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James Tiburcio
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Human Security in Angola: the role of religious non-state actors
Human Security in Angola: the role of religious non-state actors1
James Tiburcio
University of Brasília
International Relations Institute
[email protected]
Religious non governmental actors in Angola are responsible for
essential social services, including health care, primary education, and
agricultural projects. Until the end of the Angolan civil war in 2002, most of them
were primarily concerned with humanitarian relief. Since then, a relatively small
but increasingly relevant share of the responsibility for minimum human security
standards in the country lies within their realm of activity and influence. Such
activity and influence is in its turn part of a greater virtuous cycle which may
lead to national reconciliation and general well-being. Religious non-state
actors, mostly local and international Christian churches, missionary agencies
and missionaries, direct and indirectly engage in ‘human security perceptions
exchanges, as beliefs and values on human security are transmitted and their
presence spreads in urban and rural areas of Angola. How do religious nonstate actors influence the human security situation in Angola? Preliminary
evidence suggests that though essential to human security in specific areas, (1)
religious non-state actors inadvertently permit the perpetuation of chronic state
deficiencies whenever they take upon themselves general human security
responsibilities without partnership arrangements with local government
agencies; thus, (2) allowing the government of Angola to indefinitely postpone
investment in key areas; and predisposing (3) programs to fall short of their
potential due to limited international resources and qualified local staff. As a
result, (4) priorities and activities of international religious actors are conducive
to improvements in human security, but, in the short and medium term, they
tend to encourage harmful dependent behavior from state authorities.
James Tiburcio
In drafting this working paper, I am aware of some of its shortcomings. Due to a lack of literature and data dedicated specifically to
the subject matter, a majority of references are at most circuitously
about religious non-state actors in Angola or dealing with the
importance of their role in human security issues. The very importance
of religious non-state actors to human security in Angola is subject to
dispute as their budgets and general presence is limited and poorly
documented. Apart from actors’ identities and brief descriptions of their
activities, little is readily available. “Systematic, theoretically driven,
empirically based accounts” 2 of activities and impacts of non-state
religious actors in Angola are practically non-existent. Information on
their impact is scarce and specific indicators are yet to be developed in
order to demonstrate the relevance of their presence in specific
communities and how general socio-economic indicators respond to
them. The literary review that follows is, nonetheless, an indispensable
provisional guiding tool. The hypotheses presented are also tentative
and will be further tested against new evidence collected during field
research and survey. In spite of careful analysis and research, most
data relating to Angola command a cautious stance as notorious
difficulties in obtaining independently verified data remain a constant.
Research Problem, Objectives and Methodology
How do religious non-state actors influence human security in Angola?
What is acceptable in government versus others in providing welfare services?
How do Religion and Human Security fit into the national development visions?
How can Religious Actors understand their own actual and potential role in the
effort for higher standards of human security? The continued importance of nongovernmental actors in the relationship between the donor community and
recipients, as well as their role in the elaboration and execution of policies that
result in successful projects is generally accepted but little empirical evidence
has been collected. Furthermore, recent studies reinforce the need to evaluate
Human Security in Angola: the role of religious non-state actors
social and material deficiencies in order to avoid the misplacement of
decreasing donor resources. Hence, the present analysis endeavors to assess
the influence of international religious organizations on human security in
Angola. The targets of this study and its recommendations are policymakers
and practitioners in Africa, governments, and religious non-state actors and
their partners in the international donor community. This project is being carried
out as an exploratory case study through an in-depth literature review and
analysis, followed by field research focused on the participation of international
religious actors, organizations and individuals in the provision of public services
such as education, basic health care, development projects, agricultural
projects and others which may have a direct or indirect impact on human
security.
