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State and Civil Society in Social Policy
Discourse
A Paper to be delivered by Greg Mac Master at
Southern Africa’s Development Agenda in the
21st Century Colloquium
School of Public Management & Development
University of Fort Hare
Bhisho Campus
14 – 15 May 2009
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page Number
1.
Introduction
2
2.
Defining ‘social policy’ and the role of the ‘welfare state’
and ‘civil society’
4
3.
The Concept ‘State’
9
4.
The Construct ‘Civil Society’
13
5.
An Overview of Development and Socio-Economic
Conditions in Africa
18
6.
The Role of the State in Development
25
7.
Social Policy in Southern Africa
32
8.
Concluding Remarks
35
9.
Notes
38
10.
Bibliography
39
1
1.
Introduction
This paper argues for “rethinking social policy away from its conception as a
residual category of ‘safety nets’ that merely counteract policy failures or
development disasters” (Mkandawire, 2001, 1), as an integral part of a systems
thinking and long-term strategic approach to public policy, together with economic
policy, so that one engages in a substantively meaningful discourse of the role of the
state and civil society in social policy within the context of Southern Africa. Whilst
social policy is generally viewed as a subset of public policy – the other is economic
policy – some authors argue that all public policy is essentially social policy. Public
policy needs to be viewed as a package of various policy offerings by a government
or state, which directs the basket of public goods and services delivered to its
citizens and regulate various aspects of society. I concur with the sentiment that “the
‘handmaiden model’ of social policy (that) relegates social services to an adjunct of
economic policies inhibited study of the contribution of social policy to economic
development” (Mkandawire, 2001, 3). Therefore, social policy has to “serve as both
means and ends” (Mkandawire, 2001, 4) and be “embedded in development policy”
(Deyo, 1992 cited in Mkandawire, 2001, 17) for it to realise its full potential in SubSaharan Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular.
The backdrop of this paper is that “Sub-Saharan Africa is the poorest region of
the world and, in comparative and absolute terms, it may well have become poorer in
the 1990s (World bank, 2002)” and it is “the region of the world in which
industrialization and policies for the attainment of real social security seem to have
the furthest to travel” (Pierson, 2004, 16). Sub-Saharan Africa is also “characterized
by some unique land tenure regimes and systems of social organization for
production. This has profound conceptual implications and raises intriguing
questions with regard to agrarian transformation in the sub-region. … [M]ost of these
were lost in the welter of Eurocentric theories and universalizing tendencies. Yet a
careful study of African agrarian systems could easily show that there is more than
one way to agricultural and rural social development. This is particularly important in
the wake of mono-economics from the West and the drive toward globalization and
homogenization in a unipolar world order” (Mafeje, 2003, 1).
The fifteen countries1 in Southern Africa formed the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) to strengthen regional cooperation. However,
“SADC is a weak organisation; it is under-resourced, and the member states are not
2
happy to give it the powers that they agreed to give it when they launched the
overhaul of the organisation in 2001”. These “countries face many social,
development, economic, trade, education, health, diplomatic, defence, security and
political challenges. Some of these challenges cannot be tackled effectively by
individual members. Cattle diseases and organised-crime gangs know no
boundaries. War in one country can suck in its neighbours and damage their
economies. The sustainable development that trade could bring is threatened by the
existence of different product standards and tariff regimes, weak customs
infrastructure and bad roads. One significant challenge is that member states also
participate in other regional economic cooperation schemes and regional political
and security cooperation schemes that may compete with or undermine SADC's
aims.”2
Contrary to Mafeje’s (2003, 1) contention, Yeates says that a “global perspective
emphasizes that social policy must be studied from both a national and a
transnational perspective. Globalization
shapes the possibility of realizing an
inclusive, democratic and developmental social policy”, while there may be “fixed
constraints on the nature of policy reforms, or that answers lie in simple policy
transplantation, or that social convergence is desirable” (Yeates, 2005, 1 & 2).
Mkandawire offers another perspective on how globalization impacts social policy:
“A central preoccupation in both developed and developing countries is
the impact of globalization on social policy. Globalization affects social
policy both at a normative level and in a more practical way, by setting
constraints (fiscal and trade) that social policy must be attentive to.
Related to this is the growing provision of social services by
transnational actors – aid donors, non-governmental organisations and
transnational corporations. Under this new policy thrust the role of the
state is to provide “an enabling environment” for private provision while
reducing its own expenditures and activities in the social sector”
(Mkandawire, 2001, iii & 19).
In order to facilitate understanding of the two constructs (public and social policy)
definitions will be offered. There is no universally accepted definition of (public) policy
(De Coning and Fick, 1995, 18 – 21). Rather a multiplicity of theories, models and
definitions3 exist all of which emphasise different aspects of the construct, different
philosophical approaches (Parsons, 1995, 13) and political values (De Coning, 2000,
3
16). Despite this complexity, there are common threads from which it is possible to
construct a working definition of (public) policy (Anderson, 1997, 9 and De Coning,
2000, 11). Most researchers and practitioners, however, attempt to derive working
definitions and models from literature for practical purposes (Dobson, 2002, 17).
“Policy is both a noun and a verb: policy is something that governments produce and
something that governments do. It can be argued that policy is the core activity and
output of governments” (Dobson, 2002, 18). “The business of government is to make
choices and to strategically manage resources towards achieving the goals those
choices imply with policy being the product thereof” (Heymans, 1996, 29). Therefore,
it is imperative to make the point at this juncture that the nature of governments’ core
business requires a systems thinking and long-term strategic approach since
development needs can only be addressed effectively and meaningfully in the longterm.
This essay briefly explores the concepts ‘state’ and ‘civil society’, an overview of
development in Africa, the role of the state in development (both economic and
social) within the African context in general and the Southern Africa in particular, an
overview of social policy in Southern Africa, and concluding remarks are made as to
the critical need for a holistic and integrative approach to public policy in general and
an inclusive, democratic and developmental social policy in particular to address the
socio-economic challenges in Southern Africa. Further research and interrogation of
merging ideas and insights are suggested for social policy development for Southern
African countries.
2. Defining ‘social policy’ and the role of the ‘welfare state’ and ‘civil society’
A brief examination of some definitions in respect of social policy and the role of
the welfare state and civil society in social policy will now follow. The concepts ‘state’
and ‘developmental state’ will be considered in later sections. The reason why the
welfare state is previewed in this section is that the concept captures the role of the
state in social policy so much clearer. However, a discussion of the welfare state
may have more relevance for South Africa, which is currently regarded as the
biggest welfare state in the developing world. Barbone and Sanchez (1999, 1 cited in
Pierson, 2002004, 16)) “are extremely uncertain that most Sub-Saharan states have
the governing capacity (let alone the resources) to administer complex social
security systems”.
4
But Pierson appears somewhat more cautious since he found that “when
contrasting the experience of member countries of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, or OECD, with that of Sub-Saharan Africa,
economic development emerges as a very powerful indicator of welfare state
growth”. He concludes that as
“we think about the ways in which presently industrializing and yet-toindustrialize states address their development needs, it seems right to
emphasize the positive role that an active social policy has played in
the past. In particular, it is important to see that investment in public
services, such as education and primary health care, may do more for
equity than premature attempts to build social insurance institutions”
(Pierson, 2004, 1 & 17).
Social policy is defined as “measures that affect people’s well-being, whether
through the provision of welfare services or by means of policies that impact upon
their livelihoods more generally” (Hall and Midgley, 2004, glossary). Mkandawire
(2001, 1) defines
“social
policy
as
collective
interventions
directly
affecting
transformation4 in social welfare, social institutions and social relations.
Social welfare encompasses access to adequate and secure livelihoods
and income. Social relations range from the micro to the global levels,
encompassing intra-household relations of class, community, ethnicity,
gender, etc. Social institutions are the ‘humanly devised constraints that
shape human interaction’ or the rules of the game’ in a society” (North,
1990).
Van Niekerk’s (2008) definition particularly for South Africa is somewhat more
elaborate and includes the role of government, the private sector and civil society in
social policy:
“social policies at the national level are collective state-lead measures,
implemented by the central and local governments and other
stakeholders such as organized employers and workers, the broader
private sector and civil society, as well as international development
partners. Social policies are interventions which are about promoting
the well being of all citizens and which address structural inequalities in
wealth, ensure greater equity and equality for all, correct market
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shortcomings, reduce poverty and promote social inclusion. The term
‘social policy’ also used to refer to the social actions taken by policymakers in the world. Social policy thus refers both to the activity of
policy-making to promote well-being and to the academic study of such
actions.”
Since the world has become a ‘global village’, Yeates’ view on globalization and
social policy is appropriate and worth sharing:
“A global perspective emphasizes that social policy must be studied
from both a national and a transnational perspective. Social welfare,
social institutions and social relations are now entangled in material
processes that extend beyond the bounds of the nation-state and their
transformation can no longer be wholly understood within an exclusively
national framework. Recognition of these transnational connections and
the dynamics they engender must begin with an appreciation of the
contemporary pluralistic global social governance structure which is
‘multi-tiered’, ‘multi-sphered’ and multi-actored’. Governments and
representatives of capital, labour and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) all attempt to advance their interests and endeavour to
influence how national territories, institutions and populations are
governed by engaging in various types of political action in different
spheres (institutional, economic) and at different levels (multilateral,
regional, national, subnational). Multilateral and regional governmental
organizations, agencies and formations are key institutional terrains on
which ideological and political struggles over the desirable model of
welfare and social development strategies are now fought, and are as
necessary as national and subnational terrains to any understanding of
the contemporary politics of social development” (Yeates, 2005, 2).
