Download Chance, Competence and the Limits of Democratic

—Publisher’s Proposal—
Merit or Luck?:
Economic Performance and Democratic
Accountability in Latin America
Daniela Campello
Cesar Zucco Jr.
Fundação Getúlio Vargas
Fundação Getúlio Vargas
[email protected]
[email protected]
Carlos Andrés Perez governed oil-rich Venezuela for the first time between 1974
and 1979, presiding over an unprecedented oil boom. After leaving the presidency
with very high popular approval, in the late 1980’s he won a second term on the
promise to revive the “good times.” It turns out that his second government coincided with the lowest oil prices in modern history; not surprisingly, Perez could not
match his original performance and was sacked before the end of his term. Even
though fluctuations in oil prices explain much of the president’s success in the 1970s
and failure in 1990s, Venezuelans did not seem to take that into consideration when
rewarding Perez in the former or punishing him in the latter period.
This phenomenon is not restricted to oil-rich countries. Most of Venezuela’s
neighbors are subject to similar cycles of booms and crises that are beyond governments’ control, because they are essentially commodity exporters whose export
prices are set in an international market, independently of any action taken by the
presidents themselves.
Moreover, commodity prices are not the only way in which presidents are at
the mercy of external economic conditions. When the Federal Reserve Bank under
Paul Volcker increased US interest rates sharply to deal with stagflation in the late
1970’s, capital flows to Latin America dried up, and all governments faced extreme
duress in an inflationary crisis that lasted for a decade. Most military regimes in the
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region ended, and elected presidents governing through the hard times that followed
suffered from low popularity and had a dismal record electing their successors.
In contrast, in the early 1990’s, when US interest rates hit their lowest point in
decades, an abundance of capital flowed into the region seeking better returns. Presidents in countries as varied as Peru, Argentina, and Brazil were credited by their
domestic constituents with ending inflation through the usage of ingenious stabilization plans. Throughout the region, leaders spearheaded constitutional changes to
allow for immediate reelection, and were reelected. Voters did not discount the fact
that international conditions beyond the president’s control were very auspicious,
neither that inflation was brought under control in most countries at about the same
time.
Economic performance in South America is substantially determined by exogenous factors like commodity prices and international interest rates. Yet voters do
not factor this in when evaluating governments. As a result, they tend to reelect
presidents ruling in good times, and to vote out those leading during bad times. Put
simply, electoral rewards and punishments are based on “luck” (i.e. factors beyond
the president’s control) rather than on merit. If this is true, we argue, the main
normative benefit of economic voting—to hold incumbents accountable to deliver
the best economic performance—might be lost in the region.
This book explores the nature of electoral accountability in Latin America,
dwelling on the linkages between international economic factors, domestic economic
performance, and political support. Our goal is to understand how voters chose and
evaluate incumbents in contexts in which the state of the economy is mostly exogenously determined, as well as the incentives this vote produces for policymaking.
Topics in this investigation include how countries’ economic and political characteristics influence voters’ capacity to identify merit from luck, whether political
discourse reveals attempts by incumbents and opposition to attribute economic performance to external economic factors or government competence, what role the media plays in this process, and whether the pursuit of counter-cyclical fiscal policies
such as the creation of sovereign wealth funds can mitigate the impact of international conditions on voters’ evaluation of governments’ performance.
This project has direct and important implications for the literature on economic
voting. By showing that voters systematically take luck for merit, it confronts the
most recent findings of the literature on economic voting (Kayser & Peress 2012)
and challenges its fundamental claim that even uniformed voters can hold politi-
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cians accountable. At the same time, it advances the notion of blind retrospection
(Achen & Bartels 2006), by explicitly determining the mechanisms through which
luck affects governments’ performance.
Besides students of economic voting, the book will also be of interest to students
of Latin American political economy, and to those interested in the prospects for
democratic accountability, particularly in presidential systems. Finally, it dialogues
with a literature on natural resource curse, and has potential extensions to other
economies oriented towards commodity exports, not only in less developed regions,
but in countries like Australia and Canada.
Rationale and Scope
There are few—if any—reasons to believe that voters can distinguish merit from
luck, even more so in less developed democracies. In the case of South America, for
example, a tradition of inward-looking development, in addition to low levels of education and information, should all but prevent voters from making this distinction.