At first, drawing from secondary sources such as the United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Bank, the Human
Rights Watch database, Global Witness reports, as well as mission archives,
and when available, Government of Angola (GOA) documents, this study uses
the analytical tools of human security literature to examine the effect of religion
and religious activism in addressing low levels of human security in Angola. A
second phase, pending on the availability of funds, will the constituted of
interviews and field research to be conducted in Angola and in the United
States with selected decision-makers and field workers over a 3 week period in
December of 2008. Despite being an exploratory single case study, it is not
completely limited as a basis for explanations and meaningful generalizations in
what concerns the role of religious non-state actors in human security issues
specifically in sub Saharan Africa.3
Human security as an approach to address today’s causes of insecurity
to the individual are to be found in the institution of the International Council of
the Red Cross, the Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions,
as they assume the human being as their reference center4. The human
security model as developed by Leaning and Arie (2000)5 is deemed
appropriate as a structural framework for this case study. The model “seeks to
shift the focus of international assistance to the individual, household, and
community [;] [it] posits that human security at the local level is essential to
create a base of stability and resilience capable of sustaining human and
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James Tiburcio
economic development over the long term.”6 Therefore, food, water, shelter and
safety, “must be supplemented by the psychosocial inputs of identity,
recognition, participation, and autonomy.”7 Religious actors possess the
indispensable moral and ideological independence to play an increasingly
relevant role in realizing basic needs as well as supplementary needs.8
Background and Context
Since Angola’s pre colonial period, religious organizations have been
involved in addressing general needs, not only spiritual, but also material and
social. The Portuguese colonial government had little interest in improving the
living conditions of the local population, and as a result, when independence
was granted in the end of 1975, the settler population was a world apart in
relation to the local population in terms of basic social services.
In the last 33 years following independence, the national government has
done the barely minimum to address these needs, mostly blaming the long civil
war that ensued Portugal’s withdrawal 1975 and only came to an end in 2002.9
The Luena Memorandum of Understanding, signed on April 4th 2002, sealed the
end of a 27 year civil war, with the military victory of the Government of Angola
over the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), a once
liberation movement turned terrorist organization.10 By the time confrontations
halted, there were 3.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), 350 thousand
landmine victims, over a million dead and unaccounted for damage to the
country’s infrastructure and land11 and the result is a country featured near the
bottom of most global socio-economic measures.12
The United States is Angola’s most important investor and producer in
the country’s main economic sector, the oil industry, as Angola is the sixth
largest crude oil exporter to the United States, only behind Canada, Saudi
Arabia, Mexico, Nigeria and Venezuela.13 Apart from being Angola’s main
trading partner, the United States is also the largest bilateral donor through the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)14 which in Angola
works mostly through international humanitarian agencies such as Care and
Catholic Relief Services.15 Angola’s present situation provides social
Human Security in Angola: the role of religious non-state actors
researchers a once in a generation opportunity to evaluate how international
religious actors’ funding and resources are being employed to influence human
security levels in the least developed countries.
Angola has been going through four transition processes since 1989
concurrently: “(1) from war to peace and reconciliation; (2) from humanitarian
emergency to rehabilitation, recovery and development; (3) from an
authoritarian, one-party system of governance to pluralist democracy; and (4)
from a command economy to an economy based on the laws of the market.” 16
None of these processes have proceeded smoothly, at times they were aborted,
but there has been progress in all areas. Religious non-state actors are part of
the dynamics of these processes, especially in the transition from humanitarian
emergency to rehabilitation, recovery and development.
In the last 6 years, since the Luena Memorandum, Angola’s economy
has been characterized by record growth rates, fueled by record-breaking oil
prices, leading Angola to the top 5 of the fastest growing economies in Africa.
Inflation has been controlled and fiscal and external accounts surpluses have
become the order of the day.17 The GOA has complete control of the country’s
territory since 2002. Landmines are being cleared, roads and bridges rebuilt,
thus allowing free movement of people and goods. The most important result
has been the return of almost 3.7 million people to their ancestors’ homes.
