Download History 202: Class Notes - Linn

Causes of the Civil War: 1776-1848
1) Constitutional Cause – States’ rights vs. Nationalism
One of the earliest proponents of this view was Alexander Stephens, the Confederate Vice-President,
who wrote soon after the war: “The contest was between those who held [the government] to be
strictly Federal in its character, and those who maintained that it was thoroughly National. . . Some of
the strongest Anti-Slavery Men who ever lived were on the side of those who opposed the Centralizing
principles which led to the War.”
1787: The Constitutional Convention created a document which was unclear, in at least two ways:
--It did not describe the nature of the “union” very clearly—there was no specific statement that the
union should be perpetual, and the possibility of “secession” was not addressed at all.
--It was not always clear about how power was to be divided between the central government and the
states, though the balance seemed tipped in favor of the states with the 10th Amendment: “The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
1798: Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions passed in response to Alien/Sedition Acts
These acts introduced the idea of “nullfication”—that a state could nullify or
ignore federal law which did not serve the state’s interests.
1800: Presidential election shows two clear parties/philosophies: Federalists vs. Jeffersonians, with
Federalists calling for a strong central government which would improve roads, promote industry, build
a strong army and navy, regulate trade, and create a national currency. Jeffersonians felt that the
central government should be kept weak to protect individual liberties and those of the states, allowing
the pioneer spirit to flourish, as Americans built up their own fortunes.
1814: Hartford Convention threatened secession by the New England states because of the War of
1812, which was hurting the textile economy of New England
1832: Nullification Crisis in South Carolina – John Calhoun vs. President Jackson
1848: The slave and free states were balanced at 15, but the representation in Congress from the
Northern states far outweighed the representation from Southern states
1860: Although there were 4 million black slaves in the South, only about 25% of white Southerners
owned any slaves.
2) Moral Cause: Slavery vs. Freedom:
Henry Wilson, who was a “radical” Republican politician during the Civil War, wrote a history soon after
the event in which he declared: “American slavery reduced man, created in the Divine image, to
property. . . Freedom retreated from one lost position to another; slavery advanced from conquest to
conquest . . . This slavery and this Slave Power . . . made up the vital issues of that irrepressible conflict
which finally culminated in a civil war.”
1776: Jefferson declared that “all men are created equal” in the Declaration of Independence, and he
had wanted to insert a charge against the King of England for transporting Africans into slavery in
America as immoral and uncivilized. This clause was quickly “edited out” by Southerners who
themselves were slave owners.
1787: Although the Constitution never mentioned the word “slavery”, it clearly sanctioned and
protected slavery, especially by providing that each slave would count as 2/3 of a person in determining
the number of representatives and in its fugitive slave act.
1787: Northwest Ordinance: Congress prohibited the existence of slavery in the Northwest territory.
1808: Outlawing of trans-Atlantic slave trade, although it continued
1810: The “Second Great Awakening” begins with the Cane Ridge revival, igniting a passion for reform
which would include a strong anti-slavery movement
1831: Nat Turner slave revolt in Virginia and publication of William Lloyd Garrison’s paper “The
Liberator”
1836-1844: A “gag” order exists in Congress according to which anti-slavery petitions are forbidden to
be heard.
1837: Elijah P. Lovejoy is killed in Alton, Illinois because of his anti-slavery views, shocking the nation.
1839-1841: “Amistad” saga focused the nation’s attention on slavery, as African slaves who mutinied
were the subject of a legal case which went to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted their freedom.
1845: Admission of Texas to the Union as a slave state kindles more debate about slavery and whether
it should be extended
1846: Declaration of War with Mexico and Wilmot Proviso, leading to the acquisition of vast new
western territories and creating a crisis about how and whether slavery would expand into them.
3) Economic Clause -- Capitalism vs. Agrarianism
Charles and Mary Beard, “The Rise of American Civilization” (1927), wrote:
[The Republican party] “did not declare slavery to be a moral disease calling for the severe remedy of
the surgeon; it merely sought to keep bondage out of the new states as they came into the Union—with
one fundamental aim in view, namely, to gain political ascendancy in the government of the United
States and fasten upon the country an economic policy that meant the exploitation of the South for the
benefit of northern capitalism.”
1789: Arrival of Samuel Slater in New York, with knowledge of English mechanical carding and spinning
machines – Steam power soon replaced water power in American industry
1793: Invention of cotton gin by Eli Whitney made slavery more profitable
1800: An estimated 1,000 wage earners worked in the Northeastern textile industry
1803: Louisiana Purchase created vast new territories for expansion of either capitalism or slave labor
systems
1814: Hartford Convention and threat of secession by New England states
1832: “Nullification” crisis in South Carolina due to tariff agitation. However, South Carolinians later
called on the federal government to enforce the fugitive slave code
1837: There are more cotton-winding spindles in Lowell, Massachusetts than in all 11 of the future
Confederate states
4) Human Cause – The Blundering Generation
James G. Randall write in 1947: “It was small minorities that caused the war; then the regions and
sections were drawn in. . . If one word or phrase were selected to account for the war, that word would
not be slavery, or economic grievances, or state rights, or diverse civilizations. It would have to be such
a word as fanaticism, misunderstanding, misrepresentation, or perhaps politics.”