This would not be a problem, however, in countries where economic performance
is mainly determined by government decisions. Yet in countries in which exogenous
factors are determinant, it implies that incumbents are punished and rewarded on
the basis of luck rather than merit. In these cases, retrospective economic voting
will not provide the incentives for responsiveness and accountability that theorists
expect, challenging some of our deeply held beliefs about democratic systems of
governments.
The argument we put forth—that voters are unaware of factors that influence
governments’ performance but are beyond incumbents’ control—can potentially apply and be tested in any democracy. However, South American countries provide the
best possible testing ground in which to analyze the limits of retrospective economic
voting as an accountability mechanism.
First, because they share many institutional similarities—presidential systems,
fixed terms, limited central bank independence—that favor comparative cross-national
analyses.
More importantly, though, not only the performance of South American economies
is heavily dependent on exogenous factors, but these factors are well known and have
been extensively studied by economists.
Most countries in the region are essentially commodity exporters, therefore economic growth is very dependent on internationally-determined commodity prices,
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over which no single government detains any control. South American countries
have also in common very low rates of domestic savings, which makes them extremely reliant on foreign capital. Research has shown that inflows of capital to
the region are largely driven by fluctuations in international interest rates. When
these rates are low and international liquidity is high, capital is more likely to flow
to emerging economies where returns are higher. When the opposite happens, capital flees to safer havens. Governments’ decisions have been shown to cause only
marginal deviations in this trend.
As a result, it is well established that economic performance in commodityexporting-low-savings South American countries1 is highly determined by the behavior of commodity prices and international interest rates. Economies suffer when
commodity prices are low and international interest rates are high, and do particularly well when the opposite occurs.
This is particularly important from a methodological standpoint, as it offers
a great and rare opportunity in the social sciences to deal with a causal variable
that is truly exogenous to the outcome being studied, allowing us to isolate causal
effects quite neatly. It also allows us to contrast relatively similar countries in which
our argument should hold (South America), with a group of countries where it
should not hold (Mexico and Central America), providing additional causal leverage.
Finally, differently from already established notions of blind retrospection that rely
on random events such as shark attacks and draughts (Achen & Bartels 2006),
presidents can anticipate commodity prices and US interest rates, and therefore
adjust their strategies according to the state of the world.
The power of a truly exogenous causal variable allows us to use an extremely simple setup to text the core of our argument. If voters discounted the exogenous state
of the world economy (i.e. luck) in their assessments of incumbent’s performance,
there would be no association between these factors and presidential evaluations.2
If, on the other hand, voters are unable or unwilling to discount luck, then the
world conditions that strongly determine domestic economic performance should be
directly related to voters’ assessment.
The core of the book is centered on the test of this hypothesis. This is also the
portion of the manuscript for which most research has already been completed. The
strong results we already have in support of our argument will serve as the linchpin
for the rest of the book.
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Place in the Literature
The book lies at the intersection of important strands in the political science and
economics literature. In its simplest form, economic voting posits that “citizens vote
for the government if the economy is doing all right; otherwise, the vote is against”
(Lewis-Beck & Stegmeier 2000). Whereas the connection between economic performance and electoral success is widely accepted among voters, the media and also
political scientists, though, empirical findings have been recognized as very unstable.
They vary between samples, depending on measures and the period analyzed.
Scholars have also extensively debated whether economic voting is sociotropic or
egotropic and whether it is prospective or retrospective (Ashworth 2012). An institutionalist offshoot of the literature has examine how different political institutions
mediate voters’ perceptions and how they assign of responsibility for the economy to
different actors in government. Most of this research examines institutional characteristics of political systems, and how they concentrate or disperse responsibility for
the economy among different branches of government. Samuels (2004), for example,
shows that in presidential systems electoral sanctioning is stronger when presidential
and legislative elections are concurrent; Johnson & Schwindt-Bayer (2009) reinforce
these findings in a sample restricted to Central American countries. Benton (2005)
argues that citizens punish incumbents when electoral laws are more restrictive,
limiting party competition. Cutler (2004) contends that federalism and intergovernmental policymaking may reduce voters’ ability to hold their governments accountable.
Less attention has been paid, however, to another vey important aspect of the
assignment of responsibility problem: whether voters can identify and, if so, how
they respond, to circumstances in which economic performance has an important
exogenous component. This has become more problematic as economic integration
advances and the share of economic performance determined by exogenous factors
increases.