Previously important activities, such as subsistence agriculture and herd
grazing are being revived, despite drought conditions in some provinces
(cultivated land has increased only by 8%, not an irrelevant number in the case
of a landmine filled country).18 In the macroeconomic sphere, the Angolan GDP
grew 18.6% (in real terms) in 2006 and the World Bank estimates a staggering
23.4% for 2007 (as of March 2008) while the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
projects 26.8% for 2008.19 Apart from the already accounted for record oil
prices, these results are also due to increased production in new deepwater
oilfields, and rising diamond production. Infrastructural rehabilitation has
rekindled the construction and manufacturing sectors which grew double digits
in the last decade. Inflation fell to under 12% in 2007 and real interest rates
remain negative. On the political side, preparations for legislative elections are
underway. They will take place on September 5 and 6 2008, as announced by
President José Eduardo dos Santos on 27 December 2007.20
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James Tiburcio
Table 1. Angola: Key Indicators
 Land area, thousands of km2:
1 247*
 Population, thousands (2005):
15 941*
 GDP per capita, $ PPP valuation (2005):
3 363*
 GNI per capita US$
1,030**
 Life expectancy (2000-2005):
40.7*
 Literacy (pop. Age 15+):
33% (2006)**
 Arable land:
2.41%**
 Agricultural production (% GDP):
8%**
 HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate:
2.8% (2006)**
 Human Development Index
161 out of 177 (2006)**
 Population living below national poverty line
70%**
Sources: (*) AfDB/OECD African Economic Outlook. 2006. Available at:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/35/36734978.pdf. Data tables available in excel format at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/344387777260 . (**) World Food Program:
http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/indexcountry.asp?country=024
Despite all progress registered in the last 6 years, the country still is a
poor resource-rich country - an “oil state”21 - as more than 90% of exports are
from the oil industry. Oil is the key element in the Angolan government’s ability
to gain access to international political, diplomatic and economic networks and
channels. The GOA is completely dependent on oil and it confers an
extravagant life-style to its inner circle, albeit most Angolans living conditions
have deteriorated significantly in the last 10 years. According to some analysts,
Angola’s situation is symptomatic for “resource curse, whereby oil and other
extractive industries have actively harmed many developing countries.”22
Dependency on oil revenues does not only originate from exports, sales and
royalties, but especially for the reason that Angolan oil production is committed
as collateral in credit lines, which allows bankrolling general government
expenditures, import financing, and until 2002, finance an over sized military
budget.
Human Security in Angola: the role of religious non-state actors
Oil revenues allow the presidency to elude the International Monetary
Fund (IMF)’s recurrent recommendations for renegotiations of its external debt.
In this manner, the GOA is able to postpone any structural adjustment programs
with its required transparency requirements. So far, all pressures for the
government to open its books to an external audit of oil revenues, debt and debt
repayment have fallen short of any real results. Such opening would shed some
light on the complex, and oftentimes suspicious, arrangements among the
government, Sonangol (the state owned oil company) and international
stakeholders.23 The Angolan regime oftentimes neglects a number of social
services that are normally entrusted to the state in order to benefit a small elite
and foreign companies and governments that are more interested in the safety
of their investments in the country.24 Backed by oil and diamonds, the Angolan
government has enough leverage to withstand demands for change from
donors such as the United States and the European Union and at the same
time receive a great amount of support from non-liberal rising superpowers as
China and Russia, and historical allies such as Brazil.25
Table 2. Real GDP Growth and Per Capita ($ PPP at current prices)
Angola - Real GDP growth (%): blue line; Africa - Per capita GDP ($ PPP): light blue bar; Angola Per capita GDP ($ PPP): green bar;
Source: AfDB/OECD African Economic Outlook. 2006. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/35/36734978.pdf.