Since the state is central in public policy, including social policy, it is necessary to
drill a tad deeper and briefly unpack the role of the state. It is indeed the concept
‘welfare state’ relative to social policy that warrants exploration. The Latin concept
pro bono publico (for the benefit of the people) suggests that the role of the state (or
public sector) must be to provide goods and services in the interest of the people or
for the public good (Davids, et al., 2005, 52). The public sector primarily designs and
implements policies and programmes that aim to fulfil the government’s broad social
6
and economic development objectives (Schacter, 2000, 4 – 5, in Davids, et al., 2005,
53). However, the South African Constitution specifically stipulates that of the three
spheres of government only local government has to promote social and economic
development (Craythorne, 2003, 141).
But, there is a difference of opinion as to whether this developmental role applies
to all African states. One school of thought argues that because most African
countries are sparsely populated and lack the required capacity to govern effectively,
these states are not able to control the territory defined by their borders, failed to
consolidate their authority and gain the loyalty of their citizens. Therefore, some of
these states can be considered either as not being viable, “failing, failed or weak”
states (Herbst, 2000). Another school of thought says the majority of African
countries are at peace and ethnic cooperation is far more prevalent than conflict.
Democracy is prospering in some and promising for others. Most problems on the
continent derive from the nature of Africa’s relationship to the international system
and weak states it has fostered there (Leonard and Straus, 2003, ix).
In addition to the state, Hall and Midgley suggest three other:
“major institutional sets of players may be identified in the social policy
field the State, civil society, the business sector and international
development or financial agencies. Traditionally, the State has been
seen as the major architect of social policy constructs and the main
driving force behind social reform. The perception applies in particular to
the narrower conception of social policy as providing either for residual
needs associated with ‘curing’ pathologies such as crime and
delinquency, or for government-funded incremental expansion of social
services to meet the demands of growing urban populations. Yet this
picture has become rather more complicated since the 1980s as social
policy goals have broadened to encompass a wider range of human
development concerns, including poverty alleviation and livelihood
support” (Hall and Midgley, 2004, 11).
Definitions of the ‘welfare state’ appear to be intertwined with those of ‘social
policy’, and Barrow’s exposition of the latter demonstrates this connection.
“There is agreement that since the Great Depression political
development in the advanced capitalist societies is distinguished from
previous periods by the rise of the welfare state. The concept of the
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welfare state has been defined theoretically in different ways and has
been applied to many different types of democratic polities. Yet, one
can identify the welfare state with two sets of activities that were absent
from the liberal state of nineteenth-century laissez-faire capitalism e.g.
redistributive and regulatory policies.
Redistributive policies include
“providing certain services, benefits, and assistance to its citizens who
are unable to help themselves – the sick, the old, the young, the
injured, and the unemployed” (Barrow, 1993, 5).
The welfare state is structured to generally redistribute “income among classes”
and to even out “income throughout the lifetime of individuals within classes” –
“between those with children and those without children, between the healthy and
the sick, and between the employed and the unemployed” – in order “to provide a
‘social security net’ during periods of greatest need, such as unemployment, child
rearing, sickness, and retirement”. The redistribution of wealth and income among
classes has been left to private organizations like trade unions and employers’
associations that “explicitly negotiate the division of production between wages and
profits (Barrow, 1993, 5 – 6).
The welfare state has confined itself mainly to codifying the rules of collective
bargaining, supervising the process of collective bargaining, and enforcing the terms
of otherwise privately negotiated contracts between workers and employers.” The
redistributive polices have, therefore, not been at the direct expense of the private
sector. The public sector has merely expanded in absolute terms “so that private
capital accumulation continues to take place even within welfare economies”
(Barrow, 1993, 5 – 6).
Regulatory activities are primarily directed at mitigating neighbourhood effects
produced by private individuals and organizations, that is, at arbitrating disputes over
private actions that directly alter the immediate conditions of life of other individuals
and groups within a society. However, the regulatory activities of the welfare state
have expanded in scope to an ever-widening range of social activities to erode the
distinction between public and private spheres of life. These regulatory policies now
extend to the regulation of “economic relations between labor and management” or
“the corporation and the environment”, as well as “regulating institutions of civil
society such as the family, education, and the Church”, which are “primarily
8
concerned with the development of personal identity and normative values” (Barrow,
1993, 7).
The “regulation and promotion of specific normative values” include “abortion
and racial integration” and the “maintenance of specific family structures (e.g. day
acre, maternity leave, and family allowances)”. This ever-widening scope of the
state’s role has led to a growth in its institutional capacities”, which “penetrated more
deeply into economic and social orders”. This Weber describes as a “quantitative
expansion of the state apparatus” and “qualitative development of relations between
the state apparatus and civil society” – “the state, metaphorically” pushing “its
institutional rhizomes ever more deeply into the soli of civil society” (Barrow, 1993,
7).
The meaning of social policy and the roles the state and civil society fulfil in its
implementation has been clearly spelled out in this section. But these roles are not
restricted to social policy, but are more nuanced and go broader than ‘curing’ social
pathologies, ‘promoting the well being of all citizens’, ‘redistributive and regulatory
activities’, or ‘material processes that extend beyond the bounds of the nation-state’.
3.
The Concept ‘State’
As stated in the introduction, the state5 is one of the key players, if not the only
player in some developing countries, in social policy formulation and implementation.
Although the welfare state was briefly examined in the previous section, one needs
to look at the concept of the ‘state’ in a somewhat broader context, and also
problematise it. The construct ‘developmental state’6, although directly related, will
only be explored in section 4 below in the context of the role of the state in
development and social policy. Pierson (2004, 275) believes the simplest ‘one-line’
definitions of the state have not generally fared well. Most commentators are agreed
that the state is multifaceted and many accept that it is a little fuzzy around the
edges. We might find it difficult to give a precise and comprehensive definition of the
state, but we think we recognize it when it flags us down on the motorway, sends us
a final tax demand, or, of course arranges our old-age pension to be paid at the
nearest post office. From the mandatory certification of our birth to the compulsory
registration of our death, we tend to feel that the state is (nearly) always with us.
“Max Weber argued that states are compulsory associations claiming control over
9
territories and the people within them” (Skocpol, 1999, 7). The views of Stepan,
Skocpol and Burnham on the state are as follows:
“The state must be considered as more than the ‘government’. It is the
continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems that
attempt not only to structure relationships between civil society and
public authority in a polity but also to structure many crucial
relationships within civil society as well” (Alfred Stepan, in Skocpol,
1999, 7)7.
States may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of
the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society. This is
what is meant by ‘state autonomy’. Unless such independent goal
formulation occurs, there is little need to talk about states as important
actors (Skocpol, 1999, 9).
At the broadest possible level, the state – any state fulfils three
functions. First, it defends: the basic needs and interests of those who
control the means of production within the society in question. Closely
associated with this is the second function of the state: achieving
legitimacy for itself and ensuring social harmony.8 Finally, no state can
survive if it cannot adequately defend itself, and the dominant powers in
the economy and society from external attack’ (Burnham, 1982, 75,
cited in Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987, 321 – 322).
However, in Marxian political theory the state-capital relation is approached as
the theoretical basis for a state that broadly serves the interests of the capitalist class
through public policies and through specific institutional arrangements of the state
apparatus (Barrow, 1993, 146). The state is a key player in any country’s economy,
and in most of the developed world the state remains the single largest and most
decisive economic actor despite globalization and its impact causing a decline in the
powers of the nation-state (Pierson, 2004, 78 – 104). However, there is no
consensus as to the consequences of globalization on the sovereignty of the nation
state. Weiss (1999, 212) argues that there are now sufficient grounds to suggest that
globalization tendencies have been exaggerated and that we need to employ the
language of internationalization to understand better the changes taking place in the
10
world economy. In this kind of economy, the nation-state retains its importance as a
political and economic actor.
State capacities are inextricably part of and can therefore not be explored
separate from the functions of the state. Many studies of the capacities of states use
the concept of ‘policy instrument’ when referring to the relevant means that a state
has at its disposal’ (Skocpol, 1999, 18). State capacities cannot be discussed as
general capabilities – whether in the domestic or international arena. There is
‘unevenness of state capacity’ which varies from country to country, but also within
countries. America’s strong focus on foreign policy and international capacity may
well be a consequence of its weakness in the domestic arena. Highly coordinated
market economies such as Japan and Germany and the newly industrialising
countries (NICs) of Korea and Taiwan have sustained a greater capacity for growth
with equity than the least coordinated market economies of Britain and America
(Weiss, 1999, 4 – 6).