1787: Generation of “founding fathers” found it convenient to leave the problem of slavery to their
posterity!
1830-1848: Although the vast majority of both Northern and Southern whites are not overly concerned
with slavery, agitators on both sides—the “fireeaters” of the South and “abolitionists” of the North—
keep the population inflamed in competition for votes
Toward the Precipice, 1848-1860
1) Mexican War and Compromise of 1850:
1846: Wilmot Proviso: This split the two main parties, the Whigs and the Democrats,
along sectional lines, which is very important. Until then, voting on issues like tariffs,
internal improvements, and the national bank sorted out along party lines.
1847: Calhoun Resolutions: The champion of the right to extend slavery was John Calhoun of South
Carolina, who had clashed with Andrew Jackson over nullification in the 1830s.
Calhoun spearheaded the passage of a number of resolutions declaring the Wilmot Proviso
unconstitutional and rejecting the right of Congress to exclude slavery from the territories.
1846-1848: Mexican War campaigns: General Scott and Taylor performed a classic
flanking movement to defeat the Mexican armies. The campaign was a proving ground
for future Civil War leaders, including Grant and Lee.
1848: Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: At a cost of 13,000 American lives (most due to
illness) and $97 million, America acquired 529,017 square miles, almost 1/3 of Mexico.
1849: California Gold Rush: About 100,000 people arrived in California during 1849,
rushing the area ahead into territorial and statehood status. This precipitated a crisis,
since there were 15 free and 15 slave states in 1849.
1850: The “Compromise of 1850” really passed in separate stages, and represented not
a real compromise but a series of stop-gap measures which resolved nothing and set a
precedent which made things worse. Its provisions were as follows:
--Admission of California as free state and as 31st state in the Union
--New Mexico and Utah territories open to slavery under doctrine of “popular sovereignty”
--Boundary dispute between Texas and New Mexico settled in favor of latter, eliminating
possibility of carving another slave state out of Texas
--Fugitive Slave Code of 1850: This was the part of the Compromise which would cause
increasingly strained relations between North and South over the next decade. It not only prohibited
Northern citizens from helping or hiding runaway slaves, but required
Northern citizens to aid U.S. marshals in re-capturing them. It provided very flimsy safeguards for black
people, increasing the likelihood of free blacks being grabbed and
hustled south into slavery.
2) Slavery: Up Close and Personal
1851: Battle of Christiana, Pennsylvania: Some Northern newspapers declared that a
“civil war” had begun when the news of this conflict broke. A Maryland slaveowner pursued two of his
runaway slaves to this town and met opposition from free blacks. His statement that “I will have my
property or go to Hell” was very prophetic!
1852: Harriet Beecher Stowe publishes Uncle Tom’s Cabin: This serial publication
hit both the North and South like an emotional brick, forcing many Northerners to
think about the horror of slavery and causing many Southerners to become defensive.
The most poignant episodes in the book were the separation of slave families and
communities—Uncle Tom is sold by a benevolent Kentucky slaveowner to the
ruthless Simon Legree, who tries to turn him into a cruel overseer—and the flight
of Eliza across the Ohio river after she learns her child is to be sold.
1853-1856: “Filibustering” campaigns in Cuba and Nicaragua
Both James Quitman of Alabama and William Walker led armed expeditions to seize
control of Cuba and Nicaragua, and although they both ultimately failed and were
prosecuted, Southern juries would not convict them for what they considered
praiseworthy efforts to extend slavery.
1854: Kansas-Nebraska Act: This act, which started with the desire of Stephen Douglas to secure
support for a trans-continental railroad from Chicago to San Francisco, ended by pushing the nation
much closer to civil war. The overturning of the Missouri Compromise angered and radicalized many
Northerners; even Lincoln, who was not an abolitionist, became angry and defiant over this, declaring
that he would never support the extension of slavery into Kansas or Nebraska with the doctrine of
“popular sovereignty”.
1857: Dred Scott Decision: This Supreme Court ruling meant the overturning of the Missouri
Compromise and was thus a victory for Southerners who claimed that they should be able to take slaves
into any new territory.
1858: Lincoln-Douglas Debates: In this series of famous debates, the sole topic was the extension of
slavery and the future of America—whether it could continue to exist half slave and half free or not.
1859: John Brown’s Raid: More than any other event before 1861 and the firing on Ft. Sumter, this
pushed the two sections toward war.
1860: Lincoln’s Election: Because the Democratic party split on the issue of popular sovereignty, Lincoln
could win the election without even appearing on the ballot of any Southern state!