Data tables available in excel format at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/344387777260
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James Tiburcio
Human Security in Africa
International and national universal normative bases of human security
are loosely established in the laws which provide for human rights protection
and humanitarian and refugee laws.26 The concept of human security has been
adapted to contemporary Africa, at least in theory, in an all-inclusive approach
by the members of the African Union Organization (AU), as found in the,
“Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defense and Security Policy”, which
states:
“The causes of intra-state conflict necessitate a new emphasis on human security, based not
only on political values but on social and economic imperatives as well. This newer, multidimensional notion of security thus embraces such issues as human rights; the right to
participate fully in the process of governance; the right to equal development as well as the right
to have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; the right to protection against
poverty; the right to conducive education and health conditions; the right to protection against
marginalization on the basis of gender; protection against natural disasters, as well as
ecological and environmental degradation. At the national level, the aim would be to safeguard
the security of individuals, families, communities, and the state/national life, in the economic,
political and social dimensions. This applies at the various regional levels also; and at the
continental level, the principle would be underscored that the “security of each African country is
inseparably linked to that of other African countries and the African continent as a whole.” 27
Manifestly, African leaders and governments are aware that “human security
- protecting and empowering people, at the individual and community levels – is
essential to national and international security.”28 But, in spite of a handful of
commendable initiatives,29 their track record since independence has generally
been poor. As a result, African civil society and non-governmental international
organizations must take upon themselves an ever more crucial responsibility in
order to bring about higher living standards, democratization, development and
general welfare. Such involvement is directed to the following main concerns:
(i)
“[S]trengthening mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and
resolution;
(ii)
[P]romoting and protecting democracy and human rights;
(iii)
[E]xtending education and healthcare;
(iv)
[P]romoting the role of women in social and economic development;
Human Security in Angola: the role of religious non-state actors
(v)
[B]uilding state capacity to maintain law and order; and infrastructure and
agricultural programs.”30
Findings
Catholic, protestant and evangelical missionary agencies, especially from
the United States, Canada, Switzerland, Portugal, Italy and Brazil (among a
number of other nationalities) are presently working in Angola, some of them for
over a hundred years, focusing in medical care, agricultural development, and
relief work.31 As the Portuguese colonial government before, the present
government in power since 1975 has regarded religious organizations as
service providers to the state.32
Table 3. Health Service Indicators
Indicator
Measure
Doctors in the public
sector
Doctors per 100,000 inhabitants
Access to drugs
% of the population with access to
essential drug
Source
MOH
WHOSIS
WHO
Angola
Year
2000a
1997
Data
5
7.7
2001
1996
2001b
20
24
2001b
Vaccination coverage for
% of children 12-23 months vaccinated
DPT (3rd dosage)
MICS
Vaccination coverage for
% of children 12-23 months vaccinated
polio
MICS
1996
2001b
Deliveries in health
facilities
% of deliveries attended by trained
health personnel
MICS
Pre-natal consultations
% of pregnant women who attend
one or more pre-natal consultations
MICS
Contraceptive use
% of women of reproductiv age who
use any method of contraception
MICS
MSH
Sub-Saharan Africa
Source
Year
Data
HDR
1991
32
WHOSIS 1995-2003
16
SOWCc
1999
46
28
63
SOWCc
1999
48
1996
2001b
1996
2001b
22
45
64
66
SOWCc
1995 - 2000
39
SOWCc
1995 - 2000
64
1996
2001b
2002
8
6
17
SOWCc
1995 - 2000
22
Notes: WHOSIS = World Health Organization Statistical Information System, HDR = Human Development Report (U.N.
Development Program), MICS = Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, SOWC = State of the World’s Children (UNICEF),
MSH = Management Sciences for Health
a) Estimate based only on doctors in the National Health Service, as published in Anuário Estatístico do MINSA (MOH
2000).
b) MICS 2001 (MOP 2003) only covered areas accessible during the war.
c) UNICEF (2002).
d) Survey (MSH and Consaúde, 2002) covered only three municipalities in Luanda province.
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James Tiburcio
Source: adapted from Vinyals, 2002 in Connor, Catherine, Yogesh Rajkotia, Ya-Shin Lin, and Paula Figueiredo. October
2005. Angola Health System Assessment. Bethesda, MD: The Partners for Health Reformplus Project, Abt Associates
Inc, p. 19.