Far from becoming an anachronism, state capability has today become an
important advantage in international competition. State capacity in this context refers
to the ability of policy-making authorities to pursue domestic adjustment strategies
that, in cooperation with organized economic groups upgrade or transform the
industrial economy. Such strategies encompass both structural shifts: from declining
to expanding sectors, as well as technological diffusion and innovation; and the
creation of new industries, products and processes. This is not to suggest that the
state is the only institution capable of coordinating change in leading sectors or
technologies. The main point is that when possessed of domestic adjustment
capability, the state can provide a potentially more powerful locus for coordinating
change9 (Weiss, 1999, 4 – 6).
It is deemed expedient to conclude this section by problematising the concept
‘state’. There is ample evidence around the world that the state as per the various
definitions and ideological perspectives does not always act in the best interests of all
its citizens and at times transgress or have scant regard for constitutional and legal
obligations. For instance, pre-1994 the apartheid regime in South Africa ruthlessly
oppressed the black majority and denied them even basic human rights. In recent
history the media were dominated by reports of oppressive acts the Zimbabwean
government meted out against opposition supporters like incarcerating them despite
court rulings or grabbing white-owned farms without due compensation. Likewise,
11
state-sponsored violence is perpetrated in Darfur in Western Sudan. “Since February
2003, the Sudanese government in Khartoum and the government-sponsored
Janjaweed militia have used rape, displacement, organized starvation, threats
against aid workers and mass murder. The genocide in Darfur has claimed 400,000
lives and displaced over 2,500,000 people.”10
The notion of the ‘failed state’ is graphically captured by Chomsky:
“Among the most salient properties of failed state they do not protect
their citizens from violence – and even destruction – or that decision
makers regard such concerns as lower in priority than the short-term
power
and
wealth
of
the
state’s
dominant
sectors.
Another
characteristic of failed states is that they are ‘outlaw states’, whose
leaderships dismiss international law and treaties with contempt. Such
instruments may be binding on others but not on the outlaw states”
(Chomsky, 2007, 38).
The democratic South African state is termed a ‘proxy state’ by Brian Pottinger,
since “… huge swathes of public-service function have been quietly, indeed
clandestinely privatised as the state system fails (Pottinger, 2008, 201). Mamphela
Ramphele (2008, 145) again calls it a ‘paternalistic state’ in which the
“underperformance of the public service reflects a lack of human and intellectual
capacity rather than a lack of resources. Those who suffer most from ongoing
weaknesses in state capacity are poor people who rely entirely on public sectorservices for their survival. Socio-economic rights of the poorest are being violated
daily not because of lack of resources, nor failure to allocate them appropriately, but
a failure on the part of implement the laudable policies they have enacted and
adopted” (Ramphele, 2008, 145 – 146, 155, 166).
Further examples of dysfunctional types of states are mentioned in section 5
below e.g. ‘neopatrimonial’ states like Nigeria where public office holders treat
public resources as their personal patrimony and personal and narrow group
interests undermine public goals (Kohli, 2005, 9) and ‘predatory’ states of which the
former Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) was “a textbook case”. The
Zairian state preyed on its citizenry, terrorized them, despoiled their common
patrimony, and provided little in the way of services in return. Callaghy (1984, 32 –
79 cited in Evans, 1995, 45) emphasizes the Mobutu regime’s patrimonial qualities
12
– the mixture of traditionalism and arbitrariness that Weber argued was
characteristic of precapitalist but not capitalist states”.
Furthermore, Herbst’s (2000) seminal work cogently espouses why a
Eurocentric comprehension of the evolution of state formation in Africa is not helpful
and clarifies the reasons for “failing, failed or weak states” in Africa. By interrogating
both benevolent and malevolent definitions of the concept ‘state”, it becomes clear
that the state is not in all instances autonomous, does not always endeavour to
achieve the common good and social harmony, but is sometimes hijacked by
dominant interest groups or classes for their own parochial political and socioeconomic goals. ‘Patrimonial’ and ‘predatory’ states are the most notorious in this
regard. Do most states in Southern to a lesser or larger degree fall into the category
‘failed states’?
4.
The Construct ‘Civil Society’
In this section the construct ‘civil society’ will be discussed. The definitions
offered by Hall and Midgley as well as Calland are instructive, and also provide a
clear indication of different perspectives in respect of this construct:
“‘Civil society’ is an arena embracing a range of entities that have
become key actors in the design and implementation of social policy.
These include non-governmental organizations (NGOs) at both
domestic and international levels, grassroots or community-based
entities such as village associations, trade unions and the church as
well as social movements that may bring together one or more civil
society organizations (CSOs) in the pursuit of specific goals. Religious
or ‘faith-based’ organizations are an increasingly important subcategory within this group” (Hall and Midgley, 2004, 14 – 15).
“Civil society is also not the private sector, as a for-profit company,
including the media, is not part of civil society. A distinction can be
made between organized civil society and the rest. When one refers to
civil society, one does not mean individual citizens acting in relation to
their own, individual needs” (Calland, 2006, 243).
In contextualising the role of civil society, some authors like Hall and Midgley
(2004, 14 – 15) suggest, on the one hand that there has been a “rolling back of the
13
State and the modification of its role from sole provider to partner in development,
whilst on the other hand a “rapid expansion of the civil society organizations’
occurred. Hall and Midgley (2004, 15) see NGOs as the
“vital link since they are so critical for a number of reasons. They bring
together a number of key ingredients for change: popular mobilization
at the grassroots, wider political support at national and global levels for
important causes and, critically, financial backing, where resources are
scarce or non-existent. From occupying a relatively insignificant position
in the early 1970s, usually as relief agencies, NGOs are now major
contributors of to social policy and social development. As a mark of
their importance, some 12% of Western aid is channelled through
NGOs (Clark, 1991; UNDP, 2000). In net transfer terms, NGOs
contribute more resources than the World Bank. Arguably, the
development and policy impact of NGOs is proportionately far greater
than even these figures suggest.”
Calland (2006, 243 – 244) on the other hand writes that:
”Politics is in practice often a contest for the public space, and this is
important for understanding the power relations that exist in society. The
strength of civil society – its freedom to organize, to raise money, to
lobby and express itself, as well as its institutional capacity, including its
intellectual and material resources – is often cited as a key indicator of
the well-being of a democracy. South Africa has an enviously rich history
of civil society organization and activism.”
For Bendaňa (2006, 1) definitions “are a problem. Descriptions are more
appropriate and a useful characterization of NGOS is provided in the United Nations
(UN) report on civil society involvement, also known as the Cardoso report:
“Non-governmental organization (NGO). All organizations of relevance
to the United Nations that are not central Governments and were not
created by intergovernmental decision, including associations of
businesses,
parliamentarians,
and
local
authorities.
There
is
considerable confusion surrounding this term in United Nations circles.
Elsewhere, NGO has become shorthand for public-benefit NGOs – a
type of civil society organization (CSO) that is formally constituted to
provide a benefit to the general public or the world at large through the
14
provision of advocacy or services. They include organizations devoted
to environment, development, human rights and peace and their
international networks. They may or may not be membership-based.
The Charter of the United Nations provides for consultations with NGOs
(United Nations, 2004, 13 cited in (Bendaňa, 2006, 1).
Like social policy, civil society is seen not only in reference to a specific country
but also in a global context. Mary Kaldor, in Held and McGrew (2004, 559) says:
“In a descriptive sense, the term ‘global civil society’ tends to refer to
those independent NGOs and social movements that operate across
national boundaries, although there are considerable disputes about
what is or is not included in the term. Global civil society may be used to
refer to the non-profit sector: everything that operates across national
borders and between the state, the market, and the family.
Alternatively, it can refer to everything between the state and the family,
that is to say it can include the market.
“The emergence of the of the term ‘global civil society’ can be located at
the interstices of two historic developments in the 1990s: the spread of
demands for democratisation and the intensifying process of global
connectedness. The rediscovery of the term ‘civil society’ in Eastern
Europe in the 1980s was first and foremost a response to the
overbearing state and this had resonance in other parts of the world
where the paternalism and rigidity of the post-war state was called into
question. It reflected a new demand for personal autonomy and selforganisation in societies characterised by growing complexity and
uncertainty and where traditional forms of political organisation, notably
parties, were no longer the main sites of political debate.”
Let us now look at how civil society features in a democratic South Africa. As
stated above, the UDF succeeded in mobilising civil society on a scale
unprecedented in the history of the country during the struggle years. A strong and
vibrant civil society existed until after 1994. Civil society actively participated in policy
development/formulation from April 1994 until approximately June 1996 when GEAR
became government key policy framework. However, the most debilitating
experience
for
many
civil
society
organisations
since
1994
was
being
unceremoniously dumped by donors, at a time when donor funding for government
15
went unspent. There were long delays in establishing a conduit of funding from
government to civil society. “Two funding gaps occurred between 1994 and 1997
and from 1998 until 2000, when after many delays the National Development Agency
(NDA) became operational. Even as late as mid-2000, however, many Transitional
National Development Trust (TNDT) recipients were denied NDA funds, and
collapsed” (Bond, 2001, 86).
Mangcu (2007) cautions that under Thabo Mbeki the state seemed to have
discarded Peter Evans’ (1995) concept of ‘embedded autonomy as a way in which
the state can effectively manage relationships with the rest of society’ by opting for
the Weberian idea of state autonomy at the expense of a strong civil society.