Tactics, Strategy, and Logistics in the Civil War
1) Definitions:
A) Strategy: Decisions made to achieve victory at level leading up to the battlefield: politics, economics,
and military considerations are all part of strategy .
B) Tactics: Decisions made to achieve victory at the level of the battlefield
C) Logistics: Decisions made relating to military communication, supply, and transportation
2) Strategy in the Civil War:
A) Union strategy:
--“Anaconda” plan of General Scott, based on blockade and capture of Mississippi
--Need for more aggressive strategy aimed at destruction of enemy forces and crippling of enemy’s will
to fight
--Simultaneous advances on several fronts and more continuous battle
B) Confederate strategy:
--War of attrition: Wearing down of Union’s will to fight war with costly victories
--Counter-invasion: Invasion of North in 1862 and 1863 aimed at border states
3) Tactics and Technology in the Civil War:
A) Belief in massed infantry assaults but rise of new “rifled” muskets/cannons
B) Use of offensive flanking and enveloping movements but belief in defense
C) Movement facilitated by railroads and rivers but very slow in other areas
D) Operation along exterior vs. interior lines of communication/supply
1) Tactics during the Civil War:
A) Power of defense over offense:
Civil War generals on both sides understood the advantage which a defending
force had over the attackers. The defender can choose his own ground for
best effect and can improve upon it with entrenchment. The leaders of the
Civil War had been taught the need for entrenchment by the instructor of
tactics at West Point from 1830 to 1871, Dennis Hart Mahan. Mahan had
consistently stressed the need for fortifications and engineering skills, although
he had never entirely neglected the proper use of offense.
A look at 26 Civil War battles in How the North Won illustrates this point. The defending arm won 17 of
these battles, according to Hattaway and Jones.
B) Offensive concentration of forces - Flanking and enveloping movement:
Long before the Civil War, this movement (which could actually fit under both “tactics” and “strategy”)
had long been practiced by attackers seeking to engage only a part of a defensive force and thus exploit
a local advantage. It was used
again and again by Civil War leaders and generals, with mixed results, and has
been a key of tactical success ever since. Flanking the enemy, whether or one
side or on all sides, involves great risks, since it depends heavily on logistical
efficiency and often weakens part of the army which employs it. Some degree of
surprise is often essential to the success of such movements.
We can see classic flanking and enveloping movements in Napoleon’s victory at
Ulm against the Austrians in 1805, by the American armies of Taylor and Scott
in Mexico in 1846, and in the break-out of Patton from Normandy against the Germans in 1945.
C) Operation along interior vs. exterior lines:
In response to aggressive flanking or enveloping movements, a defending force
can (and often has) retreated to a safer position, from which it can keep its lines
of communication and supply open. However, if the defender chooses to
resist, he has the advantage of a shorter distance over which to move troops and supplies. Of course,
this assumes that he can use these shorter or “interior” lines
effectively and rapidly. The attacker, in order to execute the flanking attack, has
to extend his lines of communication and supply, which often create delay.
2) Strategy in the Civil War:
A) Swift and decisive victory through capture of symbolic enemy territory:
Warfare in Europe before the French Revolution and Napoleon was very
different strategically from most “modern” wars, including the American
Civil War. In those previous “dynastic” wars, armies were composed mainly
of highly trained professional soldiers or mercenaries, and while the war they
waged could be terrible, it was often limited in size and scope and aimed at
the capture of key territory or cities. The capture of a capital city was especially
important, since it symbolized the dominance of one nation over another. Often,
though not always, the fall of the capitol would bring negotiations and an end
to the war--usually followed by a shift of territorial borders. At the beginning of
the Civil War, this kind of thinking was still current, and while it changed as the
war went on, it always remained a part of strategy. Fort Sumter, in fact, was
contested more because of its symbolic value than because of its actual strategic
importance. In this model, battles should produce a clear winner and loser.
B) Nationalist/ideological warfare of modern times:
Modern “nationalistic” warfare, in which great volunteer or conscripted armies
are sent to war and in which whole societies participate, means that simply
capturing territory or cities no longer brings the war to an end. Often in modern
times, a political or even religious ideology motivates the combatants--they are
willing to fight on despite defeats in the field. To be defeated, they must be
pried out of defensive holes or must be thoroughly demoralized by attacks on
civilian targets. Therefore, the aim of such warfare becomes not only the
destruction of enemy forces through defeat, desertion, or surrender, but also the
crippling of infrastructure and supplies and the demoralization of vast sectors of
the population, who may often be innocent.
C) Simultaneous advances on several fronts:
Once the necessity of conquering the Southern people and eliminating its armies
became clear to Northern leaders and generals, this strategy was quickly designed
to counter-balance the South’s ability to shift forces along interior lines. The only
way to achieve victory, Lincoln soon became convinced, was to maintain steady
pressure on several fronts. This required a great deal of coordination, both
among the commanders of various armies but also between political and military
leaders. In fact, General Winfield Scott, the first general-in-chief of Union armies, devised a master
strategic plan along these lines early in the war. While
considered too slow and too lethargic, it actually came to resemble very closely
the blueprint for Union victory in the war. This was derisively called the
“Anaconda” Plan.