The role of non governmental religious actors in Angola to the GOA is not
restricted by their relative small size and territorial reach. Donors through
grassroots organizations offer an option to circumvent the corrupt and inept
state machine.33 In that way, most religious NGOs avoid partnerships with the
ministries of the Angolan government, although there are reports attesting to
some NGOs willingness to partner with the Ministry of Health with
disproportionate expectations about the Ministry’s capacity to do its part.34
Religious non-state actors have mentioned the inefficiency and corruption of
local government agencies in order to run completely independent projects in
Angola, avoiding any partnership with government agencies and authorities.35
Indeed, due to a lack of commitment by local authorities, much aid sent out
does not reach their intended beneficiaries. Along the way, a part ends up in the
informal local markets (praças), while another goes to officials’ storerooms, and
still another never leaves their port of entrance, deteriorating in containers due
to bureaucracy, inefficiency and transport problems.36 Bypassing government
has made service and aid delivery faster and more reliable. The downside is
that by the demoralization of local authorities, the whole public organism, be it in
health or education services, suffers. One symptom is the brain drain to the
private and third sector.37
External funding of the health sector in Angola, 8%, is below subSaharan Africa (SSA)’s average of 20%, nonetheless, it still is relevant.38
International civil society organizations are, as long as they accept the central
government’s rules, an element in the presidential office’s plan to deliver basic
services to the poorest sections of the Angolan population.39 While a
considerable part of the Angolan civil society has been co-opted by the state,
becoming part of the patrimonial system, “in which the patron-client logic so
prevalent in Africa and elsewhere is given enormous extra power and reach by
the state’s possession of natural resources”,40 most religious actors remain the
only autonomous entities that have not been contaminated.
Human Security in Angola: the role of religious non-state actors
Churches are a reliable link between NGOs and the poorest communities
in the provision of basic social services such as aid distribution, health care and
education41 despite the fact that the budgets of religious non-state agencies and
donors are minute compared to revenues amassed yearly by the country’s
innumerous oil barrels and diamond gems in a myriad of official and unofficial
transactions. Churches of most denominations enjoy substantial goodwill from
parts of the government and from communities in general. Most see in them an
opportunity for greater transparency and more poor-oriented development
policies. But, the GOA still perceives non-state actors as service providers, and
not as partners in policy-making. As such, religious and non-religious NGOs
continue to work as essential subcontractors, and in some areas, they almost
completely replace state services in the health and education sectors.42
Several other deficiencies have been identified in state practices and
structure, among them, a shortage of human and institutional capabilities and
management skills, and inadequate financing of basic public health inputs for
service delivery, such as supplies, drugs, equipment, electricity and potable
water.43
The governmental policy towards land reform has also been a source of
decline in living conditions in rural areas, chronic dependence on cereal imports
and fresh vegetables supply shortages in urban centers. There is still a long
way to go for Angola to reach a secure, minimum food supply production or
even achieve its pre-independence levels of production, although, presently,
agricultural production is steadily rising; however considering that 70% of the
population remains under the poverty line, exceedingly vulnerable to
malnutrition and unable to break free from a cycle of poverty, the government
surely could do more to alleviate the worst off communities’ lot.44
Aggravating the situation, commercial farms that once belonged to
Portuguese settlers and had been nationalized following independence (led by
the then Marxist-oriented MPLA - Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola,
in power since 1975), beginning in the late 1980s, as part of the economic
transition, those same farms were privatized. In practice, former state farms
were handed to the ruling elite, further limiting the means of existence to a large
number of impoverished small peasants and pastoralists, “who had been
occupying and tilling much of the land of the former state farms on an ad hoc
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James Tiburcio
basis, without land titles, since the mid-1980s”.45 There are no signs of change
in land reform policy, increasing social pressure on Angola’s agricultural sector,
already dependent on external food imports.