Alesina & Rosenthal (1995) offer foundation for this analysis by proposing a
model in which economic growth is established as a function of a natural rate plus
unanticipated shocks that are caused by incumbents’ competence, and by an exogenous element. In this model, voters can not identify the components of economic
shocks, but by observing the variance of these shocks over time they are able to
identify the level of responsibility for the economy that should be attributed to
incumbents. Scheve (2000) later used a similar framework to argue the opposite,
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that because globalization diversifies the country’s risk exposure and reduces the
variance of exogenous shocks, it should increase voters’ capacity to punish/reward
governments’ competence.
More recently, Duch & Stevenson (2008) proposed a modification to Alesina &
Rosenthal’s (1995) model, which establishes two different types of decision-makers:
electorally dependent (EDDs) and non-electorally dependent (NEDDs). The first
one includes elected officials, and the second encompasses firms, interest groups,
bureaucrats, foreign lenders, international institutions, and any other non-elected
actors whose decisions have an impact in the economy. In this model, competency
shocks are associated with the decisions of EDDs, and exogenous shocks with that
of anyone else.
The authors propose that fully rational voters can distinguish variations in competency shocks from variations in exogenous shocks, and do not punish or reward
governments that are not responsible for economic performance. Since the variance
in the overall competence shock should be larger in countries in which EDDs make
most of the relevant economic decisions, in these countries the competence signal
should be stronger, and so should the economic vote. Conversely, voters should be
less likely to punish/reward governments in economies in which NEDDs make most
of economic decisions.
Duch & Stevenson (2008) find support for these claims in Europe, by showing
that citizens who perceive domestic fluctuations as diverging from those in the overall
European economy are more likely to register an economic vote. Ebeid & Rodden
(2005) use data from gubernatorial elections in the United States to show that the
connection between macroeconomic performance and incumbent success is weak in
states dominated by natural resources and farming, but strong elsewhere. Kayser
& Peress (2012) also find support for relative evaluations of European leaders, but
note that voters’ capacity to discount exogenous sources of economic performance
is higher when the media “benchmarks” international economic scenario.
Our study addresses the very important topic of assignment of responsibility
through a completely different setup. First, we focus on South America, a region
with less democratic tradition than Europe and the US, with generally less well
defined parties, lower levels of information in the electorate, and less globally or
even regionally-integrated societies.
South American countries offer the advantage of sharing a longer democratic
history than other emerging regions, as well as many institutional similarities that
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favor comparative analyses. All these countries have presidential systems which,
with some variation, concentrate strong power in the executive branch. Not surprisingly, studies on economic voting in Latin America are mostly focused on presidential elections (Samuels 2004, Benton 2005, Johnson & Sooh-Rhee 2010, Baker
& Greene 2011). Moreover, presidential terms are fixed in the whole region, which
eliminates potential endogeneity on the timing of elections.
Finally, and most importantly, we make use of the fact that the main exogenous
factors that affect the economic performance are well known and can be easily observed. This puts us in the unusual position in which we can analyze the effects
of factors not controlled by presidents on their reelection prospects and popularity,
directly.
Dependency theorists has extensively researched how the position that South
American countries occupy in the world economy influences economic development
in the region. The dependence on commodity prices and on foreign capital has been
at the center of economic thinking about the region for decades. These theorists were
primarily concerned with the (then seemingly secular) declining terms of trade, for
which the natural remedy were inward growth policies to reduce exposure to the
“unequal exchange” conditions facing commodity exporters (Prebisch 1949, Singer
1950).
Even non-dependencistas, however, share the perception that the international
economic flows of trade and investment were key to countries performance. Malan
& Bonelli (1977), for instance, argued as early as the late 1970s that Brazilian
“miracle” of ten years earlier had depended heavily on “an exception and elusively
temporary international situation” (p. 21) that and been channeled through “two
dimensions, one related to commodity trade and the other to net inflows of foreign
capital” (p.4).
The economic literature has shown that Latin American countries tend to do exceptionally well when international interest rates are low and commodity prices are
high, and are likely to suffer when the opposite occurs (Maxfield 1998, Calvo, Leiderman & Reinhart 1996, Gavin, Hausmann & Leiderman 1995, Izquierdo, Romero
& Talvo 2008). Izquierdo, Romero & Talvo (2008), especially, show that both capital flows and economic growth in Latin America are fundamentally determined by
changes in the international interest rates and in commodity prices.
This book revisits these themes that were dear to the previous generations of
Latin Americanists, but with a focus on how they affect democratic consolidation
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and practice in the region.