According to Mangcu (2007, 124 – 125), Weber believed that
“the most important task of the bureaucracy is to provide a certain level
of predictability and efficiency of action by decision makers”, and such
“clarity of state actions could be achieved only by an autonomous state
unencumbered by the clamour and clatter of community participation in
the process of governance. Evans argues that while bureaucratic (or
corporate) coherence is necessary for effective action, social
connectedness is necessary to bring forth the energies of the
population into the decision processes of government.11 The ‘little social
connection that exists is mainly to business organisations such as the
Big Business Working Group or the International Marketing Council.
Organisations representing labour are weak, ineffectual and hardly
have any weight.”12
Citing Evans (1995), Mangcu (2007, 125) continues that if
“labour cannot be marginalized or ignored, a dependable arena of
centralized bargaining between capital and labor is essential. A
competent state provides that arena.”13. “However, much as its
attempts to embrace the developmental state are a laudable correction
to the prevailing orthodoxy, the ANC still sees itself as the custodian of
civil society. To solve the conundrum of managing the plurality of social
voices and forces the ANC rather cleverly places itself on both sides of
embedded autonomy.”14
However, Mbeki’s attitude towards civil society in general and labour unions in
particular does not differ in essence from that of Robert Mugabe prior to the
16
establishment of a government of national unity in Zimbabwe, and King Mswati of
Swaziland. Mugabe had no qualms about oppressing the labour federation and the
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), that challenged the ruling Zimbabwean
African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). Likewise, in Swaziland Mswati
doggedly refused to allow the labour federation political space, he has recently
relented under pressure from the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC).
Some commentators believe that they fear a repetition of what happened in Zambia
where the labour leader, Frederick Chiluba, was successful in unseating the
liberation icon, Kenneth Kaunda.
For the sake of equilibrium in the discussion on civil society, one needs to
problematise NGOs as a key constituent of civil society. “Much like social
movements, NGOs contested spaces previously held by labour unions and political
parties, in both the political and social arenas. Supposedly, the increase in
numbers15 and presence were part and parcel of the advent of civil society – and civil
society organizations (CSOs) – at the national and international level. Yeates (2005,
1 – 2) suggests that:
“While the prevalent image of NGOs is that of entities independent and
critical of governments, one cannot be naïve. Powerful governments
turn to, or even create, NGOs – government-organized NGOs – in order
to further the interest of the state. While NGO would argue endlessly
that it is independent, the reality could be different, whether by direct
control or by setting a political, financial or even ideological framework
defined by the powers that be.
The difference may be that even
governments may claim that the NGOs they work with are independent,
albeit the close working relationship on many issues raises eyebrows.
“Other governments have no such qualms. For example, the United
States (US) government makes no apology for the use of NGOdelivered ‘humanitarian aid’ that happens to also serve Washington’s
political and military objectives. The alleged neutrality reveals its true
face as military and relief activity becomes mixed, sometimes at the
expense not only of the aid agencies’ reputation, but also at the cost of
aid workers’ lives.”
17
However, even “powerful multinational corporations, usually the subject of
criticism of social movements and many NGOs”, establish and fund NGOs. “Some of
the most prominent health-related NGOs receive support from key corporations in the
same field. What credibility can these non-profit organizations claim when, according
to a report of the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CPSI),
“more than 170 disease related charities, health-professional societies,
and university-based institutes enjoy the largesse of food, agribusiness,
chemical, pharmaceutical, and other corporate interest, but that
generosity may exact too high a price on an important sector of
American life” (Common Dreams News Center, 2003 cited in Bendaňa,
2006, 2).
Social movements are a more recent development in urban and rural civil society
in developing countries, and came into being as “leading social forces in politics”.
Social movements “develop an organizing dynamic quite different from the
networking carried out by entities fundamentally dedicated to policy advocacy,
service delivery and monitoring, which are characteristic of many NGOs.” However,
there are differences of opinion and approaches between social movements of the
North and South. For instance, Jubilee South found it difficult to work with Jubilee
North, “since historical and analytical understanding of the debt question were
considerably different”. Jubilee North and “governments in the South” supported
“debt forgiveness” for only the “poorest countries” and that these governments
“spend the proceeds of any debt relief on social programmes” – a conditionality the
World Bank welcomed since “that gave it even more negotiation power”. Jubilee
South on the other hand wanted “debt repudiation” or cancellation for all poor
countries in “recognition of the real debt by the North to the South as a result of
abusive colonial behaviour”. Governments in the South dared not pronounce these
words “for fear of lowering their international credit rating and being scolded by the
World Bank and the IMF” (Bendaňa (2006, 8 – 9).
5.
An Overview of Development and Socio-Economic Conditions in Africa
The concept ‘development’ is like its twin in this contribution, ‘state’, a contested
construct. The emphasis and essence in the following definitions of development
underscore the differences of opinion. “Development is a process of economic,
18
social and political change that produces improvements in standards of living, social
well-being and political participation” (Hall and Midgley, 2004, glossary).
For Amartya Sen
“Development can be seen as a process of expanding the real
freedoms that people enjoy. Focusing on human freedoms contrasts
with narrower views of development, such as identifying development
with the growth of gross national product, or with the rise in personal
incomes, or with industrialization, or with technological advance, or with
social modernization. … Development requires the removal of major
sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic
opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public
facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states”
(Amartya Sen, 2000, p.1).
The term “development means different things to different people”, concurs
Todaro. He suggests that:
“Development must therefore be conceived as a multidimensional
process involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes,
and national institutions, as well as the acceleration of economic
growth, the reduction of inequality, and the eradication of poverty.
Development, in its essence, must represent the whole gamut of
change by which an entire social system, tuned to the basic needs and
desires of individuals and social groups within that system, moves away
from a condition of life widely perceived as unsatisfactory toward a
situation or condition of life regarded as materially and spiritually
‘better’” (Todaro, 1994, 16 – 17).
Todaro “agrees with Professor Goulet (1971) and others that at least three basic
components or core values should serve as a conceptual basis and practical
guideline for understanding the inner meaning of development. These core values –
sustenance, self-esteem and freedom – represent common goals sought by all
individuals and societies. Sen (2001) appears to concur with these values.
Countries on the African continent differ significantly from developed nations, in
that most African states vary between ‘developing’ status with a dualistic nature of
fairly modern urban centres (towns or cities) to relatively poorly or under-developed
rural areas, and some countries being classified as ‘less or least developed’. But
19
both categories are in the main predicated on the fact that the majority of people are
living in rural areas. Baker and Pedersen (1992, 11) argue that local, regional and
national development and change in Africa are inevitably bound up with a discussion
of the role, nature and repercussions of agriculture on other sectors of the economy.
However, agriculture as the lead sector in most cases, does not operate in a spatial
vacuum and the settlement pattern plays a supporting, and in (their) view imperative,
role in agricultural and rural transformation. They emphasise the interdependence
and mutuality of the rural and urban sectors and, in particular, the role that small
towns have as agents for rural improvement. Whilst Howland’s central place theory
(cited in Bingham and Mier, 1993, 62-65), with its hierarchy of settlements has some
relevance in the African context, one needs to be mindful of the fact that capitalism
emerged in Africa while the majority of the population remains outside the sphere of
influence of capitalist relations of production (Mhone, 1997, 9).
In the independence decade of the 1960s, urban development was considered
beneficial for national development (in Africa). By the 1970s, when it was clear that
these had failed, the pendulum swung in the opposite direction. Urbanisation was
viewed as a parasitic process which led to underdevelopment, and the neglect of
agriculture. Consequently, an appropriate strategy was devised to counter and
reverse the immiseration of the countryside – integrated rural development
programmes (IRDP). The main thrust IRDPs was on agricultural change, while little
consideration was given to the vital role of settlements in the rural economy. While
some IRDPs had some success they have generally depended upon permanent
external interventions and thus lack self-sustainability. By the 1980s, this ‘myopic
focus on rural development (McNulty, 1987, 36) lost its appeal as the anticipated
results and objectives were not realised. The emphasis shifted, and is still shifting,
towards a concern with the interdependence and symbiosis of the rural and the
urban, and this has meant the explicit rejection of the earlier compartmentalism of
rural and urban into two separate and distinct areas for investigation and intervention
(Baker and Pedersen, 1992, 12).
De Beer and Swanepoel (2000, 23) concur with Baker and Pedersen and Mhone
that most Southern African countries have a dualistic socio-economic structure
whereby a modern sector resides side by side with a subsistence sector and the
latter provides a livelihood for the majority of the population in the region. Gilbert and
Gugler (1984), in De Beer and Swanepoel (2000, 24), argue that migration
20
strengthens market links between rural and urban areas. There is a beneficial
relationship between the two in that some activities needed by both rural and urban
areas may be located in urban areas while others may be located in rural areas. This
is manifest in the household economy – which refers to the interaction between
household and family organisations, and the economy. The household economy is a
means to an end, namely survival, which extends beyond the survival of a
household. As a result of the socio-economic links with the rural areas, the urban
household has a duty to meet its obligations toward rural relatives, in what is known
as the ‘economy of affection’. According to Hyden (1983, 8), in De Beer and
Swanepoel (2000, 24), the economy of affection consists of support networks,
communication and interaction between groups bound by kinship, community,
religion and lineage. Decisions are made within the household economy with due
regard for the urban and rural household.