Most religious (and non-religious) grassroots organizations are
dependent on external funding and some are funded by the same donor
agencies, and often end up competing with each other to obtain the same
grants.46 Due to intra-NGO competition for funding and projects47 as well as a
need to obtain or maintain public exposure in order to attract donations and
sponsors, most NGOs, including religious ones, offer their services to the
Angolan government without pre-conditions, or an analysis of how the
corresponding ministry would be able to cooperate and how the nongovernmental sector would complement the government’s efforts instead of
substituting it.48 In this manner, religious non-state actors tend to perpetuate
chronic state deficiencies when they take upon themselves general human
security responsibilities without any partnership arrangements with the local
government agencies. Increasingly, key donors and organizations feel that the
Angolan Government should invest more of its own revenues in its own people,
especially in social services. Such situation has led to continued restrictions on
international resources available to organizations such as the World Food
Program.49
Such circumstances have allowed the Angolan state not to satisfactorily
fulfill its role as the main provider of basic social services, “due to a de-linkage
of the state from the Angolan society”.50 Taking advantage of the altruism of
religious and non-religious initiatives, government agencies indefinitely
postpone investment in key areas. During the civil war (1975 – 2002), the GOA
lacked complete control of the national territory and exhibited three inter-related
and interdependent features with direct bearing on human security:
I.
“A de-linkage of the Angolan political elite (itself fragmented) from Angolan
society;
II.
“An erosion of the Angolan state’s performance in delivering services to the
people, including providing security for the people, and in consequence”;
III.
A loss of political legitimacy of the government.”51
Human Security in Angola: the role of religious non-state actors
Such loss of legitimacy has been accompanied by an increasing
privatization of the Angolan state, and although some analysts see the
“public−private partnerships in health“, as a strength,52 the privatization process
initiated in the last decade of the 20th century has in many stances been
detrimental to public health as a whole. The deregulation and privatization 53 of
state health responsibilities has transferred considerable capabilities to private
clinics, which are inaccessible to the bulk of the Angolan population.54
Recommendations and Conclusions
Perceptions of what should be the main priorities and activities of
religious organizations in order to achieve minimum human security standards
in Angola differ considerably between donors and local NGOs. According to a
2005 USAID survey of focus groups of international donor and NGO
participants, and focus groups of Angolan counterparts, Angolans were more
concerned with end results and service delivery, while the international
community represented by religious and non-religious NGOs, concentrated on
strategic objectives and how to accomplish them. Angolans’ top priorities were
“Income redistribution and poverty alleviation”. On the other hand, international
NGOs were more concerned with combating corruption and increasing
transparency.55
Religious civil society in Angola needs to mature from a compliant
service delivery tool to an actual pivotal basis for social change. On the other
hand, a parallel basic services infra-structure may cause further atrophy of an
already thinly spread government administration. Therefore, engagement with
the government as a partner is highly advisable although practical difficulties
remain pervasive. Religious NGOs should consider the enduring consequences
of their decisions despite their short term needs on the ground. Unless the
government openly opposes such partnerships, genuine attempts need to be
evaluated before any decisions to avoid them all together are made. 56
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James Tiburcio
There is an underlying conflict of interest in the ‘human security
perceptions exchange’ dynamics in Angola. Donors and grassroots
organizations tend to paradoxically regard the strengthening of government
ministries and agencies as unconstructive, since greater government control
and political will may represent less political freedom, free market initiatives and
general and organized civil society participation. However, different approaches
are demanded, considering that state frailty can be traced as the main
independent variable in some of Angola’s worst social disasters since
independence.57
1
This is a draft working paper, comments are welcome.
2
Bratton, Michael, and Nicolas van de Walle. Democratic Experiments in Africa. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. xiv.
3
Yin, Robert K. Estudo de Caso: Planejamento e Métodos. Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2005, p. 22.