D) War of Attrition by Offensive-Defensive Means:
In response to the push along simultaneous fronts by the Union, which had to
take the offensive for political and diplomatic reasons, the leaders of the
Confederacy had to face two basic questions: whether to emphasize the offense or
defense and whether to seek to hold most of its territory or to sacrifice much of
it in order to concentrate armies on more vital points. The answer to both
questions was “both”. Davis and his leading generals, led by Robert E. Lee,
chose to adopt a defensive strategy in many cases, relying on strong positions and
interior lines of movement to off-set superior Union numbers. However, they
also chose key moments to go on the counter-offensive or even on the full-scale
offensive, in hopes of achieving spectacular results on Northern soil and thus
create either overseas intervention, loss of Northern will to fight, or both. At no
time during the war did any Confederate leader imagine that the armies of
the Union could actually be conquered or Northern territory held for any length
of time--the overall strategy of the South, therefore, was a war of attrition.
Moreover, Davis followed this same mixed strategy in trying to protect every
threatened area of the Confederacy while also trying to concentrate forces at
key areas (like around Richmond, in Tennessee, and along the Mississippi).
Many generals, like Beauregard, felt that coastal defenses could be weakened or
even stripped in order to send more forces to more likely and crucial theatres of
battle. Davis was sensitive to these requests and tried to respond to them, but he
was even more sensitive to the political and diplomatic necessity of defending
all parts of the Confederacy. What nation could call itself legitimate if it
couldn’t or wouldn’t defend all of its territory and peoples?!
E) Guerilla or partisan warfare:
There has been much debate over the extent to which the American Civil War
became a “guerilla” war. Most historians would agree that while much guerilla
activity took place in states like Missouri, Arkansas, and further west, this was
due to terrain and distance, which prohibited movements of large regular forces.
Of course, in places like Missouri, there was a partisan side to the war which
continued even after it was over, and there were acts throughout the war which
smack of such war, in which the line between civilians and soldiers is blurred or
even eliminated. Examples would include Quantrill’s raid on Lawrence, Kansas, the massacre of Union
soldiers by “Bloody Bill” Anderson, the murder of black Union soldiers at Fort Pillow by cavalry under
Nathan Bedford Forrest, Sherman’s “March to the Sea”, and Phil Sheridan’s “Bloody Shenandoah”
campaign of 1864. And yet, this troubling and modern aspect of the war did not come to characterize it-most of the fighting, while horrible, was between uniformed personnel, and much of the damage done
to civilians and their property was not the result of pre-meditated strategy.
Technology and the Civil War:
1) Weaponry:
A) Transition from smooth-bore to rifled guns:
This transition has traditionally been used to explain the high casualty rate of
the Civil War--the explanation has been that Civil War generals were using
traditional tactics and strategy with new technology. “Rifled”muskets and cannon had a much greater
range and degree of accuracy, as well as greater rate of fire, than smooth-bore weapons. Thus, when
Civil War generals used the frontal
assault or even the flanking movement, the new weaponry mowed down rows of
soldiers before most of them could get close to their opponents. Therefore, the
cavalry charge and the bayonet assault were made obsolete, and the defensive
position was made even stronger.
However, some historians, such as Paddy Griffith in a recent North and South
article, have challenged this traditional view. Griffith argues that while rifled
weapons did outstrip their smooth-bore predecessors in rate of fire, range, and
accuracy, they were not nearly as decisive as many have thought. He challenges
much of the “conventional wisdom” on this topic: Griffth argues that casualties
in Civil War battles were not really any higher than in previous wars; he maintains that many Civil War
soldiers, especially Confederates, continued to use smooth-bore weapons and that they used them to
devastating effect; he concludes that it was terrain which often made cavalry charges obsolete and
reduced the damage of artillery, not the rifled musket; and he concludes that most battles were fought
at such distances that the rifle gave no great advantage: “in the heat, smoke, and terror of battle, most
soldiers are quite unable to hit anything at all beyond thirty yards, however good their musket.”
Many historians, however, such as Grady McWhiney and Perry Jamieson, continue to argue that rifled
weapons did heavily shape the nature of battle during the Civil War. In their response to Griffith,
McWhiney and Jamieson defend the
idea that there was a “tactical” revolution during the Civil War, and they see
rifled weapons as one important part of it, although not the only part. The
rifle helped to put generals on the defensive, increasing the complexity of
entrenchment; also, they emphasize how the use of repeating rifles transformed
the war, especially toward the end of it. Griffith would agree that there was a
weapons “revolution” during the war, but he would argue that it came late, with breech-loading and
various repeating weapons.