Labour market research conducted by the University of KwaZulu-Natal and
published last year (Webster and Von Holdt, 2005, 5 – 27) found that three zones
exist in South Africa e.g. firstly “the core, formal-sector workers in more or less stable
employment relations”, secondly “the zone of casualised and externalized work,
where non-core workers are compelled into less stable employment relations”, and
thirdly “the periphery, where people ‘make a living’ through informal sector activities”.
The latter zone includes ‘rural production enterprises’, which ‘keep foundering
because of an absence of viable markets for their goods’, and ‘those who live in the
poverty-blighted rural areas’ who ‘experience an extreme degree of economic
exclusion’. ‘For many living there, virtually the only access to economic resources is
through social grants such as old-age pensions and child-support grants’. This is not
necessarily true in all respects for other Southern African countries with smaller
economies and constrained labour absorptive capacity (Mhone, 1997, 9).
The high levels of un/underemployment and poverty in Southern Africa, their
causes and theoretical conceptualisation will briefly be examined at this point.
Mhone (1997, 9) suggests that in Africa capitalism as a mode of production was
supplanted onto a primarily subsistence form of production organised along
communal lines. Capitalism in Africa and Southern Africa did not arise through the
transformation of agrarian subsistence forms of production and the simultaneous
emergence of capitalist forms of production that encompassed both agriculture and
21
industry and commodification of almost all the active population, except perhaps
housewives.
Capitalism emerged in Africa while the majority of the population remains outside
the sphere of influence of capitalist relations of production. and one finds in Southern
Africa as in many African countries the phenomenon of enclavity and economic
dualism with its concomitant low labour absorption rate. A minority of the population
is engaged in dynamic (economic) activities propelled by the capitalist imperative of
accumulation, and another, comprising the majority, is trapped in non-capitalist forms
of production and engaged in low productivity economic pursuits that are static from
the point of accumulation. The capitalist sector, which can be labelled the formal
sector, exists as an enclave in a sea of under-employment, which can be called the
informal sector. This economic dualism is not so much defined by separateness as
by interrelatedness and mutual determination (Mhone, 1997, 9).
Since many able-bodied individuals in Africa are rarely openly unemployed, it is
more useful to refer to under-employment as the major problem. The persistent and
pervasiveness of under-employment is a fundamental problem for both economic
and social reasons. From the point of view of economic efficiency the fact that a
significant proportion of the labour force, or any resource for that matter, remains
under utilized must represent a constraint and a drag on economic growth and
development. Indeed, the latter term, economic development, loses its meaning if
economic growth does not entail the involvement of the majority in productive
economic activities and the upliftment of their standards of living. At the social level,
the under-employment implies that individuals in this segment of the labour force do
not produce and earn enough to ensure that they have decent standards of living.
The social consequences of under-employment are easily seen in the low life
expectancy rates and high incidence of health and social maladies such as high
infant mortality rates, all of which are well known. Thus the persistence of underemployment is of interest on economic and humanitarian grounds (Mhone, 1997, 4).
De Beer and Swanepoel (2000, 9 – 11 & 19) opine that rural poverty is endemic
among the poor households in the Third World and manifests itself in a number of
ways, amongst others malnutrition, hunger and disease. The groups which are
affected most include the landless, the near-landless, female-headed households
and children. The poor are trapped in a cycle of poverty, which Robert Chambers
(1983) calls the deprivation trap. To understand the deprivation trap one has to
22
understand the types of disadvantage which poor people experience. Chambers
(1983) identifies five clusters of disadvantage: poverty, physical weakness, isolation,
vulnerability and powerlessness. While the majority of families are poor, rich people
are also found in the same community. The poor becomes poorer and the rich even
richer. However, some money that is distributed back to the community should not
be given in the form of handouts, because this promotes dependency.
Continuing, Chambers (1983) suggests that poor families are large and consist of
many children, as well as aged and disabled individuals. Many mouths need a great
deal of food, but poor families have little income to sufficiently provide for this basic
need. Food is of a poor quality and low nutritional value, resulting in
undernourishment and malnutrition. Malnutrition causes low birth weight – a
disadvantage to start with in life; it also contributes to poor performance in school,
and lower labour output. Communication is a problem in the rural areas and
peripheral urban squatter settlements. People are far removed from social
infrastructure such as schools and medical care; employment opportunities are
scarce and spread over a huge distance. Isolation is poor families contributes to a
high rate of illiteracy. Lack of transport further increases isolation.
The poor are vulnerable because of their dependence on the landlords and
traditional authorities. They live from hand to mouth. If the father dies, there is little
hope of survival. A vicious cycle starts: the mother must go to work (most often in the
city) and the children are left in the care of aged relatives or without care at all. The
poor are intimidated by the practices of the rich, on whom they are dependent for
their livelihood. Furthermore, because of their remoteness, the poor have little, if any,
access to politicians and opinion leaders and can therefore not influence policies to
their benefit. These people have low status in the eyes of society (Chambers 1983,
cited in De Beer and Swanepoel, 2000, 9 – 11).
Mafeje, who approaches poverty from a rather different angle, argues that in
sub-Saharan Africa
“where even the destitute have residual rights in the assets of their
lineages, the problem is less of access than of lack of means for joining
in the mobilization of existing resources. Put differently, minimal
accumulation is the prerequisite for reproducing oneself socially. The
poor are not poor because they are poor but because they are socially
deprived, that is, they can help themselves if someone somewhere in
23
society can help them to do so. Poverty is not simply a fault of
individuals but a socially determined economic condition” (Mafeje,
2003, 24).
Whilst Chambers (1983) and Guest (2004) hold rather depressing views of the
African situation, De Soto ((2000) is more optimistic about Third World prospects.
Guest (2004, 6) concludes: Africa is the poorest continent on earth, and the only one
that, despite all the technological advances that are filling stomachs and pockets
everywhere else, has actually grown poorer over the last thirty years. The numbers
are staggering: half of sub-Saharan Africa’s 600 million people live on just sixty five
American cents a day, and even this figure is misleadingly rosy. Many Africans rarely
have any money at all. They build there own homes, often out of mud and sticks.
They grow their own food. When the rains fail, they go hungry. And when the rains
are too heavy, as in Mozambique, they lose their homes. The median African country
has a gross domestic product (GDP) of only $2 billion – roughly the output of a small
town in Europe. Not even Africans want to invest in Africa – about 40 per cent of
Africa’s privately held wealth is held offshore.
However, De Soto (2000, 5 – 6, 66 – 67) argues that the grimmest picture of the
Third World is not the most accurate. In the midst of their own poorest
neighbourhoods and shanty towns (mud and stick dwellings in rural villages) there
are – if not … trillions of dollars, all ready to be put to use if only we can unravel the
mystery of how assets are transformed into live capital. Much of the marginalization
of the poor in developing countries and former communist nations comes from their
inability to benefit from the six effects that property provides. The challenge these
countries face is not whether they should produce or receive more money but
whether they can understand the legal institutions and summon the political will
necessary to build a property system that is easily accessible to the poor.
Mafeje concurs with De Soto in a somewhat different spin to the ‘bankability’ of
poor peasant African farmers, and argues that
“treating poverty elimination as basically development from below
makes perfect sense in sub-Saharan Africa. … Unlike landless
peasants in Asia and Latin America, poor peasants in Africa have a
claim to land resources and their land rights are often recognized by
their families or lineages. Such surety makes them thoroughly bankable
and an economic asset, if given the opportunity to be productive. In
24
Malawi, Kydd and Hewitt (1986) found that the rate of repayment of
government loans by poor peasants exceeded 94 per cent” (Mafeje,
2003, 28).
However, African governments will have to increase their investment of about 6
per cent in agriculture and rural development to 24 per cent with a view to increasing
the productivity of agriculture, “to reap multiple benefits, namely the elimination of
absolute poverty and acceleration of agricultural expansion by pushing into the
expanded petty mode of production as many small producers as possible, and
reduction/elimination of rural unemployment. The state has a big facilitative role to
play in development in Africa, where the local capitalists are too few and too weak to
take charge of the national economy”. African economies also need “some protection
from the state against critical external economies as it is the case in developed
countries. The African tragedy is that the state itself has become the single biggest
development problem. Apart from the rampant corruption, there is wanton waste of
resources on the development of means of repression such as militarization”
(Hutchful and Bathily, 1998 cited in Mafeje, 2003, 28).
Mohammad Yunus (2006, 7), the founder of the Grameen Bank, who argues that
capitalism has the potential lift the poorest out of plight, suggests that:
“We get what we want or what we don’t refuse”. Yunus (ibid, 5-8) in
critiquing the mainstream version of capitalism and propagating the
concept of ‘social businesses’ as a vehicle to “change the lives of the
bottom 60 percent of the world population and help them get out of
poverty”, bemoans the fact that we as human beings allowed
“conceptual restrictions (to be) imposed on players in the market”. He
suggests that by “defining ‘entrepreneur’ in a broader way, we can
change the character of capitalism radically and solve many of the
unresolved social and economic problems within the scope of the free
market”.