4
Bruderlein, Claude. The Role of Non-State Actors in Building Human Security: The Case of Armed
Groups in Intra-States Wars. Geneva: Human Security Network, 2000.
5
Leaning, Jennifer, and Sam Arie. Human Security: A Framework for Assessment in Conflict and
Transition. Washington: CERTI/USAID, 2000.
6
Stites, Elisabeth and Jennifer Leaning. Human Security in Angola: A retrospective study. A Report
for CERTI/USAID, Washington: Harvard School of Public Health, 2002.
7
Ibid., p. 3.
8
Vines, Alex, Nicholas Shaxson, Lisa Rimli, e Chris Heymans. Angola: Drivers of Change: Economic
Change and Reform. Position paper 1, London: Chatham House, 2005, p. 10.
9
van der Borght, Erwin. The Humanitarian Situation in Angola. Briefing, Geneva: Medicins sans
Frontieres, 2002.
10
“SADC Leaders Declare Unita Terrorist Group”. TOMRIC News Agency January 16, 2002.
Clover, Jenny. “Land reform in Angola: Establishing the ground rules.” In: Land rights, conflict and
peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, por Chris Huggins e Jenny Clover. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies &
African Center for Technology Studies, 2005, 347 – 381.
11
12
UNDP. Human Development Report 2007/2008. Fighting climate change: Human solidarity in a
divided world. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
13
Administration, Energy Information. Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government. 28 de
March de 2008.
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/company_level_imports/current/import.html
(acesso em 31 de March de 2008).
14
USAID, United States Agency for International Development -. USAID. 2002.
http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2002/afr/ao (acesso em 31 de March de 2002).
Human Security in Angola: the role of religious non-state actors
15
Ostheimer, Andrea. "Aid agencies: providers of essential resources?" In Angola's war economy: The
role of oil and diamonds, by Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (eds.), 115 - 140. Pretoria: Institute of
Security Studies, 2000, p. 1.
16
Hodges, T. (2004). Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, p. 199.
17
Vines, Alex and Indira Campos (2007). Angola and China a pragmatic partnership. Working Paper
Presented at a CSIS Conference, “Prospects for Improving U.S.-China-Africa Cooperation,” December 5,
2007. Chatham House, London, p. 3.
18
World Bank. Angola: Country Brief. 2008. World Bank. Available at:
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/ANGOLAEXTN/0,,menuPK:32250
0~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:322490,00.html. Accessed: Abril 11, 2008.
19
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Angola: 2007 Article IV Consultation Staff Report, IMF Country
Report No. 07/354 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, October 2007). Cited in Vines et al (2007), op. cit. p. 3, footnote.
BBC News. “Angolan leader sets election date”. Friday, 28 December 2007, 14:12 GMT. Available
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7163001.stm. Accessed on Abril 18, 2008.
20
21
Hodges, T. (2004).
22
Vines et al. 2005, op. cit. p. 3.
23
Human Rights Watch, Report. "Some Transparency, No Accountability: The Use of Oil Revenue in
Angola and its Impact on Human Rights." Volume 16, No. 1. Geneva: Human Rights Watch, January 2004.
Reno, William. “The real (war) economy of Angola.” In: Angola's war economy, por Jakkie Cilliers e
Christian Dietrich. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2000, pp. 220-235.
24
25
Ibid., p. 39
26
Cilliers, J. (2004). Human Security in Africa: A conceptual framework for review. Nairobi: African
Human Security Initiative, pp. 7-8.
27
African Union. (February 28, 2004). News Events. Second Extraordinary Session, Heads of State
and Government of Member States of the African Union Meeting., Sirte, Great Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Acesso em 08 de April de 2008, disponível em African Union Homepage: http://www.africaunion.org/News_Events/2ND%20ASSEMBLY/Declaration%20on%Comm.Af%DEf%20Sec.pdf
28
United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa. (2005). Human Security in Africa. New York:
OSAA, p. 2.
