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Alcibiades is a ubiquitous figure throughout the later half of the Peloponnesian War. Despite his exile
after being blamed for the defecation of the herms, and his consequent friendship with Sparta, which
directly contributed to the military defeat of Athens both in Sicily and at home, and thereafter friendship
with the Persians, he managed to convince an Athenian fleet stationed at Samos, and later all of Athens,
not only to pardon him, but eventually elect him as Strategos. In accomplishing this manipulation, he
stated to the troops at Samos that he “…had been forced by his enemies to give proof of his own valour
at the expense of his fatherland” (Diod. xiii. 41.5).
This statement, or argument, would have been in reference to his defection to both Sparta and later
Persia, sworn enemies of the Athenian state, and the immediate and direct contribution he had to the
downfall of Athens during this time. Taking the obvious accusations that he is a traitor to his homeland,
he spins them to instead give credit to himself, claiming instead that he was proving his own valour for
his “enemies” (making clear his enemies always have been the enemies of Athens), playing himself up to
the Greek ideals of manliness and bravery. In doing so, he cleverly took what would have been the most
likely reason for an Athenian to despise him and changed it instead into a reason to respect him, while
simultaneously distancing himself from his former allies. This argument would have been particularly
effective on a group of Athenian soldiers, far away from their mother city. On military campaigns, Greek
soldiers were constantly in competition with one another to prove who was the bravest, who had the
most honour and valour. Whether or not this was displayed on the battlefield, this machismo would
have made arguments appealing to individual valour particularly effective. Alcibiades could back it up as
well; he was a renowned soldier, having been recognized for his excellence on the battlefield while
fighting alongside Socrates, and originally being chosen to lead the Sicilian expedition after being such a
vocal supporter for it. Far from home, and at a point when Athens was very close to losing the war, it
made sense the appearance of a “hero” like Alcibiades would be very uplifting among the soldiers at
Samos. His claim of being able to bring a Persian alliance, which could perhaps have been the saving
grace of Athens, also would have been very hopeful to soldiers on the field primarily concerned with
their own mortality and the wellbeing of their families back home.
While the competition for manliness may have been pervasive throughout the Athenian military camp, a
soldier’s true priorities would have been with his own safety, as well as that of his family. As Aristotle
(Nic. Eth. viii. 13) put it, “all men, or most men, wish what is noble but choose what is profitable”. While
they may wish to be noble, they prioritize their own self interests. Not only would these soldiers receive
a raise in pay, but the survival of Athens, key to their own success, was in jeopardy, and Alcibiades was
offering a solution. Although this solution implied the end of democracy, the prevailing attitude of
Athenians, confident even in the face of destruction that they could defend against any repercussions,
appeared to be that they could simply reinstate democracy later once the crisis had been resolved. As
Thucydides (viii. 53.4) wrote, “The people were at first highly irritated at the mention of an oligarchy,
but upon understanding clearly from Peisander that this was the only resource left, they took counsel of
their fears, and promised themselves someday to change the government again, and gave way.” We
immediately again see self-interest take route in the same group of people. Immediately after pushing
to reinstate an oligarchy, when no Persian aid came and the council of the Four Hundred turned more
brutal than beneficial, the camp at Samos revolted, still under the leadership of Alcibiades. Perhaps
Alcibiades himself is the best example of dominant self-interest among the Athenians at this time,
however. In a very short span of time, we see him flee Athens to Sparta and later Persia to preserve his
own well-being, then support the oligarchic faction in an attempt to reintegrate himself into Athenian
society, but immediately oppose them when popular support changes, always siding with whatever will
further his immediate interests. The soldiers with him at Samos similarly followed suit, despite having
just been instrumental in overthrowing democracy in the first place, and while this may have been
another master stroke of manipulation by Alcibiades, more likely they were concerned for their families
under the violence of the Four Hundred. This realistic concern, as well his appeal to their valour,
overrode the inherit distrust the soldiers at Samos likely would have had for Alcibiades, forgiving him for
his past actions against the state.
Under the radical democracy, Athenians appear to be easily persuaded and subject to quick, extreme
actions, often times very brutal, only to regret them in hindsight. Such was possibly the case with
Alcibiades. In their rage over the defecation of the herms, the Athenians were very quick to implicate
anyone on even a suggestion that they could have been involved. Opponents of Alcibiades used this in
his absence to rally the people against him, despite that “there was nothing sure or steadfast in the
statements of the informers.” (Plut. Alcib. xx.5), “their passion had all the more opportunity to vent
itself, they dashed like a torrent against Alcibiades” (xxi.5) and “all who were accused of any complicity
whatsoever therein were cast into prison without trial.” (xx.3) However, after some time had passed,
the Athenians perhaps began to regret this rash action. We see this happen not long before this as well,
when after Athens had quelled the revolt in Miletus, the Athenians were persuaded to raze the city. The
next day, however, they were again persuaded to regret their action, and urgently sent to undo the
order. We see it again when Athenians voted to end democracy, only to regret it shortly after and have
it reinstated. Even Alexander the Great, although not Athenian, regretted the burning of Thebes for his
remaining life. Time and time again, Athenians prove themselves susceptible to manipulation and
immediate, rash action, often only regretting it in hindsight. This perhaps was the case with Alcibiades.
By the time he met the soldiers on Samos, the burning of the Hermes, and even his involvement with
Sparta, may have felt like it happened ages ago. Athens was no longer at the pinnacle of her power, and
Athenians had new priorities. This also again shows how easily the Athenians are manipulated; it should
be no surprise how Alcibiades persuaded them to pardon him.
Due in part to the susceptibility of the Athenians to manipulation, and their tendency to act rashly first
and forgive later, Alcibiades was able to convince an Athenian military camp at Samos to welcome
rather than arrest him for treason. By appealing to Athenian values of valour, especially to a camp full of
soldiers trying to prove their own, he turned his own treason into a positive, claiming he was proving his
honour, even if it was for the enemies of Athens. By taking the stance of an Athenian, he also, in his own
self-interest, played to the self-interest of the soldiers as well. At a point where Athens was in trouble,
he offered a solution that could not only save the lives of the soldiers, but perhaps the wellbeing of their
families as well. This clever manipulation allowed Alcibiades to finally, if temporarily, reintegrate himself
back into Athens.
Bibliography
Diodorus
Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics
Thucydides
Plutarch Alcibiades