6.
The Role of the State in Development
In this section the role of the state in development in Africa in general and
Southern Africa in particular, and the concept ‘developmental state’ will be briefly
examined. One school of thought argues that the construct ‘developmental state’
emanates from ‘development economics’ and is generally associated with
25
developing countries. Gilpin (2001, 306) reckons that the ‘theory of the
developmental state’ arose in the late 1980s and early 1990s to challenge
neoliberalism. Consistent with development economics, the theory of the
developmental state emphasizes that the state should play the central role in
economic development.
Unlike those of neoliberalism, the proponents of the ‘developmental state’ credit
the central role of the state for the rapid industrialization of the East Asian economies
– also called the NICs.16 The traditional Anglo-American view of the state is
predicated on liberalism or neo-liberalism, which propagates a reductionist or weak
state and strong market dichotomy, which is in conflict with the concept of the
‘developmental state’ (Weiss, 1999). Another school of thought suggests that the
concept ‘developmental state’ is not a new idea and dates back to the mercantilist
ideas of some German scholars. Mercantilism “was a pragmatic adaptation, a theory
of economic practice, and not a theory of how economies are supposed to operate”
(Woo-Cumings, 1999, 4 – 5).
For Evans “state involvement is a given”, and “the appropriate question” to pose
when discussing the role of the state is not “how much” but “what kind” of state
involvement is taking place in a particular economy and society and what the effects
are of such involvement. He studied Brazil, India and Korea, as “newly industrializing
countries, since they are “an excellent triplet” for his study of “the evolution of
information technology sector”, which allowed him “to sharpen general ideas about
state structures, state-society relations, and how they shape possibilities for
industrial transformation”. Continuing, Evans avers that variations in state
involvement
“… depend on
variations in the states themselves. States are not
generic. They vary dramatically in the internal structures and relations
to society. Different kinds of state structures create different capacities
for action. Structures define the range of roles that a state is capable of
playing. Outcomes depend both on whether the roles fit the context and
on how well they are executed” (Evans, 1995, 10 – 11).
Evans distinguishes between three types of state: ‘predatory’ (the then Zaire;
now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), ‘developmental’ (Japan, Korea and
Taiwan) and ‘intermediate’ (India and Brazil):
26
“Predatory states extract at the expense of society, undercutting
development even in the narrow sense of capital accumulation.
Developmental
states
not
only
have
presided
over
industrial
transformation but can be plausibly argued to have played a role in
making it happen. … Most developing states offer combinations of
Zairian predation and East Asian ‘embedded autonomy’. The balance
varies over time and from organization to organization within the state.
Brazil and India are good examples” (Evans, 1995, 12, 44 – 45 & 60).
According to Kohli (2005, 1 – 12, who conducted a comparative empirical study
of Brazil, India, Korea and Nigeria to develop his model of state-directed
development, states have played a role in fostering different rates and patterns of
economic development, especially via deliberate industrialization, in some
developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. He distinguishes between
three types of states i.e. ‘neopatrimonial’ (Nigeria), ‘cohesive-capitalist’ (Korea) and
‘fragmented-multiclass’ (India) states; Brazil has vacillated between a ‘cohesivecapitalist’ (under military dictatorship) and ‘fragmented-multiclass’ state (under
democratic rule) over time. But none of these types of states are found in pure form
in any of the developing countries. Instead, countries in specific periods exhibit more
of one characteristic and/or tendency than another.
For Kohli (2005, 9) a
“defining characteristic of all modern states is a well established public
arena that is both normatively and organizationally distinguishable from
private interests and pursuits”. “Unfortunately, for a variety of historical
reasons, this distinction between the public and the private realms was
never well established in a number of developing countries, especially
African states. As a result, a number of distorted states emerged with
weakly
centralized
and
barely
legitimate
authority
structures,
personalistic leaders unconstrained by norms or institutions, and
bureaucracies of poor quality.”
‘Neopatrimonial’ states are not really labelled as “modern, rational legal states
because, despite the façade of a modern state, public office holders tend to treat
public resources as their personal patrimony”, and state-led development in such
states has “often resulted in disaster, mainly because both public goals and
capacities to pursue specific tasks in these settings have been repeatedly
27
undermined by personal and narrow group interests. Nigeria best exemplifies this
ideal-typical tendency.”
Continuing, Kohli (2005, 10 – 11) argues that
“cohesive-capitalist states, sometimes called developmental states, are
situated opposite neopatrimonial states on the political effectiveness
continuum. These states are characterized by cohesive politics, that is,
by centralized and purposive authority structures that often penetrate
deep into society. For a variety of historical reasons these states have
tended to equate rapid economic growth with national security and thus
defined it as a priority.”
Political arrangements include “identifiable links with society’s major economic
groups” (producer and capitalist groups), which results in “a tight control over labor”,
and “efficacious political instruments”. The main political instrument of these states
is a “competent bureaucracy”, and since it is difficult to hold the “narrow elite
alliance” together, politics has often been “repressive and authoritarian, with leaders
often using ideological mobilization (e.g. nationalism and/or anti-communism) to win
acceptance in the society”.17 This type of state has been the “most successful
agents of deliberate state-led industrialization in peripheral countries”.
“In between the two extremes of political effectiveness defined by
neopatrimonial states on the one end and cohesive-capitalist states on
the other lie fragmented multiclass states. Unlike neopatrimonial states,
fragmented multiclass states are real modern states. They command
authority, and a public arena within them is often well enough
established that leaders are held accountable for poor public policies
and performance. However, public authority in these states tends to be
more fragmented and to rest on a broader class alliance – meaning that
their goals are not as narrowly defined or cannot as effectively be
pursued as is the case in cohesive-capitalist states. For example,
leaders
in
these
states
must
typically
pursue
several
goals
simultaneously, as they seek to satisfy multiple constituencies” (Kohli,
2005, 11).
Policy formulation and implementation, moreover, is often politicized, either
because of intraelite conflicts or because state authority does not penetrate deep
enough down in society to incorporate and control the lower classes. When
28
confronted by mobilized opposition, these states typically become obsessed with
jissues of legitimacy and often promise more than they can deliver.” These states
tend to be “middling performers on numerous dimensions, including the promotion of
industrialization and growth”. The cases of India and Brazil in several periods
exemplify this type of state. However, all developing countries democracies with
“plebiscitarian” politics and weak institutions constitute a special sub-set of
fragmented multiclass states (Kohli, 2005, 11).
Not everyone necessarily concurs with Kohli’s categorization of states and his
argument as to how Brazil and India should be categorized “on the political
effectiveness continuum”.18 Schneider endorses the following three categories:
“command, developmental and market economies” and agrees with Chalmers
Johnson and Juan Linz that
“developmental states and authoritarian regimes are not mere
midpoints on a continuous scale”. “Developmental has been applied to
states such as those in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and fascist Italy, but this
type of state took a particular form, what I call the desarrollista19 state,
in Mexico, Brazil, and other countries of Latin America” (1999, 276 –
277, in Woo-Cumings, 1999).
Baker and Pedersen (1992, 14) also argue that economic systems in most African
countries have been highly centralised, in other words national government (or the
state) has driven the economy in these African countries. Mhone (1993) agrees with
the South Commission’s Report, The Challenge to the South, which makes
“an impassioned plea for new initiatives by the South to address its
plight”, and “recognises the failure and unsustainability of past (pre mid
1970s) development strategies in the South, but also critically assesses
the adequacy of stabilization and structural adjustment programmes
currently in vogue in many beleaguered economies of the South,
particularly those of Sub Sahara Africa”.
The report, citing the experience of the NICs, argues for a more activist role of
the state in initiating and guiding the development process even if it is market driven.
However, the need for an activist state in (the Southern African) economies is made
all the more necessary if (the) goal is economic development rather than a mere
resuscitation of economic growth (Mhone, 1993, 221 – 222). Mhone and Edigheji
(2003, 54 – 360), who support an interventionist policy stance, believe that the
29
‘Washington Consensus’ (mostly represented by the International Monetary Fund
and World Bank) can be and is being effectively challenged by social movements
(civil society) across the globe and governments in developing countries. They argue
that the South African Government should not continue to pursue neoliberalism
(Gear), but a “developmental or transformation agenda as the primary grand strategy
to
reduce
unemployment,
underemployment
and
poverty,
within
which
considerations related to (macroeconomic) stabilisation can be considered as
secondary issues”.
However, Makgetla (2004, 10 September) believes that the conditions which
made the East Asian developmental states possible then no longer exist, and that
SA cannot simply replicate the ‘model developmental state’. For her the debate
about the developmental state does not provide answers to the economic challenges
facing SA. Makgetla also makes the point that the concept of the developmental
state captures the importance of the powerful, nationalist state driving economic
policy based on, amongst other things, a long-term structural vision for the economy.
Makgetla has sustained the gist of her argument in New Agenda (Fourth Quarter,
2007).
Dawes (Mail & Guardian, 2005, 11 to 17 February) avers South Africa is
increasingly tempering liberal economic policies based on the Washington
Consensus with a state-led growth model that draws its inspiration from a very
different capital – Beijing. He calls this the ‘Beijing Consensus’, which is a radical
economic and social model and strategy pursued by the Chinese government.