2. Logistics: Supply and Communication
A) Transportation:
Although Civil War armies moved quite slowly by our standards, compared to the Napoleonic Wars and
even the Mexican War, they were very
mobile indeed! Of course, many armies used the roads which existed in 1860's
America, which meant congestion and delay even with the best weather, and
impossible circumstances under the worst, especially during winter and early
spring. However, by 1860, the United States had more railroad miles (about
30,000) than all of the other countries of the world combined. This meant that
both sides could and did use rail to transport men and supplies--in many battles,
rail junctions were the main objective. In some battles, like First Bull Run,
movement of troops by rail were crucial in determining the outcome. Damage
done to railroads, such as during Grant’s Vicksburg campaign, could help grind
an advance to a halt or severely hamper it. Moreover, travel via river and
coastal waters was also a key element in Civil War strategy--from the outset,
generals saw rivers and coastal ways as invasion routes into the South and
as a means of supplying armies. The capture of New Orleans by the federal
forces of Farragut in April 1862 may actually have been more important than
any land battle fought during the war. And many historians consider the fall
of Vicksburg considerably more important than Union victory at Gettysburg
in eventual Union success. In fact, in places which were not serviced by either
rail or water or both, the large Civil War armies simply could not operate, such
as in Southwest Missouri and Northern Arkansas.
B) Communication/Organization:
The use of the telegraph, though far from reliable, revolutionized communication
between leaders and generals on both sides, while the many newspapers both
North and South meant that the war would be reported on in detail and that
“spin” would be an important factor (it didn’t just begin with Television!).
In many campaigns, the coordination of various armies would not have been
possible without the telegraph; although communication among various parts of
a single army were often still primitive during the war, strategic communication
was greatly improved by this device. The damaging of telegraph lines was just
as important in disrupting enemy movements as the destruction of supply bases
and railroads.
C) New/experimental technology:
It seems to be a sad but true fact that war promotes new and innovative technology. During the Civil
War, there were many such “experiments” which anticipated later developments: the repeating rifle
and the “ironclads”, i.e.
Economic Strength: Union vs. Confederacy
1) Union advantages:
A. Population increased by average of 35% per decade, but unevenly – Of the total 1860 population of
32 million, the North contained 19 million and the South 13 million, but 4 million of that number is in
slaves. In terms of effective manpower ready for war, the North held a 5 to 2 advantage over the South.,
B. GNP doubled every 15 years, but again unevenly—In 1860, the combined value of manufactured
goods in all the Southern states did not equal the value of manufactured goods in New York state alone!
C. By 1860, there were about 110,000 factories in the North, employing about 1.3 million workers. In
the Confederate states, there were only 18,000 factories employing about 110,000 workers
C. Those living in cities rose from 6% in 1800 to 20% in 1860, but the urban rate was only 10% in the
South compared to 25% in the North in 1860
D. By 1860, there were 30,000 miles of railroad track in America, but 65% was in the North compared to
35% in the South; only 4% of locomotives were made in the South in 1860.
E. The Union controlled about 80% of the nation’s total bank deposits in 1860 and about 60% of its gold
deposits.
F. Even in agricultural production, the North outstripped the South, except in one product: cotton.
2) Confederate advantages:
A. Although only 7 states of the deep South had seceded from the Union by April, 1861, the capture of
Ft. Sumter by the Confederacy and Lincoln’s call for 75,000 volunteers pushed four more crucial states
into the secession: Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee, and there were many
sympathizers for the Confederacy in the border states of Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland, which
surrounded Washington, D.C.
B. A 3,500 mile coastline in the South contained 189 harbors and river mouths which could be navigated.
C. The Confederacy contained about 750,000 square miles, more than Great Britain, Spain, France,
Germany, and Italy combined. This would make it very difficult for the Union to invade and defeat the
South.
D. Much of the world’s supply of cotton was grown in the South, which fed the textile factories not only
of the North but of Great Britain. “King Cotton” was an economic power which the Confederacy might
use to induce English support and/or recognition.
E. Despite producing only 4% of the nation’s firearms in 1860, the Confederacy managed to gain close to
parity with the Union in weapons through buying and importation of guns, capture of arsenals, and a
crash program of manufacturing weapons in the Confederacy.
1861: First Bull Run and Wilson’s Creek
1) Civil War Armies
A) Companies (100) -- regiments (1,000) -- brigades (3-4,000) -- divisions (9-12,000); and corps (20,00040,000)
B) Companies and regiments raised locally and composed of civilian soldiers
C) “Political” generals: a curse and blessing
D) No standardized uniforms – Confusion of colors
2. Battle of First Bull Run – July 21, 1861
A) Geography of Virginia a key to the strategies – Shenandoah Valley
B) Union plan to flank Confederate forces – Confederate response through interior lines of movement
and supply
C) “Stonewall” Jackson’s stand and arrival of Johnston
D) Could the Confederate army have taken Washington?
