* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
Download Pricing in Imperfectly Competitive Markets
Survey
Document related concepts
Yield management wikipedia , lookup
Transfer pricing wikipedia , lookup
Marketing strategy wikipedia , lookup
Revenue management wikipedia , lookup
Global marketing wikipedia , lookup
Gasoline and diesel usage and pricing wikipedia , lookup
Product planning wikipedia , lookup
First-mover advantage wikipedia , lookup
Marketing channel wikipedia , lookup
Pricing science wikipedia , lookup
Dumping (pricing policy) wikipedia , lookup
Service parts pricing wikipedia , lookup
Price discrimination wikipedia , lookup
Transcript
Pricing in Imperfectly Competitive Markets Determinants of Pricing Decision • Economic analysis of pricing in imperfectly competitive markets identifies the following elements of the market environment as important to pricing decision: – number of competitors/ease of entry – similarity of competitors’ products – capacity limitations – on-going interactions – Information on past pricing decisions Bertrand • • • • Simultaneous price setting Identical products No capacity constraints One time interaction Price competition results in price equal marginal cost for all firms and zero profits Bertrand • Bertrand paradox (p=mc even though few firms in market) can be resolved by relaxing certain assumptions: • No Capacity Constraints • Undifferentiated Products • One-shot competition Capacity Constraints • Suppose each firm has max capacity of Ki • If firm j sets a higher price than firm i, j may get the left-over demand that firm i can’t satisfy if demand exceeds i’s capacity • So setting price above MC may be worthwhile Repeated Games and Collusion • Can Bertrand paradox be resolved if firms interact repeatedly? • Is it a Nash Equilibrium to set p>mc in the first period of a repeated interaction in an effort to ‘signal’ willingness to ‘cooperate’? • Depends on what we mean by repeated? -fixed number of times -infinite number of times • Fixed: -last period is same as one-shot game -no incentive to cooperate in any preceding period -cooperation unravels • Infinite: -no last period so cooperation is possible -influence behaviour through use of punishment strategies • Cooperation more likely when: -there is a high probability of future interaction -actions of rivals can be monitored -defectors can be easily punished -interest rates are low Product differentiation • Can Bertrand paradox be resolved if there is a small number of firms that interact strategically? • Firms produce different varieties of a product -varieties differ according to some characteristic • Consumers differ as to how they value the characteristic • Consumer location on line reveals preference for characteristic • Consumer pays a ‘mismatch’ or ‘transportation’ cost t which measures their aversion to buying something other than their preferred degree of the characteristic • This cost allows firms to charge a price above marginal cost • Product positioning: • If price competition is intense: -firms should locate far apart (differentiate), in order to be able to drive up price • If price competition is not intense: -firms should locate close together—in the center of the spectrum Switching and Search Costs • Once a consumer has experienced a product, there may be a cost associated with switching to a new product • There may also be a cost associated with finding out what products are available and at what price • In equilibrium, firms can have market power if these costs are sufficiently high Vertical Differentiation • Consumers agree on what is better, but differ in their willingness to pay for quality • When firms compete in prices with given qualities, equilibrium involves the higherquality firm charging a higher price than the lower-quality firm and earning higher profits • If firms first choose quality first and then price second, equlibrium involves maximum differentiation. • This is done in an effort to relax price competition. • True as long as consumers are sufficiently different in their willingness to pay for quality