However, one gets a somewhat different view if one considers what authors like Lin,
Cai and Li (2003) argue about the success of the Chinese model. Whilst Lin, et al.
(2003, 2 – 3,120 – 121) opine that government has a role to play in ‘economic
development’, they believe that by opting for the ‘comparative-advantage-following
strategy like “Japan and the four Little Dragons” (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore
and Hong Kong) China has experienced unsurpassed economic growth (averaging
10% for the last 30 years) unlike the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
China has also been more successful than India over this period although they
followed the same ‘leap-forward’ strategy with its focus on investing in heavy
industries (Bezant C Raj, 2006).
“Since 1978 China began to reform its highly centralized and inefficient
economic system” by using its comparative advantage in factor
30
endowment, especially its huge and well-educated population and the
size of the country. “Under the ‘comparative-advantage-following
strategy, a government must ensure that the market is given full play
and that price signals are correct. Therefore, the role of government is,
first of all, to maintain the competitive nature and rules of the market”
(Lin, et al., 2003, 120 – 121).
However, high economic growth rates do not necessarily translate into prosperity
or poverty eradication for every one in those countries. Hall and Midgley (2004, 45)
suggest that many countries that have recorded high rates of economic growth still
have a high proportion of the population in poverty. For instance, despite China
being the fastest growing major economy in the world for the last 30 years with a
current growth rate of 9.4%, the Chinese workers in the rural areas are not benefiting
from such high economic growth, but are sometimes still earning little more than one
US dollar a day20. This is also the case in India which grows at about 7% annually.
The best hope of raising standards of living and eradicating poverty lies in an
approach that combines commitment to economic development with the introduction
of social policies that specifically and directly address the poverty problem (Hall and
Midgley, 2004, 45). The Chinese and Indian governments have now adopted policies
and strategies to narrow the urban-rural divide (Steele, Mail & Guardian, 2006,
March 24 to 30).
The governing party in South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC),
published thirteen discussion documents to stimulate debate ahead of its June 2007
policy conference. According to Matshiqi (Business Day, 2007, April 13) a key
debate would be about the “role, nature and character of the post-apartheid state”
and “whether the post-apartheid state is a developmental state or not”. According to
Matshiqi the ANC would continue “to characterise the post-apartheid state as a
‘developmental state, partly in response to the accusation (by Congress of SA Trade
Unions and the SA Communist Party) that it has been leading a ‘neoliberal state’.
For Matshiqi South Africa is neither ‘a pure neoliberal’ nor ‘a pure developmental
state’, and he concurs with Evans (1995) that in “defining a developmental state, the
trick is to establish a connection between development impact and structural
characteristics of the state”.
The ANC defined what is understands by the concept ‘developmental state’ and
adopted a number of resolutions on “Economic Transformation” at its National
31
Conference
in
December
2007.
The
organization’s
“understanding
of
a
developmental state is that it is located at the centre of a mixed economy” and that “it
is a state which leads and guides that economy and which intervenes in the interest
of the people as a whole. The ANC also believes the South African developmental
state should be democratic and
“whilst learning from the experiences of others, must be built on the
solid foundation of South African realities”. “Whilst engaging private
capital strategically, our government must be rooted amongst the
people and buttressed by a mass-based democratic liberation
movement. Whilst determining a clear and consistent path forward, it
must also seek to build consensus on a democratic basis that builds
national unity. Whilst acting effectively to promote growth, efficiency and
productivity, it must be equally effective in addressing the social
conditions of the masses of our people and realising economic progress
for the poor.”
It is appropriate to conclude this section with Leftwich’s sobering perspective on
the “primacy of politics” in the reduction of poverty in recent and contemporary
history, which he says has been:
“attributable to two processes: economic growth which creates
opportunities and jobs, and political processes which develop and
sustain institutional arrangements that provide both safety nets and
redistributive provision (welfare regimes, broadly). Neither have been
possible without direct intervention and action by effective states and
both have only occurred quickly where such states have not only been
effective but developmental. On its own, rapid market-driven (or even
state-driven) transformative economic growth can leave many people or
regions out of the process and generate profound inequalities. …
[I]ndeed … post-war South Africa illustrates precisely how growth is not
automatically or necessarily inclusive, and that it does not always
contribute directly to the reduction of poverty or inequality. Moreover,
narrow sectoral growth, however significant in terms of its contribution
to national income, as with diamonds in Botswana (Selolwe, Siphambe,
Ntseane, Maipose, Balogi and Nthomang 2007) may contribute little to
32
poverty reduction if its contribution to job creation is limited”21 (Leftwich,
2008, 4 – 6).
What should a possible model of a South African ‘developmental state’ look like?
Turok (2007, Umrabulo, No 30) contends (prior to the ANC’s Polokwane
Conference) that “given the scale of the legacy of unemployment, poverty and
inequality, there is now a sense of urgency and it takes the form of pressure for a
developmental state, though substantially different to that of the East Asian Tigers,
and even contemporary China … We clearly need a developmental state with South
African characteristics”. Godongwana, writing in the same edition of Umrabulo
(2007), advances a succinct but cogent argument that we need a ‘social democratic
developmental state, not an authoritarian one. He refers to four developing countries
e.g. Kerala (India), Costa Rica, Mauritius, and Chile, as exemplary cases.
Godongwana endorses the assertion of Sandbrook et al. (2007) that "though
unusual, the social and political conditions from which these developing-world social
democracies arose are not unique; indeed, pragmatic and proactive socialdemocratic movements helped create these favourable conditions."
Mafeje (2003, 30) also endorses social democracy, but whilst on the one hand he
opined that agriculture ought to be prioritised “in the foreseeable future” to “feed the
rapidly growing African population”, he believes on the other that African
governments should “think of other ways of financing industrialization, which is fast
becoming the sine qua non for the future of the continent”:
“… social democracy as being a necessary condition for equitable
development in Africa. In this context, the important injunction is that, if
we are serious about poverty eradication and a bottom-up development
strategy, then the policy of extracting surplus-value from the peasants
for the benefit of urban areas should be abandoned so as to ensure
equity and ensure that the urban areas live on added value, as a logical
imperative of such a development strategy.
7. Social Policy in Southern Africa
Before engaging in a discussion of the social policy interventions of Southern
African governments, this section will be prefaced by elaborating on the reasons for
social policy. Six different goals or reasons for social policy interventions have been
outlined. The six goals of social policy are: reducing poverty, promoting social
33
equality, promoting social stability, promoting social integration, promoting economic
efficiency, and promoting autonomy (Goodin, 1988; 1999). In Van Niekerk’s (2008)
opinion, these goals are highly contested in terms of what is prioritised and in terms
of what the best approaches are for meeting them. But they help to introduce us to
some of the range of motives and contested purposes of social policy interventions.
According to Van Niekerk (2008), social policy in the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) must be examined within the context of the notion
of a post-colonial state. The post-colonial state rested on indigenous social bases
whilst simultaneously being connected to international systems. Post-colonial states
were strongly influenced by the modalities of their integration into world trade - many
were mono commodity producers. Economies were not diversified and externally
weak. One of the main ideas that has shaped economic and social policy thinking
and practice in post-colonial Africa is the nationalist discourse. In turn, two concerns
have shaped the nationalist discourse, across the ideological divide: economic
growth and national unity (Adesina, 2007). The eradication of ignorance, poverty and
disease were central to the nationalist agenda, and economic growth was seen as a
means for achieving these objectives.
Central to this model was a strong social policy initiative tied to the
‘constructionist’ approach to economic development, that is, the building of physical
and social as well as human infrastructures. The state's systems of allocations and
transfers were significant in underpinning social and political cohesion and, thereby,
the state's legitimacy. This then became linked to the post-colonial social policy
agenda. Aina (2004) locates this in what is referred to as the legitimising model. In
attempting to correct the wrongs wrought by colonialism, most nationalist
movements
tried
to
create
developmental
states
after
winning
political
independence. The notion of a developmental state is thought of in ways that it was
able to marshal resources aimed at creating equitable social and economic systems
in Africa. What this meant was that the state played an active part in the social and
economic development of the nation. The state also became the main provider of
social services aimed at raising the quality of life of the people (Van Niekerk, 2008).
In terms of ideology, such a state is essentially one whose ideological
underpinning is “developmentalist” in that it conceives its “mission” as that of
ensuring economic development, usually interpreted to mean high rates of
accumulation and industrialisation (Mkandawire, 1998). However, when economies
34
failed donor agendas shaped the means (and Structural Adjustment Programmes).
Nations could not define national agendas in matters of human well-being but
became the prerogative of outside actors such as the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund. All the countries in the region were at one point colonised and the
mode of colonisation was at the outset racialistic in both economic and political terms
(Van Niekerk, 2008).
Colonial domination also implied an exclusive type of capitalism based on race
right (and privilege). After independence governments had sought to redress the
resulting marginalisation of citizens due to colonial domination. Social policy in most
of Southern Africa has been articulated through publicly guaranteed access to health
care and education; rather than for instance through social insurance, unemployment
insurance or pronatalist social provisioning. Botswana, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia
and Zimbabwe followed this route, and out of the four mentioned countries,
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe instituted the most radical and comprehensive
measures in the health and education sector (Van Niekerk, 2008).