3. Missouri and Battle of Wilson’s Creek:
A) Missouri as key border state for both sides
B) Gov. Claiborne Fox Jackson vs. Nathaniel Lyon and Francis Blair
C) April-May: Lyon acts to save U.S. arsenal at St. Louis and provokes anger
D) May-July: Lyon moves southward and takes Jefferson City
E) August 10, 1861: Lyon attacks McCulloch and Price at Wilson’s Creek
--Confederates outnumber Union troops by about 2 to 1
--Lyon’s strike is preparatory to retreat to Rolla, dictated by logistics
--Case of mistaken identity aids in Sigel’s defeat
--Death of Lyon probably the most important result of battle
1862: War in the East
1) Peninsula Campaign:
A) McClellan’s plan to “flank” Richmond by water and capture it
B) Rocky relationship between Lincoln and McClellan/Davis and Johnston
C) Problems with campaign:
--Need to keep troops in Washington and Shenandoah Valley
--Lack of good maps and rain
--Very slow and cautious movement of Union troops up Peninsula
D) Keys to Confederate victory:
--May 31: Battle of Seven Pines results in Johnston replaced by Robert E. Lee
--May-June: Stonewall Jackson baffles three Union armies in Shenandoah Valley
--June 27-July 1: Seven Days’ Battles reveals Lee’s audacity and skill
2. The Leaders and Commanders:
A) Union
--Break-down of trust between Lincoln/Stanton and McClellan
--McClellan’s strengths and weaknesses -- Good at strategic planning, organization, and
inspiring loyalty, but overly cautious as field commander
--Cooperation between Davis and Lee and distrust between Davis and J. Johnston
B) Confederates
--Ineffective Confederate reconnaissance during battles -- groping movements
--Lee’s gamble in leaving Richmond lightly defended
--Effective Union performance on tactical defensive -- Malvern Hill
--Tactical and Strategic victory for Confederacy
--Irony of McClellan’s failure: War continues and changes in nature
1862: War in the East
1. Stonewall Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley Campaign:
March 12: Jackson’s army (about 4,500) evacuate Winchester before about 40,000 approaching Federals
March 23: Jackson’s 3,500 men attack 9,000 Federals at Kernstown, later retreating
safely
May 8: Battle of McDowell -- Jackson/Johnson combine (c. 9000) are attacked by
6,000 Federals under Fremont -- Union forces repulsed
May 9: Jackson divides forces and moves north along Valley turnpike
May 23: Battle of Front Royal -- After re-combining with Ewell, Confederates overwhelm 1,000 Federals
May 25: Battle of Winchester -- 15,000 Confederates attack remainder of Banks’
(6,000)
command
May 30: Jackson begins retreat up the Valley as Fremont and Shields move in from
West and East respectively
June 8: Battle of Cross Keys -- Fremont’s force (11,000) attacks Ewell’s (6,000) but
Confederates hold their ground
June 9: Battle of Port Republic -- Jackson’s combined force (6-7,000) attacks and eventually flanks
Shields’ force (c. 3,000)
B) Keys to Shenandoah Valley campaign:
--Jackson’s intelligence of enemy movements and knowledge of terrain -- Jedediah Hotchkiss and Belle
Boyd of Front Royal
--Jackson’s ability to concentrate forces to achieve superior odds -- In all but one
battle (Cross Keys) he brought superior numbers to combat
--Jackson’s relentless pace -- 350 miles in 5 weeks for Jackson’s troops, with 3
victories
“He classed all who were weak and weary, who fainted by the wayside, as men
wanting in patriotism.”