“Luanda. The representative of the World Health Organisation (WHO) in Angola, Diosdado Nsue
Milang Friday here highlighted the Angolan government's engagement in offering the population a greater
health assistance. Speaking to the press at the end of an audience granted to him by the Angolan Foreign
Affairs minister, João Bernardo de Miranda, the WHO official referred that there are some challenges for
implementation this intention, something that is proper for countries in a situation of post-armed conflict, but
authorities are working to overcome these hindrances. "I was received with great satisfaction by the Foreign
Affairs minister, who briefed me on the country's general situation, mainly concerning the health sector",
affirmed the WHO official who was appointed to the post last February and took office on the 11th of the
same month. Diosdado Nsue Milang referred that the Angolan health system is developing and that the
government is ready to collaborate with the WHO in order to obtain more improvements.” Angola Press, A.
(March 7, 2008). Allafrica.com Stories. Acesso em 7 de April de 2008, disponível em Allafrica:
http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200803070919.html
29
30
African Peer Review Mechanism Organisation and Process, 9 March 2003, para. 3 ibid, art. 49. Cit
in Cilliers, 2004, pp. 5-6.
31
Birminghan, David. “Merchants and Missionaries in Angola.” Lusotopie, 1998: 12.
32
Ostheimer, Andrea. "Aid agencies: providers of essential resources?" In Angola's war economy: The
role of oil and diamonds, by Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (eds.), 115 - 140. Pretoria: Institute of
Security Studies, 2000.
15
James Tiburcio
33
Vines, et al. (2005), p. 37 – 48.
34
Pavignani, Enrico, e Alessandro Colombo (2001), op. cit., p. 29.
35
Vines, et al. (2005), op. cit.
36
McMillan, John. ""The Main Institution in the Country Is Corruption": Transparency in Angola." Center
on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law - Stanford Institute on International Studies, February 7,
2005.
37
Vines, et al. (2005), p. 37
38
Ibid, p. 32
39
Vines, et al. (2005), p. 37
40
Vines, et al. (2005), p. viii.
41
International Fund for Agricultural Development - IFAD, Angola: A review of gender issues in support
of IFAD's COSOP formulation process and Field Diagnostic Study. Report, IFAD, 2002.
42
Ibid., pp. 5 – 30
43
Connor, Catherine, Yogesh Rajkotia, Ya-Shin Lin, and Paula Figueiredo. October 2005. Angola
Health System Assessment. Bethesda, MD: The Partners for Health Reformplus Project, Abt Associates Inc.
44
World Food Program, Country Brief, 2008. Available at:
http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/indexcountry.asp?country=024. Accessed on Abril 19, 2008.
45
Hodges, T. (2004), pp. 135 – 137. Clover (2005).
46
Frandsen, Grey. A Guide to NGOs: A primer about private, voluntary, non-governmental
organizations that operate in humanitarian emergencies globally. Washinton, DC: United States Department
of Defense. Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine, 2002, p. 42.
47
Cooley, Alexander, and James Ron. "The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political
Economy of Transnational Action." International Security, Volume 27, Number 1, 2002: 5 - 39.
48
Ostheimer (2000), op. cit., p. 122.
49
World Food Program, Country Brief, 2008, op. cit.
50
Ostheimer (2000), op. cit., p. 118.
51
Ibid., p. 119.
52
Connor, Rajkotia and Figueredo (2005), op. cit., p. 5.
53
Pavignani, Enrico, and Alessandro Colombo. Providing health services in countries disrupted by civil
wars: A comparative analysis of Mozambique and Angola, 1975-2000. New York: World Health
Organization, 2001.
54
Stites, Elisabeth and Jennifer Leaning (2002), op. cit., p. 18.
55
Stakeholder Focus Group Report, USAID (with BP, ChevronTexaco and Esso), May 4, 2005. Vines,
et al. (2005), p. 30
56
Pavignani, Enrico, e Alessandro Colombo (2001), op. cit., p. 29
57
Vines, et al. (2005), Overview, p. 4.