These countries were heavily influenced by ideological positions in the provision
of services. All tried to express some form of socialism. Both the social policy of
Tanzania and Zambia were steeped in liberation politics. This meant that the actual
benefits of social policy did not accrue not only to citizens of these two countries but
to all Southern Africans that were fighting colonial rule in Angola, Mozambique,
Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe (Van Niekerk, 2008). Zambia undertook the
most radical measures in regard to social policy in the 1960s, ’70s and early ’80s
due to the fact that it was quite a rich country not only in Africa but in the developing
world. This was due to the profits accrued from its main export – copper. By 1969,
Zambia was classified a middle-income country, with one of the highest GDPs in
Africa, three times that of Kenya, twice that of Egypt, and higher than Brazil,
Malaysia, Turkey and South Korea (Fraser and Lungu, 2006).
Most post-colonial states had weak economies in terms of international vagaries.
They did not diversify their economies and thus were vulnerable to external shocks.
Once economies collapsed social policy also collapsed. It is important to always
conjoin the economic dimension with social variables. There is a need to embed the
discourse of ‘regional social policy’ (Van Niekerk, 2008).
35
8. Concluding Remarks
This paper attempts to contribute towards Africans findings African solutions to
our problems. Although there is consensus that social policy should aim at improving
people’s well-being (Hall and Midgley, 2004) or promoting the well being of all
citizens and addressing structural inequalities in wealth, ensuring greater equity and
equality for all, correcting market shortcomings, reducing poverty and fostering social
inclusion (Van Niekerk, 2008), it is evident that the vast majority of people living in
Southern Africa in particular and Africa in general do not as yet experience this state
of nirvana.
Sub-Saharan Africa, as “the poorest region of the world and, in comparative and
absolute terms” and “the region of the world in which industrialization and policies for
the attainment of real social security seem to have the furthest to travel” (Pierson,
2004), has the ideal opportunity for “rethinking social policy” away from its
reductionist interpretation (Mkandawire, 2001) and academic specialization. The
proposed holistic, integrative or systemic and long-term strategic approach to public
policy holds the promise of conceiving an “inclusive, democratic and developmental
social policy” (Yeates, 2005) within a multidisciplinary social scientific paradigm.
Some Southern African countries such as Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Namibia
and South Africa possess rich mineral resources, which are not benefitting poor
people. Since these countries are confronted by a number of daunting socioeconomic and social policy challenges, they should heed Leftwich’s (2008)
observation about the “primacy of politics” and that the symbiosis of the “two
processes: economic growth” and “political processes”, require “direct intervention
and action by effective”, but “developmental” states.
It is quite amazing that, whilst social policies like ideologies are human creations
we end up being the captives or slaves of our own conceptual frameworks.
Mohammad Yunus’ (2006) critique of the mainstream (Western) version of capitalism
and his propagation of the concept of ‘social businesses’ as a vehicle to “help the
bottom 60 percent of the world population out of poverty”, therefore, resonates with
me. Likewise, De Soto’s (2000) notion that capitalism should stop being an exclusive
private club of the rich minority of the world and should increasingly allow the poor
masses of the Third World access to the property system and wealth creation.
36
Although SADC has potential to promote more robust inter-regional trade and
economic cooperation like other trade blocks e.g. the European Union, owing to its
weakness the prospects for such enhanced trade and economic development
appear unlikely in the foreseeable future. Herbst’s (2000) seminal work, which
cogently espouses why a Eurocentric comprehension of the evolution of state
formation in Africa is not helpful and clarifies the reasons for “failing, failed or weak
states”, on the one hand casts doubt on these states’ capacity to deliver social
policies that will realise the “well-being of their citizens. On the other hand, Herbst’s
suggestion that SADC could contribute towards generating solutions to resolve some
of the challenges its member states encounter, warrants further research and
interrogation.
It is proposed that the following nascent ideas and insights are subjected to
further research with a view to developing conceptual frameworks and making
concrete and comprehensive social policy and related proposals for Southern African
countries on:

The masses of poor people in Southern Africa accessing the property
system and wealth creation (De Soto, 2000);

SADC contributing towards resolving the state development and
effectiveness challenges its member states encounter (Herbst, 2000);

Rethinking social within a more multidisciplinary social scientific approach
(Mkandawire, 2001);

The impact of an active social policy and investing in public services,
such as education and primary health care, on equity (Pierson, 2004);

Globalization facilitating inclusive, democratic and developmental social
policy formulation (Yeates, 2005;

The concept of ‘social businesses’ as a vehicle to changing the lives of
the poorest people and eradicating poverty in the region (Yunus, 2006);

Understanding the ‘primacy of politics’ and the symbiosis between
‘economic growth’ and ‘political processes’ within the context of ‘direct
intervention and action by effective’, but ‘developmental’ states (Leftwich,
2008);

Customising the concept of a social democratic developmental state for
Southern African countries (Mafeje, 2003 and Godongwana, 2007); and
37

Embedding the discourse of ‘regional social policy’ (Van Niekerk, 2008).
38
Notes
1
Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe
2 For example, South Africa and Botswana both belong to the Southern Africa Customs Union,
Zambia is a part of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, and Tanzania is a member
of the East African Community.See website:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern_African_Development_Community [Accessed 8 April 2009.
3 See for example, Wissink (1991), De Coning (1995) and Parsons (1995).
4 Mkandawire (2001, 1) uses “the term transformation advisedly, as this may involve retraction and
retrenchment as well as social development”.
5 As stated in the introductory section of this essay the state or public sector includes municipalities,
and one cannot examine the role of local government without inquiring how it relates to the concept of
the state in general and government in particular.
6 There are other names by which this construct is called e.g. ‘activist’, ‘developmental’, ‘dirigist’ or
‘interventionist’ state.
7 “This Weberian view of the state does require us to see it as much more than a mere arena in which
social groups make demands and engage in political struggles or compromises” (Skocpol, 1999:8).
8 “This function involves the remarkable fact, brooded upon by political theorists since time
immemorial, that somehow the state – which is organized force – becomes an agent of moral
authority, and its rule is accepted in the main by those subject to it” (Burnham, 1982:75, quoted in
Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987:321-322).
9 “This is because the state’s institutions can offer the most encompassing organizational complex for
overcoming a number of widely recognized obstacles to change, including problems of collective
action, bounded rationality and short-term horizons, as well as unprecedented time compression in
technological transformation” (Weiss, 1999:6).
10 See website: http://www.darfurscores.org/darfur (Accessed 1 April 2009).
11 “This apparently contradictory combination of corporate coherence and connectedness”, is what
Evans calls “embedded autonomy”, and it “provides the under-lying structural basis for successful
state involvement in industrial transformation. Only when embeddedness and autonomy are joined
together can a state be called developmental” (Evans, 1995, 12).
12 Mangcu’s assertion that the “National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), a
body set up for joint consultation on economic matters, was by-passed when the Mbeki government
adopted its controversial economic policy, GEAR, in 1996”, is somewhat erroneous. It happened
under Mandela, though Mbeki, as the Deputy President, drove the process and outcome.
13 “Far from making the state irrelevant, the comprehensive organization of class interest makes it
essential. As actors in civil society become more organized, a solid and sophisticated state apparatus
becomes more rather than less necessary”, Mangcu quoting Evans (2007, 125).
14 “It is the ANC and the ANC only that has the prerogative to guide society. This is not just because it
has been returned to power with ever-increasing majorities but because this is its historical mandate”,
Mangcu (2007, 5) attempts to articulate the ANC’s thinking.
15 According to the 2002 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development
Report, nearly one-fifth of the world’s 37,000 were formed in the 1990s.
16 Johnson (1982, 1&10) was the first person to apply the term ‘developmental state’ to Japan when
he describes the miraculous economic growth the country experienced since 1962. However, the
terms ‘developmentalism’ and ‘developmental state’ are not new to the social science debate on Latin
America. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto make first reference to ‘developmental
states’ in 1979 (Schneider, 1999, 76 – 277, in Woo-Cumings).
17 South Korea under Park Chung Hee and Brazil during both Estado Novo and the military
dictatorship share “some organizational and class characteristics with fascist states of interwar
Europe and Japan”. Obviously, these states do not draw explicit comparisons with discredited
fascism, and they tend to shy away from the politics of mass mobilization and ethnic cleansing.
18 Kohli says his ‘cohesive-capitalist’ state can sometimes be called ‘developmental’.
19 The Portuguese adjectives, desarrollista and desenvolvimentista, respectively, are useful for
distinguishing (post war) Latin American variants from other cases (Schneider (199, 277, in WooCumings).
20 You (magazine) 2005, July 17, 24-26.
21 Politics is best conceptualized as consisting of all the many activities of cooperation, conflict and
negotiation involved in decisions about the use, production and distribution of resources, whether
these activities are formal or informal, public or private, or a mixture of all”
39
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21
Politics is best conceptualized as consisting of all the many activities of cooperation, conflict and
negotiation involved in decisions about the use, production and distribution of resources, whether
these activities are formal or informal, public or private, or a mixture of all”
46