--Union failures: Lethargy of Fremont and Shields under Lincoln’s direct command
C) Strategic Results of Campaign:
--Diversion of c. 60,000 Union troops and disruption of East Tennessee campaign under
Fremont and linking of McDowell’s troops with McClellan’s right
--Psychological advantage of Jackson’s reputation in North and South
--Jackson’s failure during Seven Days’ battles to perform well, probably due to exhaustion
War in the West, 1862
1) Union capture of Kentucky and Tennessee:
A) Union and Confederate Strategy in Kentucky/Tennessee:
--Kentucky and Tennessee crucial to both sides, for military and political reasons
--Confederate defensive line from Columbus to Bowling Green, with interior lines via
Rail and water
--Halleck replaces Fremont for Union -- determination to strike center of Confederate
line at Forts Henry and Donelson
B) February 5-6: Grant/Foote combine effectively to capture Fort Henry, cut RR south
of Donelson and threaten other Confederate forces in the entire region
C) February 12-16: Union capture of Fort Donelson; Albert Sidney Johnston’s
reinforcement of Donelson and failed break-out of Confederates
2) Battle of Shiloh, April 6-7, 1862:
A) Johnston vs. Grant -- Confederate recklessness vs. Union over-confidence
B) April 6: Confederates achieve surprise and success, despite stubborn Union resistance
C) April 7: Grant’s refusal to withdraw and Buell’s reinforcements ---Reversal of numbers: Union advantage of 40,000 vs. 25,000
D) Tactical/Strategic results of Shiloh:
-- Confederate withdrawal after bloody fight – 20,000 killed and wounded
--Greater Union caution -- no quick Confederate collapse in the West
--Shock of Shiloh -- Inauguration of more savage type of battle
3) Union Success in the West Continues:
March 7-8: Union victory at Battle of Pea Ridge in Arkansas
April 7: Union capture of Island No. 10 in Mississippi River
April 24-25: Union capture of New Orleans by Admiral Farragut’s fleet
May 25: Confederate evacuation of Corinth, Mississippi
June 6: Union capture of Memphis
1863 in the East: Chancellorsville and Gettysburg
1) Confederate victory at Chancellorsville:
April: Outnumbering Confederates 2 to 1 (120,000 to 60,000), Hooker moves Union troops around
Confederate left
May 1: After splitting his forces, Lee engages Union troops near Chancellorsville
May 2: Jackson’s 30,000 men make 12-mile flanking march and hit Union right
flank
May 2: Jackson is wounded while preparing for an advance; he dies of pneumonia
2) Lee’s invasion of Pennsylvania:
A) Plan to draw Union forces away from Washington, gain provisions, and threaten Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania capital
B) Failure of J.E.B. Stuart to stay in touch with Lee’s army
C) Re-organization of Lee’s army after Jackson’s death:
I Corps: James Longstreet
II Corps: Richard Ewell
III Corps: Ambrose P. Hill
D) June 28: Lincoln replaces Hooker with George Meade
3) Battle of Gettysburg:
July 1: Confederate infantry push Union troops through Gettysburg to high ground
Ewell fails to attack Cemetery Hill late in the day
July 2: Lee attacks both Union flanks despite Longstreet’s protests to flank Union
Union holds Little Round Top after desperate struggle
July 3: Lee’s attack on Union center fails miserably
November 19: Lincoln sums up the war and the American experience in the “Gettysburg Address”
Vicksburg, Chickamauga, and Chattanooga
1) Capture of Vicksburg, April-July, 1863:
April 16: Union gunboats under Porter run Vicksburg batteries, moving south
April 30: Grant’s troops cross Mississippi from west to east after marching down west
bank
May 12-16: Grant’s forces fight five battles and in four days and keep Confederate armies of Pemberton
and Johnston separated
May 19-22: Grant’s assaults on Vicksburg defenses fail
2) July 4: Vicksburg surrenders after grueling 47-day siege Rosecrans (Union) vs. Bragg (Confederates) in
Tennessee:
October, 1862: William Rosecrans takes over Union Army of the Cumberland
December 31, 1862: Battle of Murfreesboro (Stones River) begins
January 2, 1863: Confederates retreat after failing to break Union line
Feuding between General Bragg and his subordinates
June 24-September 8, 1863: Rosecrans’ bloodless “Tullahoma” campaign captures Chattanooga and
pushes Bragg’s army into Georgia
September 10-13: Failure of Confederates to hit fragmented Union columns
September 19-20: Confederate victory at Chickamauga and Chattanooga besieged
3) Chattanooga Campaign, September-November 1863:
--Crucial strategic and political importance of Chattanooga as rail center and area of union loyalty
October 23-30: Arrival of Grant’s troops opens up “cracker line” to besieged army
November: Longstreet’s movement toward Knoxville gives Union initiative
November 24: Battle of Lookout Mountain ends in Union victory and 500 casualties
November 25: Union storms and takes Missionary Ridge
1864: Year of Desperation
1) War becomes more total and devastating:
A) Battles become more frequent and constant vs. Sporadic battles earlier
B) Atrocities: Suffering of prisoners of war: Andersonville and Elmira
--Andersonville (Camp Sumter): 33,000 prisoners held – 13,000 died or 40%
--Elmira, NY: 9,600 prisoners held and 2,300 died or 24%
Totals: 30,000 Union prisoners died, 15% of total captured
26,000 Confederate prisoners died, 12% of total captured
C) Civilians become targets: Campaign to devastate Shenandoah Valley by Sheridan
2) Northern problems:
A) Summer, 1864: 3-year enlistments expired—136,000 re-enlisted but 100,000 did not
B) War weariness in North: Niagara Falls “peace” conference on July 18, 1864
--Horace Greeley and John Hay met with Confederate agents—Hay and Greeley
were ready to discuss peace on the basis of re-union and abolishing slavery, which
the Confederates could not accept, but a public relations battle was won by the Confederacy.