Finally, our book also dialogues directly with the concept of accountability expost, according to which incumbents’ frequent breaking of electoral promises does not
hinder democratic accountability. It has been argued that, because in Latin America voters’ ultimate concern is less with policymaking and more with its material
results, accountability is maintained provided that they are able to reward or punish
incumbents based on economic outcomes (Stokes 2001). Put simply, accountability
ex-post hinges on the capacity of voters to link results to performance—it turns out
that, if economic performance is mostly determined exogenously, the ex-post logic
does not hold.
Political and Policy Implications
The fact that voters cannot distinguish merit from luck in their assessment of presidents’ performance in Latin America carries important consequences for the study
of economic voting and democratic accountability. As the linkage between punishment/reward and performance is broken, governments’ electoral incentives to boost
voters’ welfare diminish, and the connection between economic voting and democratic accountability is loosened.
As summarized by Ashworth (2012), the building blocks of electoral accountability are an electorate that decides whether or not to retain an incumbent potentially
on the basis of her performance, and an incumbent who has the opportunity to anticipate voters reactions and act accordingly (p. 184). Our preliminary results, and
the book project as whole, cast a shadow on both of these pillars.
First, the levels of information necessary to induce responsiveness might be very
demanding, especially in less developed democracies. It does not follow that, if
voters are aware of how well the economy is doing, they can correctly attribute
responsibility for this performance. As a result, voters might not be able to extract
meaningful information from past outcomes, and are therefore likely to not only
reward incompetent incumbents in booming times, but also punish competent ones
simply because their happened to lead during an unfavorable economic scenario.
Perhaps even more importantly, voters’ behavior can create vicious incentives
for governments, as their behavior will also be shaped the knowledge that voters’
evaluations will not depend on actions she might take.
Although we leave the development of the full strategic interaction between voters
and incumbents to future work, we posit that when the connection between electoral
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success and “good” policymaking is broken, the incentives for the incumbent to
promote good economic performance diminish. This happens as, in good times,
rulers might find they can extract rents from office and still be reelected. Similarly,
incumbents that find themselves doomed by the international scenario might be more
prone to rent seeking and corruption, knowing that no matter what they do they
will not be reelected. Examples from Latin America in support of both situations
abound.
After examining this process in depth, the final chapters of the book will be
based on individual level experiments (to be conducted) that will seek to shed light
on incumbents’ and voters’ behavior in a scenario where exogenous determinants of
economic performance matter.
First, we want to identify whether if provided with information about relative
economic performance—a more realistic goal than to inform citizens about governments’ economic policymaking—voters can improve their assessment of luck and
merit in presidents’ performance. We also plan to examine experimentally the effect
of knowing one’s “fate” on effort exerted, to understand the conditions under which
incumbents might still work hard to improve their position.
Plan of the Book
A previous version of this book project received a competitive grant from Princeton
University’s Bobst Center for Peace and Justice in early 2013, which was forgone
as Daniela Campello left Princeton University in July. Funding for the project
was replaced by an intramural grant from Fundação Getúlio Vargas, and work is
progressing swiftly. We anticipate the manuscript will be 85,000-95,000 words, and
will be ready for review by the end of Fall 2014.
This first paper in the project, which is in its final stages of preparation, has
been presented and well received at the 2012 meeting of the International Political
Economy society, at seminars at University of Florida, Princeton University, Brazilian Senate, Inter-American Development Bank, and at the Catholic University of
Chile. It will serve as the basis for Chapters 1, 2, and 3, as detailed below.
Chapter 1: International Economy, Blind Retrospection and The Limits
of Democratic Accountability: In this introduction, we present several examples of episodes in which voters failed to consider how luck (i.e. exogenous economic
conditions) affected the performance of presidents in latin America. We argue that
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this behavior is particularly problematic in countries in which economic performance
is particularly determined by factors that are beyond government’s control, and
that this can create pernicious incentives for presidents. We highlight the fact that
the international factors that affect the economies of South America’s low-savings
commodity-exporting countries (commodity prices and US interest rates) happen to
be well known and easily observable, which set the scope conditions for the rest of
the book.
Chapter 2: Economic Booms, Crises and Elections: This chapter investigates whether international conditions predict presidential reelection in Latin America, controlling for incumbents’ ideology and for measures of government competence. We show that results are strong and consistent in low-savings commodity
exporting countries, but are null in the labor-intensive-exporting countries.
Chapter 3: Economic Booms, Crises and Presidential Popularity: We
examine how international conditions affect presidential popularity, higher frequency
data which are at the same time more directly related to argument of the book. The
quantitative analysis compares time-series of presidential popularity from Brazil,
where scope conditions apply, with equivalent series for Mexico, where they do not.
