 USAID, United States Agency for International Development -. USAID. 2002. http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2002/afr/ao (acesso em 31 de March de 2002). Human Security in Angola: the role of religious non-state actors 15 Ostheimer, Andrea. "Aid agencies: providers of essential resources?" In Angola's war economy: The role of oil and diamonds, by Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (eds.), 115 - 140. Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2000, p. 1. 16 Hodges, T. (2004). Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, p. 199. 17 Vines, Alex and Indira Campos (2007). Angola and China a pragmatic partnership. Working Paper Presented at a CSIS Conference, “Prospects for Improving U.S.-China-Africa Cooperation,” December 5, 2007. Chatham House, London, p. 3. 18 World Bank. Angola: Country Brief. 2008. World Bank. Available at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/ANGOLAEXTN/0,,menuPK:32250 0~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:322490,00.html. Accessed: Abril 11, 2008. 19 International Monetary Fund (IMF). Angola: 2007 Article IV Consultation Staff Report, IMF Country Report No. 07/354 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, October 2007). Cited in Vines et al (2007), op. cit. p. 3, footnote. BBC News. “Angolan leader sets election date”. Friday, 28 December 2007, 14:12 GMT. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7163001.stm. Accessed on Abril 18, 2008. 20 21 Hodges, T. (2004). 22 Vines et al. 2005, op. cit. p. 3. 23 Human Rights Watch, Report. "Some Transparency, No Accountability: The Use of Oil Revenue in Angola and its Impact on Human Rights." Volume 16, No. 1. Geneva: Human Rights Watch, January 2004. Reno, William. “The real (war) economy of Angola.” In: Angola's war economy, por Jakkie Cilliers e Christian Dietrich. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2000, pp. 220-235. 24 25 Ibid., p. 39 26 Cilliers, J. (2004). Human Security in Africa: A conceptual framework for review. Nairobi: African Human Security Initiative, pp. 7-8. 27 African Union. (February 28, 2004). News Events. Second Extraordinary Session, Heads of State and Government of Member States of the African Union Meeting., Sirte, Great Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Acesso em 08 de April de 2008, disponível em African Union Homepage: http://www.africaunion.org/News_Events/2ND%20ASSEMBLY/Declaration%20on%Comm.Af%DEf%20Sec.pdf 28 United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa. (2005). Human Security in Africa. New York: OSAA, p. 2. “Luanda. The representative of the World Health Organisation (WHO) in Angola, Diosdado Nsue Milang Friday here highlighted the Angolan government's engagement in offering the population a greater health assistance. Speaking to the press at the end of an audience granted to him by the Angolan Foreign Affairs minister, João Bernardo de Miranda, the WHO official referred that there are some challenges for implementation this intention, something that is proper for countries in a situation of post-armed conflict, but authorities are working to overcome these hindrances. "I was received with great satisfaction by the Foreign Affairs minister, who briefed me on the country's general situation, mainly concerning the health sector", affirmed the WHO official who was appointed to the post last February and took office on the 11th of the same month. Diosdado Nsue Milang referred that the Angolan health system is developing and that the government is ready to collaborate with the WHO in order to obtain more improvements.” Angola Press, A. (March 7, 2008). Allafrica.com Stories. Acesso em 7 de April de 2008, disponível em Allafrica: http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200803070919.html 29 30 African Peer Review Mechanism Organisation and Process, 9 March 2003, para. 3 ibid, art. 49. Cit in Cilliers, 2004, pp. 5-6. 31 Birminghan, David. “Merchants and Missionaries in Angola.” Lusotopie, 1998: 12. 32 Ostheimer, Andrea. "Aid agencies: providers of essential resources?" In Angola's war economy: The role of oil and diamonds, by Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (eds.), 115 - 140. Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2000. 15 James Tiburcio 33 Vines, et al. (2005), p. 37 – 48. 34 Pavignani, Enrico, e Alessandro Colombo (2001), op. cit., p. 29. 35 Vines, et al. (2005), op. cit. 36 McMillan, John. ""The Main Institution in the Country Is Corruption": Transparency in Angola." Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law - Stanford Institute on International Studies, February 7, 2005. 37 Vines, et al. (2005), p. 37 38 Ibid, p. 32 39 Vines, et al. (2005), p. 37 40 Vines, et al. (2005), p. viii. 41 International Fund for Agricultural Development - IFAD, Angola: A review of gender issues in support of IFAD's COSOP formulation process and Field Diagnostic Study. Report, IFAD, 2002. 42 Ibid., pp. 5 – 30 43 Connor, Catherine, Yogesh Rajkotia, Ya-Shin Lin, and Paula Figueiredo. October 2005. Angola Health System Assessment. Bethesda, MD: The Partners for Health Reformplus Project, Abt Associates Inc. 44 World Food Program, Country Brief, 2008. Available at: http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/indexcountry.asp?country=024. Accessed on Abril 19, 2008. 45 Hodges, T. (2004), pp. 135 – 137. Clover (2005). 46 Frandsen, Grey. A Guide to NGOs: A primer about private, voluntary, non-governmental organizations that operate in humanitarian emergencies globally. Washinton, DC: United States Department of Defense. Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine, 2002, p. 42. 47 Cooley, Alexander, and James Ron. "The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action." International Security, Volume 27, Number 1, 2002: 5 - 39. 48 Ostheimer (2000), op. cit., p. 122. 49 World Food Program, Country Brief, 2008, op. cit. 50 Ostheimer (2000), op. cit., p. 118. 51 Ibid., p. 119. 52 Connor, Rajkotia and Figueredo (2005), op. cit., p. 5. 53 Pavignani, Enrico, and Alessandro Colombo. Providing health services in countries disrupted by civil wars: A comparative analysis of Mozambique and Angola, 1975-2000. New York: World Health Organization, 2001. 54 Stites, Elisabeth and Jennifer Leaning (2002), op. cit., p. 18. 55 Stakeholder Focus Group Report, USAID (with BP, ChevronTexaco and Esso), May 4, 2005. Vines, et al. (2005), p. 30 56 Pavignani, Enrico, e Alessandro Colombo (2001), op. cit., p. 29 57 Vines, et al. (2005), Overview, p. 4.