C) Rise of George McClellan as favorite presidential candidate for Democrats
D) Shorter internal lines of communication and supply for Confederate commanders
E) Lee and Johnston defend Richmond and Atlanta stubbornly; Jubal Early approaches Washington in
June
3) Southern problems:
A) Peace movements and States’ Righters: Gov. Zebulon Vance of North Carolina and Gov. Joe Brown of
Georgia
B) Grant takes charge in Virginia and puts new pressure on Confederate ability to rest and reinforce
sectors
C) Shortages mounting for both civilians and soldiers – problem of desertions and food riots
The Atlanta Campaign and the Re-election of Lincoln
1) Argument #1: War was not over until Atlanta’s capture, which was necessary to secure Lincoln’s relection
A) Stalemate of Sherman and Grant in summer 1864 de-moralized North
B) McClellan as Democratic presidential candidate: War is a failure plank
“After four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war . . . we demand that
immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to the ultimate convention of the
states, or other peaceable means, to the end that, at the earliest practicable moment, peace may be
restored on the basis of the Federal Union.”
C) Lincoln’s despair of being re-elected -- Almost ready to surrender emancipation for peace – Letter of
Aug. 17:
“If Jefferson Davis . . . wishes to know what I would do if he were to offer peace and re-union, saying
nothing about slavery, let him try me.”
D) Aug. 26-30: Sherman moves around Atlanta and defeats Hood at Jonesboro
E) Fremont removes himself from Republican nomination bid
F) Lincoln re-elected in November, but with narrow margin in 7 key states
2) Argument #2: War was over before capture of Atlanta and re-election of Lincoln
A) Yes, stalemate in summer of 1864 demoralized North, but determination to win the war was still
there – Importance of looking at “grass roots” feelings in local newspapers, rather than national
newspapers and Washington
B) McClellan repudiated the “War is a failure” plank of his own party and called for hostilities to cease
only after negotiations had secured an agreement:
McClellan on Sep. 8: “I could not look in the faces of gallant comrades of the army and navy . . . and tell
them that their labor and the sacrifice of our slain and wounded brethren had been in vain . . . The
Union is the one condition of peace—we ask no more.”
C) Union soldiers given right to cast absentee ballots by most states, insuring Lincoln’s re-election
regardless of state of war
D) Aug. 26-30: Union victory at Jonesboro and capture of Atlanta hurts Democratic party and McClellan,
but no real evidence that it turned Republicans back to Abe
Union Victory, 1864-1865
1) Sherman’s March to the Sea and Hood in Tennessee:
September 2: Sherman’s men take Atlanta after defeating Hood’s forces south of city
October: Sherman pursues Hood north and west into Alabama
November 15: Sherman leaves Hood and departs for his “March to the Sea”
November 30: Union victory over Hood’s Confederates at Franklin, Tennessee
December 15: Battle of Nashville smashes Hood’s army
December 22: Sherman takes Savannah after “making Georgia howl”
2) Defeat of the Confederacy:
September-October, 1864: “Bloody Shenandoah”
January 15, 1865: Union assault captures Ft. Fisher near Wilmington, N.C.
February 3, 1865: “Negotiation” between Lincoln/Seward and Stephens/Hunter
February 17: Sherman captures Columbia and the city burns
March: Union invasion of Alabama and Battle of Bentonville, NC
March 13: Confederate Congress passes law allowing enlistment of black soldiers
March 24-25: Battle of Fort Stedman results in Confederate failure to break through
Grant’s lines around Petersburg
April 2: Lee evacuates Petersburg and Richmond
April 8: Lee’s surrender to Grant at Appomattox
Legacy of Civil War: Triumph of Liberalism/Nationalism or Flawed Victory?
1) Bitterness of war’s close:
A) Legend of surrender of Lee to Grant at Appomattox has been exaggerated
B) Confederate efforts to fight on beyond surrender at Appomattox –Jefferson Davis’ capture in Georgia
on May 10
C) Assassination of Abraham Lincoln by John Wilkes Booth on April 14, 1865
D) Devastation of Southern economy:
--$1.5 billion investment in slaves had been taken
--Shrinking of Southern wealth (exclusive of slaves) by 43% during war
--Southern agricultural production in 8 Confederate states did not reach pre-war levels until 1900
--Southern industrial base had been wrecked during war
--25% of white Southerners of fighting age (18-45) died during war
2) Legacy of the Civil War: Triumph of Nationalism, Liberalism, and Capitalism
A) Civil War as part of “age of nationalism”: Unification of Italy by 1860 and unification of Germany by
1871
B) Combination of “nationalism” and “liberalism” in Civil War – Contrast to rise of Nazis in 20th century
Germany, where nationalism and liberalism were separated
C) Victory of northern industrialism and capitalism over southern agrarian lifestyle
3) Legacy of the Civil War: Flawed Victory due to failed opportunities
A) Failure to repair flawed constitution, which had started the war – No permanent or decisive power
given to federal government over state governments –
B) Failure to integrate freed slaves into American society, despite ability of Freedmen’s Bureau to
provide some aid –
C) Failure to use federal power to re-built South economically and socially left bitter legacy for future