We also compare the case of Venezuela, where voters can easily observe international
conditions represented by the price of oil that directly affects government’s account,
with that of Chile, in which counter-cyclical funds provide a “cushion” against the
impact of international economic factors. Finally, we compare the case of Uruguay,
where relatively high party id should dampen the relevance of retrospective economic
voting, with that Ecuador, where low party ID should have the opposite effect.
Chapter 4: Relative performance in the political discourse: This chapter
studies how incumbents and opposition frame/ emphasize luck and competence in
their political discourse. We plan to focus on presidential campaigns on Brazilian
TV (we already had these campaigns transcribed in Brazil for another project, and
we need to check their availability in other countries). Ideally, we would like to
compare campaigns in the same country in good and bad economic times, so that
we could examine the extent to which incumbents emphasize international context in
bad times, and opponents in good times and that, as well as how the media respond
to exogenous booms and crises.
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Chapter 5: Incentives for Presidents: Under what conditions will incumbents
make an effort to improve performance? Given that voters do not discount luck, and
given that incumbent can easily observe the state of the world economy, will they
ever try to escape their fate? In this chapter we will address this issue by formally
modeling the incentive structure facing incumbents. Our plan is to empirically test
the implications of the model in an experimental setting in which we alter the extent
to which subjects’ payoff for participating in the study is a function of their effort
or of factors beyond their control.
Chapter 6: What if voters had relative information? Here we present the
results of lab and survey experiments aimed to identify the role of information about
relative performance on voters’ assessment of presidents’ competence.
Conclusion: Is accountability ex-post a satisfactory normative horizon?
we conclude by exploring the normative implications of the findings to how we
think about democratic accountability in Latin America and other less developed
countries under similar scope conditions. Our claims are that (1) that best presidents
are selected by evaluation based on performance, discounted luck (CEO analogy),
and (2) if the only mechanism of accountability we have is retrospective economic
voting, and this responds to exogenous factors, this has bad implications. If luck is
not discounted, and it matters substantially, we risk reelecting lucky incompetent
presidents and punishing lucky competent ones. This mechanism has a series of bad
implications, among them:
Intended Readership
This is an academic book that explores a topic that is of interest to non-academics,
and revisits the most classic of themes in political economy—electoral accountability.
Because we have a truly exogenous indicator of the state of the world economy facing
Latin American countries, we will be able to keep the complexity of the quantitative
analysis to a minimum while preserving leverage over the causal claims. The result
will be a utterly readable, meaningful, and interesting book.
The book dialogues with recent and classical articles and books published in the
leading journals and university presses (including Cambridge). As such, it will be
part of undergraduate and graduate syllabi on political-economy and Latin American politics, and might even be used in discussions of contemporaneous democratic
theory. Although the empirical content of the book is focuses on latin America, the
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main claims are general, and will be of interest to scholars of other regions, especially
developing democracies.
The book is primarily geared towards the Anglo-American academic audience,
and written with its academic standards in mind. However, the book will be of
interest to a broader set of thinkers and policymakers in Latin America and beyond.
As a strong indication of such widespread interest, the first paper in the project has
been well received at a presentations in the Inter-American Development Bank, and
was presented—by invitation—to policymakers in the Brazilian Senate. It has also
received coverage in media outlets in the region, such as the Cları́n and Estado de
São Paulo. The paper has triggered the attention of policy scholars in India, and
will probably lead to collaborative work that will expand the scope of the argument
beyond Latin America.
Brief credentials
Daniela Campello is an Assistant Professor at Fundação Getúlio Vargas’ Brazilian
School of Business and Public Policy, and was formerly Assistant Professor in Princeton University’s Department of Politics and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs. Her first book, “Globalization and Democracy, The Politics of
Market Discipline in Latin America” is forthcoming by Cambridge University Press,
and her work has also appeared or is forthcoming in Comparative Political Studies,
in the Oxford Handbook of Latin American Political Economy, and in other edited
volumes in the US, Europe, and South America.
Cesar Zucco Jr. is also an Assistant Professor at the Brazilian School of Business
and Public Policy, and is on leave from Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey.
He has researched several aspects of Brazilian and Latin American politics, including
electoral politics, legislative-executive relations, social policy, as well as the meaning
and measurement of ideology. His work has been published in leading journals in
Political Science, such as the American Journal of Political Science, and Journal of
Politics, as well as in all of the main journals of Latin American Studies.
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